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American-Japanese Relations 



•^i; 



American-Japanese 
Relations 



An Inside View of Japan's 
Policiesand Purposes 



By 

KIYOSHI K KAWAKAMI 



u 




New York Chicago Toronto 

Fleming H. Revell Company 

London and Edinburgh 



Copyright, 19". by 
FLEMING H. REVELL COMPANY 






New York: 158 Fifth Avenue 
Chicago: 123 North Wabash Ave. 
Toronto: 25 Richmond Street, W. 
London: 21 Paternoster Square 
Edinburgh: 100 Princes Street 



r^ ni A o /k r Pk "T* fk 



To My Daughter Yuri Alberta 

and 

My Son Hiroshi Clarke 

in the hope that they will in their ma- 
turity contribute their quota to the pro- 
motion of friendly relatio7is between 

Japan and America 

this book is affectionately dedicated 



Acknowledgment 

Chapter I of this book originally appeared in the 
Forum, Chapters II and VIII in the Pacific Monthly, 
Chapter XXIII in the North American Review, 
Chapter XV in the World To- Day, while Chapters 
III, V, VII, XII, XIX and XX were published in 
the Taiyo, a monthly magazine in Tokio, Japan. 
Acknowledgment is due to the editors of these pub- 
lications for the courtesy they have extended to the 
author in permitting him to incorporate in the present 
volume these articles with such revisions as he deems 
necessary to bring them up to date. 

The author is particularly indebted to Mr. Frank 
Putnam, of the Houston, Texas, Chronicle, who 
read the manuscript from beginning to end. In- 
deed, without his cooperation, sympathy, and en- 
couragement, the book might never have seen the 
light. The author is also indebted to his wife for a 
similar assistance. 

KlYOSHI K. Kav/akami. 



Contents 

Introduction ii 

BOOK I 

The Manchurian Question 

I. What the War Conferred Upon Japan 

IN Manchuria .... 23 

II. The Manchuria of To-Day ... 36 

III. American Policy in Manchuria . . 58 

IV. Chinese Diplomacy in Manchuria . yS 

V. Russo-Japanese Relations in Man- 

churia 98 

VI. Japan's Commercial Advance in Man- 

churia AND the " Open Door " . 113 

VII. American Trade in Manchuria and the 

"Open Door" . . . 127 



BOOK II 

The Korean Question 

VIII. Why Japan Occupied Korea . . . 143 

IX. America's Diplomatic Relations with 

Korea 157 

X. Japanese Enterprise in Korea . .172 

XI. What Japan Has Done for Korea . 186 

9 



lO 

XII. 

XIII. 

XIV. 

XV. 

XVI. 



CONTENTS 

Judicial Reform and Exterritoriality 

IN Korea 

Japanese " Outrages " in Korea . 
The Annexation of Korea . 
American Enterprise in Korea . 

American Trade in Korea and the 
" Open Door" .... 



XVII. American Missionaries in Korea 



202 

214 
230 

242 

255 
266 



BOOK III 

The Immigration Question 

XVIII. Japanese Immigration Before the Ex- 

clusion Agreement 

XIX. Denis Kearnyism Once More — I 

XX. Denis Kearnyism Once More — II 

XXI. Japanese Immigration After the Ex- 

clusion Agreement 

XXII. The Japanese in California . 

XXIII. The Naturalization of Japanese . 
Index 



285 

302 

317 

331 

343 
356 

367 



Introduction 

LOOKING back over the past several years of 
American-Japanese intercourse one is struck 
with the radical change that has come over the 
sentiment of the American nation towards Japan. It is 
as if long and tried friendship, for some strange inex- 
plicable reason, suddenly cooled to the point of revulsion. 

Fifty years ago the Republic sent to the Sunrise Em- 
pire, still shrouded in the atmosphere of a fairy-land, an 
ambassador of peace and good-will, and lifting the infant 
nation from the cradle of seclusion, introduced it to the 
dazzling concourse of powers. From that time the 
United States fondly looked upon the insular nation as 
her protege, and guided and guarded it through storm 
and sunshine as it carried its unsteady steps onward and 
upward along rough and untried roads. 

Meanwhile, the docile youth — for such was Japan — 
proved also the most strenuous. With amazing rapidity 
he acquired the arts and learning which were the fruits 
of centuries of hard labor in the Occident. Thus 
equipped with weapons of modern civilization which he 
had imported from the West, he met in the field of battle 
one of the most formidable gladiators of Europe. As 
the doughty islander dealt at his giant adversary blow 
after blow each with an unerring hand, the American 
public cheered him on with peals of applause, and the 
plaudits never ceased as long as he occupied the arena. 

The combat came to an end through the good offices 

II 



12 INTRODUCTION 

of Mr. Roosevelt. Japan was no longer an infant nation 
to be petted and patted. She had vindicated her right 
to a place in the comity of great powers, and the world 
was forced to recognize the fact. Then destiny abruptly 
adjusted the balance, and the American nation, which 
had measured out to the Japanese nothing but golden 
opinions and roseate views, began to look askance at the 
islanders. 

What is the cause of this sudden change ? Can it be 
attributed to the jealousy of America? Decidedly not. 
It is impossible to imagine that a great nation like 
America could be envious of the success of a little nation 
like Japan, towards which it assumed the attitude of a 
patron for nearly half a century. Can it be possible, 
then, that America is fearful of Japan's military prowess ? 
A country, endowed with unlimited resources, occupying 
a position which is geographically impregnable, and, 
above all, noted for the bravery and patriotism of its 
sons, certainly need not be alarmed by what modest 
armament an impecunious nation such as Japan is striv- 
ing to maintain merely to defend the position it has al- 
ready attained. 

And yet some of the American financiers, publicists 
and officers appear ever and anon in the lime-hght of 
propaganda and proclaim to the four quarters of the 
world that America is building dreadnaughts and fortify- 
ing the Pacific Coast with an eye on Japan. To add sen- 
sation to the chorus of such alarmists, some of the Ameri- 
can newspapers, and they are many, hold up before the 
curious gaze of an unthinking public the spectre of a 
Japanese invasion. I confess I do not understand what 
this all means. I have heard some Americans suggest 
that the root of the trouble lies in the sinister designs 



INTRODUCTION I3 

concocted by "predatory wealth," as the " muck-raker" 
calls the great " interests " of the country. When I am 
almost inclmed to lend ear to this view, I begin to think 
how opulent this country is, and what great opportunities 
are in store for American trade and enterprise here on 
this side of the globe, and I cannot help wondering if my 
American informants are not, after all, mistaken. How 
can I believe that American financial magnates and cap- 
tains of industry, with their coffers overflowing with gold, 
would conspire to spread war talk so that they may sell 
their government more war-ships and more guns ? How 
can I believe that these men, to whom destiny has appor- 
tioned nothing but prosperity, would exploit the news- 
papers and invoke the influence of their government to 
check Japan's commercial advance in Manchuria so that 
they may build there their own railroads and sell their 
own goods ? Ah, that is unthinkable ! 

Meanwhile, belligerent words continue to be spoken, 
and alarmist notes continue to be sounded. The average 
American, by reason of want of unbiased information, is 
apparently inclined to listen to the counsels of jingoes 
and alarmists. Thus the cloud of misunderstanding is 
growing thicker every day, casting its gloom over Ameri- 
can-Japanese relations. The stage is reached, it seems 
to me, where the clearing of this misunderstanding should 
no longer be delayed, if friends, such as America and 
Japan have been, are not to be estranged beyond the 
point of reconciliation. It is with this need in view that 
this humble volume is presented to the American public. 

There are three questions which have been and still 
are the source of more or less serious misunderstandings 
among Americans. The first of these is the Manchurian 
question. During the past half decade Europe and 



14 



INTRODUCTION 



America have been flooded with hterature denouncing 
Japan's modus operandi in Manchuria. Thus an impres- 
sion has been created in this country that the Mikado's 
Empire is, by surreptitious means, practicing wholesale 
discrimination against American commercial interests in 
that region. It is further asserted that Japan is dealing 
with China in an overbearing manner, encroaching at 
every point upon the sovereign rights of the Celestial 
Empire. When the seven chapters in which I shall dis- 
cuss the Manchurian question are perused, the American 
public will, I hope, at least understand that such charges 
are not founded upon facts. 

The second question to which I would call attention 
is the Korean question. Here again Japan is accused 
of slamming the " open door " and of treating the 
Koreans in a manner which is an outrage to humanity. 
Whether or not Japan deserves such accusations I ask 
the public to judge for itself in the light of the facts 
which I shall set forth in this book. 

The third and last question which I propose to discuss 
is the immigration question. So far as the governments 
of the United States and Japan are concerned, this ques- 
tion is a dead issue. Japan is firmly pledged to adhere 
to the spirit and letter of the so-called "gentlemen's 
agreement," and will exert all her influence to check the 
emigration of her nationals of the laboring class to the 
United States. Nor will this policy of Japan be altered 
with the change of cabinets, for in all important matters 
affecting foreign relations a Japanese cabinet always 
adopts the policy of its predecessor. The administration 
at Washington fully understands the intentions of Tokio, 
and is, moreover, satisfied with the results already accom- 
plished by the present arrangement. This sentiment of 



INTRODUCTION I5 

the American government is indicated by the omission 
from the new treaty with Japan of all reference to the 
exclusion of Japanese laborers. 

And yet the Pacific Coast continues to agitate against 
the Japanese. Since 1906 not a year has passed but anti- 
Japanese bills of one sort or another were introduced in 
the legislature of California. How long will this state of 
things be permitted to prevail without disturbing the 
equanimity of the Japanese ? The enlightened class of 
Japanese appreciate that America as a nation is friendlily 
disposed towards Japan, but the masses are beginning to 
wonder if the Americans are not a sort of people who 
blow hot and blow cold. And who can blame them ? 

Here a few words seem not superfluous with regard to 
the attitude of the Japanese people, not the government, 
towards the immigration question. Official opinions, 
expressed in super-polite terms, may assure you that the 
people of Japan have Httle to complain about the exclu- 
sion agreement now in force. I am constrained to say 
that such is not the case. On the contrary, the Japanese 
feel that, viewed in the light of the real status of Japanese 
immigration, such a drastic measure of exclusion as 
was adopted by the two governments is not justified. 
Anxious as they are to maintain amicable relations with 
America, they will acquiesce in the arrangement as long 
as it is binding, but deep in their hearts they feel that 
America is not treating them in a spirit of fairness. 
Whether this sentiment is justified or not I shall discuss 
in the proper place. Here I ask attention to the follow- 
ing paragraph in one of Count Okuma's essays incorpo- 
rated in " Fifty Years of New Japan," edited by the Count 
himself : 

" I am well aware that behind this anti-Japanese senti- 



l6 INTRODUCTION 

ment there exist various circumstances which deserve 
consideration. However, in so far as our people are dis- 
liked because they are Asiatics, there is nothing reason- 
able or logical in this hostile feeling. Such a passion or 
sentiment arises solely from narrow and biased racial 
prejudice on the one hand, and from misconceptions 
born of competition among the laboring classes on the 
other. To reason against and to remove these prejudices 
and misconceptions is a mutual duty devolving as much 
upon our people as upon the Western nations concerned. 
We have no occasion to be deterred by doubts or to 
hesitate in pressing for the satisfaction of our just de- 
mand. I do not in any way sympathize with the idea 
that by sending abroad emigrants who become a cause 
of domestic trouble in the country of their destination, 
the rights or honor of a great and civilized nation, such 
as ours claims to be, will be served. But I contend that 
when a treaty power seeks to enact a law restricting the 
immigration of our laborers, the terms of such restriction 
should be analogous and even identical with those ap- 
plicable to the peoples of other great powers or civilized 
countries." 

Perhaps I am not far from the truth when I say that 
these words of Count Okuma's voice the general senti- 
ment among his fellow countrymen. Count Okuma is 
not a mouthpiece for the Japanese government. He 
has been out of power for a score of years, and has been 
the most fearless critic of the policy of the government 
in which he occupied a portfolio at various times. At 
the same time, it must be remembered that he is far from 
a jingo, such as the American newspapers represent him 
to be because of his opposition to the exclusion agree- 
ment. On the contrary the Count has been an ardent 



INTRODUCTION 1 7 

advocate of international peace, and is the organizer and 
president of the Peace Society of Japan. A man of re- 
markable magnetic power, he has admirers throughout 
the Mikado's realm, and his views on the immigration 
question no doubt exercise great influence among the 
masses. 

I have explained the scope and nature of the following 
studies. Let it be far from me to claim that these studies 
are absolutely free from errors and misconceptions, for 
" we are none of us infallible, not even the youngest of 
us " ; but I can at least say that they are the result of 
conscientious and painstaking investigations. My con- 
clusions may not always be correct, my estimates may 
sometimes be imperfect ; but they will be honestly given, 
as far as the knowledge and conviction of the author are 
concerned. 

To which it may be added that my absorbing interest 
is in the furtherance of friendship and good-will between 
my native country and the country which I have virtually 
adopted and for which I cherish affection and respect, 
even though its laws compel me to live here as a pilgrim 
and an alien. The fact that I have strong confidence in 
the good sense of the American nation in general makes 
me regret all the more deeply that some Americans and 
American newspapers indulge in idle and harmful talk 
of an American-Japanese war. I fail to understand the 
mental state of those persons who would link the rushing 
of American troops to the Mexican border with anything 
Japan intends or does not intend to do. As well try to 
connect Halley's comet with this globe of ours by a line 
of railroad ! It is very well for these wiseacres to speak 
of " object lessons," but should they not remember that 
such object lessons as they fancy this country is giving 



l8 INTRODUCTION 

Japan can make little impression upon a nation which 
attained the position it occupies through fire and blood ? 
To the Japanese, who have fought two great wars within 
the past fifteen years, the mere mobilization of troops or 
the manoeuvres of war-ships are a pastime. Furthermore, 
you cannot intimidate by " object lessons " a nation which 
is thoroughly confident of the probity of its conduct in 
deaUng with foreign nations, most of all with your 
country. 

It is strange that the Americans, sagacious as they 
are, did not long before this awaken to the fact that their 
sensational vociferations could only recoil upon them 
and injure their dignity and prestige. While the jingoes 
and alarmists of this country have been busy chasing the 
phantom of an American-Japanese war, the little nation 
across the Pacific has invariably remained serene and 
equanimous. Never once have the Japanese press and 
people spoken to you in bellicose tones, but have borne 
the indignities, to which your whims subjected them, 
with perfect dignity and calmness. So far as Japan is 
concerned, there is absolutely no reason to fear the rup- 
ture of amicable relationship between the two countries, 
for among the forty millions of the Mikado's Empire not 
a single soul is to be found who even dreams of ever 
taking arms against America. I, of course, hazard no 
prophecy that American interests will never conflict with 
those of Japan, but I believe that any controversy arising 
out of such conflict can be and ought to be disposed of 
in an amicable manner, by mutual restraint, tolerance 
and concession. It is time that America should conduct 
herself in a manner that becomes the power, wealth, and 
culture that inhere in her. It is time that Americans 
should awaken to the grave situation which cannot fail 



INTRODUCTION 1 9 

to result if they persist in playing the role of a provocateur 

unless, forsooth, they are really anxious to create a 

casus belli. These are plain words, but I say them in 
the name of international deportment, peace and amity. 



BOOK I 
The Manchurian Question 



WHAT THE WAR CONFERRED UPON JAPAN 
IN MANCHURIA 

IT is five years since the Titanic struggle between 
Japan and Russia passed into history, and it may 
seem trite to describe at this moment what the war 
conferred upon Japan in Manchuria. Yet to most Amer- 
icans the issues of the conflict have been vague and 
misty — so much so, indeed, that even a writer, who 
seems to be generally recognized as the greatest Ameri- 
can authority on the Far Eastern question, has unwit- 
tingly disseminated misleading information on the mat- 
ter. Nor is this surprising when it is remembered that 
half a decade ago the American public had not sufficient 
interest in Manchuria to observe with critical eyes the 
consequence of the war, and all that it signified. The 
** open door " had been declared by Secretary Hay, it is 
true, but the Far Eastern policy of America did not as 
yet assume the aggressive nature it now assumes. 

With the inauguration of the Taft administration all 
this has changed. The new cabinet insisted upon the 
right of participating in the gigantic loan for the Canton- 
Hankow and Hankow-Szchuen Railways ; Mr. Knox's 
novel scheme for the " neutralization " of the Manchurian 
railways aroused mingled surprise and curiosity through- 
out the civilized world, even as Halley's comet blazoned 
through the heavens to the awe and wonder of myriad 
humanity ; and, what is more vital, America proposes to 
build in Manchuria a line of railway extending over 

23 



24 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

eight hundred miles. Mr. Taft's Shanghai speech of 
October, 1907, has been disinterred by the press from the 
obhvion into which it was consigned, and is heralded, as 
if it were a message of warning, through the country 
from the shores of the Atlantic to the region beyond the 
Rockies. Such a radical alteration in the attitude of the 
Washington government towards the Chinese question 
could not fail to direct the attention of the American 
people to whatever is transpiring in the Far East, and 
even the man in the street, as if awakened from a pro- 
tracted slumber, now rubs his eyes, and asks " What is 
the matter with that country Manchuria, anyhow ? What 
is Japan doing there, and what are we going to do about 
it ? " These questions cannot be answered without go- 
ing back to the condition which prevailed in Manchuria 
in the wake of the war, because that condition must 
needs form the starting point in our study of the Man- 
churian question. 

Needless to say that the new condition in Manchuria 
is due to the injection of Japanese influence into the 
situation. To ascertain, therefore, what Japan acquired 
in Manchuria as the result of her victorious campaign 
against Russia is essential to the study of the radically 
altered situation in the Three Eastern Provinces, as Man- 
churia is called by the Chinese. For this purpose it is 
necessary to examine the Russo-Japanese Treaty of 
Peace, and various other documents bearing more or less 
important relations to that treaty. Not less important 
than the peace treaty is the Chino-Japanese treaty con- 
cluded at Peking in December, 1905, as well as the proto- 
col to that instrument. The fact that the Portsmouth 
treaty required China's consent to confirm the transfer to 
Japan of the Russian railways in South Manchuria, be- 



WHAT THE WAR CONFERRED UPON JAPAN 25 

hooved Japan to send an envoy to Peking immediately- 
after the Portsmouth conference in order to obtain the 
said consent, and to make such other arrangements as 
were deemed essential to the readjustment of the respect- 
ive positions and policies of Japan and China with regard 
to Manchuria. The result was the treaty of December, 
1905, which in history is referred to as the Komura- 
Yuanshikai Treaty after the names of the Japanese and 
Chinese envoys, who were instrumental in drafting that 
memorable document. In virtue of this instrument, 
China indorsed the transfer of properties and privileges 
made by Russia in favor of Japan. We shall presently 
see what these properties and privileges are. 

In the first place, Japan has secured the lease of Port 
Arthur, Ta-lien (now Tairen), and the adjacent territory 
and territorial waters. To the average mind, however* 
the extent of the lease is anything but clear. Indeed, 
the popular misconception on this point has been such 
that even the author of a brilliant book on the Far 
Eastern question is worried not a little, because in the 
Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace the term •' Liao-tung 
Peninsula" instead of " Kuan-tung Peninsula" is used 
in describing the territory covered by the leasehold 
which Russia transferred to her victor. 

As a matter of fact, the word '* Kuan-tung " is no less 
ambiguous a term than " Liao-tung," and needs to be so 
defined as to admit of no misconstruction. Conse- 
quently, Article 5 of the Russo-Japanese Treaty of Peace, 
wherein the territory in question is defined, deliberately 
avoids referring to either the one or the other of these 
terms, but unmistakably indicates that Japan's acquisi- 
tion in this respect is neither greater nor less than what 
Russia held in the peninsula before the war. 



26 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

In order, however, to ascertain the exact ahgnment of 
the leased territory, it behooves us to go back to the 
Russo-Chinese Treaty of March 27, 1898, as well as to 
the convention concluded a little later between Hsu 
Tajen, the Chinese minister at St. Petersburg, and the 
Russian government. According to these documents, 
the leased territory covers the whole of that portion of 
the Liao-tung Peninsula lying to the south of an imagi- 
nary line drawn from Pu-la-tien, at the head of an inlet 
on the west coast, to Pi-tsu-wo, a village on the east 
coast of the peninsula. To the north of the territory 
thus leased there is a " neutral zone " stretching to a line 
drawn from the mouth of the Kai-chou River to the 
south of the district city of Kaiping on the west coast, 
to a point on the Ta-yang River and down its right bank 
to the sea, and including the village of Ta-ku-shan on 
the east coast. In the neutral zone, China retains her 
jurisdiction, but relinquishes the right to quarter troops 
except with the previous consent of the power in behalf 
of which the lease is established. Such are the exact 
limits of the territory affected by the Russian leasehold. 
The duration of the lease is fixed at twenty-five years, 
out of which some seven years elapsed under Russian 
rule. Inasmuch as Japan, in the new treaty with China, 
is pledged to adhere to the stipulations of the Russo- 
Chinese treaty of lease, she must withdraw from the 
Liao-tung Peninsula at the expiration of eighteen years 
from the time of its transfer to Japan, unless the term be 
extended by the mutual consent of the high contracting 
parties. 

Next in importance is the acquisition by Japan of the 
railway between Chang-chun on the north and Tairen 
on the south, covering some 436 miles, as well as the 



WHAT THE WAR CONFERRED UPON JAPAN 27 

following three branch lines : Ta-shih-chiao to Yinkow^ 
fourteen miles ; the branch to the Fushun coal field, 
thirty-four miles ; Nan-kuan-ling to Port Arthur, twenty- 
eight miles. All told, the railways ceded by Russia to 
Japan amount to some 512 miles, for the building of 
which the former expended some 76,222,000 rubles. In 
virtue of the Russo-Chinese agreement of September, 
1896, the cojicessionnaire country for these lines must 
hand over to the Peking government these railways and 
their appurtenances without compensation on the ex- 
piration of eighty years from the day of the opening of 
traffic along the main line of the Eastern Chinese Rail- 
way, i. e., 1903. Besides, the Chinese government has 
the right, on the expiration of thirty-six years from the 
time of completion of the main line and its opening for 
traffic, to take over the lines entire, on refunding to the 
concessionnaire country all the outlays made on them. 

In addition to the railways ceded by Russia, the Chino- 
Japanese Treaty of 1905 allowed Japan the right to re- 
construct the military railway between Antung and 
Mukden, amounting to 189 miles, into a permanent Hne 
to be utilized for commercial purposes, the duration of 
the concession being fifteen years from the day of the 
completion of the reconstruction work. 

According to an additional clause of the above-men- 
tioned railway agreement between the Peking and the 
St. Petersburg government, the Eastern Chinese Railway 
enjoys the right to police a strip of territory extending 
for fifteen versts on either side of the railway line, as 
well as the right to exploit any mineral deposits within 
this strategic area. This latter privilege leads us to the 
consideration of the much talked-of coal mines at Yentai, 
Fushun, and Wa-fang-tien. The Yentai coal mines had 



28 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

been worked by Chinese until the Eastern Chinese Rail- 
way acquired them by purchase. The coal mines in the 
Fushun district and the Wa-fang-tien mines were also 
opened up by Chinese many years before the coming of 
the Russians. Since the Russians had taken possession 
of these mines, their poor management of business was 
responsible for so httle improvement that the coal raised 
was insufficient to supply even the southern section of 
the Manchurian Railway. Besides these three mines, 
the Eastern Chinese Railway worked several seams, but 
in an aimless and shiftless fashion, abandoning them 
after a short experience. I shall relate in a following 
chapter how, under the efficient management of the 
Japanese, this deplorably nebulous state of things has 
been readjusted. 

Now we come to the question of lumbering conces- 
sions, which furnished the world a topic of startling 
stories immediately preceding the Russo-Japanese war. 
The semi-official Russian corporation, the Yalu Lumber 
Company, having an imposing head office in Port Ar- 
thur, was concerned with lumbering on the Manchurian 
as well as the Korean side of the Yalu. This enterprise, 
political rather than commercial in its aim and nature, 
did not hit upon a working plan, and was already on the 
verge of dissolution. In consequence of the Chino- 
Japanese agreement of 1905, the lumbering industry on 
the Chinese side of the Yalu River is now being under- 
taken by a joint-stock company organized by the high 
contracting parties, dividing the shares equally between 
Chinese and Japanese subscribers. 

Such, in brief, are the rights and properties which the 
war left, in its wake, in the hands of the Japanese. Im- 
portant as these material acquisitions are, we must not 



WHAT THE WAR CONFERRED UPON JAPAN 29 

forget that even more important is the attainment by- 
Japan of an end, which was the raison d'etre of the war 
and which is the sine qua iiojt of her Manchurian pohcy 
— I mean the reahzation of the " open door." 

The cardinal point of the Peking Treaty of December, 
1905, is the clause in virtue of which Japan obliged 
China to open the following sixteen cities and towns " as 
places of international residence and trade " : 



Name of port 






Province 




Population 


Feng-huang-cheng 


Feng-tien (or Sheng-king) 50,000 


Liao-yang - 


- 








100,000 


Hsin-min-tun 


- 








80,000 


Tie-ling 


- 








100,000 


Tung-kiang-tsu 


- 








Unknown 


Fa-ku-men - 


- 








Unknown 


Chang-chun 


- 


- 


Kirin 


- 


- 250,000 


Kirin - 


- 


- 




- 


- 250,000 


Harbin 


- 


- 




- 


- 250,000 


Nin-gu-ta 


- 


- 




- 


40,000 


Hun-chun - 


- 


- 




- 


30,000 


San-sing 


- 


- 




- 


- 50,000 


Tsi-tsi-har - 


- 


Hei-lung-kiang 


- 100,000 


Khai-lar 


- 


- 


n 


- 


- Unknown 


Ai-gun 


. 


- 


i( 


- 


30,000 


Man-dju-H - 


- 


- 


it 


- 


- Unknown 



In classic, picturesque China it is a sacrilege to speak 
of statistics, and the above figures, gathered from various 
native sources, must be taken for what they are worth. 
This list of towns newly opened to foreign trade has to 
be enlarged by five additional ports, of which Newchwang 
and Tairen had practically been marts of international 
commerce for a number of years prior to the war, while 
the remaining three, Antung, Tatun-kow, and Mukden 
were opened in October, 1903, as a consequence of the 
joint agitation of the United States and Japan. All in 



30 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

all, twenty-one cities and towns in Manchuria have been 
thrown open to the commerce of the world. A glance 
at the map of Northern China reveals how carefully 
these places were selected. Taking the newly-opened 
sixteen ports, we perceive that their opening is of the 
utmost importance for the benefit of all nations standing 
for the maintenance of the integrity and the promotion 
of the economic prosperity of the Celestial Empire. In 
persuading China to throw open these ports, Japan no 
doubt had in view not only commercial, but also strateg- 
ical considerations. When the smoke of the battle was 
just cleared away, the insular nation not unnaturally ap- 
prehended that the Muscovites, recovering their shattered 
power, might once again light the hills and plains of 
Manchuria with the lurid flames of war. Viewed from 
a strategical point, the Japanese considered, the five 
frontier or semi-frontier posts, Man-dju-H, Ai-gun, 
Khai-lar, Hun-chun, and Nin-gu-ta, when converted into 
marts of international trade, would prove a serious ob- 
stacle to Russian aggression upon Manchuria, for, 
through them, the frontier armaments and military ac- 
tivities of the Muscovite in the Far East would be readily 
exposed to the world at large. 

The remaining eleven towns include most of the im- 
portant trade entj'epots in the maritime province and in- 
terior of Manchuria. Liao-yang, probably the oldest 
town in the Eastern Three Provinces, lies astride of the 
railway commanding the fertile Liao valley, which, fa- 
mous with giant crops of kao-liang, or the tall millet, 
veritably flows with milk and honey. Tie-ling, Hsin- 
min-tun, Faku-men, and Tung-kiang-tsu are also situated 
more or less closely to the Liao River, the greatest trade 
artery in Manchuria, down which the produce of the far 



WHAT THE WAR CONFERRED UPON JAPAN 31 

interior of that country and Eastern Mongolia are carried 
to the port of Nevvchvvang. About half-way between Tie- 
ling and Harbin is the prosperous city of Chang-chun, 
which is aptly called the clearing house of inland Man- 
churia, being the distributing centre for trade to and from 
Kirin, Hei-lung-kiang, and Eastern Mongolia. Eighty- 
four miles from this trade depot is the old city of Kirin, 
the capital of the province of the same name, which, sit- 
uated in the heart of a splendid timbered country, is so 
famous for the building of boats and junks that it is well 
styled the " dockyard." Finally, we come to the famous 
railway city of Harbin, which is the Russian metropolis 
of Manchuria. 

The opening of these towns was effected immediately 
after the withdrawal of the armies of the Mikado and the 
Czar, which was completed before April 14, 1907, in con- 
formity with the evacuation agreement between the com- 
manders of the formerly belligerent forces in Manchuria. 
The evacuation clause of the treaty of peace did not affect 
the railway guards in Manchuria, which the high con- 
tracting parties reserved the right to maintain to a num- 
ber not exceeding fifteen per kilometre. As a conse- 
quence of the publication at Tokio of the proceedings of 
the peace conference, it transpired that during the Ports- 
mouth conference Count Witte objected to Baron (now 
Marquis) Komura's proposal to fix the maximum number 
of guards, which was very significant in view of the fact 
that it had always been Russia's policy to utilize the rail- 
way as the forerunner of her conquering army. The 
Russo-Manchurian Railway was a military strategical rail- 
way guarded, as no other railway in the world was 
guarded, with blockhouses every three or four miles, and 
with garrisons at every important point adequate to 



32 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

quarter large numbers of troops. At the Peking confer- 
ence of December, 1905, the Chinese plenipotentiaries 
expressed the desire to have the Japanese and Russian 
railway guards withdrawn as soon as possible, in defer- 
ence to which Japan consented to withdraw her guards 
in the event of Russia agreeing to take a similar step. 
But until China's internal conditions are so readjusted as 
to afford ample protection to foreigners and their prop- 
erty within her borders it would be unreasonable for 
China to expect either Russia or Japan to withdraw her 
railway guards. 

Immediately after the Peking conference of December, 
1905, it was persistently rumored that Japan and China 
entered into a secret understanding which was of no 
smaller importance than the treaty made public by the 
respective governments. But this so-called "secret 
agreement," which is in reality open to the inspection of 
any one interested in the matter, is simply an arrange- 
ment relative to the building of the Kirin-Changchun 
and the Mukden-Hsinmintun Railways. It will be re- 
membered that at the Portsmouth conference Japan 
originally demanded the whole of the Port Arthur-Har- 
bin section of the Eastern Chinese Railway, and that 
Witte's refusal of this demand resulted in a compromise 
by which Russia retained to herself the Harbin-Chang- 
chun section of said hne, recognizing in lieu thereof Japan's 
right to build the proposed line between Kirin and Chang- 
chun. At the Peking conference, however, the Chinese 
plenipotentiaries declined to endorse this agreement made 
between Japan and Russia,, and the Mikado's representa- 
tives were forced to yield to another compromise, agree- 
ing to construct the Kirin-Changchun line in conjunc- 
tion with the Manchu government. This line, though 



WHAT THE WAR CONFERRED UPON JAPAN 33 

only eighty-four miles long, was sought by Japan, be- 
cause its connection with the Port Arthur-Changchun 
road will greatly enhance the value of the latter. When 
the Russian government contemplated the construction 
of that road in 1902, the semi-official Novoe Vremya 
said: 

" This branch is important both for commercial and 
strategical reasons ; for if our railway did not touch Kirin 
it would miss the great trading centre of that part of 
Manchuria. More trading routes pass through Kirin 
than through any other town in the province. It is a 
kind of junction for all the commerce of China with 
Northern Manchuria, Korea and the Amur regions, and 
through it pass the main roads leading to Mukden and 
Peking, to Korea and the Russian frontier." 

Another arrangement made by the so-called secret 
agreement relates to the military railway connecting 
Mukden and Hsin-min-tun, built by the Japanese during 
the war. As this road did not belong to the Eastern 
Chinese Railway, Japan could not convert it into a per- 
manent line, without first securing the consent of the 
Chinese government. Having failed to secure such con- 
sent, Japan made an agreement in virtue of which China 
is to build said line with funds to be supplied by the 
Tokio government. The formal transfer of this line to 
the Chinese government took place in 1908. 

The third and last settlement contained in the protocol 
is to the effect that the Peking administration shall not 
build a competitive line to the main Hne of the South 
Manchuria system. This condition Japan was obliged to 
impose upon the Chinese government from the necessity 
of protecting her Manchurian railways from total failure. 
The junk traffic on the Liao River and the Chinese rail- 



34 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

way across the river were, in themselves, a formidable 
rival to the South Manchuria Railway, and it seemed 
evident that the addition of another competitive line 
would all but supersede the Japanese hne. How Japan, 
upon the strength of the understanding, protested against 
the Chinese scheme of the Shinmintung-Fakumen line, 
shall be described in the proper place. 

Such, in short, are the main features of the so-called 
secret understanding incorporated in the protocol to the 
Peking Treaty of December, 1905. The protocol is in- 
cluded in the diplomatic documents of Japan and other 
powers, accessible to all students of international rela- 
tions, and I wonder if Mr. Thomas F. Millard who, in 
his " America and the Far Eastern Question," says that 
he " could not obtain an official copy of this secret 
memorandum," took the trouble to spend a few hours in 
one of the admirable libraries for which his country is 
noted. 

I have stated that at the Peking conference Japan 
made several important concessions in favor of China. 
She had fought China's battle as much as she had fought 
her own, sacrificing countless lives and spending hun- 
dreds of millions of dollars, and yet the Manchu govern- 
ment did not hesitate to deny her a few railway conces- 
sions which she was fully justified in claiming. Not only 
this, but the Chinese diplomats opposed and disputed 
Japan's demands at every point. They seemed to have 
forgotten that had not the doughty islanders taken arms 
against the Northern Colossus, Manchuria, with its area 
of 370,000 square miles and its 8,500,000 population, 
would have been permanently lost to China, which in 
turn might have paved the way to the not impossible 
dismemberment of the hoary empire. I confess that it 



WHAT THE WAR CONFERRED UPON JAPAN 35 

was one of the weaknesses common to humanity which 
caused the Japanese to presume that China would not 
ignore the appaUing sacrifices they had made on behalf 
of the latter. And who could blame Japan ? Disinter- 
ested she was not when she declared war in the name of 
the " open door " and the territorial integrity of China, 
for in this age of business and materialism, what nation 
can be so chivalrous as to jeopardize its own welfare and 
even existence from purely altruistic motives ? At any 
rate Japan ought not to be accused of selfishness and 
mercenary motives if she did expect China to recognize 
her claims ungrudgingly — claims which were ridiculously 
modest as compared with the gigantic concessions and 
privileges which some Western powers extorted from the 
Peking government in consequence of the killing of a 
missionary or some untoward incident of like nature. I 
have it upon good authority that it was Japan's earnest 
desire to settle all matters, which had awaited adjustment 
between her and China, without recourse to diplomacy 
but in a friendly manner. Had this desire been gratified, 
Japan might have cast her lot with China and exercised 
all her influence for the regeneration of the decaying 
empire, and for the maintenance of its integrity against 
foreign aggression. But China's attitude throughout the 
entire sessions of the Peking conference was one of will- 
ful ingratitude and irreconcilable arrogance, and she tried 
to defeat Japan's aim by dint of diplomatic finesse, in 
which the mandarins excel the Japanese. Yet the 
Japanese envoys remained lenient and patient, and made 
many important concessions in favor of China, thus hop- 
ing to convince the Chinese of Japan's sincere wish for 
the welfare of their country. How far this hope has been 
realized we shall presently see. 



II 

THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 

WHILE in Harbin in the summer of 1908, I 
met an American gentleman travelling in 
Manchuria in the interest of several flour- 
milling concerns on the Pacific Coast. His chief mission 
in Harbin was to inquire into the conditions of the Rus- 
sian flour mills there with a view to ascertaining whether 
by the apphcation of up-to-date American machinery 
and business methods a better grade of flour could not 
be milled from Manchurian grain at a less cost than was 
then borne by the Russian mills. 

Harbin, the Russian metropolis of Manchuria, boasts 
of eight flour mills with a daily capacity of 1,600,000 
pounds. A part of Russia's war performance, these 
mills were installed mostly on short notice in order to 
feed her soldiers in Manchuria. With the termination 
of the war the Russian demand for Harbin flour came 
virtually to a stop. It was understood three summers 
ago that the Russo-Chinese bank had millions of rubles 
locked up in mill-mortgages at heavy rates of interest, 
and most of the Harbin mills seemed but too anxious to 
sell out at the first convenient opportunity. It was un- 
doubtedly this unhappy condition which suggested to 
some American concerns the idea of taking control of 
the Harbin mills. 

But a nation like Russia endowed with much potential 
energy cannot be expected to succumb to the effects of 

36 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 37 

a military misadventure, and abandon all the advan- 
tageous positions she gained in the Far East. As the mem- 
ory of the disastrous war grows dim, the sense of doubt 
and misgiving which for a period depressed Russia is 
gradually giving way to the consciousness of latent 
strength and future possibilities which still remain hers. 
It is indicative of this reawakening that the Russian mills 
in Harbin, instead of considering any offer for purchase 
from foreign concerns, are now resuming their activities, 
intent upon making a powerful onslaught on the Ameri- 
can flour trade in Manchuria. During the last year or 
two a liquidation was carried out in order to place the 
mills upon a working basis. Subsidized by the Russian 
government some of these mills have organized them- 
selves into a sort of syndicate with a view to pushing 
their trade in South Manchuria, which has practically 
been monopolized by American flour. 

How far the Russian mills have been successful and 
what their outlook is we shall see in a later chapter : 
here the story is introduced only as an instance of how 
Manchuria, recovering from the effects of the tremendous 
military upheaval, is settling down to the pursuits of 
commerce and industry. If Russian Manchuria is pick- 
ing up with remarkable rapidity, even more remarkable 
is the manner in which the Japanese are pushing their 
enterprises in Southern Manchuria. Russia must perforce 
confine her activities, for the present at all events, to the 
mending of her shattered prestige and influence. With 
Japan it is different : she emerged victorious from the 
smoke of a prodigious conflict, and she entered into the 
field of commerce and industry with aspirations and en- 
ergies, refreshed and stimulated by the victory. Her 
method is not so spectacular, so dazzling, so lordly in 



38 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

scale as the method pursued by Russia before the war, 
but she cares not to play to the gallery, nor does she 
care to beguile the world by bluffing and manoeuvring. 
Western critics seem to think it their duty to remind us 
that we are getting " chesty " and " cocky " ; be it so, 
for we are by no means free from human frailties. Yet 
we have never allowed the halo of the victory to wax so 
large as to obstruct our vision ; we have been conscious 
of our limitations and weaknesses, and formulated our 
post bellum plans accordingly. Economical Japan per- 
force had to be, for her resources are scanty, but she is 
convinced that frugality, assiduity, unremitting toil, and 
organized efforts will ultimately overcome this drawback. 
Cautiousness born of this conviction is perceptible in 
every phase of her activities in Manchuria. Compared 
with the work of Russian empire-builders in Manchuria 
prior to the war, hers must indeed seem that of a pigmy 
before a giant. Small wonder that an American critic, 
whose hatred of the Japanese seems to have driven him 
even to praise Russia, indulges, from start to finish of 
his book, in such insipid sarcasms as this : " With the 
appearance of the Jap the era of high prices (in Man- 
churia) passed. The Japanese is not by nature and habit 
a free spender like the Russian." 

Mr. Millard — for such is the name of this eminent 
writer — prefers to ignore that a prosperity flashed up by 
extravagance and reckless spending must necessarily be 
ephemeral and deceptive, and he stoutly refuses to 
recognize that the Manchurians are indebted to the Jap- 
anese for the phenomenal rise in the price of the beans, 
which constitute the wealth, indeed the hfe, of Man- 
churia. 

The Japanese population in Manchuria has reached 



. Ji 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 39 

41,000, distributed along the lines of the South Man- 
churia Railway. Of this total Tairen has 17,000; Port 
Arthur 6,094; Liao-yang 3,290; Antung 4,377; New- 
chwang 2,590; Mukden 2,441; Tie-hng 2,216; Chang- 
chun 1,043; Harbin 986; Kirin 176; Kung-tsz-ling 
426; Shin-minfu 181, the rest being divided among 
other minor towns. In Newchwang, Japanese, in con- 
junction with Chinese, installed an electric light and tele- 
phone system. At Mukden, Japan is laying out a settle- 
ment of five hundred and fifty acres at an expenditure of 
^4,000,000. At Antung, Japan has spent liberal sums 
in providing well-laid-out streets, an excellently appointed 
hospital, a commodious school, a substantial post and 
telegraph office, and an extensive telephone system, 
while private enterprise has supplemented these official 
measures in the erection of substantial business and 
residence buildings. This Antung settlement is a part 
of the larger tract acquired by the Japanese military 
authorities in 1905, including all of the water-front below 
the Chinese town of Sha-ho-chien. Around the area 
thus selected for business and residence the military ad- 
ministration excavated in 1906 a ditch to drain the land, 
and erected a dike to protect it from the summer floods. 
For the crowning enterprise of the Japanese in Man- 
churia, however, we must turn to Tairen, which the Rus- 
sians used to call Dalny. This Japanese metropolis of 
Manchuria covers an area of 24,720 acres, and is said to 
be capable of harboring a million population. Besides 
the Japanese population, numbering some 17,000, the 
port has 70,000 Chinese inhabitants. While the town, 
with many substantial, even elegant, buildings, was orig- 
inally laid out by the Russians, Japan is expending 
liberal sums to improve upon the original plan. The 



40 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

most important of these undertakings is the improve- 
ment of the harbor, comprising the construction of 
breakwater, piers and jetties, the embankment and rec- 
lamation of foreshore, the improvement of quays, and 
dredging work. The entire work is to be finished in 
seven years and wiU entail a cost of 12,050,000 /^«, 
The harbor of Tairen has advantage over Newchwang 
and Antung in that it is not only free from ice but is 
capable of admitting steamers of deep draught. Since 
1908 Japanese and Chinese merchants have been locating 
there in increasing numbers, and the city now boasts of 
two banks, forty commercial and nine industrial com- 
panies. In 1906 the exports through this port of beans 
and bean-cake totalled only 8,520,0007^;/ in value, but 
the conversion of the South Manchuria Railway into a 
broad gauge greatly stimulated the exportation of these 
staple commodities, which during six months ending 
March, 1909, reached 16,200,000 j/^;/. As a commercial 
metropolis of Manchuria, Tairen is bound to become a 
strong rival of Newchwang, and as a Pacific terminus of 
the great Siberian system, it has advantage even over 
Vladivostok. Not only must Vladivostok combat the ice 
king during winter months, but it is too far, to become 
an emporium of importance, from Hongkong and Shang- 
hai, and other great commercial centres of China. 

As regards the exploitation by Japan of Manchurian 
resources, we must describe the coal mining at Fushun 
and the lumbering industry on the Yalu River. The 
Fushun coal mines, though bequeathed by Russia as a 
part of the railway concession obtained from China, 
have been opened by the Japanese almost anew, for the 
old equipment and methods of digging were found en- 
tirely unsatisfactory. Thus Japan has already^expended 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 41 

3,200,000 j^^« for their improvement, and is to expend 
5,800,000 7^;^ more until they are in satisfactory condi- 
tion. But the expenditure is thoroughly justified, as the 
daily output has already reached 2,000 tons. When the 
new equipment now in the course of installation is com- 
pleted, the daily output will, it is estimated, amount to 
6,000 tons. The coal field is ten miles long. The width 
of the workable deposits measures at least a mile, and the 
thickness of the seam ranges from a hundred and twenty 
to a hundred and seventy-five feet. The amount of coal 
contained in the belt is, at the most conservative estimate, 
placed at eight hundred million tons. 

As we have already stated, the Fushun mine as well as 
a few other mines were ceded to Japan by Russia, and 
the Chinese government by the agreement of December, 
1905, tacitly recognized the validity of the cession. 
But the details of these mining concessions had by no 
means been clearly defined between China and Russia. 
The Eastern Chinese Railway never paid any royalty or 
tax on the output of the mines, neither did it compen- 
sate the original Chinese operators for what they had in- 
vested in the mines ; and it is not at all certain that 
China ever protested against Russia about these matters. 
So, also, with regard to the extent of the mines. The 
Russian company worked many seams here and there 
over a wide district without China uttering a word of 
complaint. But as soon as Japan undertook to operate 
the mines China began to put forward a hundred and one 
complaints and protests. She would say she never for- 
feited the right to tax the mines ; she would complain 
that she never agreed to let the Eastern Chinese Railway 
Company vi^ork so extensive a field as it actually did ; she 
would demand an unreasonable amount of compensation 



42 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

for the investment made by Chinese operators before the 
coming of the Russians — an investment whose extent it 
is no easy task to ascertain since the original equipment 
was all but destroyed by Russian operators. These com- 
plaints and remonstrances are thoroughly characteristic 
of China's attitude towards a nation to which she owes a 
debt of gratitude for the recovery of a vast country of 
360,000 square miles from the hands of a ruthless 
usurper. Yet Japan has had no intention of dealing with 
China in a high-handed manner as did Russia, and has 
consistently shown a willingness to settle all questions in 
an amicable manner. It is in consonance with this attitude 
on the part of Japan that the Chino-Japanese Agree- 
ment of September 4, 1909, was concluded, solving all 
questions relating to the coal mines in a manner satis- 
factory to China. It provides that the Japanese govern- 
ment, respecting China's sovereignty in the mining dis- 
tricts, shall pay to the Peking government a tax upon 
coals produced in the Fushun and Yentai coal mines, the 
rate of such tax to be determined in a separate arrange- 
ment upon the basis of the lowest tariff for coals pro- 
duced in other mines in China ; and that the extent of 
the mines, as well as other details, such as the compen- 
sation of the previous operators, shall be arranged by 
commissioners specially appointed for that purpose. 

In pursuance of Article 10 of the Chino-Japanese 
Treaty of December, 1905, the two countries signed in 
May, 1908, a fresh agreement providing for the organi- 
zation of a Chino-Japanese joint company to fell the 
timber on the Yalu. The capital of the company is 
3,000,000 yen^ contributed equally by Japanese and 
Chinese subscribers. The forest reserved for the use of 
the company is sixty Chinese li (about twenty-two miles) 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 



43 



in width, and extends over that part of the Yalu River 
between Mao-erh-shan and what is known as the Twenty- 
fourth Valley, near the head waters of the stream. The 
area thus marked out comprises 65,000,000 square feet. 
The duration of the company is fixed at twenty-five 
years, which may be prolonged only with the permission 
of the Chinese government. While it is presided over 
by the Chinese magistrate (taotai) of the district, its busi- 
ness is under the management of two directors-general, 
appointed one each by the Chinese and Japanese gov- 
ernments. Formerly the natives felled the timber in a 
most primitive fashion, and yet they were able to float 
down the river about 1,500,000 eight-foot logs annually. 
With the installation of sawmills by the company, the 
criminally wasteful methods of the natives, involving an 
estimated unnecessary loss of thirty-five per cent, in the 
squaring of the logs, has become a thing of the past, and 
the Yalu timber promises to become the premier product 
of Southeastern Manchuria. Although the company's 
equipment is not yet completed, its gross receipts for 
1909 were 569,000 yen, while its expenses were 318,000 
yen. This leaves a balance of 251,000 yen, which is 
equivalent to a little over seven per cent, interest on the 
capital invested. The output of the timber does not yet 
exceed fifteen million lien (a lien is an eight-foot log), 
but this will be greatly increased when the company has 
completed the installation of new equipment. The cut- 
ters sail up the river in September, and work during the 
winter. In May rafts are let down the stream to An- 
tung, a distance of 360 miles. As there are many cata- 
racts and whirlpools to contend with, it takes three to six 
months to reach the destination. Not only does the 
present state of the river cause a great loss in timber, but 



44 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

it results in many fatalities to human life. To make the 
navigation safer the company has commenced to improve 
the river bed. 

As an indication of how scientifically and systematic- 
ally Japan is studying the natural resources of Manchuria, 
v^e may call attention to the Central Laboratory at Tairen. 
Originally planned by Baron Goto, formerly governor of 
the South Manchuria Railway, now Minister of Com- 
munications, this scientific establishment is maintained 
at an annual expenditure of 60,000 yen^ and is directed 
by one of the ablest scientists of Japan. Here ores from 
various parts of the country are tested, and here experi- 
ments are made to produce useful articles from the agri- 
cultural products of Manchuria. The laboratory is open 
to the use of foreigners for a nominal charge to cover the 
actual cost of chemicals and other materials consumed. 

Now we must consider the Japanese railways. The 
main Japanese line from Tairen to Chang-chun, with a 
mileage of 436, and the branch lines to Port Arthur, 
Newchwang and the Fushun coal mines, totalling seventy- 
six miles, have been altered from a forty-two-inch track 
to a standard gauge of four feet eight and one-half inches 
and are equipped with American rolling stock. In this 
reconstruction work the South Manchuria Railway Com- 
pany has already bought of America railway materials 
amounting to ;^6,722,ooo. The most difficult problem for 
this Japanese railway was that of the connection with the 
Eastern Chinese Railway of Russia. Immediately after 
the war it seemed Russia's tactics to cripple the South 
Manchuria Railway and prevent the growth of Tairen 
by refusing to establish any cooperation with Japanese 
railway, thus hoping to make Vladivostok the only east- 
ern terminus of the Siberian Railway. It was therefore 



I 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 45 

no easy matter to induce Russia to make any satisfac- 
tory arrangement for through traffic between her own 
and Japanese Hnes. Without such an arrangement the 
South Manchuria Railway must lose much of its impor- 
tance as a main artery of the world's trade and communi- 
cation. It was with a view to solving this question that 
Baron Goto visited St. Petersburg in May, 1908. The 
visit resulted in the removal of much of the inconve- 
nience which the South Manchuria Railway had endured 
in the lack of Russian cooperation. As the consequence 
of further negotiations held at Tokio last year between 
Mr. Wentchel, vice-governor of the Eastern Chinese 
Railway, and Baron Goto, harmonious traffic relations 
between the two railways have been assured. 

Another Japanese hne which promises to eclipse, in 
importance and interest attaching to it, even the main 
line of the South Manchuria Railway, is that between 
Mukden and Antung with a length of 189 miles. At 
present the line is still that wonderful little twenty-nine- 
inch track, which, improvised by Japanese military engi- 
neers, overcame the Russian forces in front of it by the 
weight of lead and stores which it belched forth at them 
from the rail head. Although a splendid sample of mili- 
tary engineering, it is too slight to have any serious 
commercial importance. As such a narrow track is too 
dangerous for night traffic, it takes under the present 
schedule two long weary days of discomfort to make the 
189 miles. 

But this unique line will soon become a thing of the 
past, as the South Manchuria Railway Company, in pur- 
suance of an article in the Peking Treaty of December, 
1905, is now reconstructing it. To link this line with the 
Korean Railway, a bridge, 3,182 feet in length, will be 



46 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

built over the Yalu River at an estimated cost of 2,500,000 
yen. Evidently Japan expects to make this line one of 
the most important highways of commerce and travel, for 
it affords not only the quickest but the most diversely in- 
teresting route from Siberia to Japan, passing, as it does, 
through picturesque scenery which one misses in Siberia 
and other parts of Manchuria. When the bridge and 
the new rails have materialized, it will be possible to 
travel from Harbin to the Mikado's capital through 
Korea in some ninety hours, and from Mukden in seventy 
hours. Or to view the matter more broadly, the line is 
destined to form a link in the long chain of railway com- 
munication which will stretch from London to Tokio, 
with short breaks at the Straits of Dover and the Straits 
of Korea, thus bringing England within a fortnight by 
rail of Japan. 

The Antung-Mukden line will be owned by Japan for 
fifteen years from the date of the completion of the re- 
construction work. At the expiration of that term the 
line will be sold to China at a price to be determined by 
appraisement of all its properties by a foreign expert who 
will be selected by both parties concerned. 

Before leaving the Japanese railways we must note 
the proposed Kirin-Changchun line in which Japan has 
much interest. In accordance with an agreement set 
forth in the protocols to the Peking Treaty of December, 
1905, China and Japan concluded on April 15, 1907, a 
convention providing that the Chinese government, being 
about to construct a railway line from Kirin to Chang- 
chun, agreed to borrow from the South Manchuria Rail- 
way Company one-half of the capital needed for this 
work. The amount of the loan was later fixed at 2,130,- 
000 yen^ redeemable in yearly installments in twenty-five 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 47 

years. In other essentials the loan contract is similar to 
that for the Imperial Railways of North China, financed 
by England. It is expected that the construction work 
will be completed by the end of 191 2. 

In connection with the Kirin-Changchun road it is im- 
portant to note that this line will ultimately be extended 
to Hoi-ryong on the Korean border, where it will effect 
a junction with the Korean Railway leading to Chong- 
jin, a port on the Japan Sea. The " Chien-tao Agree- 
ment " of September 4, 1909, has the following provision : 

" The government of China shall undertake to extend 
the Kirin-Changchun Railway to the southern boundary 
of Yenchi and to connect it at Hoi-ryong with a Korean 
railway, and such extension shall be effected upon the 
same terms as the Kirin-Changchun Railway. The date 
of commencing the work of the proposed extension shall 
be determined by the government of China, considering 
the actual requirements of the situation, and upon con- 
sultations with the government of Japan." 

At present the Korean town of Hoi-ryong mentioned 
in this agreement is connected with the port of Chong- 
jin by means of a military railroad of fifty miles built by 
the Japanese during the war with Russia. But in the 
event of China undertaking the extension of the Kirin 
Railway to Hoi-ryong this military railway will be recon- 
structed so as to facilitate its connection with the Chinese 
Hne. When these two Hues materiahze, the provincial 
capital of Kirin and its surrounding district will be in 
direct communication with the South Manchuria Rail- 
way on the one hand, and on the other with one of the 
most promising ports on the Sea of Japan. As I have 
said in the foregoing chapter the city of Kirin, being in 
the heart of a vast lumbering country, is so noted for 



48 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

junk building that it is called the " inland dockyard" of 
Manchuria. Yet this town of so great a commercial im- 
portance has been practically out of touch with the prin- 
cipal arteries of trade except by the extremely imperfect 
means of cart and of junk traffic over a tributary of 
the Sungari River which is unnavigable for the greater I 
portion of the year. The advent of railway which will 
bring that region into close contact with the main route 
of the South Manchurian system and the Sea of Japan, 
cannot fail to stimulate its industry and open up its rich 
resources hitherto undeveloped. While this proposed 
railway will be legally owned by the Chinese government, 
Japan will have supervising authority over its traffic, as 
half of the money required for its construction is to be 
borrowed from Japan. As to the details of the method 
of supervision, they will be decided upon between China 
and Japan along Unes followed by England in financing 
Chinese railways. 

The Chinese line between Peking and Shang-haikwan 
extends itself into Manchuria, reaching Shin-min-tung, 
one of the important inland towns in the Liao Valley. 
These lines are officially called the Imperial Railways of 
North China, their Manchurian section measuring some 
280 miles. Financed by English capitalists this system 
is still under British supervision, the method of which is 
to be adopted by Japan in connection with the Chang- 
chun-Kirin and Kirin-Hoiryong Railways we have al- 
ready described. Briefly, the British method is this : 
the Chinese government is required to furnish capital suf- 
ficient to show a reasonable margin for the security ; a 
British engineer-in-chief and a British accountant are in- 
cluded among the officials responsible for the administra- 
tion of the system. 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 49 

In addition to the lines just described, the Chinese sys- 
tem in Manchuria includes a line of thirty-six miles be- 
tween Mukden and Shin-min-tung. Originally this line 
was a military railway, built by Japan during the war 
with Russia, but in April, 1908, China purchased it for 
1 ,600,000 j/^;2, upon the condition that she would borrow 
from the South Manchuria Railway Company, for a term 
of eighteen years, one-half of the sum required in recon- 
structing that portion of the line lying east of the Liao 
River, i. e.^ 32,000 yen. The line, having already been 
converted into a permanent standard track, connects with 
the South Manchuria Railway at Mukden. 

Now, we are in a position to consider the Russian rail- 
ways in Manchuria. That portion of the Eastern Chinese 
Railway which runs through Manchuria from Man-dju- 
lia on its western and Pogranichnaya on its eastern border 
has a length of some 920 miles. At Harbin, the Russian 
capital in Manchuria, this main line sends forth a branch 
of 147 miles, which at Chang-chun joins the main line of 
the South Manchuria Railway. As has been noted in 
the foregoing chapter, China, by the agreement of 1896, 
reserves the right to take over, at the end of thirty-six 
years from the time of completion of the main line, /. e., 
1903, the hne entire on refunding to Russia all the outlays 
made on it. Should she fail to avail herself of this 
privilege, she has the alternative of taking over the railways 
without compensation at the end of eighty years from the 
above specified time. With the exception of the Antung- 
Mukden line, the Japanese system in Manchuria must 
also conform to these conditions. 

The railway is the source of Russian influence in Man- 
churia. Deprive Russia of the iron road, and she will 
have no foundation left her in the Three Eastern Provinces. 



50 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

And yet this railway itself, viewed from a commercial 
point of view, has been an utter failure. The Eastern 
Chinese Railway has never hit upon a working basis, its 
balance sheet showing even at present an annual deficit 
averaging more than ;^ 10,000,000. When Russia first 
constructed the Manchurian railways she, in spite of the 
heavy drain they made upon her treasury, consoled 
herself in the hope that the economic development of 
Southern Manchuria might some day reach a stage 
wherein the Eastern Chinese Railway might be enabled 
to place itself upon a paying basis. Russia's only hope 
for the possible recuperation of the enormous loss she 
had been enduring lay in South Manchuria, rich in min- 
eral and agricultural resources. With the cession of the 
southern section of her Manchurian railways this cher- 
ished hope has been deprived of all possibility of realiza- 
tion, and the financial strain of the Eastern Chinese Rail- 
way has been growing harder and harder. It was un- 
doubtedly with this unfortunate fact in view that the Paris 
Temps suggested not long ago that Russia dispose of her 
railway holdings in Manchuria. 

But the abandonment by Russia of her Manchurian 
railways means the abandonment of all her Manchurian 
enterprises, political and commercial. Such a course 
Russia will never adopt until, if ever indeed, she has called 
into play all her abilities and energies in the effort to 
rehabilitate the financial condition of the Eastern Chi- 
nese railway. Early last year Mr. Kokovtseff, Russian 
Minister of Finance, made a tour of Manchuria with a 
view to ascertaining whether anything could be done to 
alleviate the financial difficulties of the railway. After a 
careful investigation this Russian statesman arrived at the 
conclusion that the following measures must be adopted, 



I 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 5 1 

if the Eastern Chinese Railway was to avert the catas- 
trophe towards which it had been drifting : 

1. The semi-mihtary management of the railway now 
in vogue must be replaced by a more businesslike method, 
giving the foremost consideration to the commercial side 
of the enterprise. 

2. The number of railway guards, whose maintenance 
has been the main cause of the financial strain of the 
company, must be reduced to a great extent. 

3. Heretofore the military officers attached to the 
railway have been receiving their salaries both from the 
War Department and from the railway company. This 
practice must be stopped, and the officers must be paid 
either by the company or by the government. 

4. Women and superannuated officials with whom 
the company is at present overburdened must be dis- 
missed, their places to be taken by younger and abler 
officials. 

Whether this recommendation will, in the face of the 
stout objection of the military clique, be put into prac- 
tice, we have yet to see. 

In connection with the railways it is important to note 
the land acquired by the Russian and the Japanese rail- 
way authorities. The Russo-Chinese railway agreement 
of September, 1896, provides that the railway company 
has the privilege to acquire without compensation any 
state land required for constructing, managing and pro- 
tecting the line. Where land is privately owned the 
company must provide funds for compensating the 
owners at market rates. All lands thus acquired are ex- 
empted from land tax, and " as soon as they come under 
the management of the company, they may erect thereon 
any buildings and carry on all kinds of work." In virtue 



52 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

of this provision Russia obtained extensive tracts of land 
at important points along the railway. Of these lands 
those lying on the lines ceded to Japan, amounting to 
sixty-five square miles, were naturally handed over to 
the Japanese. In addition to the lands thus obtained, 
Japan has purchased 3,429 acres, or 5.36 square miles 
from Chinese landowners. Thus the South Manchuria 
Railway possesses at present some 45,156 acres of land, 
or about 70.54 square miles. Of this total about 5,486 
acres are within the leased territory of Kwan-tung. Of 
the remaining 39,670 acres outside the leased territory, 
Liao-yang has 1,157 acres, Antung 1,258 acres, and 
Mukden and Changchun 1,239 acres each, while the 
rest is distributed among other minor towns. These 
railway concessions are in a sense " settlements," where 
Japanese maintain their residence and business quarters. 
The South Manchuria Railway Company leases the land 
to those desiring to establish themselves within the con- 
cession ; in many instances it builds houses to let. 

The Russian railway concessions are on a more ex- 
tensive scale. The entire land belonging to the Eastern 
Chinese Railway covers an area of 328,720 acres, or 
513.63 square miles. The following table shows Ihe dis- 
tribution of the land in Russian control : 



In Hei-lung-kiang 


Province : 




Depots - 


- 


- 


- 124,970 acres 


Other lands - 


- 


- 


- 71,328 *• 


Along the rail 


- 


- 


- - 9,983 " 


In Kirin Province 








Depots 


- 


- 


- 84,967 '' 


Along the rail 


- 


- 


5,07s '' 


At Harbin - 






- 32,397 *' 


Total - 


- ^28,720 " 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 53 

The concession at Harbin alone measures more than 
32,397 acres, or 50.62 square miles, lying astride of the 
Sungari River. It is said that this vast stretch of land, 
which cost Russia 400,000 rubles in purchase money 
some nine years ago, is now worth a hundred millions. 
This is not difficult to understand when it is noted that 
where there was in the winter of 1897 but a solitary Chi- 
nese village, the city of Harbin rose phoenix-like, and is 
now reputed to be one of the most populous European 
cities in the Far East, having at present some 80,000 
Russian civilian inhabitants. The Harbin Railway land 
as well as those at other points may be acquired on 
special leasing terms from the railway authorities in 
regular lots. 

While Chinese sovereignty is ostensibly respected 
within the concessions, these railway lands constitute an 
imperium in imperio. Not only do they enjoy immunity 
from taxation by the Chinese authorities, but the pres- 
ervation of law and order therein is intrusted " to police 
agents appointed by the (railway) company." Under 
such conditions it is but natural that many delicate ques- 
tions should arise as regards the respective jurisdictions 
of the local Chinese authorities and the railway adminis- 
tration. In the spring of 1908 the American consul at 
Harbin had to protest against Russian measures, requir- 
ing foreign residents within the railway concessions there 
to pay taxes to the Russian authorities. This step the 
American consul interpreted as the violation of Chinese 
sovereignty, and his protest aroused at the time much 
sensation in the diplomatic world in the Far East. 

In order to avoid such complications China and Russia 
signed on May 11, 1909, an agreement, in which Russia 
reasserts her intention to respect China's sovereignty in 



54 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

the railway zone. The novel feature of this fresh agree- 
ment lies in the provision for '* self-governing " councils 
to be organized in important towns along the railway. 
No national distinction is to be made as to the franchise, 
all inhabitants, with certain properties within the railway 
concession, being qualified to elect councillors. The 
council thus organized will be a deliberative body ; the 
executive body is to consist of three members of the 
council, namely, the chairman, and one nominee each of 
the governor of the Eastern Chinese Railway and of the 
director-general of the Foreign Affairs Department of 
China. This Chinese director-general should not be 
confounded with the Foreign Minister or, to use Chinese 
nomenclature, the president of the Board of Foreign 
Affairs. The former, though appointed by the Chinese 
government in accordance with the railway agreement of 
1896, is paid by the Eastern Chinese Railway Company, 
his duty being to supervise the task delegated to the 
company by China, to investigate from time to time the 
accounts of the company with the Chinese government, 
and to manage all business between the company and 
the Chinese government or any Chinese officials, either 
central or local. Heretofore this apparently important 
Chinese functionary discharged his duties only in per- 
functory fashion. Whether Russia will, under the new 
arrangement, allow him to assert his rights is yet to be 
seen. While the new agreement makes no national dis- 
tinction as to the franchise, the council will consist al- 
most exclusively of Russians, who form the majority of 
the population within the railway concessions. 

The Manchurian Railway inevitably suggests the rail- 
way guards whom Russia and Japan, in virtue of the 
Portsmouth Treaty, have the right to maintain. By the 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 55 

evacuation agreement entered into between the Japanese 
and Russian commandants in the field on October 30, 
1905, the maximum number of such guards was fixed at 
fifteen per kilometre. At the latest computation the 
Russian force of railway guards consists of four bri- 
gades, which roughly speaking comprises fifty-five com- 
panies each of infantry and cavalry, and a company of 
artillery. As a Russian company usually consists of 
about two hundred and thirty officers and men, the entire 
Russian force would be about 26,680. As against this 
force Japan maintains only a division and six battaUons, 
numbering about 8,800 officers and men. 

That a reasonable number of guards are absolutely 
necessary there is no room to doubt, as the entire coun- 
try is infested with bandits, who ever and anon raid the 
trains and attack the travellers. But the maintenance of 
unnecessarily large forces is regarded by China as an 
affront to her sovereign rights, and it is much to be 
desired that both Japan and Russia see to it that the 
number of their railway guards is kept within reasonable 
limits. The Chino-Japanese Treaty of December, 1905, 
provides : " When tranquillity shall have been estab- 
hshed in Manchuria, and China shall have become her- 
self capable of affording full protection to the lives and 
property of foreigners, Japan will withdraw her railway 
guards simultaneously with Russia." How soon that 
time will come it is impossible even to conjecture. 

As I write this chapter an auspicious report comes 
from the Far East, once again vindicating Japan's faith- 
fulness in adhering to the principle of the " open door" 
— it is the news of the opening of Port Arthur to inter- 
national trade. That Gibraltar of the Far East, whose 
fortification cost unnumbered rubles and called into play 



56 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

all the talent and ingenuity of which the Russian mili- 
tary engineers were capable, has remained just as the 
destructive power of Japanese shells left it at the end of 
the historic siege. The Japanese have not spent a single 
yen for the repair of the destroyed fortifications. That 
grim " 203 Meter Hill," that sullen Kei-kwan-zan, with 
batteries shattered and casemates demolished, tell to-day, 
as vividly as on the morrow of the surrender of the be- 
sieged army, the tales of wonderful heroism displayed by 
both the attacking and the defending forces. Obviously 
Japan does not think it worth while to fortify Port Ar- 
thur, and now she has made it a commercial port by 
throwing its doors open to foreign trade. It is a sensible 
measure, and Japan ought to be congratulated upon hav- 
ing already put it into execution. The innovation will 
materially contribute to the prosperity of Manchuria, 
with which all trading nations are seriously concerned. 
As I have said, Tairen is supposed to be a port free from 
ice, yet when the weather is calm during the intense 
cold of the winter months, the harbor is hable to freeze, 
for a short time at all events. Then again, when a 
blizzard blows the water is so agitated that the vessels 
are forced to suspend the loading and discharging of 
cargo. The breakwater now in course of construction 
will protect the harbor from high waves liable to be 
stirred up by blizzards, but it is not at all certain that this 
precaution will not result in the freezing of the water. 
The opening of Port Arthur will make up for this pre- 
carious state of the Tairen harbor. Protected by wind- 
ing high hills, the harbor of Port Arthur is not disturbed 
by strong blasts for which Manchurian winters are noted. 
What is more important, it is the only Manchurian port 
which is really free from ice. Its only drawback is that 



THE MANCHURIA OF TO-DAY 



57 



the entrance to the harbor is rather too narrow to permit 
the free movement of large steamers, but this incon- 
venience can be easily remedied by cutting a canal be- 
tween the harbor and Pigeon Bay, so that steamers may 
come in by the present entrance and depart by the canal. 
All things considered, Port Arthur surpasses Tairen as a 
commercial port, and it is to be hoped that its opening 
to international trade will greatly enhance the value of 
the South Manchuria Railway. 



Ill 

AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 

AMERICAN policy in Manchuria, and indeed in 
China, may be summed up in what is commonly 
designated the " open door," having for its cor- 
ollary the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the 
Celestial Empire and equal opportunity for all nations in 
commerce and trade in that country. Nowadays every 
one speaks of the " open door " : few know how the doc- 
trine originated, and what it exactly means. The " open 
door " principle is in reality an application of the Chino- 
American Treaty of 1868 secured through the efforts of 
Anson Burlingham, but for our present purpose it is not 
necessary to go back to the classic period of Burlingham 
—suffice it to begin with the late Mr. Secretary John 
Hay, who invested the " open door" with a more defi- 
nite meaning according to the needs of the times. 

The name of John Hay has indeed been so closely 
associated with the " open door " that the public has for- 
gotten that the doctrine really originated in England. 
When Germany seized Kiao-chou in 1898, England felt 
the necessity of adopting a policy which might serve to 
safeguard her interests in China. She discerned an 
obstacle, if not a menace, to her interests in a movement 
which aimed at the vivisection of the hoary empire into 
various spheres of influence. By upholding the principle 
of equal opportunity for all foreign nations, England 
thought she could maintain her position, which was 

58 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 59 

practically impregnable unless attacked by means of polit- 
ical intervention such as was manifested in the establish- 
ment of a German sphere of influence in the province of 
Shan-tung. Unfortunately, however, the decrepit condi- 
tion of China had begun to be evident, and the German 
occupation of Kiao-chou seemed but the entering edge 
of the wedge which was to split the huge empire. Eng- 
land was forced to take cognizance of this unhappy situ- 
ation, and she began to be skeptical as to the availability 
of the " open door " doctrine as the means of securing 
the purpose for which it was invented. It must have 
appeared to British statesmen more advisable to accept 
the inevitable, and be ready to fall in line with the chan- 
celleries of continental powers which were contemplating 
the slicing of China. For a while Downing Street seemed 
to be carrying water on both shoulders, apparently oscil- 
lating between the " open door " and the sphere of 
influence. 

Thus abandoned by its sponsor, the '* open door " doc- 
trine was on the verge of oblivion, when a new actor 
appeared upon the stage of world politics, determined to 
save the forsaken doctrine. The new character was John 
Hay. That illustrious American Secretary of State, with 
keen insight and broad statesmanship, perceived in the 
abandonment of the " open door " the grave possibilities 
not only to China but to the United States. Mr. Hay 
lost no time in acting upon his conviction. He in- 
structed, at various times from September 6 to Novem- 
ber 17, 1899, American Ministers in France, Germany, 
Great Britain, Russia, Italy and Japan to request the 
governments of said powers to give formal assurances 
that the principle of the " open door " would be strictly 
adhered to, even where a sphere of influence was actually 



6o AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

established. The meaning of the " open door," as given 
in these instructions, is this : 

First. That no power will in any way interfere with 
any treaty port or any vested interest within any so- 
called " sphere of influence or interest " or leased terri- 
tory it may have in China. 

Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time 
being shall apply to all merchandise landed or shipped 
to all such ports as are within said sphere of influence 
(unless they be free ports), no matter to what nationality 
it may belong, and that duties leviable shall be collected 
by the Chinese government. 

Third. That no power shall levy any higher harbor 
dues on vessels of another nationality frequenting any 
port in such sphere than shall be levied on vessels of its 
own nationality, or any higher railroad charges over lines 
built, controlled, or operated within its sphere on mer- 
chandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other nation- 
ahties transported through such sphere than shall be 
levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own 
nationals transported over equal distances. 

Such, then, is the exact meaning of the " open door," 
as conceived by Mr. Hay and accepted by the powers. 
By the time the American memorandum was addressed 
to the powers, Russia had leased the Kwan-tung Penin- 
sula, Germany had established herself in Kiao-chou, and 
even Great Britain, which had championed the " open 
door," had felt it expedient to recognize by a formal 
agreement the exclusive right of Germany to enjoy in 
Kiao-chou and the contiguous sphere of influence certain 
privileges, more especially those relating to railroads and 
mining enterprises, in acknowledgment of which Ger- 
many, on her part, recognized the British sphere of in- 



I 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 6l 

fluence in the Yangtse Valley. Yet all these powers felt 
constrained to put themselves on record as approving 
the American proposal, which was obviously just and in 
principle irrefutable. If England, Germany and Russia 
would not dare refuse the proposal, why should France, 
Japan and Italy object to it ? The " open door " had 
smooth saihng, and within a few months after its launch- 
ing all the powers interested in China became apparently 
pledged to its cause. 

Meanwhile Mr. Hay's programme was in his own 
country received with mingled commendation and de- 
nunciation. Some of the American publicists and states- 
men regarded this move of Mr. Hay's as a dangerous 
departure from the traditions of the United States. He 
was accused of committing his country to a policy " im- 
possible of attainment by our own independent action, 
and if pursued in common with other powers fraught with 
the gravest possibilities of those international entangle- 
ments with European nations, which it is our historic 
policy to keep out of." Yet, considering the condition 
existing in China at the time and in the face of what the 
doctrine has achieved, there can be no doubt but that the 
" open door " programme was best adapted to the inter- 
est of the United States. At the time when the " sphere 
of influence" doctrine was on the ascendant, America 
had no foothold in China. Should European powers 
agree to slice up China among themselves, where would 
the United States come in? Russia would have taken 
Manchuria and Mongolia ; Germany a vast stretch of ter- 
ritory lying south of the Russian sphere ; Great Britain 
the Yangtse Valley, Thibet and a goodly portion of 
Southern China ; and France the provinces adjacent to 
her Tongking possessions. This would have left nothing 



2 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

for the United States, for she was in no position to put 
forward any territorial claim in China even if she desired 
to. By an undivided China, therefore, America had 
much to gain and nothing to lose. With the doors of 
China left open, America would be able to push her 
trade, maintaining, at the same time, the integrity of 
the empire. I hazard no theory that it was merely the 
protection of America's own economic interest which 
prompted Mr. Hay to propose the " open door," but I 
am, with Mr. Thomas Millard, inclined to believe that he 
is but an amateur in international affairs who thinks 
America was actuated to put forward this policy from 
purely altruistic motives. 

Secretary Hay's " open door " programme was neither 
too ambitious nor too political to conform to the national 
spirit of the times. America had already been inclined 
to play fast and loose with her traditional policy of iso- 
lation. The annexation of Hawaii was the first step 
towards her political and economic expansion in the 
Pacific and beyond. Then came the occupation of the 
Philippines, and with it was tolled the knell of those 
happy days when American statesmen and people, con- 
tented with the enormous wealth which nature bestowed 
upon them, harbored no idea of territorial expansion. 
The call of empire had been heard, and the great republic 
responded to it with the booming of cannon that flashed 
from Admiral Dewey's flag-ship in Manila Bay. Once 
her traditional policy was so radically altered, it was but 
natural that American statesmen, if not people, should 
keep their eyes intently fixed upon the Orient. As the 
years rolled on, it became evident that the American na- 
tion came definitely, if unconsciously, to embrace im- 
perialism, which is at once the glory and nemesis of 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 63 

modern times. The voice of imperialism is no voice of 
humanity : rather it is a gospel of commercialism and 
self-aggrandizement, and the imperialism of America is 
no exception to the general rule, however anxious some 
Americans may be to have us believe that American ac- 
tivities in the Philippines and China are perfectly disin- 
terested. It is the animating desire to become great 
among the nations, to be respected in the council of the 
powers, to consolidate her foothold in the Far East, to 
secure market for the products of her ever-expanding in- 
dustry — it is this desire which impels America to greater 
and greater activities in the Orient. Perhaps this Zeitgeist 
is most clearly and ably expressed by no less a statesman 
than Theodore Roosevelt when he says : 

" The Mediterranean era declined with the Roman 
Empire and died with the discovery of America. The 
Atlantic era is now at the height of its development and 
must soon exhaust the resources at its command. The 
Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, and to bring 
the whole human race at last into one great comity of 
nations, is just at the dawn. Man, in his migration west- 
ward, has at last traversed the whole round of the planet, 
and the sons of the newest West now stand on the Pacific 
Coast of America and touch hands across the greatest of 
oceans with those ancient races of Asia which have from 
time immemorial dwelt in their present seats. It is the 
fate of the American nation to be placed at the front of 
the turmoil that must accompany this new placing of the 
peoples. I believe the contest will be friendly and peace- 
ful ; it surely will be if we keep ourselves so strong that 
we do not have to fear wrong, and at the same time 
scrupulously respect the rights and feelings of others." 

Verily it is the conviction of the American nation that 



64 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

it is destined to play the role of the star actor in the Far 
Eastern drama upon whose scene the curtain has only- 
gone up. How much more simpHfied will the matter be, 
if other nations only do not cherish the same desire and 
the same conviction. Alas ! nations of the old world are 
not likely to exalt America to the altar of international 
supremacy, and with meekness and reverence follow the 
lead of the Republic in the disposition of the Far Eastern 
question. Be that as it may, men like John Hay and 
Theodore Roosevelt pointed the way, and men like Will- 
iam H. Taft and Philander Knox are now striving to 
follow it. Whether Mr. Taft and Mr. Knox are playing 
their part successfully and ably is, of course, another 
question. 

I have given the meaning of the " open door " as de- 
fined by Secretary Hay, and I ask that the reader keep 
it in mind as he follows America's fresh activities in 
Manchuria. For several years after the acceptance by 
the powers of Mr. Hay's " open door " programme Rus- 
sia made a feint of abiding by it, evading it at every 
point at the sacrifice of the interests of other nations. 
During this period America and Japan were naturally 
drawn closer, as the Mikado's Empire felt even more 
keenly than did the United States the necessity of pre- 
venting the Russian absorption of Manchuria. America, 
of course, did not even so much as dream of ever going 
to fight Russia for her Manchurian trade, but she was 
ready to exercise a highly benevolent neutrality towards 
any nation which the Manchurian situation might bring 
into collision with Russia. Both Japan and America 
protested on more occasions than one against the Rus- 
sian method in Manchuria, but each protest met only 
with rebuff, if nothing worse. In the strenuous effort to 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 65 

hold the doors of Manchuria open — doors that had al- 
ready virtually been slammed — Japan and America forced 
China, in the face of Russia's stout objection, to open the 
Manchurian towns of Mukden, Antung and Ta-tung-kou. 
But all such palHative measures were utterly powerless 
to stop the mighty snowball which the Russian bear set 
rolling down from the frozen shores of Baikal on to the 
Yellow Sea. The result was the Russo-Japanese war. 

With the termination of the war America's attitude 
towards Japan changed radically. The romance and 
poetry of the mighty conflict were destined to fade away 
as considerations of self-interest again possessed the 
American mind. The beginning of this change of 
American attitude was noticeable even when the peace 
conference at Portsmouth was proceeding. In a strange, 
vague, unconscious manner, the ardor of sympathy which 
the American people had extended to the Japanese dur- 
ing the war seemed to cool even to such a degree that 
Russia was virtually substituted for Japan in the interest 
and good wishes of the nation. The reason for this 
change of sentiment and opinion is not beyond under- 
standing. Nations are essentially selfish in that they 
think of their own interest first and foremost. America 
was actuated to extend moral support to the Mikado in 
his struggle with the great White Czar by the belief that 
with the Muscovites driven out of Manchuria American 
trade there would be accorded an ample chance to forge 
ahead. The average American, of course, did not think 
so far ahead, but supported the Japanese chiefly by 
reason of sentiment. But time for sentiment was soon 
past, and the average American is now led by the opinion 
of those who look at the Manchurian question from the 
point of view of America's commercial interest. Even 



66 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

when the outcome of the Portsmouth conference was yet 
uncertain, the New York Times clearly foresaw this in- 
evitable change of America's attitude towards Japan, and 
made the following pertinent remarks : 

" Entertaining for us the most sincere sentiments of 
affection and respect, Japan as she works out her present 
ambitions will set up in the East a commercial Monroe 
doctrine, and by the simplest process in the world, the 
process of making and selling goods so cheap that we 
shall be unable to find any buyers. . . . If it be true 
that price makes the market, another terrible taking 
down awaits the Western world's vanity, and this time 
its pockets will come into the reckoning. If there be a 
yellow peril, undoubtedly it is a commercial one, and of 
the nature we have delineated here. . . . Every ad- 
vance she makes towards securing for herself the Chinese 
market will provoke European opposition, and in par- 
ticular will rasp the tenderest nerve of her firm ally, 
Great Britain. It would be illogical — worse, it would be 
humiliating — to set up commercial restriction against a 
nation that makes a virtue and a speciality of the • open 
door.' But in what other way, should China not be par- 
titioned, will the Jap, with his excellent cheap goods, be 
kept out from markets to which his admission would be 
equivalent to the exclusion of the rest of the world?" 

Whether Japan is so quixotic as to entertain the ambi- 
tion to set up a " commercial Monroe doctrine" in the 
Far East is a question we care not to discuss. What is 
essential is the emphasis which the Times laid upon the 
Western world's disHke of Japan's commercial advance in 
the Asian continent, which accounts for the alienation of 
Western sympathy from the insular nation. As the Japa- 
nese promoted their commercial interest in Manchuria with 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 67 

marked success, American trade interests became appre- 
hensive as to whether they would be able to hold their 
own against Japanese competition. The apprehension 
soon turned into suspicion that Japan's success was due 
to the discriminative measures which she adopted against 
foreign interests. The trouble was, they could never tell 
what such discriminative measures were. If they only 
could do that, Japan would be but too willing to straighten 
things up to suit the American traders. But how could 
they? Discrimination there was really none. Japan 
benefited herself, as we shall presently see, only by taking 
advantage of the natural laws of trade, which were favor- 
able to her. In the case of Russia before the war there 
was substantial evidence of hindrance and obstacles which 
she laid in the path of American interest ; in the case of 
Japan discrimination is not proved, but merely suspected. 
So far as I am aware, the only charges, which have been 
made with some semblance of specification, are that Japan 
applies to Japanese goods railroad and steamship rates 
much lower than are applied to foreign merchandise. 
Yet the critics who advance such complaints unmistaka- 
bly admit that there is no evidence with which to support 
such charges. Probe however deep they may, they will 
never be able to find such evidence, for they, with all their 
creative genius, cannot produce anything from nothing. 

By 1908 the American suspicion had become so in- 
tense that the Tokio government felt constrained to take 
some measure to alleviate it. Thus the diplomatic notes 
of November of that year were exchanged between Tokio 
and Washington, asserting that the two governments 
were *• animated by a common aim, policy and intention " 
in the Pacific and in the Far East. The notes declared 
that: 



68 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

" It is the wish of the two governments to encourage 
the free and peaceful development of their commerce on 
the Pacific Ocean. 

" The policy of both governments, uninfluenced by any 
aggressive tendencies, is directed to the maintenance of 
the existing status quo in the region above mentioned, and 
to the defense of the principle of equal opportunity for 
commerce and industry in China. 

" They are accordingly firmly resolved reciprocally to 
respect the territorial possessions belonging to each other 
in said region. 

'• They are also determined to preserve the common 
interests of all powers in China by supporting by all 
pacific means at their disposal the independence and in- 
tegrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity 
for commerce and industry of all nations in that empire. 

" Should any event occur threatening the status quo as 
above described or the principle of equal opportunity as 
above defined, it remains for the two governments to 
communicate with each other in order to arrive at an un- 
derstanding as to what measures they may consider it 
useful to take." 

In entering into this understanding the Roosevelt ad- 
ministration, with Mr. Root as its Secretary of State, was 
no doubt sincere, and was willing to take Japan into con- 
fidence. But the cabinet had soon to change, and with 
it was gone Mr. Root. It seems tolerably clear that Mr. 
Root's successor, Mr. Knox, in dealing with the Manchu- 
rian question or the Central American question, has not 
exactly followed the line marked out by his predecessor 
in the State Department. It is not my place to criticize 
Mr. Knox's policy in Central and South America, but so 
far as his dealings with the Far Eastern questions are 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 69 

concerned, I am inclined to think that the Secretary of 
State has added very little to the prestige of American 
diplomacy. The Crane episode and his proposal for the 
neutralization of the Manchurian railways bear witness to 
this conclusion. 

I have no intention to make apologies for that ephem- 
eral minister to China, Mr. Charles R. Crane. Whether 
he was, as some observers think he was, led by the idea 
that he was the only choice of Mr. Taft to attach too 
much importance to himself, I do not know. What I do 
know is that Mr. Knox's manner of handling this diplo- 
mat was hardly calculated to add to his credit. If Mr. 
Crane was indiscreet in speech and unfit in other respects 
to fill the important post of a minister of a great repubHc 
to a foreign court, why not let him resign quietly without 
making so much ado ? I fail to appreciate the wisdom 
of Mr. Knox in publishing a statement of such a nature 
as would surely provoke a retort from the dismissed min- 
ister. At any rate it was an unseemly squabble that 
passed between the Secretary of State and the deposed 
minister to China. It only resulted in exposing to the 
curious, gossipy world awkward family disagreements 
that ought to have been kept private, if a great nation 
like America was to maintain its dignity before the 
powers. 

But the Crane episode is passed, and it is at least com- 
forting to think that it is fast slipping from the memory 
of the public. What is infinitely more vital is Mr. Knox's 
scheme for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways. 
Here again our Secretary of State met with sarcasm and 
even ridicule in Europe, while Japan received the proposal 
with antipathy that bordered upon indignation. Nor is 
this surprising when it is considered that Japan sacrificed 



70 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

untold treasure and countless lives for the acquisition of 
her railways in Manchuria. As for Russia, she obtained 
her gigantic railway concessions in Manchuria by mere 
bullying or wily diplomacy ; but the cost which her 
Manchurian venture has since entailed has been so enor- 
mous that she is driven to keep on playing the game in 
the hope of winning back what she has been losing. To 
Japan, her Manchurian railway holdings, though totalling 
only some 700 miles, meant a loss of 100,000 lives and 
2,000,000,000 jj/^;/, which constituted the cost of a mighty 
war upon which she staked her very existence. In the 
face of such an appalling sacrifice she made, it may well 
be conceded that she has the right, as long as she con- 
forms to the principle of the " open door," to operate her 
railways, so that the proceeds from the traffic may assist, 
if ever so little, in hghtening her financial burden entailed 
by the war. For while the Eastern Chinese Railway of 
Russia is a heavy burden upon the Russian treasury, the 
South Manchurian Railway is yielding a fair margin of 
profit. As I have already stated, China has the right to 
buy up both the Russian and Japanese lines in Manchuria 
by 1939; then it may be opportune for America, should 
she still think the game is worth the candle, to propose 
the neutralization of these railways, or, what is simpler, 
to finance China so that the latter may purchase the lines 
for herself instead of neutralizing them. " But surely we 
can't wait so long ; anything may happen before we are 
anywhere near 1939," you may retort. Yet Russia's in- 
tentions in Manchuria have undergone a marked change 
since the war, while China's foreign relations in general 
are no longer such as would allow any single power to 
absorb such a vast territory as Manchuria. As for Japan, 
she has repeatedly reassured the world of her sincere de- 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 71 

sire to respect China's sovereignty in the Three Eastern 
Provinces. You are, of course, at Hberty to suspect that 
Japan is an arch-hypocrite ; but if she is, she has not yet 
betrayed any sinister designs, which you fear may be 
behind her professed intentions. In the face of this fact, 
who can ask her to surrender her railways in Manchuria 
on the ground that she may use them for evil purposes ? 
Can any one fail to see that such a proposal puts Japan 
in an extremely embarrassing position ? She dislikes to 
turn down any formal proposal from a nation with which 
she entered into a sort of entente coj'diale, yet she cannot 
stultify herself by accepting a compact based upon the 
hypothesis that she has no intention of fulfilling her en- 
gagements with China. If the spirit of the diplomatic 
notes, exchanged between Japan and America during 
Mr. Root's incumbency in the State Department, was 
lived up to, Mr. Knox should have sounded the Japanese 
government with regard to the feasibility of the neutraliza- 
tion scheme before submitting a formal proposal to the 
powers. Apparently Mr. Knox thought it better to 
permit the Root-Takahira notes to fall into innocuous 
desuetude, else he certainly would not have acted as he 
did. 

Apart from the considerations I have mentioned, 
Russia and Japan had fairly sound reason for rejecting 
the Knox proposal— I refer to the fact that the two 
countries are solemnly pledged by treaty to abstain from 
using the Manchurian railways for military purposes. 
As I take it, Mr. Knox proposed neutralization mainly 
because the railways would thus be disabled for the 
transport of troops and munitions of war. If this be 
so, could not Russia and Japan promptly reply that so 
far as concerns their potentialities in war the Manchurian 



72 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

railways have already been neutralized ? Then, again, 
there is the consideration that Russia's Amur railway, 
which, when completed, will circumscribe the Manchurian 
frontier, will enable Russia to muster any military force 
at all points within a stone's reach of Manchuria. As for 
Japan, she has no such advantage, yet she can easily de- 
scend upon Manchuria from her bases of operation in 
Korea. It comes to this, that, neutralization or no neutral- 
ization, neither Japan nor Russia would find any difficulty 
in swooping down upon Manchuria, if she should set her 
mind to do so. The more closely we scrutinize the neu- 
tralization scheme the more insuperable do the practical 
difficulties appear. After all, the only effective guarantee 
for China's integrity lies in her ability to regenerate 
herself. 

Secretary Knox did not sit quiet under the rebuff of 
the neutralization project, but followed it up with a fresh 
project, which, if carried out, would be of more serious con- 
cern to America. This new project is that of construct- 
ing with American capital an extensive line of railway 
in Manchuria. Here again Mr. Knox is confronted by 
obstacles which seem well-nigh insurmountable. But 
before discussing the practicability of this scheme let us 
delineate the nature of the proposed railway. 

The railway is to connect Chin-chou on the south 
and Aigun on the north, tapping the Russian railway at 
Tsi-tsi-har. Chin-chou lies on the main line of the Im- 
perial Railways of North China, and is one of the im- 
portant trade entrepots in Southern Manchuria. Tsi-tsi- 
har is the capital of the province of Hei-Iung-kiang, and 
is situated in the heart of Northern Manchuria. The 
distance between the two cities will be approximately 
700 miles. Starting from Chin-chou the line will tap 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 73 

the northeastern corner of Chih-li, the metropolitan 
province of China, and following the trade routes farther 
north will traverse the eastern section of Mongolia until 
it reenters Manchuria and strikes the Eastern Chinese 
Railway near Tsi-tsi-har. At present the Liao River 
and the South Manchuria Railway are the greatest trade 
arteries for the produce of the far interior of Manchuria 
and Eastern Mongolia ; and Chang-chun, the northern 
terminus of the South Manchurian line, is aptly termed 
the clearing-house of inland Manchuria, being the dis- 
tributing centre for trade to and from Kirin, Hei-lung- 
kiang and Mongolia. In travelling that region in winter 
one is struck with the wonderful sight of string after 
string of carts proceeding from north to south all 
heavily laden with the produce of the interior, including 
beans, tobacco, hemp, dressed pigs, skins and large 
droves of black pigs, which are either unloaded at 
various railway stations, or deposited in the numerous 
pawn-shops until the Liao River opens in the spring. 
But when once the Chinchou-Tsitsihar line is con- 
structed much of this trade will inevitably be diverted to 
this new route. The line, morever, has the advantage 
of affording the shortest route from Europe to Peking 
and the great marts of commerce in China such as 
Tientsin, Shanghai, Hankow and Hongkong. 

But, as I have already indicated, the ultimate terminus 
of this hne will not be Tsi-tsi-har. It is the American 
plan to extend it as far as Aigun, on the Amur River, 
just opposite Blagovestchensk, the capital of the Russian 
province of Amur, made infamous by General Gribsky's 
wholesale massacre of 5,000 innocent Chinese in 1900. 
From a commercial point of view the Tsitsihar-Aigun 
section will be of little value, but it is strategical con- 



74 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

siderations which actuated America to plan its construc- 
tion, as it will no doubt have the effect of safeguarding 
the northern border of Manchuria, which was constantly 
encroached upon by Russia. All in all the proposed 
American railway will measure some i,ooo miles. The 
project, like Mr. Knox's ill-fated neutralization scheme, 
bears the mark of that bold spirit of speculation, which 
seems to be the impelling force of the American in- 
dustrial world. 

In the execution of this gigantic project America must 
overcome the objection which Russia has offered against 
it. It was also feared that Japan might join hands with 
Russia in the effort to prevent the construction of the 
railway, because of the fact that, in virtue of the protocol 
annexed to the Chino-Japanese Treaty of 1905, China 
relinquished the right to build any railway which might 
prove prejudicial to the interest of the South Manchurian 
Railway. But this apprehension has been dispelled by 
the announcement that Japan will indorse the project on 
the condition that China allow Japan to build a hne to 
effect a junction between the South Manchurian system 
and the projected Chino-American Hne. On the other 
hand, Russian objection is of more vigorous nature. 
She contends that there is a treaty with China, in virtue 
of which she has the right to veto such a scheme as has 
been launched by America. To this China retorts that 
the privilege, which Russia claims she still enjoys, was 
virtually nullified by reason of the fact that Russia failed 
to protect her railways against the Japanese during the 
late war. Whether that treaty stipulation is binding or 
not, the fact remains that the proposed Chino-American 
line must tap, and make a junction with, the Eastern 
Chinese Railway, which cannot be done without Russia's 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 75 

consent. But the granting of such a consent would mean 
to Russia the abandonment of her cherished hope of 
making the Eastern Chinese Railway the trunk Hne in 
the great trans-continental system, and thus make the 
Vladivostok the first port for commerce and intercourse 
between Europe and the Far East. The Russian Railway 
and Vladivostok have already keenly felt the competition 
of the South Manchurian Railway and the port of 
Tairen. The addition of another line, whose advantages 
promise to eclipse even those of the South Manchurian 
Railway, seems certain to deprive the Russian line of 
much of its raison d'etre. 

Here it seems important to note British attitude 
towards the Chino-American project. In launching this 
project the Washington administration paid due respect 
to British interests in the region through which the line 
is to be built, and invited British firms to cooperate with 
the American syndicate which is to finance the railway. 
But England, on her part, is, by reason of her particularly 
cordial relations with both Russia and Japan, in honor 
bound to refrain from taking any active part m a scheme 
which runs counter to the interest of either one of these 
powers. This point was raised in the House of Com- 
mons on March 23, 1910, when Sir W. J. Bull queried 
whether the cabinet's policy in the Far East would be 
modified so as not to obstruct Anglo-American interests. 
Replying to this question Sir Edward Grey, Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, said that Great Britain must pay due 
regard to the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1899, which 
forbade her to accept the American invitation with re- 
gard to the Chinchou-Aigun Railway. Sir Edward 
added that to interpret this attitude as jeopardizing 
Anglo-American interests in Manchuria was an entire 



76 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

misapprehension, and explained that America had been 
kept fully informed of the British view of the matter, 
with which she was obviously satisfied. 

Mr. Willard Straight, who resigned the post of American 
Consul-General at Mukden to become the adviser to the 
American syndicate which broached the Chinchou-Aigun 
Railway scheme, was in St. Petersburg in the effort to 
persuade Russia to indorse the project. Apparently his 
efforts were crowned with little success. Russia, instead 
of consenting to the scheme, proposed to the Chinese 
government that, as the alternative to the Chinchou- 
Aigun line, she be allowed to build a railway from a 
point on the Siberian line near Lake Baikal, by way of 
Urga and Kiakta, to Kalgan, where it will join the Chi- 
nese line leading to Peking. The concession for this 
line was secured some years ago, but was later virtually 
abandoned as its construction could not be justified as a 
commercial undertaking. With the . launching of the 
fresh Chino-American scheme, however, Russia resusci- 
tated the old concession, claiming that the Kiakta-Kalgan 
line is much preferable to the Chinchou-Aigun line. 

That America is quite anxious to carry out the Chin- 
chou-Aigun Railway scheme is indicated by the change 
of its attitude towards Russia with regard to the payment 
of taxes by Americans residing in Harbin. In 1908 the 
American consul at Harbin protested against the Russian 
measure, requiring American residents within the Rus- 
sian municipality there to pay taxes in the same manner 
as did the Chinese and Russians. The American gov- 
ernment, indorsing the consul's action, consistently de- 
clined to recognize the validity of the Russian measure, 
until it launched the Chinchou-Aigun Railway project. 
It may have been merely a coincidence, but it is interest- 



AMERICAN POLICY IN MANCHURIA 77 

ing to note that almost simultaneously with Mr. Straight's 
arrival in St. Petersburg as the representative of the New 
York syndicate interested in that railway scheme, Ameri- 
ca's attitude towards the taxation question in Harbin 
changed perceptibly. By the middle of June last, the 
Washington administration was willing to recede from 
its former position, and through Minister Calhoun at 
Peking instructed the American consul at Harbin not to 
remonstrate with the Russian authorities with regard to 
the taxation of American residents there. This conces- 
sion on the part of America may not have had anything 
to do with the new railway scheme, but it is significant 
that the semi-official Novoe VremyUy commenting upon 
this new move of America's, refers to the Chinchou- 
Aigun Railway question in these words : 

" The Chinchou-Aigun Railway concession, whose thin 
edge was directed against Russia, appears in a changed 
aspect as a subject for future negotiations, as Russia has 
no reason to distrust American enterprises in the Far 
East, once American hostility has been permanently 
abandoned." 

American objection to the Russian measure above 
mentioned was based upon the assumption that it was in 
violation of Chinese sovereignty within the railway zone. 
But the apparently altruistic view, which America at first 
advanced with regard to the taxation question in Harbin, is 
now cast into the winds. And yet it is extremely doubt- 
ful whether America will ultimately secure what she has 
been coveting. So far as I am able to judge, Russian 
attitude towards the Chinchou-Aigun Railway question 
has not changed, in spite of the American compromise. 



IV 

CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 

AT the outset of the present discussion I con- 
tended that China's attitude towards Japan has 
been one of ingratitude and insincerity. It is 
a grave charge, and I feel in honor bound to prove it. 
That this point should be clearly brought home to the 
reader seems all the more desirable inasmuch as the 
American pubhc, by reason of want of accurate informa- 
tion, has been led to believe that it is Japan, rather than 
China, which is really to blame in the disputes over vari- 
ous questions relating to Manchuria. It is regrettable 
that the Americans are utterly oblivious to the fact that 
China has been flirting with their country for the evil 
purpose of embroiling America with Japan. For a while 
China conspired to estrange Great Britain from Japan, but 
the mandarins failed to remember that the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance was established upon too solid a foundation to be 
affected by their transparent manoeuvres. Her first designs 
having proved abortive, China has cast her coquettish 
eyes towards America. Woe betide those good, credu- 
lous Americans who really believe that China is wooing 
their country with all her heart and soul ! In the hands 
of the mandarins America is like an inexperienced youth 
before a veteran courtesan. China has never taken any 
foreign nation into confidence, but has always plotted to 
make capital out of suspicion and distrust among foreign 
nations, thus hoping to balance the activities of one na- 

78 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 79 

tion against those of another, and so to nulHfy the effects 
of both within her sphere. For this perverted method 
of diplomacy China alone is not to blame ; more to blame 
are those Western nations which during the past half 
century exploited China at the expense of her own in- 
tegrity and welfare. 

What wonder that China, thus abused and maltreated 
these many years, is irrevocably wedded to the idea that 
foreigners are all creatures of fair mien but of evil spirit ? 
Yet the fact remains that this spurious idea often entails 
deplorable effects to China herself, and works serious 
mischief to those foreign powers which are sincerely anx- 
ious for the rehabilitation of her affairs. When a farmer 
attempted to rope up a shaky barrel in which a hen was 
sitting on a nest full of eggs, the silly fowl mistook him 
for a mischievous youngster and flew in his face. The 
fowl may have been innocent, but the farmer had to take 
proper steps to protect himself. Japan's attitude towards 
China with regard to the Manchurian question has 
been the attitude of the farmer who shielded himself from 
the silly hen. Let us see. 

The characteristic Chinese method of diplomacy is 
most conspicuously exemplified in the case of the Shin- 
mintung-Fakumen Railway controversy, in which China 
and Japan, and to a lesser degree England, were involved. 
For a while at least the controversy was, at the hands of 
the British and American press, made an occasion for 
censuring Japan's uncompromising attitude. When the 
history of the question, and the intrigues and designs in- 
volved in it, are clearly known, the public will be able to 
judge more intelligently whether or not Japan's position 
was justifiable in the light of fairness and equity. 

In the spring of 1907 the Chinese government broached 



8o AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

the scheme of constructing a railway line from Shin-min- 
tung to Fa-ku-men in extension of the Shanghaikwan- 
Shinmintung section of the Imperial Railways of North 
China. The plan was so secretly made that Japan did 
not even suspect it until August of that year, when ne- 
gotiations between the Peking government and the Brit- 
ish firm of Pauling and Company for the construction of 
that railway were well under way. If China had enter- 
tained any respect for an engagement contained in the 
protocol annexed to the Peking Treaty of December, 
1905, she would have abstained from conceiving such a 
scheme, or at any rate would have consulted Japan before 
taking any measures towards its execution. The engage- 
ment referred to reads as follows : 

" The Chinese government engage for the purpose of 
protecting the interests of the South Manchuria Railway, 
not to construct, prior to the recovery by them of the 
said railway, any main line in the neighborhood of and 
parallel to that railway, or any branch line which would 
be prejudicial to the interest of the above mentioned 
railway." 

Upon the strength of this provision the Tokio govern- 
ment warned the mandarinate government that the Shin- 
mintung-Fakumen scheme would not be acceptable to 
Japan. The friendly warning apparently made no im- 
pression upon China, for the latter proceeded with the 
plan as if Japan had said no word about it. Japan, 
though chagrined by this arrogant attitude of China, was 
nevertheless patient enough to repeat the same warning 
in October in a kindly manner, only to receive an evasive 
reply thoroughly characteristic of China. Japan's mag- 
nanimity was not yet exhausted, and in November she for 
the third time reminded China of the above-mentioned en- 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 8l 

gagement, in the same gracious manner as before. Instead 
of heeding this repeated warning the authorities at Peking 
secretly concluded a contract with Pauling and Company, 
almost simultaneously with the receipt of the third warn- 
ing from Tokio. Secrecy so profound was maintained 
that it was only towards the end of January, 1908, that 
Japan detected the conclusion of the deal. Can a more 
flagrant case of discourtesy, spitefulness and treachery in 
diplomacy be imagined ? Japan had acquired her Man- 
churian railways with an appalling sacrifice, which she 
braved on behalf of China as much as of herself, and the 
acquisition was unequivocally recognized and confirmed 
by China in the Peking Treaty of December, 1905. In 
the face of this fact, Japan was fully justified in requiring 
China not to build any railway which might prove inim- 
ical to the interests of the South Manchuria Railway. 
Suppose Japan had not dared to combat Russia, what 
would have become of Manchuria, and indeed of China ? 
With the Three Eastern Provinces irretrievably lost to 
China, other powers would not have hesitated to follow 
the suit of Russia and slice for themselves such regions 
as they had fixed their covetous eyes on. The defeat of 
Russia at the point of the Japanese bayonet, therefore, 
meant the prevention of the dismemberment of China, 
which would have become imminent had the Muscovite 
been allowed to stay in Manchuria. Sagacious as they 
were, the mandarins apparently did not think it worth 
while to take this vital point into consideration, and de- 
liberately taunted the Japanese, ignoring the understand- 
ing which they had put themselves on record as approv- 
ing of. The railway project was in itself unjust enough, 
but when its ulterior aim is considered, it appears worse 
than unjust. But before entering into the evil designs 



82 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

concealed in the project, let us inquire whether Japan's 
contention on the question was warranted. 

The contract for the construction of the Shinmin- 
tung-Fakumen Railway having become an accomplished 
fact, Japan was forced to abandon the hope of settling 
the matter in a friendly manner without recourse to 
diplomacy ; it remained for her only to lodge with the 
Chinese government a formal protest against the execu- 
tion of the contract. It was a delicate matter for Japan 
to handle, as one of the parties to the railway contract 
was a firm of the country with which she was in alliance. 
The firm freely utilized such British newspapers as were 
unkindly inclined towards Japan, and thus spread broad- 
cast news of Japan's alleged violation of the " open door " 
principle. The exploitation of the British press by 
the promoters of the Shinmintung-Fakumen Railway 
proved so successful that the mistaken conception of the 
scheme soon overleaped the Atlantic and found expres- 
sion in American newspapers. But amid warnings, 
alarms and protests voiced by misinformed British 
journals, Downing Street remained unmoved, fully rec- 
ognizing the justifiabihty of the attitude Japan had as- 
sumed. Nor did the British government fail to detect 
the sinister motive ill-concealed in the apparently inno- 
cent project. 

It is indeed difficult to see how the British government 
could have acted otherwise. The idea of inserting in a 
railway agreement with China an article forbidding the 
construction of competitive hues to a railway owned by 
a foreign nation is not new ; it was not invented by 
Japan. On the contrary, Japan merely adopted a prec- 
edent established by other powers participating in rail- 
way enterprise in China. The Russo-Chinese convention 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 83 

of April 8, 1902, contains an article providing that in 
case an extension of the Shanghaikwan-Shinmintung 
line, or the construction of branch hnes in Southern 
Manchuria is to be undertaken, the matter shall be pre- 
viously arranged by an understanding between the St. 
Petersburg and Peking governments. Another instance 
of similar nature is found in the Russo-Chinese agree- 
ment of 1898, relative to the construction of the Cheng- 
ting- Taiyuan Railway. Article 5 of that agreement 
reads as follows : 

" During the whole thirty years, or while the loan is 
unredeemed, the high authorities of Shansi shall interdict 
the construction of another railway or other mechanical 
means of transport between Cheng-ting and Tai-yuan, as 
such would be detrimental to the interest of this railway." 

A third instance is furnished by the American-China 
Development Company, which on July 13, 1900, signed 
an agreement with the Chinese government, containing 
the following article : 

" Without the express consent in writing of the direct- 
or-general and the American company, no other rival 
railway detrimental to the business of same is to be per- 
mitted, and no parallel roads to the Canton-Hankow line 
are to be allowed to the injury of the latter's interest, 
within the area served by the Canton-Hankow main line 
or branch lines." 

In the agreements of July, 1903, and of March, 1907, 
both between China and the British and Chinese Corpo- 
ration, Limited, — one providing for the construction of 
the Shanghai-Nanking Railway, the other the Canton- 
Kowloon Railway — we find a similar provision. Lastly, 
Germany, in virtue of her Kiaochou agreements with 
China, claims the exclusive right of railway exploitation 



84 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

in the province of Shantung. If Germany, Russia, 
America, and Great Britain, which obtained their rail- 
way concessions without sacrificing anything and with- 
out giving China anything in recognition thereof — if 
these powers are justified in imposing upon China the 
restriction which we have noted, how much more justi- 
fied must Japan be in claiming a similar privilege with 
regard to her Manchurian railways, after restoring to 
China the vast territory of Manchuria. 

It remains for us to inquire whether the proposed 
Shinmintung-Fakumen line was of a nature to jeop- 
ardize the interest of the South Manchuria Railway. This 
question cannot be determined by merely considering 
the distance which separates the South Manchurian line 
from the proposed railway. More important than mere 
distance are topographical considerations. Thus a rail- 
way, entering a valley, undivided by any impassable 
streams and already occupied and actually served in all 
its parts by another line, would, if running parallel with 
and at a distance of thirty or forty miles from the origi- 
nal line and bidding for a share in its traffic, be clearly 
regarded as in the neighborhood of and detrimental to 
the established line. On the other hand, a railway sep- 
arated from another by a mountain range could not be 
considered as in the neighborhood of such other line, 
even if within ten or fifteen miles of it. Now the dis- 
tance between the main line of the South Manchuria 
system and the contemplated line is in many points con- 
siderably less than thirty five miles, and in few places 
more than that. Thus from Shin-min-tung to Mukden 
it is about thirty-two miles ; from Fa-ku-men to Tieh-ling 
twenty-seven miles ; and from Shin-tai-tsu on the South 
Manchuria Une to the nearest point on the proposed line 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 85 

is only twenty-four miles. True, the Liao River trav- 
erses the region lying between the South Manchuria 
line and the proposed railway ; but the stream forms no 
natural traffic boundary, as it is easily passable. As a 
matter of fact it is readily ascertained that the existing 
Japanese line serves the territory both to the right and 
to the left of the Liao. Produce in large quantities is 
conveyed from the Fa-ku-men regions to Tieh-ling in 
Chinese carts, and thence is carried southward by the 
South Manchuria Railway. Especially is this true in the 
winter season when the rivers are frozen over, and the 
whole country becomes one broad smooth highway. 
The logical conclusion of it all is that the Shinmintung- 
Fakumen line, if materialized, will draw away from the 
existing Japanese line no small portion of its traffic. Sir 
Alexander Hosie, acting commercial attache to the Brit- 
ish Legation at Peking, writing recently on the commer- 
cial situation in Manchuria, said : 

" It is true that the Imperial Railways of North China 
are competing successfully with the Japanese Une from 
Newchwang to Mukden." 

If this be true under the existing conditions, it cannot 
be doubted that with an extension of the Chinese Hne 
there would be at least a corresponding extension of 
competition. 

Such was the nature of the Shinmintung-Fakumen 
Railway, and yet Japan's attitude was far from uncom- 
promising. Thus in February, 1908, she proposed that 
she would indorse the project, if China would promise to 
extend the line to Tieh-ling or some other suitable point 
on the South Manchuria Railway. The Japanese com- 
promise was suggested by the fear of probable extension 
of the Shinmintung-Fakumen line to the region farther 



86 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

north. The Chinese themselves seemed to attach greater 
importance to its eventual extension to Tsi-tsi-har or 
some other important point in Northern Manchuria, than 
to the Shinmintung-Fakumen line as such. Once such 
extension is realized, the South Manchuria Railway must 
entirely lose its 7'aison d'etre^ and it was with the object 
of obviating the danger of such extension that Japan 
offered the compromise that she did. It was a reason- 
able proposal, and yet China, turning a deaf ear to it, 
forthwith proposed that the question be submitted to the 
tribunal at the Hague. Japan, of course, could not meekly 
accept China's new proposal, after having been slighted, 
defied, and taunted by the mandarins. So the matter 
came to a deadlock, and there it stood until China, 
towards the summer of 1909, virtually abandoned the 
scheme. By that time China had been given to under- 
stand that the British government could not favor a 
scheme which was calculated to run counter to the inter- 
est of its ally, even if the scheme was promoted by its 
own subjects. The British newspapers, too, had awak- 
ened to the real significance of the question, and had be- 
gun to doubt China's sincerity. Thus the London Times, 
which in the early stage of the controversy was inclined 
to support China, so signally modified its opinion towards 
the summer of 1909 as to publish the following editorial 
comment : 

" Japan's right to veto the construction of a competi- 
tive line cannot be disputed either by China, who signed 
the protocol of December, 1909, or by Great Britain, to 
whom the protocol was communicated without her rais- 
ing objections. . . . There is little doubt that one 
of China's objects in handling the Manchurian question 
has been and is to create friction between Japan and 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 87 

Other powers. By giving to the British the contract of 
the Fa-ku-men Railway after having been informed that 
Japan would regard the scheme as a violation of the 
protocol of 1905, China doubtless hoped to embroil 
Great Britain with Japan. In this they were disap- 
pointed. The alliance and friendship with Japan are 
based too firmly on the interests of both countries to be 
seriously affected by such transparent manoeuvres." 

Nor was the Times the only British journal which dis- 
cerned China's ulterior motive in putting forward the 
Shinmintung-Fakumen Railway scheme. Several other 
newspapers, notably the Globe and the Pall Mall^ dealt 
with the question much in the same spirit as did the 
Times. Verily, the railway project was little more than 
a dummy behind which lurked a dastardly intrigue aimed 
at the estrangement of Japan and England. It was the 
old story — China tried to set ally against ally, and sow 
seed of dissension among powers, vainly fancying that 
the weakening of friendship among foreign nations would 
proportionately strengthen her own position. Such a 
perverted method of diplomacy cannot long be per- 
mitted to prevail, and it is time that China should learn 
to take diplomacy more seriously to heart. But China 
has not, and she is now trying to alienate American 
sympathy from Japan. 

In June, 1907, the United States made a stupendous 
gift to China in the form of the reHnquishment of her 
claim to the Boxer indemnity. This measure was taken 
undoubtedly with the object of winning back China's 
good-will, which the United States had lost through the 
outrages committed upon the Chinese on the Pacific 
Coast. About this time Japan's commercial strides in 
Manchuria aroused much anxiety and suspicion in 



88 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

America. The Chinese diplomats, with characteristic 
astuteness and sagacity, were not slow to read the signs 
of the times, and set their minds to make the most of 
them. By utihzing American distrust of Japan on the 
one hand, and on the other playing up to the American 
desire to befriend China, the mandarins fancied that the 
United States could be used to undermine Japanese in- 
fluence in Manchuria. The apostle of this apparently 
shrewd diplomacy was Tang Shao-yi, the right-hand 
man of the then all-powerful Yuan Shi-kai. Tang 
Shao-yi also it was who conceived the Shinmintung- 
Fakumen Railway scheme which we have just described. 
Trained in modern jurisprudence and political science in 
one of the highest seats of learning in America, the 
Honorable Tang was nevertheless too closely allied with 
the traditions of his country to break with the perverted 
foreign policy of China. Seeing that his game in the 
Shinmintung-Fakumen Railway scheme was lost, he 
cast his eyes across the Pacific and set his mind to try 
his hand in America. Through his master Yuan Shi-kai, 
Tang succeed in persuading the Peking court to send 
him to America as special envoy to thank the Washing- 
ton government for its magnanimity in waiving the 
Boxer indemnity. The envoy with a large suite arrived 
in Washington in the fall of 1908, when the Roosevelt 
administration was still in office. Apparently, the 
envoy's mission was innocent enough, but Tang Shao-yi 
had a scheme. Simultaneously with his arrival in 
America, the New York Herald abruptly began to 
advocate an American-Chinese alliance much of the 
same nature as the Anglo-Japanese alliance. It seemed 
to augur well for the Chinese diplomat. He must have 
passed many a happy night, dreaming of a union be- 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 89 

tween the greatest republic and the oldest empire on 
earth. But his dreams were not to come true. Like a 
thunderbolt out of the blue sky came the Root-Takahira 
notes of November, 1908, affirming Japan's friendship 
with America. That was a crushing blow to Tang's 
cherished ambition, but the worst was yet in store for 
him. Early in 1909, while Tang Shao-yi was still 
sojourning in America, the most startling news came 
from the Far East — Yuan Shi-kai had been deposed ! 
With his master and patron at home stripped of author- 
ity, what could Tang Shao-yi do here in America? 
Nothing but leave the country with what dignity and 
grace he might, and hurry back to the hoary capital of 
China where a great political drama was then being 
enacted. Thus ended the American " mission " of Tang 
Shao-yi. 

But Tang's efforts proved not entirely abortive. The 
Chinese government, whether adopting his idea or not, 
followed the policy of injecting American influence into 
the Manchurian situation. Meanwhile, Mr. Taft's suc- 
cession to Mr. Roosevelt seemed not unfavorable to the 
realization of the Chinese scheme. Mr. Knox, whose 
intimacy with Wall Street is well known, was ready to 
back a group of money kings, who conceived the idea 
of investing on Chinese and Manchurian railways some 
of the dollars that were overflowing their pockets. So 
the pet scheme of China suited the new policy of 
America. The result was the launching of the Chin- 
chou-Aigun Railway scheme, which I have fully de- 
scribed in the foregoing chapter. The Chinchou-Aigun 
Railway scheme is virtually the substitute for the Shin- 
mintung-Fakumen Railway scheme ; only the new proj- 
ect is divested of those features of the older one which 



90 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

were objected to by Japan. As I have stated, the Chin- 
chou-Aigun line, if constructed, will deprive the South 
Manchuria Railway of much of its business, but inasmuch 
as the line will not run quite as near the Japanese line as 
the Shinmintung-Fakumen line was to run, Japan felt 
obliged to indorse the project, as she actually has. It 
would have served China's purpose more admirably had 
Japan provoked America's ill-feeling by joining hands 
with Russia in the effort to veto the scheme. 

So much for the Shinmintung-Fakumen Railway 
scheme, and its offspring the Chinchou-Aigun Railway 
project. Now we must consider the Antung-Mukden 
Railway controversy which is equally illustrative of 
Chinese diplomacy. As has been observed, the Antung- 
Mukden line was a light military railway with a gauge 
of two feet six inches. To meet the exigencies of the 
war it was constructed hastily. To avoid the construction 
of tunnels and bridges, for instance, the line was given 
many wide detours and steep gradients, as well as many 
sharp curves. In consequence there was frequent danger 
of derailment. The hauling capacity of the engines was 
very small, three or four small passenger and freight 
cars constituting a maximum train. Where the grades 
were steep, even these short trains had to be divided into 
two or three separate hauls. All the way the trains ran 
at a dog trot, and as night traffic on such a line was im- 
practicable, the transit between Antung and Mukden, 
though only 1 88 miles distant, required two full days. 

To obviate this inconvenience and danger, Japan, by 
the arrangement complementary to the Peking Treaty of 
December, 1905, obtained the right to improve the road 
so as to make it fit for commercial purposes. As soon as 
Japan was in a position to undertake the reconstruction 




CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 9I 

of the line, she opened informal negotiations with China, 
hoping that the Peking court would be disposed to make 
necessary arrangements in a friendly manner and with no 
recourse to diplomatic tactics. In this, however, Japan 
was sorely disappointed, and the Tokio administration, in 
January, 1909, formally proposed to China that commis- 
sioners be dispatched to survey the route. With the 
exception of a small section of some twenty miles between 
Mukden and Chen-siang-tun, the surveying work was 
completed in April, and the duly authorized Chinese 
commissioners expressed themselves perfectly satisfied 
with the result. Thereupon Japan proposed that con- 
struction be commenced in the already surveyed section, 
so that the line would be made available as speedily as 
possible as a connecting link between the Korean and 
South Manchurian systems in the great inter-continental 
line. 

Instead of assenting to this reasonable proposal, China 
tried to prolong the pourparlers indefinitely on one 
excuse or another. Evading Japan's demand, she pro- 
posed that Japan should relinquish the right of policing 
the railway zone, and completely withdraw her railway 
guards along the line in question, ignoring that both 
these rights were conceded to Japan by the Peking Treaty 
of 1905. Worse still, the Chinese government on July 
24th sent to Japan a most incomprehensible note, declaring 
that the work of improvement on the said line must be 
confined to the existing track, and that no broadening of 
the gauge would be permitted. Such a restriction, if 
concurred in, would have completely nullified the provi- 
sion of the agreement of 1905, as well as the result of the 
survey accepted by the Chinese commissioners. Japan, 
chagrined as she was, patiently and in a friendly manner 



92 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

tried to convince China of the unjustifiability of such 
proposals, and yet China maintained the same evasive at- 
titude, until Japan's patience was exhausted. China's 
performance, from beginning to end, was characterized by 
apathy, insincerity, subterfuge, dilly-dallying, and utter 
disregard of treaty obligations. Certainly no nation can 
be expected to be more patient than Japan was. Japan 
was thoroughly justified in addressing to China the so- 
called " ultimatum " of August 6, 1909, declaring that she 
would proceed with the reconstruction work in spite of 
China's objection. It was no doubt a bitter pill for China 
to swallow, but in the life of a nation, as in the life of an 
individual, there are times when medicine is absolutely 
necessary. But did China swallow the medicine? No, 
she mistook it for poison, and submitting to her chronic 
weakness of trickery, she addressed to the powers a note, 
declaring that it was Japan, not China, which violated 
treaty obligations. 

The Japanese coup, however, was not entirely without 
good effects upon Chino-Japanese relations. Even the 
callous mandarins were forced to ponder upon the signi- 
fication of the incident, and to feel that they must take 
diplomacy more seriously. At any rate it materially 
assisted in bringing into speedy termination negotiations 
that had long been outstanding between China and Japan 
on various questions relating to Manchuria. The result 
was the conclusion of the two conventions of September 
4, 1909. The first of these conventions is called the 
" Convention relating to Manchuria," and the second the 
*' Convention relating to Chien-tao." 

First as to the Manchurian convention. Article I of 
this document disposes of the long mooted question of 
the Shinmintung-Fakumen Railway. At last China 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 93 

definitely relinquished the right of constructing the said 
line without first consulting Japan. In the second place, 
the convention recognizes Japan's right to bring the 
terminus of the Tashichao-Newchwang branch of the 
South Manchuria Railway closer to the city of New- 
chwang than it is now located. This is a necessary 
sequel to the Peking treaty, which provides that China 
and Japan, ♦' with a view to promote and facilitate inter- 
course and traffic, will conclude as soon as possible a 
separate convention for the regulation of connecting 
services between the railway line in South Manchuria and 
all the other railway lines in China." Thirdly, China 
confirms Japan's right to work the coal mines in the 
Fushun and Yentai districts, and agrees to exploit in con- 
junction with Japan such mines as may be found in other 
districts along the lines of the South Manchuria Railway. 
This, again, is nothing but the reassertion of a provision 
in the Peking treaty, wherein China consented ** to all 
transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan," and 
wherein Japan agreed to conform, " in the matter of rail- 
way construction and exploitation," ** to the original 
agreements between China and Russia " ; and Russia in 
connection with her railway concession in Manchuria en- 
joyed the privilege of exploiting mineral resources within 
the railway zones. It must not be understood that this 
creates a mining monopoly for China and Japan along 
the South Manchuria Railway lines. As the provision 
was couched in terms whose exact meaning was not quite 
clear, the United States inquired of the Chinese and 
Japanese governments whether the high contracting 
parties meant to reserve mines along the South Manchuria 
Railway lines exclusively to themselves ; to which China 
and Japan replied that such was not the intention. 



94 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

From the above statement it will be seen that the 
Manchurian convention gives Japan no fresh privileges, 
as was universally presumed by the American press at 
the time of its conclusion. On the other hand, Japan by 
the same instrument made an important concession in 
favor of China in that she agreed to pay to the latter a 
certain amount of tax upon the output of the Fushun and 
Yentai coal mines. 

The " Convention relating to Chien-tao," as the title 
indicates, deals with the long-disputed district of Chien- 
tao. This territory which lies, roughly speaking, between 
the River Tumen, which empties into the Japan Sea, and 
the Chang-pai Mountains, is divided into two parts, 
Eastern and Western ; and it is Eastern Chien-tao, with 
an area of some 1,550 square miles, which was disputed 
by Japan in behalf of Korea. Owing to the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of its population were Koreans, 
the territory seems to have been claimed both by China 
and by Korea for many years before Japan established a 
protectorate over the peninsula. At the latest computa- 
tion there were in the country some 83,000 Koreans as 
against only 27,000 Chinese. When the Japanese au- 
thorities undertook to protect this Korean population, 
they found somewhere at the foot of the Chang-pai range 
a stone tablet, the inscription on which clearly showed 
that it was planted on May 15, 171 2, during the reign of 
the first emperor of the present Chinese dynasty, in order 
to fix the boundary between Korea and Manchuria. The 
inscription stated that the representatives of the two 
countries agreed that the River Tumen on the east and 
the River Yalu on the west be made the line of delimita- 
tion between the Korean and Chinese territories. Now, 
there are in that region two rivers whose names, though 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 95 

written in different Chinese characters, are both pro- 
nounced " Tumen." One Tumen is a tributary of the 
great Sungari River, the other Tumen empties into the 
Japan Sea. That the river named in the inscription was 
the Sungari branch was evident from the characters used, 
and in the absence of further evidence, and upon the 
strength of various data favorable to Korea, Japan pre- 
sumed that the territory known as Eastern Chien-tao 
rightfully belonged to Korea. 

In the later stage of the negotiation, however, China 
seems to have produced new evidence purporting to 
nullify the above-mentioned delimitation. This evidence 
was not quite convincing to Japan ; but, anxious to 
maintain amicable relationship with China, the Mikado's 
empire renounced her claim, and recognized Chinese 
sovereignty in the territory. In consideration of this 
concession, China agreed to extend the Kirin-Changchun 
Railway to the Korean town of Hoi-ryong, and to bor- 
row from Japan one-half of the fund required for this 
work. The important nature of this railway has been 
fully described in a previous chapter. Japan also per- 
suaded China, in the convention under review, to open 
four towns and villages in Chien-tao to international 
trade and residence, which will prove a material contri- 
bution to the " open door." 

A casual observer may find in this Chien-tao conven- 
tion an objectionable feature in that it authorizes the 
Japanese consular official to attend the Chinese court in 
the hearing of either civil or criminal cases relating to 
Korean subjects residing in Chien-tao, and requires the 
Chinese authorities to previously notify the Japanese 
consul where cases affect the lives of Korean subjects. 
As a matter of fact, this privilege conceded to the Japa- 



96 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

nese is a very mild form of what is commonly called ex- 
territoriality. It has been the custom of all civiHzed 
nations to maintain exterritoriality in a country whose 
administrative and judicial system is not up to their own 
standards. In virtue of that usage people from advanced 
countries residing in a backward country are above the 
native law, but subject to the jurisdiction of their own 
consular courts. In China it was the British who first 
exacted the grant of a concession in the open ports, 
within which their consuls should have chief, if not ex- 
clusive, authority not only over the British subjects but 
also over the Chinese population. Other nations soon 
obtained the same privilege. Even where no special 
quarter was thus marked out as a " settlement," the 
foreign subject was exempt from control by the local 
Chinese authorities, but was controlled by his own consul. 
Japan might have demanded the right of exterritori- 
ality for the Korean subjects in Chien-tao, for Korea 
under Japanese rule had already adopted an efficient 
modern system of law courts. But considering peculiar 
circumstances existing in Chien-tao, she recognized the 
jurisdiction of the Chinese court over Koreans, reserving 
only the right to protest against such decisions as she 
might believe to be rendered in disregard of law. Even 
this moderate concession must be distasteful to the Chinese 
government, but it is inevitable so long as China remains 
in its present unstable state. She is still on probation, 
and the only way to recover the exercise of her sovereign 
rights is to show herself worthy of confidence, not by 
indiscreet anti-foreign agitation, but by the thorough- 
going renovation of her internal conditions. China ought 
to learn a lesson from the experience of her little neigh- 
bor Japan. The Sunrise Empire had her period of pro- 



I 



CHINESE DIPLOMACY IN MANCHURIA 97 

bation, when exterritoriality fixed upon her the stigma 
of inferiority ; but when she had proved her right to a 
place in the comity of nations, with good laws adminis- 
tered, foreign powers were forced to allow her the exercise 
of all the prerogatives of sovereignty. By pursuing the 
course followed by Japan, and by abandoning her petty 
diplomacy of sowing dissension among powers, and by 
this alone, can China hope to put an end to the unperium 
in imperio, which the powers have set up within her 
borders in the form of " settlements," consular courts, the 
policing of railway zones, and the like. As a Chinese 
proverb has it, " Heaven helps no one who does not help 
himself." It is a law stern and merciless, but there is no 
escape from it, so long as we live in this hard world of 
ours. 



V 

RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA 



"^HE recent attitude of Japan towards Russia 
has been a subject of much severe criticism in 
America, and it seems proper that the real 
status of Russo-Japanese relations with regard to the 
Manchurian question should be laid clear before the 
Americans. The most widely quoted of such criticisms 
is, I believe, Mr. Jacob H. Schiff's address made before 
the Republican Club of New York City in February last. 
As reported by newspapers, the speech was a downright 
prediction of an American-Japanese war over the Man- 
churian question; but it may not be fair to judge his 
views from miscellaneous versions of his address that 
found their way to the columns of newspapers. Let us 
hear Mr. Schiff himself explain, in a letter to the Japan 
Advertiser y an American daily in Yokohama, what he 
really did say : 

" It can certainly not give any satisfaction to the 
American people, when they find Japan, to whom they 
had lent their undeserved support in her desperate strug- 
gle for self-preservation hardly more than a decade ago, 
joining hands, under the protection of England, with her 
erstwhile foe who sought to crush her, and thus combine 
against the forces of civilization, who wish to see estab- 
lished a strong, self-reliant China, rather than an impor- 
tant vassal state, a second India. America will be the 
last to deny Japan's dearly purchased right to work out 

98 



RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA 99 

its manifest destiny on the Asiatic continent, but Japan 
must not seek to do this by acting in unison with Russia, 
whose methods of government are not such that its bless- 
ings ought to be permitted to be extended beyond its own 
borders." 

There is, I concede, some truth in Mr. Schiff's asser- 
tion, but it is the kind of truth that does not bear close 
scrutiny. Certainly Mr. Schiff cannot expect Japan to 
keep on fighting, or even antagonizing Russia indefinitely 
simply because the Russian method of diplomacy or 
system of government is not, judged by the standards of 
other civilized countries, what it ought to be. We did 
not fight Russia much in the same spirit as a Christian 
missionary would fight a heathen religion. To protect 
our legitimate interests both in Korea and in Manchuria, 
and to safeguard our existence, to which Russian descent 
upon those countries was certain to spell a menace — that 
was the only reason we had to measure swords with the 
Muscovites. Russia's method of dealing with the Jewish 
race, her persecution of political convicts, her dreadful 
exile system in frozen Siberia, her traditional policy of 
keeping her peasants ignorant and downtrodden, her 
absolute system of government which is wrapped in a 
cloak of constitutionalism too thin to conceal the real 
figure under it — all these and more the Japanese do not 
care to emulate any more than Mr. Schiff does. But that 
was not the reason why we ventured upon a mighty con- 
flict upon the issue of which seemed to hang our ex- 
istence. 

We extremely disliked the Russian method of diplo- 
macy before the war. Then subterfuge and insincerity 
characterized her attitude towards us. This was because 
the Muscovites underestimated our prowess, miUtary and 



lOO AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Otherwise, and failed to realize how firm our determina- 
tion was. To them, Japan was a nation of *' yellow 
monkeys," which need not be taken seriously in diplo- 
matic dealings. So they toyed with us, defied us, af- 
fronted us, and finally ignored us. But the war taught 
Russia that the Japanese were a nation not to be trifled 
with, and with the dawn of this new sentiment upon her 
the chicanery and subterfuge with which she had dealt 
with the Japanese were abandoned. Russia having thus 
learned to treat with us with due respect and circumspec- 
tion, the way was readily prepared for us to come to a 
clear understanding with her, in order that our interests 
in Manchuria might be safeguarded and promoted, in so 
far as such interests would not encroach upon the sov- 
ereign rights of China. It would be the height of folly 
for Japan to cherish animosity towards her former foe, 
when the latter showed a willingness to become her friend. 
She desires peace above anything else, so that she may 
extend her foreign trade, develop her resources, and 
lighten the heavy load of taxes which the war laid upon 
her subjects. Most of all Japan needs Russia's coopera- 
tion in order to turn her Manchurian railways into a 
financial success. Russia tried, for some time after the 
war, to cripple our railway enterprise by refusing to es- 
tablish any traffic connection between the Eastern 
Chinese and the South Manchuria Railway. Without 
securing this connection the South Manchuria system 
cannot expect to have any share in the inter-continental 
traffic between Europe and the Far East. How is Japan 
to attain this end without befriending Russia ? She has 
borrowed of England ^20,000,000 for her railway enter- 
prise in Manchuria. How is she to pay this debt, if she 
does not take advantage of every opportunity that can 



i 



RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA lOI 

be utilized without infringing upon the rights and priv- 
ileges of other nations ? When we think of this, we feel 
we must not be too fastidious in deahng with our neigh- 
bor, whose business cooperation we are obliged to seek. 
Our neighbor may not lead the life we would have him 
lead, nor may he manage his own affairs in a manner we 
can approve of; but that is a matter which we feel con- 
strained to refrain from interfering with, when we are 
forced to bend all our energies to putting our own venture 
upon a paying basis, so that our sons and daughters may 
not be hampered by the legacy of debts that we have 
contracted. Apparently these considerations did not 
enter Mr. Schiff's mind, or he certainly would have been 
more lenient in criticizing Japan's attitude towards 
Russia. 

The first step towards a Russo-Japanese rapprochement 
was taken two years after the war, when a convention 
was concluded between the two powers, binding each of 
the high contracting parties (i) " To respect the actual 
territorial integrity of the other, and all the rights accru- 
ing to one and the other party from treaties, conventions 
and contracts in force between them and China," (2) " To 
recognize the independence and the territorial integrity 
of China and the principle of equal opportunity in what- 
ever concerns the commerce and industry of all nations 
in that empire," and (3) " To sustain and defend the 
maintenance of the status quo and respect for this princi- 
ple by all pacific means within their reach." Such was 
the substance of the convention signed on July 30, 1907. 
Almost simultaneously a convention arranging for the 
connection of the Russian and Japanese railways in 
Manchuria, a treaty of commerce and navigation, as well 
as a fisheries convention, were entered into between the 



I02 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

two nations. There was nothing unusual in the treaty 
of commerce and navigation, while the railway conven- 
tion was of a temporary nature to be applied pending the 
formation of a more satisfactory arrangement. But in 
the fisheries convention Russia made important conces- 
sions in favor of Japan. It bestowed upon Japanese 
subjects the right to fish along the entire Russian coast, 
with the exception of inlets and rivers, on the Behring 
Straits and the Okhotsk and Japan Seas. This privilege 
applied not only to fish but all sea animals other than sea 
otters. While the Japanese thus engaged in fishing were 
required to pay to the Russian authorities the same taxes 
as Russians, the export of fish to Japan was declared to 
be free from all export duty. 

The convention of July 30, 1907, the substance of 
which we have noted, placed Japan and Russia in a 
relation of entente cordiale. And yet the Russians in 
general were far from understanding Japan's true motives 
and intentions. A group of Russian officers, headed by 
General Linevitch, still entertained the notion that Japan, 
feigning a desire for peace, was preparing for another 
war with Russia. To make the situation still worse, not 
a few writers published books and articles in various 
languages, declaring that the peace treaty of Portsmouth 
was but an arrangement for a truce. Russian news- 
papers such as the Retch, the Russkoe Slovo, the Golos 
and the Bourse Gazette sounded ever and anon alarmist 
notes, as if Japan were on the point of seizing the 
Russian outposts in the Far East. It was at this time 
that Mr. Schipoff, Russian Minister of Finance, visited 
Japan to see for himself what that spasmodic alarm all 
meant. Japan, of course, did not let this God-sent op- 
portunity slip without making the utmost efforts to con- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA 103 

viiice the Russian statesman of her sincere intention of 
being at peace with all the world. Mr. Schipoff's visit 
to Japan was soon reciprocated by a visit to St. Peters- 
burg of Baron Goto, who then, as governor of the South 
Manchuria Railway, was directly responsible for the suc- 
cess or failure of Japanese enterprise in Manchuria. 
While his chief mission in St. Petersburg was to 
negotiate for harmonious traffic relations between the 
Eastern Chinese Railway and the South Manchuria 
system, it was generally believed that he availed himself 
of the occasion to impress the Russian statesman with 
Japan's earnest desire to befriend Russia. Baron Goto 
was most cordially received in the official circles of St. 
Petersburg, and thus another step towards a Russo- 
Japanese rapprochement was taken. 

Notwithstanding all these official efforts on both sides, 
Russian newspapers did not cease to publish sensational 
rumors as to Japan's belligerent attitude towards Russia. 
It may have been that these newspapers were influenced 
by bourse manipulators, or it may have been that they 
merely intended to regale sensation-seekers. At any 
rate, news and comments in these papers with regard to 
the Far-Eastern situation had, by the end of 1909, be- 
come so harmful that the Russian authorities felt obliged 
to issue a statement, categorically denying the authentic- 
ity of warlike reports published in the press. So clearly 
does this communique explain the attitude of the Russian 
government towards Japan at that time that its repro- 
duction here may be justified : 

" There has latterly been evident in the press a par- 
ticularly nervous feeling created by rumors of a conflict 
which is alleged to be impending between Russia and 
Japan. Disquieting reports from the Far East fill the 



I04 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

newspapers, and this feeling is penetrating in a regretta- 
ble manner to wider circles. According to present 
reports, the effect of these rumors is making itself 
especially strongly felt in our frontier territory in the 
Far East, where, under the influence of a conviction of 
the inevitableness of an approaching war with Japan, 
which is becoming deeply rooted in the minds of the 
community even among representatives of the adminis- 
tration, the feeling of anxiety is assuming such a strained 
character that it reacts directly upon private enterprise, 
obliging business men to apply to government organs for 
information as to how far the rumors current are correct, 
and whether commercial and industrial undertakings in 
the Far East may rely upon the preservation of peace. 
The interests of the people forbid the government to ab- 
stain from intervention in this disturbing state of affairs, 
and oblige it to declare categorically that all rumors of 
complications between Russia and Japan at the present 
time are absolutely unfounded. The government has 
made use of the four years that have elapsed since the 
last war to conclude a whole series of international agree- 
ments, designed to wipe out all traces of enmity left be- 
hind by the war and to assist in the peaceful development 
of the political and economic relations of the two 
countries. From this point of view, next to the com- 
mercial treaty and the fisheries convention, particular 
importance attaches to the political agreement of 1907, 
concluded with the object of mutually guaranteeing the 
integrity of the territorial possessions and treaty rights 
of the two powers in the Far East. These acts undoubt- 
edly contribute to the stability of the general political 
situation on the coasts of the Pacific, and particularly to 
Russo-Japanese relations, which completely lack the 



RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA 105 

character wherewith certain newspapers endeavor to 
invest them. As regards these relations, there has been 
no friction of any kind since the treaty of 1907, nor 
have any misunderstandings arisen. Communications 
which have reached the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
direct, as also the impressions which the Minister of 
Finance gained during his recent journey in the Far 
East, contain nothing disquieting. On the contrary, 
they emphatically confirm that in our relations with 
Japan complete mutual good-will is to be perceived and a 
readiness to settle in peaceful friendly manner all ques- 
tions which may arise." 

With Russia's position made so clear, it became all the 
easier for the two countries to enter into an entente 
cordiahy divested of all suspicion and misgiving. Mean- 
while, Chinese diplomacy in Manchuria was such as 
would virtually assist in cementing Russo-Japanese 
friendship. As I have said in previous chapters, it had 
been Japan's earnest desire to establish a close friend- 
ship with the Chinese, and extend to them hearty co- 
operation in their efforts for internal rehabilitation. This 
hope was utterly blighted by the apathetic, unappreciative 
attitude which China consistently assumed towards Japan. 
Not only this, but China, by dint of her characteristic 
diplomacy, conspired to alienate British sympathy from 
us, and thus cast a shadow over the Anglo-Japanese 
alliance. 

To convince the Chinese of the folly of attempting to 
undermine the Japanese position in Manchuria by 
trickery and conspiracy, the Mikado's Empire felt it 
advisable to join hands with Russia, thus forming a sort 
of triple alliance between Great Britain, Russia and 
Japan. It appeared obvious that without such a power- 



I06 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

ful union China would never learn to take Japan and her 
legitimately acquired rights seriously, and deal with the 
latter nation with sincerity and respect. 

Simultaneously Secretary Knox's Manchurian policy 
was such as would invite Japan to turn her face towards 
Russia. It would be rash to conclude that the Knox 
diplomacy was the direct cause of the Russo Japanese 
rapprochement ; indeed, the majority of the Japanese press 
stoutly decline to accept any such views as would at- 
tribute the conclusion of the recent convention between 
St. Petersburg and Tokio to Secretary Knox's proposal 
for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways and his 
Far-Eastern policy in general. And yet no keen ob- 
server can fail to see that American attitude towards the 
Manchurian situation was, at all events, one of the causes 
which precipitated the formation of the entente^ if it did 
not actually drive Japan and Russia into each other's 
arms. I have already made it clear that the necessity of 
establishing a friendly relationship between Russia and 
Japan had been felt long before America's Far-Eastern 
policy assumed such serious aspect as it now does, and it 
was certain that an entente cordiale would be entered into 
between the former belligerents without any foreign in- 
fluence impelling them to that goal. With the Knox 
scheme for the neutralization of the Manchurian railways, 
the launching of the Chinchou-Aigun Railway project, 
the rumor of a probable American protest against a cer- 
tain phase of the Chino-Japanese convention of August, 
1909, Russia and Japan felt more forcibly than ever the 
advisability of arriving at a perfect understanding with 
each other. The psychological moment had come, and 
the two powers promptly seized it. The result was the 
convention of July 4, 1910, reasserting the principles es- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA 107 

tablished by the convention of July 30, 1907, which we 
have aheady noted. Let the convention itself explain its 
nature and object : 

" With the object of facihtating communications and 
developing the commerce of nations, the high contracting 
parties mutually engage to lend to each other their 
friendly cooperation with a view to the amelioration of 
their respective railway lines in Manchuria and the im- 
provement of the connecting service of the said railways, 
and to abstain from all competition prejudicial to the 
realization of this object. 

" Each of the high contracting parties engages to main- 
tain and respect the status quo in Manchuria resulting 
from the treaties, conventions and other arrangements, 
concluded up to this day, between Japan and Russia, or 
between either of these two powers and China. Copies 
of aforesaid arrangements have been exchanged between 
Japan and Russia. 

'♦ In case any event arises of a nature to menace the 
status quo above mentioned, the two high contracting 
parties shall, in each case, enter into communication with 
each other in order to arrive at an understanding as to 
the measures they may judge necessary to take for the 
maintenance of the said status quo.'* 

It has been observed that the establishment of a perfect 
cooperation between the Eastern Chinese Railway and 
the South Manchuria system was one of the main con- 
siderations which persuaded Japan of the advisability of 
entering into a cordial relationship with Russia. That 
this observation is correct is indicated by the fact that 
the provision for the connecting service of the railways is 
placed in the foreground of the new convention. In 
spite of the railway agreement of May, 1907, to which 



I08 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

reference has been made, Russia was naturally reluctant 
to make satisfactory arrangements, and there remained 
much to be done for the improvement of traffic relations 
between the Russian and Japanese railways in Man- 
churia. Soon after the conclusion of the new convention, 
the respective representatives of the South Manchuria 
Railway and the Eastern Chinese Railway met at St. 
Petersburg with a view to making the desired arrange- 
ment. Thus the mooted question was at last solved in a 
manner satisfactory to both parties. 

The second and last articles of the convention are vir- 
tually the reiteration of the principles embodied in the 
Anglo-Japanese treaty of alliance of 1905, the Franco- 
Japanese convention of June, 1907, the Russo-Japanese 
convention of July, 1907, and the diplomatic notes ex- 
changed between Japan and America in November, 1908. 
They emphasize the necessity of maintaining the status 
quo in Manchuria, having for its corollary the preserva- 
tion of the peace in the Far East in general. In seeking 
to attain this end the contracting powers pledge them- 
selves to observe not only the treaties and agreements 
between themselves, but those concluded between either 
of them and China. This implies that the principle of 
the " open door " and equal opportunity shall be re- 
spected, and that the Manchurian railways, with all 
other enterprises of Japan and Russia, shall be handed 
over to China at the expiration of the periods prescribed 
in treaties and conventions. But China deemed the con- 
clusion of the Russo-Japanese pact an occasion fit to re- 
mind them of their obligation to withdraw from Man- 
churia at the fixed time, and in indorsing the con- 
vention by an official communique addressed to the 
powers, she took particular pains to emphasize that 



RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA 109 

point. The authentic version of this communique is as 
follows : 

" The government of China recognizes that the newly 
concluded convention between Russia and Japan consol- 
idates the principles defined in the conventions and 
agreements between either of the contracting parties and 
China, as it is declared in the convention that all the 
conventions and agreements between China and Russia, 
those between China and Japan, and those between Rus- 
sia and Japan shall be acknowledged and respected. It 
may be noticed that Article 3 of the Portsmouth Treaty 
provides that Russia and Japan mutually bind themselves 
to hand over Manchuria to China to be absolutely re- 
stored to her administration, and that territorial interests 
or preferential and monopolistic concessions, which are 
calculated to injure the sovereignty of China and to be 
against the principle of equal opportunity, shall not be 
allowed in Manchuria. In Article 4, Russia and Japan en- 
gage each other not to prevent China from taking meas- 
ures common to all the powers with a view to developing 
the commerce and industry of Manchuria. In the same 
year, China and Japan concluded an agreement with re- 
gard to affairs in the Three Eastern Provinces, according 
to the Portsmouth Treaty. By this step, the open door in 
Manchuria became a fait accompli. Acting upon the 
principles of the Portsmouth Treaty, therefore, and car- 
rying out the stipulations defined in the conventions and 
agreements with Japan, China will endeavor to observe 
the principle of equal opportunity and to develop the 
commerce and industry of the Three Eastern Provinces." 

It has been repeatedly asserted by Western critics that 
the Japanese method in Manchuria is exactly the method 
pursued by Russia before the war. Some writers have 



no AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

even gone so far as to say that Russia was more gener- 
ous to foreigners and foreign interests than Japan is. 
Such assertions can be made only by ignoring patent 
facts or with the evil purpose of misguiding the public. 
At any rate it is no difficult task to prove that the Japa- 
nese method of to-day is radically different from that of 
Russia prior to the war. Let me elucidate this point. 

It was the policy of Russia to exclude foreigners from 
its newly acquired territories or its spheres of influence 
in the Far East, so that its military operations might be 
kept concealed from the world. By the treaty of Aigun, 
she obtained the exclusive right to navigate the Amur, 
the Sungari, and the Ussuri, forbidding the vessels of any 
other country, excepting China, to utilize these water- 
ways. At Vladivostok it was the rule not to permit 
more than two foreign vessels to enter the harbor at a 
time. On April i8, 1903, the Czar demanded of the 
Peking court to agree not to open any new treaty ports 
in Manchuria, or permit new consuls without previous 
consent of St. Petersburg, or employ any foreigners, ex- 
cept Russians, in any administrative capacity in said 
country as well as Mongolia. Has Japan ever put for- 
ward such a demand as this? Again, in August, 1901, 
the Imperial Russian Controller of Newchwang issued 
the following proclamation, which was in direct contra- 
vention of the rights of a treaty port : 

" As this port has now reverted to the control of the 
Imperial Russian government, all you who have matters 
in dispute and the like should bring your petition to the 
superintendents or other government officers, where re- 
dress can be obtained and cases settled in perfect justice 
and impartiality. ... If after the issuance of these 
presents there be found any person disobeying this proc- 



RUSSO-JAPANESE RELATIONS IN MANCHURIA III 

lamation, I will punish the dehnquent severely and will 
exercise no mercy. Tremble ! Be most careful ! Do 
not say by and by that you have had no notice." 

Has Japan ever been so audacious as to assume so 
overbearing an attitude towards foreigners in Manchuria? 
The collection of maritime revenues at Newchwang was 
carried on by Russo-Chinese officials, who wore Russian 
uniform, and therefore appeared to the natives to be 
actually the emperor of Russia's officials. Has Japan 
ever usurped any customs establishment in Manchuria in 
utter disregard of Chinese sovereignty ? The London 
Times of September 13, 1901, stated that the Russian 
administration at Dalny had refused to permit Americans 
to build warehouses for the storage of American kero- 
sene, and had also announced the intention of excluding 
American oil altogether from Manchuria. Has Japan 
ever adopted such a flagrant measure of discrimination 
against American trade? During that period the Rus- 
sian authorities looked upon Americans " with keen sus- 
picion, if they ventured further than a couple of miles 
from Newchwang," the Russians refused " to recognize a 
British passport in Manchuria and insisted that all British 
subjects travelling in that country must possess Russian 
passes, which were procured from Port Arthur only with 
great difficulty and considerable delay." Has Japan ever 
put such obstacles, except during the war, in the path of 
foreign travellers in Manchuria? 

Now that Japan and Russia are bound by ties of close 
friendship, it is a delicate task for us to tell the truth 
about the Russian method in the historic days of Viceroy 
AlexeiefT, knowing that the truth is cruel. Yet Russia 
will, I trust, be magnanimous enough to admit the blun- 
ders and mismanagement attending her mihtary misad- 



112 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATION 

venture in Manchuria, which was directed by the Czar's 
mihtary entourages in defiance of sane counsels of broad 
statesmanship. Russia has repented, and with the re- 
pentance has come a marked modification of her poHcy 
in the Far East. Let us, then, be lenient towards her, 
and be friends with her, in the name of universal peace 
and fraternity ! 



VI 

JAPAN'S COMMERCIAL ADVANCE IN MANCHURIA 
AND THE "OPEN DOOR" 

IN May, 1906, the Mikado summoned before the 
throne all his ministers, as well as the " elder 
statesmen," and commanded them to express their 
views frankly and freely as to what policy Japan should 
adopt in Manchuria. After a deliberation, which lasted 
several days, this council reached the decision that China's 
sovereignty should be respected, and that the principle 
of equal opportunity for all nations should be adhered to 
with the utmost sincerity. In spite of all the harsh judg- 
ments passed by foreign critics, I do not hesitate to assert 
that Japan has been faithful to this fundamental policy 
sanctioned by the throne. If the " open door " must be 
so interpreted as to bind Japan not to promote her own 
interests, in order to give opportunity to other nations, 
she has deviated from that principle. On the other 
hand, if it implies that all nations, Japan included, are 
equally entitled to exploit the markets and resources of 
Manchuria by all legitimate means, then her activities in 
the Three Eastern Provinces have assuredly been unim- 
peachable. Having preferred the latter view — for what 
else could she do ? — Japan has subsidized her steamship 
lines to Manchuria, installed commercial museums in 
various important Manchurian towns in order to adver- 
tise her merchandise, sent commercial agents to inquire 
into the Manchurian markets, and, what is more impor- 

113 



114 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

tant, has become a most liberal purchaser of Manchurian 
products, thus establishing close business relations with 
the native producers and merchants. These, reenforced 
by the advantage which she enjoys over Western nations 
in geographical position and in the cost of production 
and transportation, have enabled her to push her trade 
in Manchuria with remarkable success. 

What is the secret of Japan's commercial success in 
Manchuria? This question Westerners usually answer 
with the hackneyed two words — cheap labor. Japan has 
an abundant supply of cheap labor, which enables her to 
turn out merchandise at comparatively small cost : hence 
she is able to undersell her Western competitors — such is 
their simple reasoning. But there is a less charitable 
view, which attributes Japanese success wholly to the 
underhand measures of discrimination and double deal- 
ing. The first view tells only half truth, the second is a 
slander, pure and simple. As I see it, the first cause of 
Japan's commercial success in Manchuria lies in the fact 
that Japan, of all foreign nations, has been the only cus- 
tomer for Manchurian products — a fact which has enabled 
Japanese merchants to enter into more intimate and last- 
ing business relations with the native traders and con- 
sumers than is otherwise possible. Japan, buying so 
much from Manchuria, must needs send to that country 
in exchange her manufactured articles. That this is per- 
fectly natural no one can gainsay, yet, in my knowledge, 
it has never been, except in one case, pointed out clearly 
enough to bring it home to the Western people inter- 
ested in Manchurian trade. That solitary exception is 
found in an article by George Bronson Rea, appearing in 
a recent issue of the Far Eastern Review (Shanghai, 
China) published by that gentleman. So important is 



JAPAN'S COMMERCIAL ADVANCE I15 

this article that I may be permitted to extract from it at 
length. 

The real basis of Japan's success in Manchuria is, Mr. 
Rea believes, the operation of the fundamental economic 
law, that the country consuming the major portion of the 
exports of another country holds the most advantageous 
position in supplying its necessary imports. Now Japan 
has for years been the chief consumer of Manchuria's 
principal export, consisting of beans and bean-cake. 
Before the Russo-Japanese war the Chinese trader 
brought the bean product to the market at Newchwang, 
and received in exchange foreign piece goods and 
sundries. The Japanese purchasers of beans and bean- 
cake paid the foreigner his profit on the turnover, plus 
the storage charges, lighterages, and freight, and were 
apparently contented with a situation impossible for them 
to remedy. Then came the war and all was changed. 
Japan began an aggressive campaign to gain control of 
the Manchurian trade, and success soon crowned her ef- 
forts. Says Mr. Rea : 

" Under these conditions the foreign merchants and 
their agents in the interior were placed at a disadvantage 
from the outset. As they could not penetrate into the 
interior and purchase beans by an exchange of com- 
modities, they were reduced to selling their wares for 
cash — the one thing the native was short on. If they at- 
tempted to follow the lead of the Japanese and barter 
merchandise for beans, they were handicapped by their 
various charges at Newchwang, and having to ultimately 
sell to the Japanese at their price, which of course was 
unprofitable under the then existing conditions. The 
decadence of American and European imports followed as 
a natural consequence. A few venturesome American 



Il6 AMERICAN JAPANESE RELATIONS 

and British piece goods agents established themselves in 
the interior, firmly determined to win back their lost 
trade, but acting solely as sellers and unable to reciprocate 
by purchasing the products of the farmers, results were 
discouraging, and they finally had to abandon the field as 
unprofitable. This, in short, is the real reason for Japan's 
success in Manchuria." 

Not a few critics have been at pains to create in 
Europe and America the impression that Japan dis- 
criminates against foreigners in Manchuria in shipping 
and railway rates. The subsidized shipping of Japan, 
one of such critics insinuates, carries Japanese goods at a 
minimum charge, subject to further rebates as quantities 
rise, from the place of manufacture to the port of Tairen, 
thence the goods are carried at special rates to their sell- 
ing place over the trucks of the South Manchuria Rail- 
way. In Mr. Rea's opinion, such charges and insinua- 
tions fall far short of the mark in explaining the loss of 
the Manchurian market for American and European 
products, and he sums up the whole situation in these 
words : 

" It is a far cry from high diplomacy to the humble 
soya beans, yet we hold to the belief that the past and 
present commercial situation and ultimate solution of the 
vexatious Manchurian question is bound up in the control 
of this one product." 

That really furnishes the key to the Manchurian 
question. Here is a country where there is no manufac- 
turing industry, and whose agricultural products can be 
enumerated upon five fingers. Beans and their by- 
products, bean-cake and bean-oil, constitute its only im- 
portant produce. What can Western nations do with 
them ? The annual crop of beans is approximately 



japan's commercial advance 117 

1,000,000 tons, which has a value of ;^25, 000,000. How 
IS Manchuria to dispose of this enormous quantity ? 
The Manchurians themselves do not want them, for their 
staple food, as well as their animal feed, is millet. Europe 
and America do not know, or at all events have not 
known, how to utihze them. Japan and China are the 
only places where the goods can be sold. 

Prior to the Chino-Japanese war, beans and bean-cake 
were almost exclusively distributed through the ports of 
Swatow, Amoy and Canton, among the southern prov- 
inces of China, where mills were erected for extracting 
the oil from the beans, and where the bean-cake was used 
for fertilizing the sugar plantations. Then came the 
Chino-Japanese war, and the Japanese, having, during 
their occupation of the Liao-tung Peninsula, reahzed the 
value of the Manchurian produce, became its most 
liberal purchaser. So rapidly had Japanese purchases of 
the pulse and bean-cake multiplied that by 1899 they 
exceeded the total export to Southern China. The 
Japanese knew how to utilize beans and bean -cake. The 
white, red, and small green beans — for there are six 
varieties of beans — they manufactured into various food 
stuffs ; from the yellow, black and large green beans they 
made bean-cake and bean-oil. The bean-cake they used 
as fertilizer and animal feed, and the bean-oil for culinary 
and other purposes. They found out that Manchurian 
beans could be laid down in Japan at less than it cost to 
produce the same varieties in their own country. Why 
not buy them from Manchuria rather than raise them at 
home ? 

The Russo-Japanese war proved, as we have noted, a 
golden opportunity for Japanese traders to establish 
direct business relations with the native producers of 



Il8 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

beans or native dealers in the commodity, thus doing 
away with the medium of foreign merchants in New- 
chwang. Since the war Japanese purchases of beans in- 
creased by leaps and bounds, until to-day almost nine- 
tenths of the Manchurian produce is purchased by the 
Japanese. Here lies the secret of the success which Ja- 
pan's export trade has secured in Manchuria. Here also 
is where all the indiscriminate talk about the closing of 
the " open door " came in. Let American traders go 
into the interior of Manchuria and buy beans and bean- 
cake and bean-oil, just as the Japanese are doing, and 
they may rest assured that their export trade to Man- 
churia will increase proportionately, just as Japan's has. 
Unless they could do that, all the hysterical condemna- 
tion which some American critics are capable of piling 
upon the Japanese would accomplish nothing but make 
them ridiculous and contemptible in the eyes of the in- 
telligent and the thoughtful. '• Of all broken reeds," 
warns Mr. Roosevelt, " sentimentality is the most broken 
reed you can lean on." It is nothing but sentimentality 
which tempts some critics to indulge in effeminate com- 
plaints about the " open door " in Manchuria. 

But I must come back to the bean question. It is 
doubtful whether the Japanese will be able to maintain 
their supremacy in the bean trade of Manchuria. The 
firm of Mitsui, which has had the control of Manchurian 
beans, thought it an excellent idea to teach Europe how 
to utilize the Manchurian produce and thus extend its 
profitable business abroad. The enterprise is likely to 
result in an unexpected situation. It has proved success- 
ful in so far as it made the Westerners appreciate the 
value of the bean, but it has opened wide, to Japan's 
own disadvantage, the very door which foreigners claimed 



japan's commercial advance 119 

was being closed against them. The British oil-seed 
crushers pronounced the Manchurian bean as the next best 
oil producer to cotton seed. The immense possibilities 
of the bean trade soon attracted the attention of British 
traders, several of whom entered the arena, with the 
intention of buying beans direct from Manchurian 
farmers, and not through the Japanese firm of Mitsui. 
Naturally British oil-seed crushers will favor the purchase 
of beans through British exporters. Should the British 
traders succeed in this novel undertaking — and there is 
no reason why they should not — they will likewise suc- 
ceed in selling wares of their own country in exchange. 
At any rate the time seems not far away when the ex- 
port trade of Manchuria will no longer be monopolized 
by the Japanese alone. Then the tables will be turned ; 
and just as Japanese trade in Manchuria increased in 
proportion as her purchase of Manchurian goods in- 
creased, so will any Western nation, which becomes a 
good customer for beans and bean- cake, succeed in mak- 
ing incursion into the field where Japan is now estab- 
lished. And the Western world may rest assured that 
when that time comes the Japanese will not heap upon 
their successful rivals groundless charges and vile epi- 
thets, but will face with manliness and dignity the new 
situation which is the inevitable result of the natural laws 
of trade. 

Here we may pause a moment and examine a few sta- 
tistics to learn something of the real extent of Japanese 
patronage of Manchurian products. As the reports of 
the Chinese Customs do not, except in a few cases, re- 
cord the destination of goods exported, it is difficult to 
ascertain the exact amount of Japanese purchases in 
Manchuria. But those few cases, where such distinction 



I20 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

is shown, seem sufficient to indicate how important a 
factor Japan is in the export trade of Manchuria. In 
1907 exports through the port of Newchwang, ** ninety 
per cent, of which were made up of beans and bean- 
cake," amounted to 7,685,359 taels (a tael is about 
seventy-nine cents), of which " ninety-five per cent, was 
for Japan." In 1908 the same port exported 4,583,000 
piculs (a picul is 133^ pounds avoirdupois) of bean-cake, 
of which " all but an infinitesimally small portion went to 
Japan." The Maritime Customs at Antung reports that 
in 1907 " the steamer-borne beans and bean-cake went 
almost exclusively to Japan"; in 1908 the same port 
exported beans, silk, timber, and other products to the 
extent of 709,953 taels, of which 691,000 taels was for 
Japan. Turning to the port of Tairen we learn that ex- 
ports through that port during the first six months of 
1907 amounted to 3,735,288 taels, practically all of which 
was for Japan ; exports during the latter half-year totalled 
2,205,677 taels, Japan sharing in it to the extent of 
2,128,786 taels. In 1908 beans exported through Tairen 
amounted to 2,709,668 piculs, of which 1,398,605 piculs 
went to Japan. 

Turning to Japanese source of information, we find in 
the Japan Year Book for 1 9 10 that in 1908 beans and 
bean-cake were imported to Japan to the extent of 
6,659,000/^;/ and 23,617,000 j/^;/, respectively. In 1909 
Japanese purchase of beans amounted to 6,260,000 yen^ 
and that of bean-cake to 24,189,000 yen. It may be 
noted that these figures include imports both from China 
proper and from Manchuria, but it is safe to say that 
practically all the beans and bean-cake imported to Japan 
in those two years came from Manchuria, for China 
proper has never produced beans to such an extent as to 



JAPAN'S COMMERCIAL ADVANCE 121 

make their exportation possible. At any rate it is certain 
that Japanese purchase of Manchurian beans and bean- 
cake is not less than 30,000,000 yen per annum. But 
beans and bean-cake are not tlie only commodities Japan 
buys of the Three Eastern Provinces. Let us see what 
else she purchases. 

Next to beans wild raw silk and cocoons are the most 
important products of Manchuria. The raw silk finds its 
way largely to Japan and Shanghai, while the cocoons 
are shipped mostly to Chef 00, where they go on the 
market to feed the local Chinese filatures and the Ger- 
man one at Tsing-tau. That Japanese demand for the 
raw silk and cocoons will steadily increase is assured by 
the establishment of a Japanese filature, turning from 
its 200 machines at least a picul per day for the Osaka 
looms, as well as by two Japanese inventions which 
should bring tussore upon the market as a competitor 
with the domestic silks of China and Japan. The first of 
these inventions is a new process for bleaching the silk, 
which will render it amenable to dyes of the lighter 
shades ; the second is a spinning machine, which makes 
a smoother and more uniform thread than is now pro- 
ducible. Facts such as these are usually unnoticed in 
Europe and America, but they are just what assists the 
Japanese in pushing their trade in Manchuria. 

Aside from the fact that Japan is the most liberal pur- 
chaser of Manchurian products, there are various factors 
which facilitate her commercial advance in Manchuria. 
In the first place, Japanese canvassers, salesmen, and 
commercial agents in Manchuria are usually well versed 
in the Manchurian dialects. That Japan is in a position 
to place in the field a force of men able to carry on com- 
mercial transactions through the medium of the Chinese 



122 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

language is the result of organized efforts. Besides the 
Foreign Language School at Tokio, whose curriculum 
includes the Chinese dialects, there is the Tokio College 
of Commerce which encourages the study of the com- 
mercial language and usages of China. In addition to 
these institutions, the Toa Dobun Kvvai, a society whose 
main object is the promotion of friendly relations between 
Japan and China, maintains two schools, one in Tokio, 
the other in Shanghai, each devoted to instruction in the 
Chinese language. It is from among the graduates of 
these various institutions that Japanese commercial agents 
in Manchuria are recruited. 

The Toa Dobun Kwai has rendered Japan a more 
valuable service than the mere dissemination of knowl- 
edge of the Chinese language. With the cooperation of 
the graduates from its two schools, engaged in various 
mercantile business throughout China and Manchuria, 
the society has been making thoroughgoing investigations 
into the economic conditions in China. The result of 
these investigations has been published in a series of 
books, dealing with Chinese commercial usages, geog- 
raphy, money and banking, articles of trade, means of 
transportation, and all that concerns the trade conditions 
in the Celestial Empire. 

Another important agency in Japan's economic prog- 
ress in Manchuria is the establishment of commercial 
sample museums in various principal towns in that 
country. The establishment of such museums for ad- 
vertising Japanese products in foreign countries dates 
from 1895, when the Japanese government installed mu- 
seums in Vladivostok, Odessa, Bombay, Singapore, Shasi 
and Mexico. Since then Japan has followed the policy 
of establishing commercial museums mostly in Oriental 



JAPAN'S COMMERCIAL ADVANCE 123 

countries. Before the Russo-Japanese war there were 
such estabhshments in Shasi, Hankow, Chunking, Bom- 
bay, Singapore and Bangkok. At that time Newchwang 
was the only Manchurian town which had a Japanese 
museum, but immediately after the war this was reen- 
forced by new establishments in Tairen, Liao-yang, Muk- 
den and Tie-ling. The museums are placed under the 
control of the Japanese consulates, but are left in charge 
of merchants properly qualified to act as a medium for 
the conclusion of transactions between Japanese and 
foreign merchants or manufacturers. 

Japanese consuls in foreign lands, like those of other 
countries, are required to submit to the home government 
reports on the commercial conditions of the respective 
countries where they are stationed. But the consuls are 
not always possessed of the technical knowledge and 
experience necessary in an intelligent understanding of 
industrial and commercial conditions, nor are they able 
to devote ample time to the observation and study of the 
market. As a means of remedying this defect the Japa- 
nese government annually sends abroad a number of 
capable young men, who are charged with reporting from 
time to time on the commercial conditions of foreign 
countries with a view to facilitating the extension of 
markets for Japanese merchandise. More than forty of 
such " student commercial agents " are in China and 
Manchuria, closely studying all matters relating to the 
commerce and manufacture of the country. 

Still another factor which is a great auxiliary to Japan's 
commercial activities in Manchuria is the advantage 
which she enjoys over her Western competitors in the 
matter of transportation. Manchuria lies within three 
days of Japan by steamer, while it is separated from 



124 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

America by the whole length of the Pacific Ocean. 
What is still more important, Japan has numerous vessels 
plying between her own and Manchurian ports, whereas 
America has no regular steamship service of her own to 
Manchuria. If it be true that " trade follows the flag," 
how much more truly may it be said that trade follows 
the mercantile marine. In 1907, eighteen American ves- 
sels totaUing only 10,663 tons entered the port of Antung, 
but in the year following not a single steamer under the 
American flag appeared in any Manchurian harbor. Let 
us cast a glance at the following table, showing the num- 
ber of vessels of various nationalities which entered the 
three ports of Manchuria during 1908 : 





Antung 


Tairen 


Newchwang 




No. Ves. Ton. 


No. Ves. Ton. 


No. Ves. Ton. 


Japanese . . 


. 298 I47»254 


1,327 950,439 


221 222,460 


English . . . 


. 25 28,359 


118 192,025 


286 286,659 


American . 











German . . 


. . 


17 27,163 


12 13,946 


Chinese . . 


. . 13 4,108 


81 19,521 


78 54,713 


French . . 


. . 





30 23,113 



We see that the number and tonnage of Japanese 
steamers were by far the largest. The table does not in- 
clude sailing vessels, of which Japan had also a large 
number plying between Manchuria and home ports. 
The phenomenal progress of Japanese steamship service 
to Manchuria, like that to other countries, has been made 
possible by generous subsidies and bounties granted to 
shipping enterprise. So important a bearing does this 
phase of Japan's economic activities possess upon the ex- 
pansion of her foreign trade that its detailed description 
may be justified. The bounty fund set apart for the year 
1909 amounted to 11,170,255 j^^;^, which was distributed 
among various steamship companies as follows : 



JAPAN'S COMMERCIAL ADVANCE 1 25 

Company Amount of subsidy 

Nippon Yusen Kaisha (Japan Mail S. S. Co.) . . 4,503,707 yen. 

Toyo Kisen Kaisha (Oriental S. S. Co.) .... 1,763,880 " 

Japan China S. S. Co 800,000 «« 

Osaka Shosen Kaisha (Osaka Merchant 

Steamship Co.) 641,000 " 

Mitsui & Co. shipping department 230,000 " 

Others 2,381,668 " 

Again, if we apportion the above sum to the principal 
Hnes subsidized we obtain the following figures : 

Lines Annual grant 

Austrian service 473,092 yen. 

Yangtse River service 800,000 " 

European service 2,673,895 " 

Seattle service 654,030 " 

San Francisco service 1,013,880 " 

Far Eastern near-sea routes (North China, Korea, 

Vladivostok) 530,000 " 

Japan Sea coasting service 351,000 " 

Tairen 140,000 " 



As this table shows the Manchurian port of Tairen 
alone receives an annual grant of 140,000 yen, while 
North China (including Manchuria) and Korean service 
shares the major portion of an annual subsidy of 530,000 
yen. Let us see how these subsidies and bounties are 
granted. 

An ocean-going steamer with a displacement of 1,000 
tons and a speed of ten knots is entitled to the prescribed 
rate of bounty according to the distance covered and the 
tonnage of such vessels. The bounty for a steamer of 
1,000 tons is at the rate of twenty-five sen per ton per ten 
knots, the rate subject to increase by ten per cent, for every 
additional 500 tons, and by twenty per cent, for every 
additional speed of one knot per hour. For a steamer of 
not less than 6,500 tons and with a speed of eighteen 
knots per hour the maximum limit of bounty corresponds 



126 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

to the rate allowed to a ship of 6;000 tons with a speed of 
seventeen knots. The full rate is granted only to steam- 
ers not older than five years, a reduction of five per cent, 
being made for every one year exceeding the above 
Hmit. The above schedule appUes only to home-built 
steamers, foreign-built steamers being entitled to half 
rate. Besides the 11,170,255 yen granted to various 
steamship companies in 1909, Japan in the same year 
appropriated 1,995,440 yen for the encouragement ot 
ship-building at home and 25,0007^;/ for the training of 
seamen. 

I have reviewed, though in a succinct manner, Japan's 
method of commercial operations, and in doing so I be- 
lieve I have explained the secret, if secret it can be 
called, of her commercial success in Manchuria. If 
American trade in that country has suffered any loss 
from the practice of that method, it is not the Japanese 
who are to blame. But has America really been a loser 
in the commercial competition in Manchuria ? This 
question we shall try to answer in the next chapter. 



VII 

AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA AND THE 
"OPEN DOOR'* 

N 1904 American cotton shirtings imported to Man- 
churia through the port of Newchwang aggregated 
85,385 pieces ; in 1908 they decreased to 63,097 
pieces. Again, American cotton sheetings and drills im- 
ported through the same port in 1904 were 1,140,620 
and 442,291 pieces, respectively ; four years later there 
were only 515,193 pieces of sheetings and 194,570 pieces 
of drills imported from America. If imports of other 
American goods such as flour, kerosene-oil and tobacco 
are declining at the same rate, who knows but that 
American trade in the country may before many years 
sink into insignificance ? 

The question arises : " Is this unhappy situation due 
to the Japanese advance in Manchuria ? " With cour- 
teous bows and unfailing smiles Japan stands at the 
'* open door," and invites all nations to come and share 
the benefit of Manchurian trade. Indeed she seems to 
make a speciality of the ♦' open door " and equal oppor- 
tunity for all nations, but once within the threshold, do 
not the Western guests find themselves jostled and el- 
bowed by the hostess ? 

Naturally there is growing up in the American mind 
a deep apprehension that American trade is being grad- 
ually eliminated from Manchuria by questionable tactics 
which Japan does not scruple to employ. We can fully 
understand, and even sympathize with, the Americans in 

127 



128 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

their uneasiness as to the future of their Manchurian 
trade, when we consider that American interests in Man- 
churia are, or at all events have been, par excellerice com- 
mercial. It was undoubtedly with a view to alleviating 
this popular anxiety that the Tokio and Washington 
governments exchanged diplomatic notes, reasserting 
their mutual intention " to preserve the common inter- 
ests of all powers in China by supporting . . . the 
principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry 
for all nations in that empire." But when a nation is 
seized with distrust and suspicion, its trust cannot be re- 
stored by the reassurances of diplomats. A treaty or a 
convention may clear away misunderstandings between 
governments, but in this blessed age of democracy the 
masses of people must be reckoned with in the adjust- 
ment of international relations. It often requires years 
of earnest efforts and assiduous toil on the part of the 
broad-minded and public-spirited to set aright the esprit 
de corps of the populace which has been misled by ill- 
advised counsellors. Is it any wonder that the diplomatic 
notes exchanged between Washington and Tokio have 
apparently failed to attain the end they had in view ? I 
have already explained in the foregoing chapter that 
Japan's modus operandi in seeking supremacy in Man- 
churian trade is perfectly legitimate, so that no other na- 
tion has any right to complain ; it remains for me to 
inquire how far, if at all, Japan has made incursion into 
American trade in Manchuria. 

America's staple imports to Manchuria consist of flour, 
kerosene-oil, tobacco, and cotton goods. But before 
dealing with these articles let us consider American im- 
port of railway materials to Manchuria, for these, while 
not staple import, have been, and, if America will not 



AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA 1 29 

unnecessarily assume the attitude o( 3. /provocateur iovjdirds 
Japan, will for many years to come constitute one of the 
important items in the list of American imports not only 
to Manchuria but also to Korea. 

According to the United States consul at Tairen the 
South Manchuria Railway Company purchased of America 
in 1907 railway materials to the value of ^6,721,959, of 
which ^^281,089 was for machinery, ^6,288,922 for roUing 
stock, and the remainder for general railway material. 
Never in the history of Manchuria had so large an amount 
of American railway material been imported to the 
country. Russia built her Manchurian railways mostly 
with her own material, the Imperial Railways of 
North China used exclusively British material; it was 
only after Japan entered the field that American rails and 
cars began to be used in Manchuria. The railway ma- 
terials imported in 1907 have been utilized for the improve- 
ment of the main line of the South Manchuriasystem, meas- 
uring some 500 miles. But the significance of the Amer- 
ican railway-material trade in Manchuria lies not so much 
in what it has been as in what it promises to be. The light 
railway between Mukden and Antung will soon be con- 
verted into a standard gauge, which means that Japan 
must place more orders for rolling stock in some foreign 
country. Then again, the construction of the Kirin- 
Changchun line will soon be completed. This line, as 
we have already seen, is to be extended to Hoi-ryon on 
the Korean border, and thence to the port of Chong-jin 
on the Sea of Japan. In this connection it is well to 
remember that Japan has conceived an extensive scheme 
for covering the Korean peninsula with a network of iron 
road, for Korea has been and will be as good a market 
for American railway material as has been Manchuria. 



I30 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

But there are untoward circumstances, which, if per- 
mitted to prevail, may prove prejudicial to American trade 
in Manchuria and Korea. The first of such circumstances 
is engendered by the utterances and agitation of those 
very Americans whose speciality is the advocacy of 
America's commercial expansion in the Far East. 
Closing their eyes, wittingly or unwittingly, to the real 
status of American enterprise and trade in Korea and 
Manchuria, these apostles of American commerce have 
made Japan a target of slanderous criticism. The 
thoughtful class of the Japanese understands that such 
criticisms do not represent the concensus of opinion 
among the majority of Americans, but who can venture 
to guarantee that Japan is absolutely free from dema- 
gogues and agitators, who may not scruple to mislead 
that all-powerful individual, the " man in the street " ? 
Besides, in this " iron age of hurry-skurry " much of our 
reading must be taken running, and he who runs does 
not take the trouble to meditate upon what he may read. 
And here Hes the point of danger. Unwarranted utter- 
ances of irresponsible critics, published in newspapers, 
magazines and books, may as much be read by the man 
who runs as by the man who thinks, and thus readily be 
converted into a leaven which may ferment ill-feeling in 
the mind of a whole nation. If America allows the agi- 
tation of her indiscreet critics to reach such a pitch as to 
alienate Japan's sympathy from her, who can blame the 
Japanese if they divert the patronage, which they have 
bestowed upon American goods, in favor of other 
countries ? 

However that may be, I must emphasize the fact that 
in the future American rails and rolling stock may not be 
able to monopolize the Manchurian market, as it has done 



AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA 131 

hitherto. While Americans have been indulging in 
groundless complaints about Japanese methods, and have 
been neglecting to suggest any practical means for re- 
moving the handicaps which America herself placed in 
her own path of commercial progress, German and even 
Russian concerns have been active in the field with the 
obvious intention of enticing away Japanese patronage 
of American railway materials. With the shrewdness 
and energy characteristic of her, Germany has been push- 
ing her trade in Japan through her local agencies estab- 
lished in important towns throughout the country, in a 
recent issue of the official German journal, the Continen- 
tal Correspondence y it is noted that " the Tokio agency of 
the Siemens-Schuckert Works, with branches at Osaka 
and in the interior, has grown to such dimensions that a 
division into separate minimum current and intense cur- 
rent agencies is contemplated. A number of German 
machine factories that have representatives in Japan are 
sending out a staff of experts for service on the spot. 
Evidently the economic conditions of Japan have settled 
down sufficiently since the war to secure a rapid develop- 
ment of its industrial life, and German enterprise will not 
miss its chance." 

The activities of German interests have evidently been 
successful, for where only a few years before America 
and England had been almost the only countries export- 
ing railway materials to Japan, in 1907 Germany sold 
Japan railway materials to the extent of ^^ 1,2 5 0,000, a 
portion of them having been utilized in Manchuria. As 
for Russian competition in the railway-material trade, it 
may be reasonably predicted that it will assume a serious 
aspect in the near future, although it is as yet an insig- 
nificant factor. During the late war many new steel 



132 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

mills and car factories sprang into existence in Russia, 
while those already in business greatly enlarged their 
plants. Now that the war has passed into history, the 
Russian manufacturers of railway material must find 
markets for their product in foreign countries, or their 
plants will lie idle, if nothing worse. It is undoubtedly 
with a view to allaying this unhappy condition that sev- 
eral Russian factories have been eagerly seeking the pat- 
ronage of the South Manchuria Railway. When Baron 
Goto, Japanese Minister of Communications, was in St. 
Petersburg in the spring of 1908, various Russian con- 
cerns took particular pains to impress the Japanese states- 
man with the advantage of ordering railway materials 
from Russia. Whether or not their efforts have had any 
influence upon the Baron's mind, it is a noteworthy fact 
that a considerable amount of Russian rails is now found 
in South Manchuria. And as luck would have it, Amer- 
ican diplomacy has unconsciously forced Russia and Japan 
into each other's arms, thus creating a more favorable 
situation for the Russian railway-material trade in Man- 
churia. Meanwhile, American steel mills and car fac- 
tories are apparently doing naught in the way of stay- 
ing German and Russian incursion into their field. Can 
American manufacturers, enjoying as they do a great ad- 
vantage in transportation over Germany and Russia, af- 
ford to abandon their Manchurian market to these 
European competitors ? 

Russian competition is not confined to the railway- 
material trade; Russia even dreams of driving out Amer- 
ican flour from Manchuria. This leads us to the consid- 
eration of the flour trade in Manchuria. 

As I have stated in the foregoing chapter, Harbin, 
the Russian metropolis of Manchuria, has eight flour 



AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA I33 

mills with a daily capacity of 1,600,000 pounds. If these 
mills are all kept in operation Russia must necessarily 
find in Southern Manchuria an outlet for their output. 
The most important section of Manchuria from a com- 
mercial point of view is its southern section. Northern 
Manchuria, though more than twice the size of Southern 
Manchuria, has but one-third its population. Now Har- 
bin has for its background the least populated part of the 
country, and unless Russian flour seeks a market in South- 
ern Manchuria, the Harbin mills will hardly ever hit upon a 
profitable working plan. To estimate the amount of flour 
annually consumed in Southern Manchuria, we glance at 
the latest returns of the Chinese Maritime Customs. 

In 1908 the total amount of flour imported to Man- 
churia through Antung, Tairen, and Newchwang, 
through which the foreign trade of Southern Man- 
churia is carried on, was about 426,574 piculs, or 
about 56,876,500 pounds. Although the customs re- 
turns do not distinguish between American flour and 
flour from other countries, we learn from the reports of 
the Tairen Commercial Museum that nearly five-sixths 
of flour imported through that port is from America ; 
and it is safe to say that the same proportion holds true 
with regard to the flour trade of the other two ports, 
Antung and Newchwang. The annual import of 
American flour to Southern Manchuria, therefore, must 
amount to some 47,396,270 pounds. It is this trade 
which the Harbin mills will try to wrest from America. 
As yet the price of Harbin flour is a Httle higher than 
American flour, while its quality is inferior to the latter. 
American flour of medium grade can be laid down in 
Newchwang at about Mexican ;^i.90 per fifty pounds, 
while Harbin flour of the first quality, which is no better 



134 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

than ordinary American flour, costs about Mexican ;^2.I0 
per fifty pounds. But before long the Russian mills will 
learn to produce a better grade of flour at a less cost, and 
when that time comes, they are bound to become power- 
ful rivals of American flour merchants in Manchuria. 

In this connection it may be well to note that Japanese 
flour is imported into Manchuria in small quantities. 
But as the raw material feeding Japanese mills is mostly 
American, the United States cannot be regarded as the 
ultimate loser even if Japanese flour is exported to Man- 
churia to any considerable extent. 

As to the kerosene- oil trade we have more accurate 
figures to show the extent of American import. In this 
field America's only rival is the German concern, the 
Asiatic Petroleum Oil Company, which imports Sumatra 
oil. In 1908 the total amount of kerosene- oil imported 
to Manchuria was about 8,999,211 gallons. Of this 
total, 7,236,260 gallons were from America, and 1,762,951 
gallons from Sumatra. 

Now we come to the consideration of the tobacco 
trade in Manchuria. The British-American tobacco 
trust, with its head ofifice in Shanghai, maintains a 
factory in Mukden which is the source of the trust's 
commercial operation in Manchuria. During the Russo- 
Japanese war the presence of a large number of Japanese 
soldiers in Manchuria naturally favored the importation 
of Japanese tobacco, and it seemed, for a while at least, 
that Japan would ultimately wrest from the American- 
British trust supremacy in the tobacco trade in that 
country. But the success of Japan in this field proved 
ephemeral. A foothold so firmly established as that of 
the trust could not be dislodged so easily. As the 
Mikado's army withdrew from the field, and as Man- 



AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA 135 

churia returned to the pursuit of its normal industry, 
the American-British syndicate again became the master 
of the situation, and the Japanese tobacco trade grad- 
ually dwindled before its increasing influence. The in- 
vulnerable position which the trust secured in Manchuria 
is largely due to the up-to-date business methods which 
it has consistently pursued. To cite an illustration, the 
trust carries stocks in warehouses at various points 
where the local dealer can obtain what he desires with- 
out delay, with no letter writing nor annoying prepara- 
tion of drafts and remittances. All the dealer has to do 
is to go to a bank or other authorized agent, pay the 
fixed price for the amount he wants, and receive a ware- 
house order for the goods. This order is honored at the 
warehouse and may be used as a check on the bank or 
agent, the latter remitting direct to headquarters. 

This practice is followed not only in Manchuria but 
also in Korea, where the trust has an extensive business. 
Further details of the American-British enterprise will 
be described in connection with American trade in 
Korea. For the present we must leave the trust and 
pass on to the cotton-goods trade in Manchuria, in 
which field America is striving to maintain supremacy. 

The principal cottons imported to Manchuria are 
shirtings, sheetings, drills and jeans. Until fifteen years 
ago Great Britain contributed most to the cotton-goods 
trade of Manchuria, but it was her ill-fortune to be 
gradually superseded by America. The reason for this 
change is obvious. The rigorous climate of Manchuria 
and North China naturally favors the importation of the 
heavier makes of goods, which are exactly the kinds 
America has been sending to Manchuria. The Ameri- 
can goods have another merit in that they withstand 



136 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

hard washing much better than do the English goods. 
The difference in price, though rather sHght, has also 
assisted in turning the scale in the eyes of the Chinese 
merchants and consumers in favor of the American 
goods. England still held supremacy as regards shirt- 
ings, but in sheetings, drills and jeans she was all but 
driven from the field by the United States. Then came 
the war, and a new factor was injected into the situation. 
Soon after the war, the leading Japanese cotton manu- 
facturers, with the backing of the house of Mitsui, the 
greatest Japanese firm engaged in foreign trade, organized 
themselves into a guild with a view to pushing their 
trade in Manchuria. Their organized efforts were soon 
crowned with success. To-day Japanese cotton goods 
can be laid down in Manchuria at less than it costs to im- 
port American goods. For instance American sheetings 
cannot be retailed in Manchuria at less than fourteen yen 
fifty se7i per piece with a weight of thirteen to fourteen 
pounds, while Japanese sheetings of practically the same 
quality are sold at thirteen yen eighty sen per piece. It 
is estimated that the annual demand of Manchuria for 
sheetings alone is as large as ten million yen, and it is in 
this special field that the Japanese manufacturers have 
been most active. To indicate how successfully Japan is 
pushing her cotton-goods trade in Manchuria, the follow- 
ing table is prepared, comparing the respective volumes 
of American, British, and Japanese manufactured cottons 
imported through the port of Newchwang during 1907 
and 1908: 





Amej'ican 


British 


Japanese 




igoy igoB 


igo7 igo8 


igo7 1908 


Shirtings 


3,590 63,095 


32,332 67,253 


1,800 


Sheetings 


258,460 515,193 


3,520 15,650 


98,940 151,400 


Drills 


194,570 


3,075 1,840 


9,200 52,200 


Jeans 


54,102 63,990 


42,979 124,996 





AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA 137 

It is a remarkable fact that a nation which as late as 
1900 laid down in Newchwang practically no manu- 
factured cottons should eight years later import sheetings 
to the extent of 151,400 pieces, as well as 52,000 pieces 
of drills and 1 ,800 pieces of shirtings. While the Japanese 
trade has made such a great stride, the American trade 
has been gradually declining. Witness the following 
table, which shows the import of American manufactured 
cottons through Newchwang from 1903 to 1908: 

igo^ igo4 igos igo6 igoy igo8 

Shirtings 38.470 85,385 79,216 29,632 3,590 63,097 

Sheetings 1,033,089 1,140,620 2,252,165 336,951 258,460 515,193 

Drills 596,625 442,291 974,557 65,958 130,540 194,570 

Jeans 92,410 80,350 151,023 102,968 54,102 63,990 

The significance of this table will be brought home 
more forcibly to the Americans when it is remembered 
that in 1899 American sheetings imported through New- 
chwang amounted to 1,101,765 pieces, while American 
drills and jeans imported in that year were as many as 
584,877 and 29,630 pieces, respectively. Besides the 
trade returns of Newchwang there are the returns of the 
Tairen and Antung customs to be considered, but the 
statistics already presented are sufficient to indicate the 
relative positions of the Japanese and American cotton- 
goods trade in Manchuria. 

In the previous chapter I have stated that cheap labor 
is not among the most potent factors in promoting 
Japanese trade in Manchuria. Yet the low cost of pro- 
duction, made possible by abundant supply of cheap 
labor, is of no small advantage to Japan. The New York 
Times, predicting five years ago a coming economic 
struggle between America and Japan, made the following 
pertinent remarks : 



138 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

" Southern cotton mills operated by water power and 
employing cheap labor have already demonstrated their 
ability to sell their product in China in competition with 
Manchester. But southern mills pay their operatives 
from five to seven dollars a week, while Japan pays her 
male operatives seventeen cents a day, and her female 
operatives ten cents. The wage scale puts the South out 
of the running. Fall River is not in the competition at 
all. With cotton at about twelve cents a pound in 1904, 
the cost of turning out print cloths in Fall River was 
three and three-eighths cents a yard. Japan can under- 
bid Fall River by at least a cent in the yard. Our cotton 
yarns cost us forty per cent, more to produce than Japa- 
nese yarns cost. But the material, not the labor, is the 
main element of cost in cotton goods and yarns. In manu- 
factures of a higher complexity the difference in labor 
cost must be vastly greater." 

Other things being equal, it is low price which con- 
trols the market. But in the case of American-Japanese 
rivalry in Manchuria other things are not equal. So far 
from it, everything seems to favor the advancement of 
Japanese trade. The Japanese did not create these 
favorable circumstances by iniquitous, underhand means : 
they merely benefited themselves by what nature be- 
stowed upon them. Japan's geographical situation, the 
abundant supply of cheap labor at her disposal, her 
familiarity with the use of pulse, a certain similarity exist- 
ing between the Chinese and her own languages — are not 
these all conditions prescribed by nature, in whose hands 
the Japanese are but an instrument ? As the New York 
Times, in the same editorial we have just quoted, fitly 
observes, if America will have the losing end of the bar- 
gain in the Far East, she cannot complain that Japan has 



AMERICAN TRADE IN MANCHURIA 139 

not given her a square deal. We realize that when once 
we begin to take away the Chinese trade of Western 
nations, the latter will cease to be effusive, sympathetic 
and cordial towards us. But that is one thing we can- 
not help. We are poor ; our natural resources are 
limited ; we cannot grow wheat and corn, raise hogs and 
cattle, and " live on the fat of the land," as you of great 
America can ; no one has made us a handsome bequest 
so that we might live comfortably without worrying 
about the morrow. And like all poor families ours is in- 
creasing with embarrassing rapidity — such is the irony of 
fate. What will become of our ever-increasing children, 
if we do not manufacture and export as best we can ? If 
we entice away your customers by underselling, that is no 
fault of ours. It would be unreasonable — worse, it would 
be cruel — to condemn the man who lives by the honest 
sweat of the brow without in the least violating the com- 
mon dictates of justice and honor. Japan's case in 
Manchuria is the case of the poor man who is forced to 
toil hard and practice strict economy. If the Western 
world cannot tolerate Japan's commercial advance in 
Manchuria simply because its pockets come into the 
reckoning, no more can Japan afford to stay home idle in 
order that the Western nations may have all the chance 
they want. 



BOOK II 
The Korean Question 




VIII 

WHY JAPAN OCCUPIED KOREA 

ALF a decade has elapsed since the establish- 
ment of the Japanese protectorate over Korea, 
and the interval has witnessed the publication 
of numerous books and articles dealing with the Korean 
question. It may therefore be presumed that the public 
has been afforded an ample opportunity to understand 
the sequence of events which impelled Japan to choose 
the course she did. But the truth is that the Western 
world has not yet grasped the true significance of the 
Korean situation which inevitably led up to the Japanese 
control of the peninsula. To the mass of literature which 
proceeded from the pens of Western writers far from 
friendly towards Japan, some of the Japanese writers, 
who undoubtedly meant to defend the cause of their 
country, have unwittingly added material which, instead 
of clearing misconceptions, has assisted in intensifying 
them. Let me note a trenchant essay of a well-known 
Japanese writer which has been widely quoted as indicat- 
ing Japan's ruthless method of dealing with Korea. 

Writing in an important New York monthly, this 
Japanese writer declares that the Japanese are doing in 
Korea "just as the Americans have done to the Indians," 
and adds : '• Nippon has joined the household of great 
powers ; she has become civilized." The assertion is 
straightforward and fearless, yet its tone savors of cyni- 
cism and is scarcely calculated to impress the reader with 
the inevitable situation which impelled the Japanese to 

143 



144 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

establish a protectorate over Korea. Furthermore, when 
he serenely says that '• we have gone over into the back 
yard of our neighbor and are telling him to kindly move 
on, simply because we need his home," he becomes 
plainly misleading, for such a statement is hardly war- 
ranted by the facts which necessitated the obliteration of 
Korean autonomy. To the Japanese, the control of the 
peninsular empire was no matter that could be made 
hght of, as is done by this writer ; it was the inevitable 
outcome of the hopeless corruption and irredeemable im- 
potence of Korea, which defied the repeated attempts of 
the Japanese to put her on her feet. These attempts, 
though not wholly disinterested, were undoubtedly sin- 
cere and earnest, for it was Japan's conviction that her 
interests, aye, her very existence, could be maintained 
only by maintaining Korea's independence, or by pre- 
venting her from passing into the hands of a third power. 
The conviction may have been mistaken, but Japan could 
view the matter in no other light ; and in following this 
conviction she did not hesitate to sacrifice countless hves 
and incur endless drain upon her treasury. It is not 
*' simply because we need the home of our neighbor " 
that we are in Korea : on the contrary, we told him again 
and again that he must keep his home in respectable 
condition ; that he must clear up his premises, so that no 
powerful neighbor would have an excuse for doing this 
for him. If we seemed to recant, it was simply because 
the home seemed certain to pass into the hands of some 
other party, extremely dangerous to us, unless we took 
care of it ourselves. To bring home this fact to the 
reader it is necessary to survey briefly the history of dip- 
lomatic relations between Japan and Korea. 

It is commonly known that the United States was the 



WHY JAPAN OCCUPIED KOREA I45 

first Western power to receive a Korean minister ; but 
not many people are aware that of all the nations Japan 
was the first to recognize the independence of Korea. 
It was early in the seventies of the past century that 
Japan first sent her envoy to the court at Seoul only to 
meet a rude rebuff at its portal. Not only did Korea 
foolishly refuse to enter into friendly relations with Japan^ 
but she fired, for no plausible reason, upon a Japanese 
war vessel which was peacefully at anchor off Chemulpo. 
This incident furnished Japan the opportunity to force 
open the door of the hermit nation, and wrest the treaty 
of peace and commerce of 1876. The acquiescence of 
Korea in this treaty forms the pivotal point in the history 
of the peninsular kingdom, for the instrument was the 
first treaty ever entered into by Korea with any foreign 
power. But its greatest significance lay in the fact that 
it dealt with Korea as an independent state, and thus ig- 
nored the suzerain power which China claimed to possess 
over the peninsula. Article I of this treaty declares 
that " Chosen (Korea), being an independent state, en- 
joys the same sovereign rights as does Japan." 

The conclusion of this treaty naturally placed a heavy 
responsibility upon Japan's shoulders, for her adherence 
to the letter and spirit of the treaty must necessarily stir 
the ire of China, which was then universally regarded as 
immensely more powerful than Japan. Having emerged 
from tremendous political upheaval only several years 
before, and having just suppressed a formidable insurrec- 
tion, Japan was far from prepared to run single-handed 
the gauntlet of such a powerful enemy. Following 
Japan's lead, several Western powers likewise concluded 
similar treaties with Korea, but their advocacy of Korean 
independence was only half-hearted, for did not these 



146 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Western powers accept without protest the note from the 
Seoul court, stating that these treaties would make no 
change to the status of Korea as a vassal state of China ? 
Not only this, but England and Russia practically de- 
parted from the spirit of their treaties with Korea, when 
on the occasion of the Russian occupation of the Korean 
island of Chee-wen (Port Hamilton) in 1885, these pow- 
ers negotiated not with Korea, the rightful owner of the 
island, but with China. Even the United States, which 
had the privilege of receiving the first envoy Korea ever 
sent to the West, made no efforts to prevent China from 
recalling and punishing the minister. 

Alone and unaided, Japan boldly undertook to up- 
hold the independence of Korea in the face of an enemy, 
which had brought pressure to bear upon the Seoul 
court like an incubus. It soon became evident, how- 
ever, that the peninsular people were decrepit beyond 
the point of renovation. Following upon the heels of 
the treaty of 1876, a spirit of reform in the internal affairs 
of Korea flushed the sky with a light of hope, which 
seemed to forestall the approach of sunshine after an 
arctic winter. A Japanese officer was invited to reform 
the degenerate army of Korea, and a few progressive 
Koreans were admitted into the government. 

Apparently, Korea was committed to the cause of 
progress. But it soon transpired that these progressive 
statesmen were merely dupes of a designing clique, 
which had made a feint of espousing a reform policy 
simply as the means of ousting from power the opposing 
clique, led by the arch-chauvinist and conservative. 
Prince Tai-wun. Only a spark was needed to kindle a 
fierce factional feud. That spark was found in the mili- 
tary riot of 1882, caused by the shameless peculation of a 



WHY JAPAN OCCUPIED KOREA I47 

few officers, who lined their pockets at the expense of 
their soldiers. At the covert instigation of Prince Tai- 
wun, the rebels forced their way to the palace, intent 
upon murdering all those who were in power, not ex- 
cluding even the queen, the avowed antagonist of the 
conservative prince. With the utmost inconsistency, the 
insurgents also murdered the Japanese officer entrusted 
with the reformation of the Korean army, burned the 
Japanese Legation, and forced the Mikado's minister, with 
his staff and his countrymen in Seoul, to beat a retreat to 
Chemulpo. This unfortunate riot resulted in an agree- 
ment, by which Korea was to pay Japan an indemnity 
of 550,000 yen ; but when she paid its first installment 
of 150,000 yen, Japan magnanimously relinquished her 
claim to the remainder of the indemnity. In this mat- 
ter Japan was actuated by her sympathy with the de- 
pleted condition of the Korean treasury as much as by 
the less altruistic desire of instilling in the Korean mind 
a friendly sentiment towards her. Some twenty-five 
years later, the same motives actuated the United States 
to relinquish her claim to the greater portion of the 
Boxer indemnity. 

Again the hope of Korea's regeneration was held out 
only to fade away like the flash of a meteor. A coterie 
of progressive Koreans, who returned from Japan im- 
bued with progressive ideas, organized themselves into 
what was known as the Independence Party, whose 
object was the consolidation of Korean independence by 
adopting progressive measures. The king himself seemed 
well disposed to heed the advice of these reformers, and 
endorsed the invitation of two Japanese publicists as 
advisers to the court. Acting upon her avowed policy, 
Japan backed the Independence Party and all the move- 



148 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

merits calculated to further the cause of progress. At 
the same time, however, Japan was careful to impress 
these progressives with the danger of •• forcing the pace," 
for she was well aware that a state like Korea could not 
be roused all of a sudden from a torpor of centuries. 
But the inexperienced radicals, to whom the regenera- 
tion of their country seemed a case of " now or never," 
were too impatient to refrain from rash measures, while 
the conservative clique was employing all its resources in 
its attempt to expel the radical element from the admin- 
istration. At this juncture, China threw her influence 
on the conservative side of the scale, and the unsuccessful 
coup, resorted to by the indiscreet radicals, left the gov- 
ernment in the hands of the reactionaries. Again the 
Japanese Legation was reduced to ashes, and a number of 
Japanese officers and residents were murdered. 

The decade following this ruinous upheaval wit- 
nessed a continuous encroachment by China upon 
Korean administration, and the gradual elimination of 
Japanese influence from the peninsula. All this while, 
however, Japan did not acquiesce in the situation, and 
protested time and again against China dealing with 
Korea as her tributary state. As China was thoroughly 
intrenched in the Hermit Kingdom, so firmly was Japan 
determined to uphold the independence of the helpless 
nation. The crash between the two powers was only a 
matter of time. By 1894 the little islanders of Nippon 
were thoroughly prepared to settle the matter by the 
arbitrament of the sword. Having perceived that the 
internal administration of Korea had been going from 
bad to worse, Japan, in that year, proposed to China that 
the two powers cooperate in executing necessary reforms 
to maintain the integrity of the peninsular kingdom. 



WHY JAPAN OCCUPIED KOREA I49 

This proposition China met with a flat refusal. The re- 
sult was the war of 1894- 1895, in the wake of which 
Korea was left in Japan's hands. But even the shock of 
the great war that swept through their own country- 
proved powerless to awaken the dull people of the 
peninsula. Unheeding Japan's advice to rehabilitate 
their internal affairs along new lines, they did nothing 
but quarrel among themselves, or, at best, play at all 
manner of silly pastimes. 

Soon after the war Japan sent to Korea one of her 
ablest statesmen in the person of Count, now Marquis, 
Inouye, with the instruction to urge upon Korea a re- 
form programme, of which the following items were the 
main features : (1) the affairs of the Royal Household 
should not be confounded with those of the govern- 
ment ; (2) the sovereign must rule only in accord with 
the principles laid down in the laws; (3) there should be 
one, and only one source of authority, which means that 
the consort or private relatives of the sovereign should 
not be allowed to interfere with the affairs of state ; (4) 
the respective powers of the different departments of the 
government must be clearly defined, and all officers must 
be subject to disciplinary measures ; (5) the army must 
be reorganized along modern lines ; (6) taxes must be 
collected only at rates fixed by the law. To facilitate 
the execution of this reform programme, Japan loaned 
Korea 3,000,000 ye7t. But all this sane advice fell upon 
a deaf ear, and the Koreans went repeating the old story 
of plots and counter-plots among themselves. This un- 
fortunate state of things was largely responsible for the 
assassination of the queen on October 8, 1895, although 
the Japanese government itself could not shirk the 
responsibility in so far as it failed to foresee that the ap- 



I50 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

pointment to the post of minister to Korea of an indis- 
creet, unscrupulous man might entail an embarrassing 
situation. 

The poHtical situation in Korea, already disturbed by 
the continuous factional feuds and the consequent as- 
sassination of the queen, became worse confounded by 
the appearance on the scene of Russia with all her sinis- 
ter designs, aimed at the disintegration of Korea. The 
indolent, unpatriotic people, weary of Japan's insistence 
upon reform, readily handed themselves over to Russia, 
which would have none of reform and progress in the 
peninsula, but would let things go along the old way, 
knowing that this would admirably serve her purpose. 
Thus the curtain rose on a new scene in February, 1896, 
when the weak-minded king practically removed his 
court to the Russian Legation, and immediately ordered 
the murder of all the ministers known to be friendly 
towards Japan. Thenceforward Russian activities in 
Korea became more and more ominous, and seemed to 
lead the peninsular nation into the quagmires of degen- 
eration. The Muscovite diplomats made the most cor- 
rupt Korean officials tools in their hands, and through 
them obstructed the Japanese policy of reform at every 
point. 

Anxious to check Russia's further encroachment upon 
Korea, Japan sent Marquis Yamagata to St. Petersburg 
in May, 1896, with the mission of defining the respective 
attitudes of the two powers towards Korea. This mission, 
however, was unable to accomplish anything important, 
except the agreement that in case Korea had to have 
recourse to foreign aid in carrying on her internal re- 
form, both Russia and Japan would lend, by mutual 
accord, their assistance to that country. From a diplo- 



WHY JAPAN OCCUPIED KOREA 151 

matic point of view this understanding meant a defeat of 
Japan, inasmuch as Japan thereby plainly accredited 
Russia, which had no real political or economic inter- 
est in the peninsula, with the same advantageous posi- 
tion as she herself held. 

The worst of it was that Russia had no intention of 
adhering to this arrangement. From the outset it was 
plain that the Muscovite diplomats in the Far East em- 
braced no moral code save that of the dying patriarch, 
who offered this advice to his first-born : " My son, get 
money — honestly, if you can, but get money." By dint 
of chicanery and subterfuge, they succeeded in reversing 
the above agreement. As it became more and more 
evident that the Russian absorption of Korea was merely 
a matter of time, Japan became restive and made another 
effort to stay Russian encroachment. The result was 
the agreement of April 25, 1898, which contained the 
following article : 

'* The Imperial governments of Russia and Japan rec- 
ognize definitely the sovereignty and entire independence 
of Korea, and pledge themselves mutually^gjiij^^bstain 
from all direct interference in the internal'^'affairs 01 that 
country." \ 

But all these pledges and agreements were of no use, 
when Russia's ultimate plan was to add Korea to her own 
map. The matter was a matter that should be discussed 
only in the language of shot and shell, if Japan <Vas to 
convince the great White Czar of the unjustifiabiHty of 
his pretentions. The war that ensued was the final act 
in the great drama of the Russo-Japanese rivalry in 
Korea ; and the public must be sadly deficient in political 
insight if it does not perceive that the war and the conse- 
quent establishment of a Japanese protectorate over 



152 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Korea were forced upon the Mikado's Empire by the 
necessity of safeguarding her vital interests, indeed her 
very existence. 

The war left Japan in a position to act in Korea ad 
libitum. But before assuming the direct control of 
Korean administration, Japan exhausted all her good 
offices in her attempt to maintain Korea's independence. 
Thus, in February, 1904, when the Russians in Man- 
churia were retreating before the onslaught of the Japa- 
nese, Japan concluded a protocol with Korea, in which 
the Seoul court promised to adopt the advice of the 
Tokio government " in regard to improvements in ad- 
ministration," while the Mikado's government pledged 
itself " to ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial 
House of Korea," and to " guarantee the independence 
and territorial integrity of Korea." In pursuance of this 
protocol, Korea invited Mr. T. Megata as financial ad- 
viser, and Mr. D. W. Stevens, who was assassinated by a 
Korean fanatic in San Francisco early in the spring of 
1908, as diplomatic adviser. The Tokio administration 
spared no pains in urging upon the Korean ruler the 
necessity of administering the government in accord 
with modern principles. But the venality and supineness 
of the Korean officials had become such that any amount 
of good advice proved of no avail. Far from sincere in 
cooperating with the Japanese in carrying out adminis- 
trative reforms, they hindered them at every point by 
resorting to plots and intrigues, in which they were past 
masters. Instead of endeavoring to improve the condi- 
tions of their own country, they foolishly conspired to 
subvert the new order of things by invoking the assist- 
ance of a third power. It was, therefore, inevitable that 
in November, 1905, Japan should assume the control of 



WHY JAPAN OCCUPIED KOREA 1 53 

the foreign affairs of Korea, sending Prince Ito to Seoul 
as resident-general, who was invested with the power to 
direct all matters relating to the external relations of the 
country. 

This episode, however, made no change in the internal 
affairs of the country. The Korean emperor and officials 
still enjoyed initiative power, and were at liberty to adopt 
or reject Japan's advice as they pleased. And thus the 
Japanese were repeating the same experience, the use- 
lessness of which had been indisputably proved during 
the thirty years that preceded. But at last Japan's pa- 
tience was exhausted, when, in the spring of 1907, the 
Korean emperor again sent his emissaries abroad, this 
time to the Hague Conference, hoping to embroil Japan 
in international complications over the disposition of the 
Korean question. 

As an evidence that the Korean is a born intriguer, it 
may not be amiss here to quote no less an authority than 
Dr. Horace N. Allen, who spent twenty-two years in 
Korea, and who enjoyed the unique privilege of being a 
personal friend, physician and adviser to the Korean 
emperor. Discussing in his book, " Things Korean," the 
characteristic of the Koreans, this sympathetic writer 
says : 

" Travelling through the country one often notices at 
a hamlet two or more men off by themselves, engaged 
in whispered conversation. These men are surely plot- 
ting to gain some advantage over another. Entertain an 
official alone, even in a large room, and he will edge up 
to you and begin to whisper. It is the same manifesta- 
tion of the native aptitude for intrigue, which makes 
them excellent as starters and destroyers, but unsatis- 
factory as sustainers of an undertaking. . . . The 



154 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

villagers scheme against a successful neighbor; the court 
official pleads for the influence of the foreigner to en- 
hance his own power at court ; in both cases it was the 
same game of politics in all its petty meanness." 

This aptitude for intrigue as well as " the habit of not 
doing to-day that which may be put off till to-morrow — 
a day that never comes, since when it arrives it is still 
to-day " — these are the factors which set at naught all 
the efforts of the Japanese for the betterment of the 
Korean administration by means of friendly advice. 

And thus the curtain went up on the last act of the 
Korean drama, when in July, 1907, Japan despaired be- 
cause of the treacherousness, impotency and indolence 
of the Korean ruler and officials, wrested from them 
an agreement, conceding to her the control of internal 
affairs of the peninsula. In this agreement it is stipulated 
(i) that the Korean government shall act under the guid- 
ance of the resident-general in all matters relating to 
administrative reform ; (2) that in all matters relating to 
the enactment of laws and ordinances, and in all im- 
portant matters of administration, the Korean government 
must obtain the preliminary approval of the resident- 
general ; (3) that there shall be clear differentiation of the 
executive and the judiciary ; (4) that in all appointments 
and removals of high officials the Korean government 
must obtain the consent of the residency-general ; (5) that 
the Korean government shall appoint as Korean officials 
such Japanese as may be recommended by the resident- 
general. In the meantime the emperor, knowing that 
his game was lost, issued this edict : 

'* Alas ! I have been in possession of my ancestor's 
throne for forty-four years. Having experienced many 
disturbances, the administration has not been up to my 



WHY JAPAN OCCUPIED KOREA 155 

desire, and frequently the ministers were not the proper 
men. Rumors are daily increasing, and actions are unfit 
at present. The worry is great, and the danger to the 
Hves of the people and the downfall of the country's 
progress are greater than ever — fearful and dangerous, 
like stepping over ice." 

With this pathetic declaration, he abdicated on July 1 8, 
1907, leaving the throne to his son. 

This episode virtually ended the Korean tragedy — a 
tragedy which might never have been enacted had Korea 
heeded Japan's advice thirty years before. In speaking 
of the American occupation of the Phihppines, Mr. 
Roosevelt once said : " The inevitable march of events 
gave us the control of the Philippine Islands at a time 
so opportune that it may without irreverence be called 
providential." The same may be said with regard to the 
Japanese control of Korea. It was " the inevitable march 
of events " which drifted us into the haven where we 
now find ourselves. And again with Mr. Roosevelt we 
must say that " unless we show ourselves weak, un- 
less we show ourselves degenerate sons of the sires from 
whose loins we sprang, we must go on with the work we 
have undertaken." Furthermore, the Japanese control 
of Korea seems far more justifiable than the American 
occupation of the Philippines, inasmuch as Japan's inter- 
ests in Korea, political and economic, were immensely 
more vital than were those of the United States in the 
Philippine Islands. To the Mikado's Empire, the sacri- 
fice of these interests and the abandonment of Korea to 
a third power, bent upon territorial aggrandizement 
seemed to spell a menace to her own existence. 

The inevitable sequel to the episode of 1907 was the 
annexation of Korea by Japan in the summer of 1910, 



156 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

But before entering into the discussion of the annexation 
and its effects upon Korea and foreign nations interested 
in that country, let us pause a moment and inquire into 
American relations with Korea as well as what Japan has 
done for and in Korea. 



IX 

AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH KOREA 

AMERICAN-KOREAN treaty of May 22, 1882, 
in its first article solemnly declares that 
" If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively 
with either government, the other will exert their good 
offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an 
amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feel- 
mg. 

This article, which was long interred in oblivion, was 
recently brought to light by those American critics who 
would have us believe that in recognizing the paramount 
authority of the Japanese over Korea the United States 
has violated a sacred pledge, and made herself a despi- 
cable figure in the eyes of a forsaken people. To such 
critics it appears that America ought to have abided by 
this promise, which had never been withdrawn either 
tacitly or implicitly, and relieved Korea of the incubus 
of Japanese domination. To me, however, such asser- 
tions are Httle more than platitudes. More than that, I 
venture to advance the theory that this covenant was 
virtually nullified not long after its conclusion. 

America's intercourse with Korea began in the usual 
manner. An American schooner was wrecked off the 
coast of Northwestern Korea, and the surviving crew 
asked for succor of the local authorities. The appeal met 
with a generous response from both the officials and the 

157 



158 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

public, and the unfortunate sailors were escorted across 
the Yalu and handed over to the local Chinese officials 
for safe conduct to Tientsin, where they might find for- 
eign ships on which to sail homeward. This happened 
in June, 1866. A month later another American 
schooner, the General Sherman, approached the Korean 
coast on a mission, the true nature of which has never 
been known. Defying the protests of the natives the 
vessel forced her way up the Tatong River to the old 
capital of Pingyang. Scarcely had she reached Pingyang 
when the freshet caused by heavy rainfalls began to sub- 
side, and the vessel soon found herself unable to retreat, 
for at ordinary times the Tatong permits the passage only 
of small sampans. With their ship hopelessly aground, 
the crew were nevertheless too arrogant to refrain from 
displaying their innate contempt for the yellow man. 
Some altercation ensued, and the General Shertnan soon 
found herself besieged by fire-rafts which the natives 
floated down the river. Leaving the schooner to burn, 
the crew came ashore only to be slain by the natives. 

Another American expedition of a questionable nature 
was that undertaken in 1867 by one Oppert, whose his- 
tory is not known except that he was an American of 
German descent. He heard of invaluable treasures being 
buried in the tombs of Korean emperors, and he fancied 
he might make a fortune by despoiling one of these 
tombs. So Oppert fitted out an expedition and sailed 
from Shanghai for Korea with two armed vessels ; but 
whether the expedition was successful or not is not 
known, any more than the life of Oppert himself. 

All these incidents served to pave the way to the es- 
tablishment of treaty relations between Korea and the 
United States. The first expedition to Korea under- 



AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 1 59 

taken by the Washington government was that of 1 87 1. 
It was led by Admiral Rogers with a flotilla of five ves- 
sels, — the Colorado y Alaska, Bertdcia, Monocacy^ and 
Palos. The American government ordered Frederick F. 
Low, then American Minister at Peking, to accompany 
Admiral Rogers to attend to the diplomatic part of the 
undertaking. Low responded to the call, although he 
was convinced of the futihty of any attempt to open the 
doors of the hermit nation. Late in May of that year 
the flotilla reached the western coast of Korea, and Ad- 
miral Rogers tried to enter into direct communication 
with the court at Seoul. The attempt was ill-timed, for 
Korea was then permeated with anti-foreign spirit. The 
chauvinistic regent, Prince Tai-wun, had used his power 
more for the persecution of foreigners than for the pro- 
motion of the welfare of his subjects. A shrewd man, he 
suspected that the American fleet came to demand an 
explanation for the massacre of the crew of the General 
Sherman, and he resolved to deal with it in a high- 
handed manner. He was so conceited as to flatter him- 
self that he had men and arms powerful enough to chastise 
any intruder, for had he not, only a few months before, 
vanquished a French force which consisted of the very 
men who had captured the capital of the great Celestial 
ruler and reduced his sacred palace to ashes ? While the 
American envoys were awaiting a reply from the court, 
two of their vessels, which were engaged in taking sound- 
ings in the estuary between the mainland and the Kan- 
wha Island, were fired upon from the forts on the island. 
The American vessels responded to the challenge, and 
took the forts by storm with the loss of a single officer. 
This untoward event deprived the American envoys of 
all hope of entering into amicable negotiations with the 



l6o AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Koreans, and the flotilla steamed down towards the Yel- 
low Sea, leaving Prince Tai-wun and his court in the 
conceit that the foreigners were, after all, not so formi- 
dable as they were thought to be. The concluding act of 
this drama was the erection in Seoul of a monument 
commemorating Korea's *' victory " over the " foreign 
barbarians," and forbidding any one to express views in 
favor of entering into friendly relations with any Western 
nation. 

But it was not many years before Korea had to aban- 
don her time-honored policy of seclusion. This con- 
summation was precipitated by the sudden awakening of 
Japan, which injected a new force into the poHtical situa- 
tion in the Far East. The Sunrise Empire, in the dawn 
of her fresh energies and new aspirations, thought it her 
duty to bring her backward neighbors, China and Korea, 
into line with herself, so that the whole Orient might one 
day rise in one solid mass and declare to the tide of 
Western aggression ; " Thus far shalt thou go and no 
farther." Korea readily yielded to the impact of Japa- 
nese cannon-balls, and the Japanese-Korean Treaty of 
1876 was concluded. With the walls of exclusion thus 
battered down, it was comparatively easy for the Western 
powers to open trade relations with Korea. In 1882 the 
United States fitted out a second expedition to Korea 
with Commodore Schufeldt at its head. The result was 
the Korean-American Treaty of May 22d of the same 
year, and General Foote was sent as first American min- 
ister to Seoul. 

Here we must pause for a moment and consider the 
first article of this Korean-American treaty, cited at the 
outset of this chapter. This article provides, as we have 
seen, that Korea and America are under mutual obliga- 



AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS l6l 

tion to protect each other's welfare against the encroach- 
ment of other powers. The absurdity of such an article 
ought to be obvious to any one, for it is the chimera of 
chimeras to presume that a decrepit nation like Korea 
could come to the rescue, should a great nation like the 
United States be attacked by a third power. The Hermit 
Kingdom was as weak and helpless in 1882 as she has 
been ever since, and one would almost think that it was 
a bit of American humor which actuated Commodore 
Schufeldt to put in the foreground of the treaty he drew 
up a provision whose impracticability was a foregone con- 
clusion. As the years rolled on, the hopeless condition 
of Korea became more and more evident, until the stage 
was reached wherein she had to be subject to the rule of 
either Russia or Japan. It is obvious that when a nation 
is so utterly destitute of the qualities necessary for the 
maintenance of its independence, reams of treaties and 
conventions are of little avail in propping up the decay- 
ing state. The question of whether Korea should remain 
an independent nation was a question which had to be 
considered not from a legal, but from a poHtical point of 
view. 

To say that the United States had from the beginning 
no intention to adhere to the spirit of that article would 
be to charge her with hypocrisy and insincerity, and I, 
for one, prefer to think that the course of events that 
followed the conclusion of that treaty revealed to her the 
hopelessness of Korea's case, necessitating a radical alter- 
ation of her policy towards the Hermit Kingdom. It 
was the same state of things which forced Japan to 
abandon her first avowal of a purpose to uphold the in- 
dependence of Korea. However that may be, here we 
are chiefly concerned with the fact that the recognition 



1 62 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

by America of the independence of Korea was virtually 
repealed in 1888, when China, acting upon the pretention 
that the peninsular country was one of her vassal states 
caused the recall of the Korean minister at Washington, 
against which America launched no protest. 

In 1883 Prince Min Yong-ik, the nephew of the 
queen, accompanied by a number of progressive young 
Koreans, proceeded to Washington to ratify the newly 
concluded treaty. Min had been recognized as one of 
the leaders of the faction which stood for reform and 
progress, but upon his return home from America in 
1884 he cast his lot, for what reason is not known, with 
the reactionary or Chinese faction, and in consequence 
was severely wounded by an assassin belonging to the 
radical party. Three years after the ratification of the 
treaty Korea decided to install a legation at Washington. 
At this time China exercised paramount influence over 
Korea. Li Hung-chang, one of the shrewdest diplomats 
China has ever produced, had sent his ablest lieutenant. 
Yuan Shi-kai, to Korea with the secret instruction that 
he should endeavor by all means to vindicate China's 
claim for suzerainty over Korea. When, therefore, Yuan 
learned of Korea's plan to despatch a minister to America 
he lost no time in launching a vigorous protest against 
the arrangement, asserting that as a vassal state of China 
Korea had no right to send her political representative 
to any foreign country. The Chinese diplomat employed 
all sorts of tactics from persuasion to threat in the effort 
to prevent the departure of the Korean minister. But 
the Seoul court, heartened by American backing, would 
not yield, and let the minister leave Seoul on his journey 
to America before Yuan detected the plan. On the mor- 
row of his departure Yuan knew, to his great chagrin, 



AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 163 

that he was outwitted, and hurried his lieutenant down 
to Chemulpo whence the mission was to sail on the 
American naval vessel Omaha. He threatened that un- 
less the mission was forthwith ordered back to Seoul he 
would return to China, intimating thereby that a grave 
situation would follow. But in reality Yuan had no in- 
tention to adopt drastic measures, for he feared that such 
a course might embroil China in trouble with the United 
States. The American government despatched the 
Omaha to escort the mission as far as the Japanese port 
of Nagasaki, and, what was still more important, an 
American citizen was to accompany the party in the ca- 
pacity of adviser. This American was no other than 
Dr. Horace N. Allen, who, having come to Korea as a 
medical missionary, secured the friendship and confidence 
of the Korean emperor to such an extent that he was re- 
quested to conduct the diplomatic mission to Washing- 
ton. It was, therefore, small wonder that at the last mo- 
ment Yuan receded, and allowed the Korean minister to 
start. At the same time Yuan imposed upon the Korean 
minister the following conditions : That the Korean min- 
ister, upon his arrival in Washington, should first of all 
pay a call upon the Chinese minister, who would present 
him to the President ; that in public functions partici- 
pated in by the diplomatic corps the Korean minister 
should never precede his Chinese colleague ; that on all 
important matters pertaining to the Korean Legation tlie 
Chinese minister should first of all be consulted. Ac- 
cepting these conditions the Korean minister boarded 
the Omaha. As the American vessel passed through 
the cordons of a Chinese fleet which had been sent to 
intercept the Korean mission, the salutes fired from the 
cannon of the Chinese war-ships caused consternation 



1 64 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

among the members of the Korean party, who thought 
that the Chinese were there to capture them. 

The picturesque party burst upon Washington in 
January, 1888. The Chinese minister there had already 
announced that he would introduce the Korean minister 
as vassal envoy, and insisted upon carrying out this an- 
nouncement. But Dr. Allen, on behalf of the Korean 
minister, decHned to accept such humiliating treatment, 
and insisted that the presentation of the Korean repre- 
sentative required no introduction from the Chinese 
Legation. At this juncture the American government 
showed no desire to exercise its influence in favor of the 
Korean envoy, but told him that the matter was one that 
had to be settled between the Chinese and Korean min- 
isters. After much argument and counter argument Dr. 
Allen succeeded in presenting the Korean ministers 
without Chinese mediation, although he felt constrained 
to tender his resignation as adviser to the Korean Lega- 
tion, thus assuming all the responsibility for the course 
pursued. His resignation, however, was not to exonerate 
the Korean minister, much less did it solve the question 
of whether the representative of the Korean ruler should 
at a foreign capital be treated as an envoy from an in- 
dependent nation. The Chinese government, seeing an 
affront to its dignity in the manner in which the matter 
was settled in Washington, demanded explanation of the 
Seoul court for the conduct of the Korean minister. 
Not satisfied with the apologies offered, China further 
demanded that the minister be recalled and punished for 
having slighted the legation of the suzerain state. What 
could poor Korea do but tremble and obey the stern 
mandate of the Son of Heaven ? The unhappy minister 
was ordered home to be disgraced in order to " save the 



AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 165 

face " of the Chinese, and the Korean Legation at Wash- 
ington, though allowed to remain there, became less than 
nominal. 

The inevitable inference from this episode is that 
America was far from whole-hearted in upholding 
Korean independence, and when she acquiesced in the 
high-handed measure which China adopted in recalling 
and humiliating the first Korean minister to Washington, 
she virtually recognized China's suzerain power over 
Korea, thus converting into a dead letter the first article 
of the treaty of 1882. The American government had 
perceived, seventeen years before the Roosevelt ad- 
ministration did, that no high-sounding proclamations 
and solemn covenants could maintain the independence 
of a nation, which had neither determination nor abil- 
ity to uphold itself. The withdrawal of the American 
Legation from Seoul in 1905 was merely an epilogue to 
the drama written as early as 1888. 

From 1888 to 1905 nothing noteworthy happened be- 
tween America and Korea, excepting that during that 
period American enterprise gained a strong foothold in 
the peninsula. The American diplomat who figured 
most prominently in Korea during these seventeen years 
was Dr. Allen. The career which this diplomat carved 
out in the Far East is alike unique and remarkable. 
Having spent a year in China as a medical missionary, 
he went to Korea in the same capacity in 1884, and 
within a short time thereafter he became a confidant and 
adviser for the Korean emperor. From 1885 to 1888 he 
was in the service of the Korean government, and it was 
during that period that he conducted the Korean mission 
to America. Shortly after his resignation as adviser to 
the Korean court Dr. Allen was appointed to be a 



l66 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

secretary of the American Legation at Seoul, and was 
gradually promoted to minister plenipotentiary to Korea, 
which post he occupied when the American Legation was 
withdrawn in 1905. It is with a pardonable pride that 
Dr. Allen, looking back at his achievements in Korea, 
says : 

" It was a somewhat unique position in which I found 
myself upon leaving Korea after twenty-one years' 
residence there, having to my credit the introduction of 
the following new departures, all of a useful nature : — 
Protestant missions and Western medical science; modern 
mining on a colossal scale ; steam railways ; electric 
trolleys and water- works, all of which were left in a suc- 
cessful, going condition." 

The circumstance, which enabled him to secure various 
franchises for his nationals during his service in the 
American Legation, was that he was the most familiar 
foreigner in the inner circles of the Korean court, where 
he had served as physician and adviser. The character- 
istic manner in which he obtained such privileges and 
concessions is recounted by Dr. Allen himself. On the 
morning of October, 1895, when a band of reckless 
Japanese assassinated the Korean queen, six of the 
frightened officials, all occupying the highest positions, 
took refuge in Dr. Allen's bedroom where Mrs. Allen 
dressed the wounds of those who were injured. They 
were kept as refugees at the American Legation until, 
upon the escape of the emperor to the Russian Legation, 
they were made the cabinet, with Dr. Allen's old friend, 
the former minister to Washington, as prime minister, 
upon his own recommendation. Appreciating this kind 
treatment extended by the American minister the Korean 
officials wished to return the compliment, and when Dr. 



I 



AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 167 

Allen asked for a concession for a railway to connect 
Seoul and Chemulpo it was instantly granted. 

During his incumbency as minister to Korea an ex- 
tremely amusing story was widely circulated in America 
and Europe, which resulted in the American Legation 
being deluged with applications for positions as nurse, 
physician, lady's maid, governess, coachman, cook, den- 
tist, and what not. The incident was trivial as it was 
comical, but a few words will be said as it affords an apt 
illustration of how the influence of the press is sometimes 
abused for the sheer purpose of satisfying the sensations 
of an unthinking public. The story referred to is that 
of " Emily Brown," who, the newspapers said, was the 
daughter of an American missionary and was married to 
the Korean emperor. The story was so cleverly and 
truthfully told, setting forth much detail as to the pedi- 
gree, acquaintances, age, and personal appearance of the 
woman, that even the thoughtful were led to believe that 
Emily Brown could not be altogether a fictitious charac- 
ter. So annoying became applications for positions from 
all sorts of Americans that Minister Allen was obliged to 
issue a circular declaring that the whole story was a hoax. 
But the newspapers would lend no ear to the correction, 
and continued to pubhsh the story until the climax was 
reached when this mysterious Emily, upon the abdication 
of the emperor, was flung upon the world and went wan- 
dering about the country asking charity at the portals of 
the people who had not even been allowed to cast a 
glance at her. 

But we must leave the fairy tale, and come back to the 
proper field of our study. 

The final stage in America's diplomatic relations with 
Korea is soon reached. In November, 1905, Japan, hav- 



l68 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

ing proven by the verdict of war her ability to rule the 
peninsula, obliged the Korean emperor to sign an agree- 
ment, granting her a protectorate over the country. 
Within a few days after this announcement the Roose- 
velt administration recognized the validity of Japan's 
claim, and withdrew the legation from Seoul. The Korean 
emperor, acting upon the advice of an American citizen 
in Seoul, had addressed a petition to President Roosevelt 
entreating him to rescue Korea. This American friend 
of the emperor was universally believed to be Mr. Homer 
B. Hulbert, who went to Korea as a missionary, but in 
later years quit the ministry to publish in Seoul a Korean- 
English newspaper entitled the Korea Review. It was 
also understood that the emperor's letter was written by 
Mr. Hulbert himself. I shall therefore note its contents 
as set forth by its author himself in his admirable book, 
<' The Passing of Korea." The letter " cited the fact that 
Korea has heretofore received many tokens of good-will 
from the American government and people, that the 
American representatives have been sympathetic and 
helpful, and that American teachers of all kinds have 
done valuable work. He (the emperor) granted that the 
government had not been what it should have been, and 
that many mistakes had been committed, but he urged 
that whatever the Korean people might think of their 
government, they were passionately attached to the real 
Korea, to their nationality ; that they had few things to 
be proud of, and that if their nationality and independ- 
ence, which had been guaranteed by Japan, were swept 
away, there would be left no incentive for the people to 
advance. He acknowledged the need of Japanese super- 
vision and declared that the advice of Japan had been 
and would be followed along all lines that looked towards 



AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 169 

the betterment of conditions in the peninsula. He inti- 
mated that the acts committed by the Japanese during 
the past year did not warrant the giving to Japan of com- 
plete control of Korea, for it would make Japanese resi- 
dents all the more contemptuous of the private rights of 
Koreans. He urged that Japan would be doing herself 
an injustice, in breaking her promise to preserve the in- 
dependence of Korea, for it would make other powers 
rightly suspicious of Japan's good faith elsewhere in the 
Far East. In conclusion he asked the President to bring 
to bear upon this question the same breadth of view and 
the same sympathy which had characterized his distin- 
guished career in other fields ; and if, after a careful in- 
vestigation, the facts above enumerated and others that 
would come to light should seem to warrant him in so 
doing, he should use his friendly offices to prevent the dis- 
aster to Korea which seemed imminent." 

The appeal arrived in Washington, it seems, before the 
withdrawal of the American Legation at Seoul was or- 
dered, but the President declined to receive it until the sev- 
erance of diplomatic relations between Korea and Amer- 
ica became an accomplished fact. The letter was cleverly 
written, and it no doubt elicited a deep sympathy from 
the President, but his " breadth of view," which the letter 
extolled, did not warrant his yielding to mere sentimen- 
talities and taking sides against Japan. If the Korean 
ruler and people had the desire and the determination to 
preserve their independence, they ought to have vindi- 
cated the fact during the thirty years when circumstances, 
so far as the outer world was concerned, were not unfav- 
orable for such an attempt. Japan had extricated Korea 
from the clutches of the Chinese, reasserted her inde- 
pendence, and made repeated efforts to help her reform 



lyo AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

her internal conditions. The emperor in his letter to 
the President endeavored to make it appear that he had 
followed Japan's good advice, but Mr. Roosevelt knew 
better. So far from doing what he should have done, he 
had wasted the thirty long years without doing anything 
towards the improvement of the deplorable state of his 
country, allowing his court to remain a hotbed of plots 
and conspiracies, and the rendezvous of witches, fortune- 
tellers, charlatans, adventurers, and what not. It was 
more pitiful than ridiculous that the Korean king, utterly 
oblivious to the precarious condition of his government, 
took upon himself the high-sounding title of emperor in 
1897, and in 1902 invited foreign ambassadors to be 
present at a grand anniversary that was to have been 
celebrated in honor of his forty years of " enlightened " 
rule over the *• great empire." All this and more Mr. 
Roosevelt had been fully informed of, and it was but nat- 
ural that the emperor's appeal should have failed to in- 
fluence the President's views. If one reads Mr. Roose- 
velt's recent speech in Cairo, wherein he upheld British 
rule and declared the Egyptians unqualified to regain in- 
dependence, one can thoroughly understand why he did 
not countenance the request of the Korean emperor. 
And as Mr. Roosevelt also told the Englishman that un- 
less he maintains good order and continues to make good 
in Egypt, he must in honor withdraw from that country, 
so we are constrained to tell the Japanese that their oc- 
cupation of Korea can be justified only by demonstrating 
their sincere wish for the welfare of the Korean people. 

It is not my place to pass judgment upon the manner 
in which Mr. Roosevelt received the Korean emperor's 
letter ; but when future historians, far removed from the 
excitement of the actual scene, shall look at the matter 



AMERICA'S DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS 171 

ill clear perspective, they will agree that Mr. Roose- 
velt's act in this case was neither " contemptuous " nor 
" treacherous," as Mr. Hulbert thinks it was, but was 
based upon his broad view of humanity, which is on the 
whole salutary and unimpeachable. And, as a Japanese, 
I must add that the prompt recognition by the American 
government of Japan's claim in Korea, at a time when 
the Mikado's Empire needed most the moral support of 
Western powers, will always be remembered with grati- 
tude by the Japanese, and unless those critics, who have 
their own axes to grind, conspire to misrepresent Japa- 
nese activities before the American public, the Korean 
question will provide no occasion for disturbing the tra- 
ditional friendship between the two nations. 



X 

JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 

IN an age when diplomatic questions are discussed 
in conventional manner and often in super-polite 
phrases, it is refreshing to note a frank, and even 
rude expression of views upon international relations. 
It is with this pleasing sensation that I read in Mr. 
Thomas F. Millard's « The New Far East " the following 
passage : 

" I advance no claim that America is more disinter- 
ested than other nations. Her policy is based upon the 
belief that the * open door ' will be best for her interests, 
just as some other powers consider the sphere-of-influence 
doctrine as best calculated to advance theirs. All are 
purely selfish, in the sense that each nation is concerned 
most about its own advantage." 

I would be the very last man to emulate Mr. Millard's 
method of dealing with the Far Eastern question, but 
the remarkable straightforwardness with which he ex- 
presses himself no one will hesitate to admire. However 
that may be, here I desire to emphasize the idea that the 
above-cited view of Mr. Millard's with regard to the 
American policy in the Far East is exactly what I want 
to apply to the Japanese case in Korea. However anx- 
ious some officially inspired writers may be to have us 
believe that Japan's war with Russia was a crusade whose 
incentive was purely disinterested and humane, no one 

172 



JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 1 73 

will be so credulous as to be deceived by a pretense so 
transparent. As the economic interpretation of history- 
has expounded, there can hardly be such a thing as altru- 
istic war, and the war which the Sunrise Empire waged 
against the Muscovites is no exception to the general 
rule. True, Japan at first made it her avowed aim to up- 
hold Korean independence, but that affords no indication 
of the disinterested nature of her purposes. The fact is 
that she believed her interests would be best served by 
maintaining the independence of Korea, if Korea was 
only capable of adopting such measures as were neces- 
sary to attain this end. It was therefore but natural 
that, when thirty years of consistent efforts to invigorate 
the effete nation convinced her of the futihty of all such 
attempts, she should not hesitate to alter her fundamental 
policy and assume the control of Korean affairs in her 
own hands. It is as vain to claim that her championship 
of Korean independence sprang from any altruistic mo- 
tive as it is unreasonable to impute bad faith to her when 
she receded from her first avowed principle. In either 
case she was actuated by the urgent necessity of pro- 
tecting her own interests, and even safety, and it was 
only after her sincere hope of attaining that end by pre- 
serving Korean autonomy was utterly blighted that she 
was driven to adopt the only alternative of making her- 
self the mistress of the situation. 

It is in harmony with the above interpretation that 
since the establishment of her paramount authority over 
Korea, Japan has been busy promoting various enter- 
prises of such nature as would benefit Korea as well as 
herself. Finding the national structure of Korea crum- 
bling and tottering, she was confronted first of all with 
the task of preventing it from a total collapse. But the 



174 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

old material was of slight value in the work of renova- 
tion, and Japan had to bring along with her new material 
in order to infuse life and energy into the decaying na- 
tion. *' The Japanese," says a prominent American 
journalist, " have taken the Hermit Kingdom by the 
neck, and are shaking its dry bones into action." The 
truth is that dry bones do not act, however vigorously 
you may shake them, and the Japanese found it impera- 
tive to employ new materials as well as new methods. 
The appointment of Japanese to various important posi- 
tions in the Korean government before the annexation 
is one of many instances of this inevitable arrangement. 
In the various enterprises which Japan has launched in 
the country we find another example of similar nature. 
These enterprises, it must be admitted, have been meant 
not only to advance Japanese interests but to furnish a 
concrete example which will bring home to the Koreans 
the indisputable advantage of adopting modern civiliza- 
tion. Within the past half-decade Japan has placed at 
Korea's disposal all the fruits of a cycle of her own 
strenuous life, expending for that purpose g},, 000,000 yen 
during the short period of three years (1906- 1 908), and 
yet it does not appear that any ordinary incentive will 
move the Koreans out of their indolent groove. What 
could Japan do but go ahead and adopt necessary meas- 
ures at her own initiative, if she is to accomplish the 
Herculean task of regenerating a nation of ten million 
souls ? 

One of the most important Japanese enterprises in 
Korea is the construction of railways. Japanese railway 
enterprise in the peninsula dates back to 1898, when a 
Japanese syndicate purchased from an American citizen 
the concession to build a railway connecting Seoul with 



JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 1 75 

the Chemulpo anchorage. The first railway ever built in 
Korea, the Hne was opened to traffic in October, 1901. 
In the same year when the Seoul-Chemulpo railway con- 
cession was granted, another concession on a much 
greater scale was obtained by another Japanese concern, 
with an authorized capital of 25,000,000 j^;/, and enjoy- 
ing the Japanese government's guarantee of interest on 
the debentures issued by the company. This concession 
was that of constructing a railway of 268 miles between 
Seoul and Fusan, and the company was called the Seoul- 
Fusan Railway Company. Towards the end of 1903, 
when the relations with Russia became strained, the 
Japanese government granted the company an additional 
subsidy of 2,200,000 jk^;2 as well as a loan of 1,500,000 
yen without interest, charging the company to complete 
the construction as speedily as possible. Thus the line 
became available for transportation a few months before 
the outbreak of the war. 

Another line of equal importance is that between 
Seoul and Wiju. The concession for this line was at 
first given to a French syndicate in 1896, but owing to 
delay in commencing work, the concession was cancelled. 
Immediately after the outbreak of the war the Japanese 
army began building this railway as well as the Masampo 
line. The Seoul-Wiju line, 323 miles in length, was 
completed in March, 1906, and the Masampo line of 
twenty-five miles in May, 1905. All in all, railways in 
Korea open to traffic amount to 641 miles in length, 
with 104 locomotives, 158 passenger cars, and 955 freight 
cars. 

Up to March 31, 1907, 33,194,910 yen was expended 
for the Seoul-Fusan line, 3 1 ,600, 1 1 o j^;? for the Seoul- 
Wiju hne, and 2,338,951 yen for the Masampo line. In 



176 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

February, 1907, the Japanese Diet authorized the Railway 
Bureau of the Residency-General to establish a special 
account for the construction and improvement of rail- 
ways in Korea. For this purpose a sum of 21,873,144 
yen was appropriated, to be expended in the four con- 
secutive years as follows : 10,100,020 j/^« in 1907 ; 7,257,- 
5877^/2 in 1908; 3,281,537 j/^;2 in 1909; and 1,134,000 
yen in 1910. The plan was further elaborated in 1910, 
when the Diet assented to the additional appropriation 
of 36,820,0007^;/ for the purpose of railway construction 
and improvement in Korea, the work to be spread over 
eleven years. 

Almost as important as railway enterprise is the main- 
tenance by the residency-general of a postal, telegraph 
and telephone service. The native means of communi- 
cation were so imperfect and inefficient that in 1905 
Japan found it necessary to take control of that branch 
of administration in her own hands. Since then Japan 
has expended 10,000,000 j^;/ for the installation and up- 
keep of post-offices, and telephone and telegraph Hnes. 
The enterprise, so far from profitable, has proved a great 
burden to the Japanese treasury, and there is yet no hope 
of recuperating the enormous losses she has been endur- 
ing. And yet Japan is bound to continue to improve 
these services if she means to be true to her promise to 
promote the welfare of the Korean people. A glance at 
the following table reveals the detail of expenditures and 
receipts relating to this enterprise : 



Year Expenditures 

1905 2,581,023 yen 

1906 2,296,078 " 

1907 2,183,664 « 

1908 2,303,704 « 



I 



/Receipts 


Deficits 


768,650 yen 
1,111,154 " 
1,592,006 " 
1789.738 " 


1,811,373 ;/^» 

1,184,924 " 
591,658 " 
513,966 " 



JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 1 77 

In addition to ordinary postal business, the post-offices, 
which in 1908 numbered 272, carry on the business of a 
savings bank. The amount of deposits by the end of 
1908 reached 1,673,658 j/^w. To encourage the habit of 
saving among the natives, pamphlets describing the 
method of the postal savings bank have been freely dis- 
tributed through local authorities, schools and other or- 
ganizations. 

Of telegraph offices there were 172 in 1908, and the 
number is being increased as necessity demands. At the 
end of the same year forty-seven cities and towns had 
telephone facilities, while such important cities as Seoul, 
Chemulpo, Ping-yang, Chin-nampo, and Yong-san are 
connected by long-distance lines. 

Equally important is the banking business established 
in Korea by the Japanese. The pioneer Japanese bank 
in Korea was a branch of the Dai-ichi-ginko (First Bank) 
of Tokio. The branch was opened at Fusan in 1878, 
but it was soon afterwards removed to Seoul. In 1884 
the Korean government authorized the bank to issue 
" customs-house notes " in the treaty ports, the object be- 
ing to facilitate the speedy payment of customs duties. 
In view of increasing commercial relations between Korea 
and Japan, and of the inadequacy of the monetary sys- 
tem in the peninsula, the Dai-ichi-ginko, with the ap- 
proval of both the Seoul and the Tokio government, 
issued, in 1901, notes payable at sight, these notes being 
secured by reserves in accordance with special regula- 
tions. The bank also made monetary accommodation to 
the Imperial House as well as the government of Korea. 
Having already established such intimate relations with 
the financial world of the peninsula, it was natural that 
the Seoul government should in 1905 authorize the bank 



178 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

to act as the central bank of the country. Thus the 
Korean government recognized the notes issued by the 
bank as legal tender in all transactions, and authorized it 
to receive and disburse the national funds. In consider- 
ation of these and other privileges enjoyed by the bank, 
the institution was placed under the supervision of the 
Korean Minister of Finance, and required to observe the 
provisions of a Japanese imperial ordinance issued in 
March, 1905. This ordinance provides that the bank 
should provide special capital for its business transactions 
in Korea ; that it should hold, as a " conversion reserve," 
gold coins, gold and silver bullion, or convertible notes 
of the bank of Japan, equalling the total of the notes 
issued ; that the amount of the silver bullion thus reserved 
should not exceed one-fourth of the entire reserve ; that 
it should set aside each year at least one-twentieth of its 
annual profit, until such fund reached one-half of the cap- 
ital invested by the bank for its Korean business ; that 
the amount of notes issued by the bank should not ex- 
ceed 10,000,000 ye7i, except in case economic considera- 
tions necessitated the issuance of larger amounts. So 
steadily did the reputation and popularity of the bank 
grow that by the end of December, 1907, notes issued 
by it exceeded the limit of 10,000,000 j^;^ by 2,805,300 
yen. 

The Seoul branch of the Dai-ichi-ginko faithfully dis- 
charged its duties as the central bank of Korea. But 
being in its organization nowise different from an ordi- 
nary bank, it could not meet all the requirements essen- 
tial to a central bank. Consequently the Japanese and 
Korean authorities agreed in July, 1 909, to organize a 
new central bank independently of any Japanese bank. 
The Central Bank of Korea thus organized is a joint- 



JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 1 79 

stock company and is to exist for a period of fifty years. 
Its capital is 10,000,000 j/^;/, which is divided into 100,000 
shares of 100 yen eacii. The share certificates bear the 
name of the purchaser, and can be held by Koreans and 
Japanese only. 

It will be seen that the Central Bank is a Japanese- 
Korean enterprise. After its organization is completed 
the Dai-ichi-ginko will still maintain its branch office in 
Seoul, and carry on ordinary banking business. Besides 
the Dai-ichi-ginko, four Japanese banks, with an aggre- 
gate capital of 67,000,000 yeit, maintain branches in 
Korea, devoting an additional capital of 1 3,000,000 ^^« 
to their business in Korea, whereas there are only three 
ordinary banks maintained by Koreans, whose aggregate 
capital does not exceed g^o, 000 yen. 

Another Japanese-Korean enterprise is the organiza- 
tion of a joint-stock company with the object of promot- 
ing agriculture in the peninsula. This company came 
into existence in August, 1908, under the name of the 
Oriental Development Company. The scope of the 
business to be engaged in by the company is defined by 
its regulations as follows : 

1. Sale, purchase, renting and leasing of lands requir- 
ing development. 

2. Undertakings connected with the cultivation of 
the soil. 

3. Construction, sale, purchase and renting of build- 
ings necessary for the cultivation of the land. 

4. Assembling and distributing Japanese and Korean 
settlers necessary for cultivation of the land, 

5. Supplying settlers and farmers with articles neces- 
sary for agriculture, and the distribution of articles pro- 
duced or acquired by them. 



l8o AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

6. Advancing money to Japanese and Korean settlers 
to defray expenses of settling. 

7. Making loans to settlers and farmers on the mort- 
gage of immovable property, or on the security of articles 
produced or acquired by them. 

In addition, the company may engage in fishery or 
other undertakings where such undertakings are deemed 
necessary as an accessory to the main business. Indeed 
the fishery industry will become one of the important 
undertakings of the company, as the natives have neg- 
lected to take advantage of marine resources in which 
the country is rich. While Japan, with a coast line of 
8,000 nautical miles, annually gathers marine products 
to the extent of 100,000,000 j/^;^, Korea, whose coast line 
extends over 6,000 nautical miles, obtains only 7,000,000 
yen by fishery. The primary object of the company, 
however, is the exploitation of land, by agriculture, for- 
estry, horticulture and cattle breeding. The urgent ne- 
cessity of such an undertaking can be understood when 
it is remarked that nine-tenths of the whole peninsula is 
left as waste land or denuded mountains. The Koreans, 
though essentially an agricultural people, are as slow to 
adopt modern productive methods of farming as they are 
indifferent to the impoverished condition of their land. 
The agricultural industry of the country will never rise 
above the plane where it rests at present, unless a well- 
organized company shall initiate advanced methods with 
adequate capital and experience. 

The Oriental Development Company has a capital of 
10,000,000 yen, which is divided into 200,000 shares to 
be subscribed for exclusively by Japanese and Koreans. 
The Korean government subscribed for 60,000 shares, 
having a face value of 3,000,000 ^^;2, in the form of 5>700 



JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA l8l 

cho (about 14,200 acres) of paddy fields and another 
5,700 cho of upland fields. Of the remaining 140,000 
shares, 8,400 were set apart as preferential for the Im- 
perial Households of Japan and Korea; i ,000 were taken 
by the directors of the company, thus leaving 1 30,600 
shares for general subscription by the public. The pros- 
pects of the company were so bright that the public sub- 
scriptions in Korea and Japan reached 4,665,442 shares, 
or thirty-six times the amount floated. Of the entire 
200,000 shares, 136,138 are owned by Japanese, and the 
remaining 63,862 by Koreans. The Japanese govern- 
ment guarantees the reimbursement of debentures issued 
by the company up to 20,000,000 yen. Not only this, 
but the same government grants the company an annual 
subsidy of 300,000 yeri for the first eight years of the 
company's existence, when little profit is expected from 
its various undertakings. 

Of enterprises, not semi-governmental but purely pri- 
vate, we must first of all mention the undertakings of the 
Japanese-Korean Gas and Electric Company, which suc- 
ceeded the American-Korean Electric Company founded 
by the firm of Collbran and Bostwick. The newly or- 
ganized Japanese company proposes to double the electric 
trolley track in Seoul, which was originally laid by the 
American firm. It will also enlarge the power house, 
and put improved cars on the road, fifty new cars having 
already been ordered from America. New gas mains 
have been laid by the company, and within a few weeks 
all the principal streets in Seoul will be illuminated with 
gas light. The American-Korean Electric Company, 
when handing over its business to the new Japanese 
company, secured from its successor a promise that no 
change would be made in the personnel of the original 



l82 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

company, except in the case of highly-paid Americans. 
In deference to this pledge the Japanese company is 
obliged to maintain a staff which, considering the pres- 
ent dimensions of the business conducted, seems too 
large. 

But the true extent of Japanese enterprise in Korea 
cannot be measured merely by those undertakings which 
the Japanese government or corporations have launched 
in the peninsula. For not less important than these are 
enterprises of private individuals in agriculture, in in- 
dustry, and in commerce. Small in scale, the shops and 
factories and farms owned by these individuals may not 
attract much attention, yet these constitute an important 
factor in the assimilation of the Koreans with the Japa- 
nese, and vice versa. They come into close contact with 
their native neighbors ; they patronize and are patronized 
by the Koreans in mercantile business ; they disseminate 
their own ideas and experiences among the natives and 
in turn benefit themselves by absorbing the ideas and 
experiences of the latter. In such and many another 
manner they will in time become the woof and warp of 
Korean institutions. That, indeed, is the only process 
by which a nation can establish a firm hold upon an- 
other, which it wishes to affiliate with itself not only in 
form but in reality. 

At the end of 1908 there were in Korea 126,168 Japa- 
nese, showing an increase of 28,167 over the figures for 

1907. As the number of the Korean population is 
estimated at 9,781,000, it works out that to every 1,000 
Koreans there were ten Japanese in 1907, and twelve in 

1908. Classifying by occupation the Japanese popula- 
tion in Korea at the end of 1908, we obtain the following 
table : 



JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 183 

Occupation ^T^rZ'^ 

^ Population 

Officials and teachers 16,502 

Journalists 379 

Priests and clergymen 278 

Lawyers 108 

Physicians 1,020 

Midwives 146 

Farmers 4>887 

Merchants 47.398 

Fishermen 2,956 

Manufacturers ii»763 

Laborers . IS»237 

Miscellaneous occupations 16,815 

No occupation 4»424 

Women engaged in public entertainment, and 

prostitutes 4»253 

It will be seen that the number of Japanese farmers 
was comparatively small — a phenomenon which is by no 
means desirable from the view-point of solidifying the 
Japanese position in Korea. The above statistics were 
compiled from figures obtainable before the Oriental 
Development Company began its work for the encourage- 
ment of Japanese and Korean agricultural settlers. With 
this influential company now active in the field, it may 
be reasonably hoped that Korea will soon see a large 
number of Japanese farmers reclaiming her fallow lands, 
planting trees upon denuded plains and mountains, and 
what is most important, introducing agricultural methods 
superior to those followed by the natives. At the end 
of June, 1908, there were 8,474 Japanese landowners, 
whose holdings aggregated 228,090,529 tsubo (188,504 
acres) valued at 135,032,353^^/2; but how much of this 
total area was agricultural land we are unable to ascer- 
tain. Buildings with the estimated value of 12,088,458 
yen were owned by 7,580 Japanese. 

In conclusion it seems not amiss to note what Japan 
has, up to the annexation of Korea, expended for her 



l84 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Korean enterprise. The following table shows the 
summary of Japan's Korean budget for the three years 
following the establishment of the residency-general : 

Names of offices ^ etc. Expenditure 

jgoS 

Expenses for inaugurating 
Residency-General . . . 

Residency-General, local 
Residencies, Court o f 
Appeal 1,185,916 

Construction and repair of 

office buildings 287,365 

Educational aid for Japanese 

settlements 30,000 

Subsidies to fishery .... 20,000 

Agricultural and industrial 
model farm 

Expenses for preventing epi- 
demic diseases 

Forestry undertakings station 300,000 

Subsidy to Oriental Devel- 
opment Company .... 300,000 

Patents Bureau 43,914 

Railway Bureau 7>66i,533 

Communications Bureau . . 2,276,695 

Army and Navy 15,229,116 

Loan to Korean government 5,259,580 

Total 32,594,119 

Of the offices here enumerated the Railway and the 
Communications Bureau are the only places which earn 
an income. Yet the earnings of these bureaus have been 
much less than the amount of expenditures they have en- 
tailed, and no one can yet venture to foretell how soon 
Japan will be in a position to balance cost and gain. As 
I have already said, the Communications Bureau received 
1,180,738 ye7i in 1908, but the expenditure for that year 
amounted to 2,276,695 yen. Discrepancy between in- 
come and expenditure is even more marked in the case 
of the Railway Bureau, whose balance-sheets showed a 



Expenditu7'e 
igo7 


Expenditure 
jgob 




114,015 


1,468,872 


1,223,117 


226,690 


507.825 


20,000 
20,000 


14,930 




167,894 


100,000 




300,000 




12,098,046 
2,183,664 

10,720,967 
1,769,503 


12,117,025 

2,296,078 
14,871,528 


28,907,742 


31,312,407 



JAPANESE ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 1 85 

deficit of 94,377 j^?2 in 1907, and of 2\\fiZ'j yen in 1908. 
How the annexation, instead of lightening the financial 
burden, increased it to a great extent, will be described 
in the proper place. 

We have been told that Japan's method in Korea is 
httle better than the method followed by the Spanish 
conquerors of yore who sacked every country upon which 
they set their feet. To be sure, the facts described in 
this and other chapters do not warrant such an opinion. 
Blind indeed the Japanese must be if they, with all the 
history of colonial successes and failures of other nations 
before them, fail to perceive that tyranny, be it never so 
well-meant, is always bounded on all sides by the black 
horizon of revenge and rebellion. Their past activities 
certainly do not support any theory which credits them 
with so little a gift of foresight. 



XI 

WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA 

THE reform measures to be described in this 
chapter were all inaugurated before the annex- 
ation of Korea to Japan. These measures, ex- 
cept in a few cases, will not be affected by the change of 
the political status of the peninsula. The Korean em- 
peror is divested of sovereignty, but Japan will treat him 
with the same respect and consideration as hitherto ; the 
government of Korea exists no more, but the progressive 
policy which it inaugurated at the instance of the resi- 
dency-general will be maintained. Furthermore, a fairly 
good knowledge of the state of Korean administration 
before the annexation is essential to a clear understand- 
ing of the situation which necessitated the obliteration of 
Korean independence. It is with this fact in view that 
the present chapter is prepared. 

It is rather difficult to offer a satisfactory explanation 
for my treating " What Japan has done for Korea " apart 
from " Japanese Enterprise in Korea." There is no clear 
line of demarcation between the two. Both are Japanese 
enterprises, and both for the welfare of Korea. And the 
welfare of Korea was, even before the annexation, like- 
wise the welfare of Japan, and vice versa, for the two 
countries were one in reality, if not in name. When, 
therefore, we speak of what Japan has done for Korea 
we also speak of what she has done for herself. But the 
various enterprises, which I have described in the fore- 
going chapter, were inaugurated either in Japan's own 

i86 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA 187 

name or in the name of both Japan and Korea, while in 
the case of the undertakings which I shall presently de- 
scribe, it was the Korean government which was responsi- 
ble for them, nominally at all events, although these, too, 
were due to the initiative of the Japanese. In the former 
case Japan's interest was direct and substantial, in the 
latter it was moral rather than material, indirect rather 
than direct. For this reason I group some Japanese 
enterprises in Korea in one category, and others in 
another. 

Let us begin with the Imperial Court. Under the old 
regime there was no distinction between the court and the 
government, and a host of sorcerers, fortune-tellers, 
mountebanks, and what not, who infested the palace, 
had as much influence in the administration of govern- 
ment as did the ministers of state. Taxes were collected 
both by the court and the government, each acting inde- 
pendently of the other. One day personal agents of the 
emperor would go out to a certain province and levy 
money in the name of the Imperial Household ; the next 
day representatives of the government would appear in 
the same district and extort what they could from the 
people whose purses had already been emptied the previ- 
ous day. The emperor, cheated out of his money by his 
designing favorites, contracted debts right and left, while 
the princes were not slow in emulating him. The differ- 
ent offices of the government likewise contracted loans 
without consulting each other, all in a most arbitrary 
manner. Not a semblance of system was to be seen in 
the management of financial or other affairs of court and 
government. 

When, therefore, the residency-general assumed its 
duties, a thoroughgoing cleansing of the court and the 



1 88 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

government seemed of the first importance. The first 
measure adopted was the strict differentiation of the af- 
fairs of the court from those of the state. With the con- 
sent of the emperor the residency-general began, in 1906, 
placing constables at each gate of the palace in order to 
keep off persons of questionable character. At the same 
time the " Palace Precincts Ordinance " was promulgated, 
restricting the issuance of passes to persons known to 
have legitimate business with the court. This naturally 
caused the wrath of both Koreans and foreigners whose 
business was to prey upon the Imperial Household, but 
the Japanese authorities knew that the path of a reformer 
was not always strewn with roses. The above-mentioned 
preliminary steps towards the purification of the palace 
were followed in November, 1907, by a more vital meas- 
ure entaihng the dismissal of 4,126 court officials and 
employees and 222 court ladies. All the dismissed offi- 
cials and ladies were given a pension, the sum paid for 
that purpose during 1908 being 270,820 yen. 

Simultaneously with these measures, the residency- 
general took steps towards the settlement of debts in- 
curred by the emperor and his relatives and officials. 
Thus in April, 1908, a law was promulgated, which, 
among other things, invalidated those claims which were 
not presented to the Imperial Household within three 
years from the date of promised reimbursement. It also 
-provided that no loan incurred by the Imperial House- 
hold prior to the enforcement of this law would be recog- 
nized, unless such loans were submitted before September 
30, 1908. The claims duly submitted to the Imperial 
Household in accordance with this law amounted to 
1,643,000 j/^;2, which has since been reimbursed under 
the supervision of the residency-general. 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA 189 

Meanwhile, the residency-general took pains that 
everything should be provided for the comfort and dig- 
nity of the emperor. In Seoul one is struck with the de- 
caying state of public buildings, from the walls around the 
city to the innermost precincts of the imperial palace. 
Deploring this condition, the residency-general, in 1908, 
advised the Korean government to appropriate 300,000 
yen for the repair and extension of the palace then occu- 
pied by the emperor, and an additional sum of 393,000 
yen to be expended for the installation of an electric light- 
ing plant and a telephone service for the palace ; for the 
purchase of modern carriages to replace the uncouth pal- 
anquins ; for the laying of an extensive drive road within 
the court grounds ; for the establishment of an art museum, 
and zoological and botanical gardens to be maintained by 
the Imperial Household for the benefit of the public. 

Now we come to the consideration of measures adopted 
to put the Korean administration upon a basis of efficiency. 
In the first place, the various departments of the central 
government were thoroughly reorganized, in some cases 
by amalgamating several offices, in others by abolishing 
those that were superfluous, or by creating new ones. 
At the same time the method of administrative business 
was readjusted along modern lines. The next important 
step was the prohibition of the sale of offices by high of- 
ficials. To put an end to indiscreet appointment and ar- 
bitrary dismissal of officials, the residency-general, by 
the agreement of July 24, 1907, secured the right to be 
consulted by the Korean government upon all matters 
concerning the appointment and dismissal of high officials 
of the Korean government. Meanwhile, regulations were 
promulgated defining the qualifications necessary for can- 
didates for various official positions. 



IQO 



AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 



One of the chief causes of the corruption of Korean 
officialdom was the inadequacy of salaries paid to officials. 
Their regular stipends were hardly enough to meet even 
the sordid needs of life, and it was but natural that their 
recipients should resort to trickery to supplement their 
legitimate income. To remedy this deplorable condition 
it was necessary to increase the salaries of all officials from 
the highest to the lowest. A glance at the following 
tables, comparing the new schedule of salaries with the 
old, reveals how radical was the change introduced. 



I. TABLE OF SALARIES FOR THE SHINNIN AND 
CHOKUNIN RANKS 



Premier 



Shinnin rank 

Ministers 
of State 
New rates, 7,000 6,000 
Old rates, 2,500 2,000 



Chokunin rank 
1st grade 2d grade 3d grade 

1st class 2d class 
2,200 2,000 1,800 1,600 

1,500 1,250 1,100 1,000 



II. TABLE OF SALARIES FOR THE SONIN RANK 



1st grade 
1st class 2d class 

New rates, 1,400 1,200 

Old rates, 800 700 

3d grade 



2d grade 
1st class 2d class 

1,000 900 

600 400 

4th grade 

1st class 2d class 

600 500 



III. TABLE OF SALARIES FOR THE HANNIN RANK 

2d grade 

1st class 2d class 

480 420 





1st class 


2d class 


New rates. 


800 


700 


Old rates. 


400 


300 



1st grade 
1st class 2d class 

New rates, 600 540 

Old rates, 250 210 



New rates. 
Old rates. 



New rates. 
Old rates, 



3d grade 

1st class 2d class 

360 300 

120 90 

5 th grade 

1st class 2d class 

144 120 



180 



150 



4th grade 
1st class 2d class 

240 180 

75 60 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA I9I 

With all these measures put into operation, it was 
nevertheless no easy task to divest Korean officialdom of 
pernicious practices, unless it was guided and superin- 
tended by officials whose conduct would afford an ob- 
ject lesson in efficiency and probity. It was with this 
point in view that the residency-general, in pursuance of 
the agreement of July, 1907, recommended to the Korean 
government the appointment of Japanese subjects to 
various important offices. At the end of 1908 there were 
2,090 Japanese officials thus appointed as against 3,021 
Korean officials. The distribution of these Japanese 
among various departments, and their proportion to 
Korean officials are shown in the following table : 







Japanese 




Koreans 




High 


Subordinate 


High 


Subordinate 


officials 


; officials 


officials 


officials 


Imperial household , . 


12 


15 


87 


213 


Cabinet and privy 










council . . . . 


5 


8 


44 


38 


Home department and 










local government . . 


95 


278 


363 


552 


Finance department . . 


102 


860 


67 


818 


Army department . . 






"3 


34 


Justice department, law- 










courts, prisons , . . 


187 


216 


88 


179 


Educational department 










and schools .... 


20 


86 


23 


306 


Department of agricul- 










ture, commerce and 










industry .... 


45 


161 


16 


89 


Total 


466 


1,624 


801 


2,229 


Percentage ..... 


9.12 


31-59 


15.68 


43-63 



It will be noticed that in the Cabinet, and the Depart- 
ments of the Imperial Household, Home Affairs and 
Education, Japanese high officials were less in number 
than Korean officials of the corresponding rank. But in 
the Departments of Finance, Justice, and Agriculture, 



192 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Commerce and Industry, the number of Japanese exceeded 
Koreans — an arrangement necessitated by the fact that 
much technical knowledge is needed in these depart- 
ments. 

So much for the reform achieved within the court and 
the government. Next to be considered are those un- 
dertakings calculated to bestow material benefit upon the 
public. These include sanitary measures, the extension 
of public education and industrial training, construction 
of highways, subsidizing the agricultural and industrial 
banks, and the construction of various public buildings. 
To carry out these public works Japan, in 1907, loaned 
Korea 5,000,000 yen with an interest of six and one- 
half per cent, per annum, and in 1908 an additional sum 
of 17,963,920 yen on easier terms. The following table 
shows the principal items among which these funds were 
apportioned : 

Cadastral survey 10,000,000 yen 

Extension of government salt manufacturing station . 160,000 " 

Extension of printing bureau 434,438 " 

Industrial training school 149,654 " 

Construction of highways 1,496,000 " 

Chemulpo water- works 2,170,000 " 

Ping-yang water- works 1,300,000 " 

Subsidy to Fusan water-works 100,000 " 

Extension of educational system 500,000 " 

Subsidy to agricultural and industrial banks .... 1,395,000 " 

Subsidy to money circulation associations 40,000 " 

Construction of hospital 357>577 " 

Construction of Court of Cassation 80,000 " 

Construction of brick manufacturing station .... 234,000 " 

Cement works 300,000 " 

Forestry undertaking station 600,000 «« 

Total 20,320,663 " 

Of these items the first, which claims the lion's share 
of the public-undertakings fund, requires special ex- 
planation. 



t 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA 1 93 

In Korea land tax is levied on the unit of " kyeiy 
which is divided into six grades according to the fertility 
of the soil, the facilities of irrigation, etc. The first grade 
of the kyel represents 100 man-loads of unhulled rice, 
each man-load being composed of ten sheaves ; the sec- 
ond represents eighty-five man-loads, or fifteen man-loads 
less than the first grade ; and so on to the sixth grade 
which represents twenty-five man-loads. Now the pres- 
ent number of kyels is based upon the investigation and 
surveys made five centuries ago, when there were i,455r 
492 kyels. To maintain the accuracy of assessment the 
number of kyels was to be revised from time to time, so 
far as the law went. But as administrative corruption 
grew with the years, local magistrates neglected to regis- 
ter new kyels, for the obvious purpose of peculation. 
This, coupled with the fact that a large number of kyels 
were exempted from taxation on account of ravages 
wrought by natural calamities, resulted in the gradual de- 
crease oi kyels, until by 1902, the total number was re- 
duced to 988,147. The effect of this anomalous condi- 
tion upon the revenue of the central government has been 
anything but desirable. To make the matter still worse, 
the Korean method of measuring land is even more 
rudimentary than the method of determining the unit of 
assessment. In measuring rice fields the unit adopted is 
the area that requires one to of seeds ; in the case of or- 
dinary land the unit is the area that can be ploughed by 
one man and one ox in one day. 

If this antiquated method is replaced by a scientific 
method of surveying and assessment, there is no doubt 
but that the national revenue of the country will be 
greatly increased without raising the present rate of tax- 
ation, putting a stop to evasion and delinquency as well 



194 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

as official embezzlement. This is the reason why cadas- 
tral surveys are considered of the first importance in the 
financial rehabihtation of Korea. A coterie of Japanese 
civil engineers were invited to Seoul to train Korean 
students in the principles and practice of land surveying, 
and the field work has already been commenced. 

In the foregoing chapter it has been noted that the 
semi-official Oriental Development Company has for its 
main purpose the encouragement of agriculture and kin- 
dred industries in Korea. Another potent factor in the 
promotion of agriculture is the estabHshment of agricul- 
tural and industrial banks, and the subsidizing of the so- 
called •' local monetary circulation associations." While 
the Oriental Development Company deals with both 
Koreans and Japanese, these institutions are exclusively 
for the benefit of Koreans. The agricultural and indus- 
trial banks are to advance funds for the cultivation, drain- 
age and improvement of land ; the construction and 
improvement of roads ; forestry undertakings ; the pur- 
chase of seeds, plants, manure, or other materials for 
farming and manufacturing ; the purchase of agricultural 
and industrial implements ; the construction of buildings 
for agricultural or manufacturing purposes ; and various 
other purposes of a similar nature. At the end of 1907 
there were nine agricultural and industrial banks with 
seventeen branches and agencies, and their aggregate 
capital was 1 2,000,000 jj/^;/. While these banks are es- 
sentially private organizations, the Korean government 
rendered them a substantial assistance by subscribing for 
their shares to the extent of 335,96ojf^«, and by loaning 
a sum of I ,o^S ,6So j/en without interest. Where agricul- 
tural and industrial banks have not yet come into exist- 
ence, the deficiency has been supplied by the organiza- 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA 195 

tion of " Local Monetary Circulation Associations," 
facilitating the circulation of money among small farmers, 
each association being subsidized by the government to 
the extent of 10,000 j/en. At the end of 1908 there were 
forty-eight of such associations, with 15,059 members 
and a capital of 480,000 j/^';^. 

Along with the establishment of banking facilities for 
farmers, various other measures were adopted for the ad- 
vancement of agriculture. Korea was once Japan's 
teacher in sericulture, but now the progressive islanders 
are returning courtesy by imparting to the now back- 
ward peninsular people the improved method of that in- 
dustry. At the instance of the residency-general the 
Women's Sericulture Training Association was organ- 
ized at Yong-san, which has been followed by many 
another in various parts of the country. To each of 
these associations the Korean government granted an 
annual subsidy, gave silkworm eggs of the best quality, 
as well as mulberry trees imported from Japan, and in 
some instances furnished silk spinning machines or 
wheels. The government also despatched experts in 
sericulture, both Japanese and Korean, to different parts 
of the country to give the people instruction in the in- 
dustry. 

But the encouragement afforded to sericulture is only 
one of the many instances of the method with which the 
economic resources of Korea are being developed and 
exploited under the new regime. Five model farms, or 
agricultural experimental stations, have been established, 
one each at Su-won, Mokpo, Kun-san, Ping-yang and 
Tai-ku ; a school of agriculture and forestry has been 
opened in connection with the model farm at Su-won ; 
effective measures have been adopted for repairing the 



196 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

old irrigation ponds, which though originally serviceable 
became practically useless through ages of neglect ; 
horticultural stations, nursery gardens, and a cotton 
plantation station have been inaugurated in various sec- 
tions of the country, all by the initiative and under the 
auspices of the government. 

Nor did the government confine its activities to 
agriculture : in the field of industry it did commendable 
work. The Department of Agriculture, Commerce and 
Industry instructed the provincial governors to in- 
vestigate the industrial conditions in their respective 
jurisdictions, and to report the most promising in- 
dustries which might be encouraged in the interest of 
the country. The result was the granting of subsidies, 
though on a small scale, to weaving and matting in- 
dustries, paper manufacture, and bamboo works. But all 
industries in Korea are in the infant stage, and await im- 
provement at the hands of the rising generation trained 
in modern sciences and arts. To meet this urgent neces- 
sity the Korean government was persuaded to estabhsh 
an industrial training school in Seoul, with courses in 
dyeing and weaving, keramics, metal work, applied 
chemistry, and civil engineering. Meanwhile, a com- 
mercial school was established in Seoul with a fund of 
200,000 yen donated by Mr. K. Okura, a wealthy Japa- 
nese merchant, who had already established two com- 
mercial schools in his native country. 

In travelling through Korea one is struck with the de- 
nuded condition of its mountains and hills, and one won- 
ders if it was one of the whims of nature that omitted to 
adorn them with trees. Yet there is evidence that in 
ancient times this grim, naked country was clad with 
vegetation. What was it, then, that converted Korea 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA I97 

into a treeless country ? The only plausible answer to 
this question seems to be that the natives felled timber in 
a ;most arbitrary manner, and when the mountains and 
hills and plains were divested of trees, never thought of 
setting young plants, thinking, perhaps, that forests, hke 
Aladdin's palace, would spring from nothing. The 
tyranny of the Korean ruler also had something to do 
with the annihilation of forests. It is within the ken of 
history that people in different localities set fire to forests 
merely to avoid the imposition of whimsical sovereigns 
who would command their subjects to bring timber to 
the capital to furnish material for their new palaces. In 
an age when there was no iron road and in a country 
where even the beasts of burden were but sparingly util- 
ized, it is beyond our imagination what enormous labor 
and what appalling suffering it must entail to haul huge 
timber, often hundreds of miles, over rough trails degen- 
erating now and again into ravines and ditches. Small 
wonder that the abused people should have reduced their 
forests to ashes rather than be so imposed upon by ex- 
travagant rulers. 

However that may have been, the residency-general 
found it an urgent necessity to reforest the denuded 
mountains and hills which brought about calamities such 
as flood and landslides so common in all treeless coun- 
tries. Thus the Japanese authorities caused the Korean 
government in 1907 to establish model forests in the 
mountains near Seoul, Tai-ku and Ping-yang, as well as 
three extensive nurseries in the vicinity of Ping-yang, 
Tai-ku and Su-won. A bureau of forestry was created in 
the Department of Agriculture, Commerce and Industry, 
and a school of forestry and agriculture was established 
at Su-won. The model forestry stations are all equipped 



198 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

with a staff of experts and clerks, and are intrusted with 
the task of afforesting the mountains, plains, and moors 
belonging to the state. The model forests already estab- 
lished comprise 83,300 acres and will in time contain 
17,889,000 trees. To supply them with young trees, the 
nursery gardens at Su-won, Ping-yang and Tai-ku, up 
to the end of 1908, raised 3,531,846 plants. 

Next we must consider sanitary measures, which in a 
country hke Korea, frequented by all sorts of epidemic 
diseases, are of the utmost importance. In January, 
1908, a sanitary bureau was created in the Department of 
Home Affairs, and was intrusted with the administration 
of sanitary affairs of the country. Measures have been 
adopted to combat cholera, typhoid fever, smallpox, 
dysentery, diphtheria and scarlet fever, and the effect has 
already become perceptible in spite of native prejudice 
against such measures. The characteristic attitude of 
Koreans towards the stern requirements of modern civi- 
lization is seen in the idea they entertain of the hospital 
for epidemic diseases. Should a Korean patient die in 
such a hospital whither he was taken by order of the 
government on account of cholera or diphtheria he con- 
tracted, the picturesque Koreans believe that the poor 
man was buried before he breathed his last. This is how 
the Koreans got the notion that the Japanese, Hke the 
tyrants of old, burn patients or bury them alive. 

Before the advent of the new regime Korea had no 
adequately equipped hospital. Missionary hospitals there 
were, and also a few small hospitals maintained by the 
Korean government or various Japanese settlements ; 
but these were all imperfect in more respects than one. 
In 1906 the Korean government, at the advice of the 
residency-general, decided to inaugurate a large hospital 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA 199 

by amalgamating the hospitals then maintained by the 
government. For this purpose 357,577 /^^^ was allotted. 
The hospital thus established was called the Taihan (or 
Great Korea) Hospital, and was under the control of the 
Home Department. Its medical faculty was composed 
of a president, eight Japanese and two Korean doctors, 
three Japanese and five Korean assistants, four Japanese 
pharmacists and ten Japanese nurses. 

As a corollary to the establishment of the Taihan Hos- 
pital a medical school was inaugurated, which became 
the successor to the old Seoul Medical School maintained 
by the Educational Department. The new institution is 
much larger in scope and more complete in equipment 
than its predecessor, and is designed to train Koreans 
not only as physicians and pharmacists, but also as mid- 
wives and nurses. 

In the execution of sanitary measures the supply of 
pure water is of the first importance. Especially is this 
true in a country where impure water has been the main 
cause of epidemic diseases which have swept away thou- 
sands and even tens of thousands of human lives year 
after year. And yet the question of water supply had 
never attracted the serious attention of the Korean au- 
thorities or people, until the Japanese municipal council 
in Seoul held, in January, 1904, a meeting to discuss the 
matter, which resulted in a decision to build a reservoir 
near Seoul at a cost of 100,000 j/^;2 for the purpose of 
supplying the Japanese settlement with pure water. The 
resolution was not carried out, owing to the protest of 
Messrs. Collbran and Bostwick, an American firm, which 
claimed the exclusive privilege of constructing water- 
works in Seoul. Of the enterprise of this American firia 
I shall have the occasion to speak at length in a follow- 



200 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

ing chapter ; here we are concerned with the work of the 
Korean government and the residency-general. In 1906, 
the residency-general advised the Seoul government to 
install water-works in the principal towns. As the con- 
sequence a bureau of water-works was organized, and the 
construction of water-works at Chemulpo and Ping-yang 
was commenced, with funds amounting to 2,1^0^000 yen 
and 1,300,000 yen^ respectively. At the same time a 
subsidy of 350,000 yen was granted to the Fusan water- 
works undertaken by the Japanese settlement there, while 
a loan of 150,000 j^;^ was made in favor of a similar un- 
dertaking by the Japanese settlement municipality in 
Mokpo. All these works were completed during 19 10. 

Last to be considered is educational reform. Imme- 
diately after the Chino-Japanese war the Korean govern- 
ment made a feint of following Japan's urgent advice for 
educational reform, by issuing several laws and ordinances 
relating to primary, middle, normal and technical schools, 
but these plausibly commendable laws were never carried 
into effect. True, several schools were established in 
Seoul and a few other principal towns, but these did little 
more than the teaching of Chinese ideographs and calig- 
raphy. The original native school system comprises the 
Clu-pung, the Han-gyo, and the Son-gymi-kaon. The 
Clu'pu7ig is a school, if school it may be called, maintained 
by a village literateur who teaches the writing and read- 
ing of Chinese characters ; in the Han-gyo, where the 
image of Confucius is worshipped, more advanced lessons 
in Chinese literature are offered ; the Son-gyun-kao7i, the 
highest seat of learning, is in Seoul, and is devoted to the 
study of the Chinese classics. 

It will be seen that the original system of education 
was utterly out of touch with the spirit of the times. 



WHAT JAPAN HAS DONE FOR KOREA 20I 

Consequently the residency-general prevailed upon the 
Korean government, in March, 1906, to appropriate for 
educational reform 500,000 yen. Of this sum, 350,000 
yen was allotted for improving and establishing common 
schools, high schools, and foreign language schools. 
Thus up to the end of 1908, fifty-nine common schools 
were established in accord with modern principles of 
pedagogy. In the common schools compulsory attend- 
ance is not in vogue, as the present standard of living in 
Korea does not warrant the adoption of such a system ; 
but to attract children to the schools both tuition and 
text-books are given gratuitously. Along with the in- 
auguration of common schools, a high school, a foreign 
language school, and a normal school were established in 
Seoul, while the time-honored Son-gyun-kaon was im- 
proved by adding to its curriculum elementary law and 
economics, mathematics, history, geography, the Japa- 
nese language and the Korean classics. At the same time, 
the authorities have not neglected the education of girls. 
In Korea, as in China, women are relegated to a shady 
hemisphere, with the result that the education of girls has 
been regarded as something utterly useless. While rec- 
ognizing the necessity of educating girls, the authorities 
have not deemed it wise to upset the established moral 
conceptions of the people, and in consequence girls are 
taught separately from boys in the new common schools, 
and a high school exclusively for girls has been estab- 
lished in Seoul. 



XII 

JUDICIAL REFORM AND EXTERRITORIALITY 

IN KOREA 

WE have already discussed what Japan has done 
for the amelioration of the internal conditions 
in Korea, but the reform in the field of ju- 
dicial administration deserves a separate chapter. So im- 
portant is the inauguration of a modern system of law 
courts in Korea that an appreciative writer in the Outlook 
fitly declares that if Japan can succeed in this one respect 
" she will have more than earned her right to its occupa- 
tion." The abolition of exterritoriality, as a consequence 
of the annexation of Korea by Japan, adds much interest 
and importance to the question of judicial reform. 

This latter phase of the question has been discussed by 
American and European critics, some favoring the aboli- 
tion of exterritoriality, but not a few decidedly objecting 
to such a course. One of those American writers whose 
business seems to be wholesale condemnation of the 
Japanese, finds in exterritoriality one of the " bulwarks 
behind which advocates of the ' open door ' may still 
make a stand." Whether Japan has deviated from the 
principle of the *' open door " is a question which I have 
already discussed in previous chapters, and which I shall 
recur to in the proper place. What I desire to direct the 
attention of the reader to here is the following clause in 
the American- Korean treaty of May, 1882: 

" It is, however, mutually agreed between the high 

202 



JUDICIAL REFORM IN KOREA 203 

contracting powers that whenever the king of Chosen 
(Korea) shall have so modified and reformed the statutes 
and judicial procedure of his kingdom that, in the judg- 
ment of the United States, they conform to the laws and 
courts in the United States, the right of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States shall be abandoned, and 
thereafter the United States citizens, when within the 
limits of Chosen, shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the 
native authorities." 

Other Western powers followed the suit of the United 
States, and inserted a similar provision in their treaties 
with Korea. In the face of this tacit provision, it would 
have been difficult for the Western nations to maintain 
the privilege of consular jurisdiction in Korea, even if 
Korea had not been annexed by Japan, for the Japanese 
installed in the peninsula a system of law courts that was 
calculated to sweep away the corruption, iniquity, and 
general travesty of justice that had for ages characterized 
the course of civil poHty in the country. 

It goes without saying that before the advent of the new 
regime Korea possessed neither law nor tribunal efficient 
to protect the property and safety of the people. Then ex- 
tortion, blackmail, embezzlement and what not were prac- 
ticed almost with impunity, the officials themselves having 
often been hand-in-glove with the culprits. One of the 
common methods of extortion in those days was that of 
accusing a man of an offense and demanding pecuniary 
payment. As no less an authority than Mr. H. B. Hul- 
bert says, this practice was so common that it was fre- 
quently anticipated, and regular sums were paid over for 
the privilege of not being lied about, just as bands of 
robbers are subsidized in some countries to secure im- 
munity from sudden attack. If a man of the upper class 



204 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

had any ill-feeling against a man of the inferior class, he 
would simply ask the authorities to detain the latter in 
jail for several days, administering severe beating once a 
day. In most cases this was done without any investi- 
gation as to whether or not the accused man was really 
to blame. This abominable practice, coupled with offi- 
cial peculation and extortion, has made the Koreans the 
most suspicious, intriguing people. 

It was not only after the inauguration of Japanese rule 
that Japan attempted to reform the judicial system in 
Korea. In the wake of the Chino-Japanese war Japan 
urged upon Korea the necessity of doing away with the 
pernicious method of meting out justice. As the conse- 
quence a code for the constitution of law courts was pro- 
mulgated on March 25, 1895. It provided for the estab- 
lishment of a special court to deal with crimes committed 
by members of the imperial family, a court of cassation, 
circuit courts, local courts, and *• treaty-port courts," the 
last of which was to determine cases of an international 
nature. A law school was to be founded for the purpose 
of training judges, public procurators, and clerks. But this 
apparently commendable plan was not carried out, ex- 
cepting the establishment of the Court of Cassation and 
the Seoul Local Court, with the result that the provincial 
governors, prefects, superintendents of treaty ports, and 
district magistrates were allowed as before to combine in 
their respective offices the functions of executive officials 
and those of judges. Civil cases were usually determined 
according to the amount of bribe offered by plaintiff or 
defendant, while criminal cases were judged according to 
the whims of the officials. There was no barrister to de- 
fend the accused ; a witness was in many cases found to 
be a particeps criniinis ; evidence desired by the magis- 



JUDICIAL REFORM IN KOREA 205 

trate was extorted by brutal methods of torture. The 
result was a universal miscarriage of justice. Even in 
the Court of Cassation and the Seoul Local Court, 
considered comparatively free from corruption, judg- 
ments delivered were often iniquitous. Under such cir- 
cumstances it was but natural that, despite the treaty 
stipulation that Korean courts could entertain actions 
brought by foreigners against natives, such cases were 
always turned into international questions by foreign 
complainants, who preferred to seek redress through dip- 
lomatic channels. 

Such was the condition of judicial administration in 
Korea when Japan established supremacy in the penin- 
sula in 1905. In the year following the residency-general, 
while avoiding the introduction of any radical reform in 
the organization of the Korean courts, caused the Seoul 
government to engage a Japanese councillor and assistants 
in the Department of Justice who should take an active 
part in the administration of judicial affairs and superin- 
tend the revision of laws and ordinances. At the same 
time, the number of judges and clerks in the Court of 
Cassation and the Seoul Local Court was increased, and 
a Japanese assistant was attached to each of these courts. 
A Japanese assistant was also appointed to each court 
held by governors or prefects, while a Japanese police 
adviser was stationed in each district to act as legal assist- 
ant in the court of magistrate. This tentative measure, 
unsatisfactory as it was, was not without some good re- 
sults. Thus the system of torture was abolished ; arrests 
on civil charges were forbidden ; detention of alleged of- 
fenders in the court-house was stopped ; and all judges 
were strictly charged to keep the records of decisions 
rendered by them. 



206 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Yet the evils of the old system were so deeply rooted 
that nothing short of its complete rehabilitation could at- 
tain the desired end. Consequently by the agreement of 
August, 1907, Japan secured from the Korean govern- 
ment a pledge to separate the judiciary from the executive 
as the first step towards a thoroughgoing judicial reform. 
In pursuance of this promise the Korean government, 
with the assistance of the residency-general, enacted in 
December, 1907, regulations for the organization of the 
courts. Thus the country was provided with a court of 
cassation or supreme court, three courts of appeal, eight 
local courts, and 115 district courts. The system 
adopted by Korea is what is commonly known as " three 
trial system," which is in practice in Japan as well as in 
Continental Europe. The district and local courts hear 
civil and criminal cases in first instance. A case originat- 
ing in a local court goes up to a court of appeal, while a 
case brought up from a district court to a local court 
must be referred directly to the Court of Cassation. In 
the district courts the hearing is before a single judge, but 
in the other courts the bench is collegiate. 

In putting this system into practice the residency- 
general, on account of the impossibility of finding honest 
and competent judges among the Koreans, was forced to 
appoint Japanese to the following offices : 

I. A chief justice, a chief procurator, two judges and 
five clerks in the Court of Cassation. 

II. A chief justice, two judges, a chief procurator, an 
assistant procurator and five clerks in each of the three 
Courts of Appeal. 

III. In the eight Local Courts the chief justices, the 
senior procurators, thirty-two judges and eighty clerks. 

IV. A judge and a clerk in each District Court. 



JUDICIAL REFORM IN KOREA 207 

When the new judicial system was adopted in August, 

1908, the Korean courts of law became to all appearances 
a Japanese institution. Yet they were controlled by the 
Korean government, and not by the residency -general ; 
and the Japanese judges attached to the courts were 
amenable to the authority of the Korean Minister of Jus- 
tice. Furthermore, the Japanese judges and procurators 
found it in many cases impracticable to render full justice 
to the litigants when their only instrument was the Korean 
laws, which were deplorably inadequate. Then again, 
these courts, though virtually Japanese, had no jurisdic- 
tion over the Japanese in Korea, except where action was 
brought by a Japanese subject against a Korean. Japa- 
nese in Korea were subject to the jurisdiction of residential 
tribunals. To do away with the obvious disadvantages 
of such a system, the Japanese government secured, in 

1909, a convention in virtue of which Korea intrusted 
Japan with the execution of judicial administration. 
Thenceforth the courts in Korea became Japanese courts 
not only in reality but also in name. 

The new convention provided that Japan should bear 
all expenses connected with the administration of justice 
and prisons in Korea. Another noteworthy feature of 
the convention was that Korean subjects were made 
eligible for seats on the bench and posts in the manage- 
ment of the prisons. While it may reasonably be pre- 
sumed that Koreans, by reason of their lack of legal 
knowledge and training, can, for the present at all events, 
aspire to no higher position than that of an interpreter, 
they will at least console themselves in the thought that 
they are not conventionally discriminated against. To 
the credit of Japan, it is fair to add that the Japanese ad- 
ministration at Seoul is making apparently unselfish ef- 



208 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

forts to encourage the natives in the study of modern 
jurisprudence. It has promulgated regulations for judicial 
examinations, by virtue of which native aspirants for 
judgeships and procuratorships, as well as those desiring 
to practice at the bar, are given an opportunity to prove 
their abilities. According to these regulations, the 
examination consists of two parts, written and verbal, and 
only those successful in the former are allowed to take 
the verbal test. The subjects for written examination in- 
clude the civil, criminal and commercial laws, laws for 
civil and criminal procedure, administrative and inter- 
national laws, while the subjects for the verbal examina- 
tion are taken from three of these laws. Whether or not 
Koreans will derive any benefit from these regulations 
depends entirely upon their ability. 

Side by side with the rehabilitation of law courts, Japan 
undertook to codify Korean laws. In 1906 Dr. Ume, 
Professor in the Law College of the Imperial University 
of Tokio, one of the leading framers of the Japanese Civil 
Code, was invited to take charge of this undertaking. 
Owing to the fact that in Korea the ownership of land 
was extremely ambiguous, laws regarding real estate 
claimed the first attention of the Japanese jurist, with the 
result that at the end of the same year " Land and Build- 
ing Certification Regulations " were promulgated, the 
fundamental object of which was to guarantee to natives 
as well as to foreigners rights of ownership of real estate, 
on certifying, at a local magistracy or a Japanese resi- 
dency, contracts for the transfer of lands or buildings by 
sale, exchange, gift or mortgage, and also to prevent any 
fraudulent transaction in matters of this nature. Simul- 
taneously with this law, regulations governing procedure 
in the foreclosure of mortgages on lands and buildings 



JUDICIAL REFORM IN KOREA 209 

were promulgated. In December, 1907, the Code Inves- 
tigation Bureau was organized, and the work of compiling 
the codes of civil and criminal law and procedure devolved 
upon it. 

The codification of these laws will not be completed 
for several years to come. In the meanwhile, to meet 
the pressing needs of the new courts, it has been found 
necessary to revise the native criminal law. Although 
enacted as late as 1905, the Korean criminal law was too 
severe in the punishments it prescribed. On the other 
hand, many penalties were lightened or commuted on 
payment of money. Moreover, in the administration of 
these laws so little independence was enjoyed by the 
judiciary that, in case of doubt as to proper application of 
laws, the judges in the Court of Cassation or in any 
other court must consult the Minister of Justice and 
decide in accordance with his opinion. With such 
defects remedied, the Korean laws will be in force until 
the new codes shall have become available. 

Such was the status of judicial administration in Korea 
at the time of the annexation. As a rule the annexation 
will place the Koreans under the jurisdiction of Japanese 
laws ; but considering peculiar customs and institutions 
of the country, the natives will continue to be governed 
by Korean laws. When the litigants consist of Japanese 
and Koreans, the case is to be treated according to the 
laws of the country the defendant belongs to. When the 
action brought is between foreigners, or when the 
defendant is a foreigner, Japanese laws are to be applied. 
This change of jurisdiction with regard to Americans 
and Europeans in Korea is the natural outcome of the 
annexation, which obviated the raison d'etre of the con- 
sular courts. Exterritoriality was estabhshed from the 



2IO AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

necessity of protecting foreign offenders against arbitrary 
proceedings of the native courts and the severe punish- 
ments of native laws, as well as the necessity of guard- 
ing foreign defendants in civil cases against whimsical 
decisions of Korean magistrates. In brief, the consular 
jurisdiction in Korea sprang into existence merely 
because the judiciary of the country was entirely out of 
touch with the spirit of the times. But, as the Shanghai 
Mercury^ in discussing exterritoriality in Korea, says, 
where *' the power in occupation has not only a code of 
laws in consonance with civilized standards, but has the 
official machinery suitable for putting that code in opera- 
tion, there can be no question that a single judiciary 
working under that code, with all the inhabitants of the 
country amenable thereto, is the only possible means of 
securing not merely uniformity but elemental justice." 

Speaking more directly on this question, this British 
paper in Shanghai says : 

" With the establishment of the Japanese code for 
Japanese subjects (in Korea) the necessity for exterri- 
torial privileges for Europeans and Americans ceases. 
In spite of those occasional lapses, that cause so much 
annoyance at times to Japan's best friends but are ob- 
viously inevitable in a youthful member of the family of 
nations such as Japan is, the Japanese code and its 
administration are recognized as being quite on a par 
with the judicial code and administration in European 
states, and if one reasonable and civilized judicial admin- 
istration exists there is no need for others, and hence a 
natural step will be the abohtion of exterritoriality." 

The recent trial of the Korean assassin of Prince Ito 
at the Japanese court at Port Arthur furnished a golden 
opportunity for the new courts in Korea to gain the con- 



JUDICIAL REFORM IN KOREA 211 

fidence of the Koreans. So sympathetic and impartial 
was the manner in which the culprits were treated 
throughout the entire proceedings of the case that 
foreign newspapers in the Far East expressed unstinted 
praise for the judicial integrity of Japan. Even the 
Kobe Heraldy which is rather sparing in complimenting 
the Japanese, was on this particular occasion forced to 
say : " VVe doubt if the prisoner would have so much 
consideration shown him had he been before a Western 
court." The assassin, puffed up by some misguided 
notion, behaved so arrogantly before the judges that 
their patience and magnanimity were on many occasions 
most severely tried. Yet the court authorities manifested 
perfect self-control, and never allowed their sense of 
justice to yield to their feeling of pardonable indignation. 
The court was even inclined to allow a foreigner, an 
English barrister in Shanghai, to appear on behalf of the 
accused, but it was found that such a step was against the 
provisions of the Japanese law, which prevents a court 
from extending this privilege even by courtesy to a 
foreign lawyer. It was indeed surprising, as the Shang- 
hai Times observes, to hear ♦' the speech of the prosecu- 
tion in a trial dealing so broad-mindedly with the old 
and new theories of criminal punishment, and the speech 
for the defense so openly and eloquently advocating the 
application of a contemptuous sentence as the best remedy 
for the prevention of crimes of the nature of that under 
review." 

Japanese judicial administration is one of the many 
things which the censors of Japan have gibed and 
scorned at. Mr. Thomas F. Millard, for instance, in his 
" America and the Far Eastern Question " and " The 
New Far East," takes particular pains to tell the Ameri- 



212 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

cans not to trust the Japanese courts. Let writers of 
Mr. Millard's school say what they will : as for Japan, 
she can well afford to be serene and complacent with 
such critics, reposing full confidence in the verdict of an 
unbiased public. 

I cannot conclude this chapter without reproducing a 
story told by Mr. S. F. Moore, of Seoul, through the 
columns of the Seoul Weekly Press — so illustrative is the 
story of the radical contrast between the old and the 
new administrative method in Korea. The story, in Mr. 
Moore's own language, runs as follows : '♦ Last week my 
work took me to the country. Getting off the train at 
Dojo I started to walk to Pai Chun. A Korean who had 
evidently come down on the same train and who was 
going my way made my acquaintance and told me some- 
thing that cheered my heart. He lives in a village in 
Pai Chun, owns some land, occupies the important posi- 
tion of land agent for a rich landlord who resides in Seoul. 
A short time ago this agent had been notified that a rela- 
tive of his (a dissipated loafer) had, in association with a 
bad Japanese citizen, borrowed quite a sum of money in 
his name and squandered it in Seoul. He was ordered 
by his magistrate to either pay the money or go to Seoul 
to state what reason there was why he should not settle 
the account. (The initiated will understand that the ras- 
cals had a pull somewhere and expected to fleece the 
ignorant countryman, as is so commonly done here.) 
Having arrived in Seoul he had gone to the Japanese 
court where, to his surprise and satisfaction, the repro- 
bate relative had been properly rebuked and spanked, 
while he was told that of course it was unnecessary for 
him to pay a debt contracted without his consent. 

" As the Japanese rascal had run away, the judge told 



JUDICIAL REFORM IN KOREA 213 

the agent that it was likely the confederate rascals would 
visit him later and try to get money from him somehow ; 
at the same time he charged the agent that in case such 
an attempt was made he should first catch the Japanese 
rascal, bind him and send him up for trial, when he prom- 
ised to administer the proper remedy in allopathic doses. 
Our friend, who had come expecting to be fleeced, as so 
many others have been, was quite astonished at this little 
bit of simple justice and felt that it would not do to go 
home without giving the Japanese judge some token of 
his appreciation ; so next day he went to him and offered 
him twenty yen as a slight thank- offering for deciding 
the case in his favor. On doing so he was still further 
astonished at being told that he (the agent) must be a 
very nappon savam to offer money to a judge. He was 
told that such custom was unknown in Japan, and was 
advised to take his twenty yen and buy something for his 
parents or his family. This remark from the judge so 
upset all his previous ideas as to the usual proprieties in 
connection with lawsuits that he seemed to be in a sort 
of dazed condition — wondering if this was really a sample 
of the new era upon which the country was entering." 



XIII 
JAPANESE "OUTRAGES" IN KOREA 

IT is only three years since Japan assumed the control 
of Korean administration. Set this over against the 
half-century that has gone by since England occu- 
pied India, or the generation which has elapsed since the 
establishment of British rule in Egypt, and we can readily 
realize how far removed from the desired goal the Japanese 
in Korea must yet be. True, the Japanese protectorate 
was recognized in November, 1905, but it was only in 
July, 1907, that Korea intrusted Japan with a direct 
supervision of her internal affairs. It would have been 
truly wonderful if the Japanese could have in three years 
put every part of the intricate machinery of Korean ad- 
ministration in perfect working order ; it was not given 
to them to work such a miracle, and Japanese rule in 
Korea is to-day far from what they desire it to be. In- 
deed we cannot help blushing when we reflect how little 
we have contributed towards the betterment of conditions 
in Korea, after such critics as Mr. Alfred Stead held us 
out before the Western public as the model of *' national 
efficiency." 

The fundamental question which confronts us in Korea 
is the question of how to teach men of another race 
voluntarily to accept and to assimilate a superior civiliza- 
tion imposed upon them from without. It is the same 
question which America is trying to solve in the Philip- 
pines, and England in India and Egypt. It is perhaps 

214 



JAPANESE ** OUTRAGES" IN KOREA 215 

unreasonable to expect Japan, the youngest of modern 
nations, to regenerate Korea in so short a period, when 
her schoolmasters in colonial administration are still strug- 
gling to overcome the difficulties arising from the an- 
tipathy of the peoples over whom they have for years 
been exercising suzerain authority. We see unrest in 
India assuming such portentous aspect that England has 
lately been forced to muzzle the native Hindu press ; we 
find a nationalist propaganda looming greater and greater 
upon the political horizon of Egypt ; we know that con- 
ditions in the Philippines are far from what they ought 
to be. And yet the Filipino's dishke of the Americans 
does not necessarily mean American maladministration 
in the Philippines ; the disaffection in India and Egypt 
is no indication of British outrages in those countries. 
When we think of this the delicate and difficult nature 
of our task in Korea is brought forcibly home to us. Is it 
any wonder that Japanese administration in Korea has 
not been free from blemishes and blunders, which some 
Western critics have dragged into the garish light of 
day, branding them " Japanese outrages in Korea " ? It, 
therefore, behooves us to inquire what these outrages are. 
The Japanese in Korea have repeatedly been accused 
of treating the natives as the very scum of the earth. I 
frankly admit that in the early stage of the Japanese 
occupation of Korea many adventurers, and speculators 
and other undesirable characters came to the peninsula 
from Japan, all expecting to fish in troubled waters. The 
worst of these people were, perhaps, money-lenders and 
low-class laborers. The natural thriftlessness of the 
Koreans, coupled with a childish pride in actually pos- 
sessing large sums of money, furnished eminently suitable 
traits upon which the unscrupulous usurer could build 



2l6 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

a thriving business. His favorite method was to loan 
money upon rice-fields in sums much below the actual 
value of the land. These loans bore high interest and 
were made for short periods ; when the debtor failed to 
pay on the fixed date the creditor lost no time in fore- 
closing the mortgage. 

Not less reprehensible was the conduct of low-class 
laborers. Puffed up by the notion that their country 
vanquished one of the greatest military powers of 
Europe, they vented their arrogance and their contempt 
for the Koreans by bullying and bluster. They appar- 
ently believed that they were, by right of conquest, 
entitled to handle their native neighbors as they pleased. 
It never dawned upon them that their acts were cal- 
culated to hinder the good work of the residency- 
general by alienating the sympathy of the natives as 
well as of foreign nations. Had it not been for the 
detestable conduct of this riffraff, Japanese rule in Korea 
would not have been made the target of scathing criti- 
cisms. 

It must not be construed, as has frequently been done, 
that the influx of unruly Japanese into Korea was due 
to encouragement offered by the Japanese authorities. 
Critics who make such insinuations plainly admit that 
they have no substantial evidence to support their 
theory. Can a more flagrant violation of the code of 
honor be imagined than to charge a nation with the 
lack of moral integrity and the utter disregard of con- 
science, without any proof with which to justify such 
accusations ? Yet this is exactly what some critics have 
been doing with regard to the Japanese case in Korea. 
The truth is that in the early days of the Japanese 
occupation of Korea the Mikado's government had its 



JAPANESE "OUTRAGES" IN KOREA 21 7 

hands full in carrying on a gigantic war, and that when 
the war ended it was busy in readjusting its political 
relationship with Korea, with the result that its attention 
was not directed as much as it ought to have been to 
the control of undesirable Japanese entering into the 
peninsula. To accuse the Japanese authorities of in- 
efficiency and inability is not unreasonable : it is decid- 
edly unjust to say that they were hand-in -glove with 
usurers and low-class laborers in abusing the Koreans. 
In honor, then, let it be said that as the country resumes 
its normal condition, and as the Japanese authorities 
settle down to the arduous task of internal reform in 
Korea, the objectionable element of the Japanese popu- 
lation there is gradually weeded out, while the new- 
comers from Japan are of a law-abiding, industrious 
class, following their trades peaceably and legitimately 
without trespassing upon the rights of their native 
neighbors. 

As soon as Prince Ito assumed his office as residency- 
general he made resolute efforts to put down the dis- 
orderly elements among his countrymen in Korea. His 
attempts met only with a lukewarm support on the 
part of the Japanese communities at large, while some 
agitators openly objected to his policy, declaring that it 
manifested unpatriotic partiality for the Koreans. The 
Japanese government and Prince Ito stood firm, and 
proceeded with the work to which they were committed, 
promulgating regulations for deporting undesirable Jap- 
anese and prohibiting the harmful practices of the 
money-lenders. The residency-general, in pursuance 
of these regulations, deported, during the three years 
from 1906 to 1908, 107 Japanese, who were regarded as 
mauvais sujets. 



2l8 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

It would be unfair to attribute the whole blame for 
the estrangement of the Koreans to the mistakes made 
by the Japanese. The native officials, seeing in the 
advent of the new regime the termination of those 
happy days of fortune-making by extortion and pecula- 
tion, cursed, at heart at all events, the reform measures 
inaugurated by the Japanese. The masses of the popu- 
lation perceived in the settlement among them of enter- 
prising and industrious people the approach of an age 
of more assiduous toil and less pastime than they had 
been accustomed to, and were but too ready to lend 
ear to the seductive utterances of those who had selfish 
purposes to serve. The disband ment of the Korean 
army in 1907 injected another turbulent element into 
the already agitated situation, for the dismissed soldiers 
easily became desperadoes and increased the sum total 
of public misery by plundering defenseless travellers 
and raiding inoffensive villagers. Moreover Korea, like 
Manchuria, has for centuries been infested with bandits, 
the most formidable of whom are called hwa-jok, or 
armed robbers, who not only prey upon people of 
means, but often invade district magistracies and post- 
offices in order to purloin public money. With all these 
turbulent elements always at large it was no difficult 
task for malcontents and agitators to foment local dis- 
turbances, which were easily magnified into a patriotic 
rebellion, when reported in Western newspapers. 

We are told that the maladministration of Japan has 
been responsible for the rising of insurgents which four 
years ago spread disturbance throughout the country. 
As a matter of fact, the so-called insurgents are nothing 
but robbers and brigands. The fact that these pseudo- 
insurgents prey more upon their fellow countrymen 



<< /-VTTT-D A/^TTC " 



JAPANESE "OUTRAGES" IN KOREA 219 

than upon the Japanese is strong evidence that their 
activities have nothing to do with the woe and weal of 
their country. The Japanese Chamber of Commerce 
at Mokpo in the province of South Chon-la, where the 
insurgents were for some time most active, inquired 
into the extent of damages they have inflicted on 
Jananese and Koreans during the three months from 
January to March, 1909. The result of this investiga- 
tion is shown in the following table : 

Japanese Koreans 

Cases of incendiarism against 4 2 

Number of houses destroyed due to incendiarism 8 4 

Amount of money taken from 28 yen 1,294 yen 

Estimated loss caused to buildings of .... 900 yen 1,760 yen 

Estimated loss caused to properties of ... . 3,623 yen 1,786 yen 

Number of killed 4 36 

Number of wounded 11 16 

It will be seen that the Koreans suffered more than did 
their Japanese neighbors from the ravaging hands of " in- 
surgents." This is especially noticeable in the number 
of killed and wounded and the amount of money taken 
by robbery. 

At the same time it must be admitted that in the year or 
two immediately following the establishment of the Japa- 
nese protectorate some misguided Koreans took up arms 
against the Japanese from patriotic motives. The first 
insurrection of this nature broke out in the South Chung- 
chong province in May, 1906. Its leader declared that 
he was a commander of the •* righteous army," and that he 
had in view the emancipation of his country from the 
hand of the Japanese. Equipped with old fuse cannon 
and rifles, his followers attacked the Japanese gen- 
darmerie, the post-ofiice and district magistracy in the 
walled city of Hong-ju. The city was captured and 



220 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

made their headquarters. Levying contributions from 
the people by force, the insurgents inaugurated a veritable 
reign of terror throughout the region. But they were 
no equal of the trained soldiers who were rushed to the 
scene from the Japanese garrison army. In the encounters 
that ensued eighty insurgents were killed and 150 cap- 
tured. The manner in which the Japanese authorities 
dealt with the captured insurgents was far from severe. 
Of the 150 prisoners eighty were pardoned on the spot 
and seventy brought to Seoul for trial. Even the ring- 
leader was not sentenced to death-penalty, but was 
banished to Chin-do for life, that is, he was allowed to re- 
tire to that country and live the rest of his life quietly 
and peaceably ; but he had been in exile only a few 
months when the Japanese authorities pardoned him un- 
conditionally. 

The next insurrection was instigated by a scholar of 
the old school. Having his headquarters in Seoul, he 
sent out to all parts of the country seditious literature, in- 
citing scholars and young men in various provinces to the 
point of insurrection. Thus he succeeded in assembHng 
a force of some 150 men in July, 1906, but these were 
soon obliged to surrender. 

The abdication of the Korean emperor in the summer 
of 1907 was another occasion for riots, this time within 
the walls of the national capital. The riots were im- 
mediately put down by the Japanese mihtary and gen- 
darmerie so far as Seoul was concerned, but in the coun- 
try districts disturbances of a more or less serious nature 
continued to prevail for some time thereafter, owing 
mainly to the fact that the disbanded soldiers, having 
squandered the allowance given them by the government, 
joined hands with insurgents and vented their discontent 



II 



JAPANESE "OUTRAGES" IN KOREA 221 

by plunder and pillage. From this time on the insurrec- 
tion has lost all claim for patriotism, and become little 
better than brigandage. It is plain that the " tragedy of 
Korea " was enacted more by the folly and lawlessness of 
the Koreans than by the severity of the Japanese. 

The situation in Korea was delicate enough without 
those foreigners always on the alert to seize upon every 
opportunity to prejudice the natives against the Japanese 
administration. The most mischievous of such foreigners 
were those who, with journalism as their weapon, openly 
attacked the residency-general, and instigated the natives 
to rise against the new regime imposed upon them. The 
most audacious of such journalists was Mr. E. T. Bethel, 
editor and proprietor of the Korea Daily NewSy whose 
Korean edition appeared under the title of the Taihan 
Mai-il Shinpo, and was printed both in the Korean 
alphabet and in Mixed Korean and Chinese ideographs. 
Mr. McKenzie, discussing, in his " The Tragedy of 
Korea," foreign journalism in Korea, endeavors to 
make it appear that the Japanese authorities disliked 
newspapers of the nature of the Korea Daily Nezvs 
simply because they were loath to hear foreign criticism. 
Admiring the enterprise of Mr. Bethel, Mr. McKenzie 
tells us that the Korea Daily News was able to keep up 
a handsome office, with safes, typewriters, and handsome 
electric fittings that would do credit to a daily with a 
circulation of 50,000. I am not less enthusiastic in ad- 
miring the ability of Mr. Bethel, but I would be the last 
person to indorse the policy followed by him. Em- 
boldened by the rights of exterritoriality, which exempted 
him from the jurisdiction of the Japanese or Korean 
authorities, he published seditious news and comments 
both in English and in the native language. When 



222 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Mr. D. W. Stevens was assassinated in San Francisco the 
Korea Daily News extolled his Korean assassins as 
" patriots " and as " loyal and righteous gentlemen " be- 
cause they murdered a man who supported the Japanese 
protectorate. Again, this journal, comparing Prince Ito 
to Metternich, and Korea to Italy, made the following 
audacious remarks : •' But at last patriotic sons of Italy 
rose up in great force, and with banners of right flying 
and with bells of freedom ringing, opposed him. That 
Metternich, who was like a devil, fox, and badger, had to 
put up the white flag, and fleeing his native country, to 
spend the rest of his life in a foreign land. This should 
serve as a warning to such as may have the same bar- 
barous mind as Metternich, and like him plot against an- 
other country." Still another article referred to the 
" finger blood of the seventeen students," and said : " We 
will certainly recover our Korea. . . . What heroes 
have left glorious monuments in history except through 
blood ? " If the Japanese authorities failed to suppress the 
journal, it was not because it wielded too great a power, as 
Mr. McKenzie seems to think it was, but merely because its 
editor hid himself behind the bulwarks of exterritoriality. 
The incendiary activities of the Korea Daily News 
became so rampant that the British consul in Seoul, in 
accordance with the provisions of the " Order in Council 
of 1904," was obliged to summon Mr. Bethel and order 
him to give a bond of ;^300 for six months, and " to 
keep the peace and guarantee his future good behavior." 
During that period the journal behaved with comparative 
moderation, but as soon as the term expired its seditious 
activities were resumed with greater energy, until the 
Japanese resident in Seoul was obliged to lay a com- 
plaint before the British Consular Court against Mr. 



JAPANESE '' OUTRAGES " IN KOREA 223 

Bethel. The pubhc hearing of this case, which lasted 
from the 15th to i8th June, 1908, resulted in a judg- 
ment which sentenced the accused to imprisonment for 
three weeks and required subsequently " to give security 
for good behavior during six months or to be deported." 
In the text of the judgment we find the following signif- 
icant passage : 

" It comes to this, that you [Mr. Bethel] being a 
foreign guest in this country and owing a duty of quiet, 
orderly conduct to its government in return for the pro- 
tection they extend to you, set yourself up as a paper 
leader of insurrection with this court as a sanctuary to 
flee to in case of danger. In what respect can you be a 
real leader in the forefront of the battle with your hfe and 
family and property at stake ? Suppose they follow the 
advice of your editor and take up the sword, where will 
you be when their blood is flowing? Without at all 
questioning your courage or disinterested motives, I say 
you are in a false position and likely to do the most 
grievous harm to the people you wish to befriend. It is 
my duty to warn you that if you continue to preach re- 
bellion you must be deported." 

I have dwelt at length upon foreign journalism in 
Korea because it was one of the factors which conspired 
to incite rebellion among the masses of the Korean pop- 
ulation. But it must not be presumed that Japanese 
authorities were partial to the newspapers published by 
Japanese subjects in Korea. So far from it, where com- 
ments of these papers were found injurious to the peace 
and order of the country, the residency-general did not 
hesitate to adopt rigorous measures. Thus during 1908, 
the Keijo-shinpo, one of the leading Japanese papers in 
Seoul, was suspended its pubhcation three times ; the 



224 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Chosen-nichi-nichi, of Seoul, twice ; the Taikan-nippOy of 
Seoul, once; the Chosen- shinbun^ of Chemulpo, three 
times ; and the Fusan-nippo^ of Fusan, once. 

The native hostilities stirred up by discontented offi- 
cials, disbanded soldiers, foreign journals, brigands and 
pirates, accomphshed nothing in the way of improving 
conditions in Korea, but resulted in fatalities to about 
15,000 Japanese and Koreans, besides inflicting untold 
misery upon the innocent, peaceful people. Fortunately 
the insurgent movement was soon exterminated. During 
the campaign of the Japanese military against the insur- 
gents the most blood-curdling tales were told by such 
writers as Mr. McKenzie about the cruelty of the Jap- 
anese. But as Mr. W. T. R. Preston, for several years 
Canadian Trade Commissioner in Japan, writing in the 
Toronto Globe, says : 

" Many of the stories have no foundation in fact, and 
others have been greatly exaggerated. Every one is well 
aware that war is war. Passions are let loose that under 
other times are subject to absolute control. Korean 
insurgents have been met by Japanese, and, refusing to 
surrender, have been annihilated. Japanese troops have 
met with the same tragic fate at the hands of Koreans. 
Some Japanese troops passing beyond the control of 
their officers have been guilty of serious offenses against 
the rules of warfare, but the cases that have come to the 
knowledge of the authorities have been dealt with as un- 
sparingly as the British commander-in-chief did in two 
or three notable instances during the South African war. 
. . . But it is charitable to express the hope that 
when all is known of the Japanese operations in Korea, it 
may be found that the military have been as tolerant as 
they were with Russian prisoners in the late war." 



JAPANESE " OUTRAGES ** IN KOREA 225 

What more can we add to this just interpretation of 
the situation ? This, forsooth, is the real nature of Jap- 
anese " outrages " in Korea. 

One of the gravest charges directed at the Japanese 
authorities is that during their mihtary operations against 
Russia they appropriated private lands in Korea in a 
most arbitrary manner. The appropriation was made in 
pursuance of the protocol of February 23, 1904, which 
conceded to Japan the right to occupy " such places in 
Korea as might be necessary from a strategical point of 
view." But it is not the right itself, but the method in 
which it was put into practice, that has been vehemently 
attacked by foreign critics. Thus we are told by Mr. 
Hulbert that the Japanese : 

" Have gone in and seized the most valuable property 
in the vicinity of the largest towns in Korea. When 
the people ask for payment, they are told to go to their 
own government for payment. But the Japanese know 
that the government has no money and that the land is 
simply confiscated. But not only so ; men claiming to 
be connected with the Japanese army go out into the 
country districts and seize any land they like, repeating 
simply the formula * this is for military purposes.' " 

I do not desire to enter into controversy with Mr. 
Hulbert, but I may be permitted to set forth facts which, 
in the light of my investigation, are authentic. 

In July, 1904, the Japanese authorities appropriated 
for military purposes some 8,264 acres in Yong-san, 
Ping-yang, and Shin-wiju, as well as 1,500 acres to be 
used in connection with the construction of three mili- 
tary railways — the Masampo, the Seoul- Shinwiju, and 
the Seoul-Wonsan line. Japan promptly took steps 
towards compensating the owners for the appropriated 



226 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

land, handing over, on August lo, 1904, 200,000 j^;/ to 
the Home Department of the Korean government, to 
be distributed as partial reimbursement for lands formerly 
owned by private individuals in Yong-san, Ping-yang, 
and Shin-wiju. But confusion concerning the survey 
of the lands and their appraisal, as well as the difficulty 
of distinguishing public lands from private lands, greatly 
deterred the settlement of the matter, thus causing much 
misunderstanding on the part of some Koreans. Rec- 
ognizing the necessity of a speedy settlement the Korean 
government, at the request of the residency-general, 
organized, in October, 1907, a temporary bureau for the 
purpose of investigating into all questions relating to the 
lands appropriated by the military authorities. The 
director and secretary of the bureau were Koreans, a 
Japanese officer, and a civil engineer having been at- 
tached to it only as counsellors. Prior and subsequently 
to the creation of this bureau more than half of the 
lands occupied for military purposes at the above-named 
three towns were restored to the original owners or trans- 
ferred to the Railway Bureau of the residency-general, so 
that the lands actually remaining in occupation by the 
army were reduced from 8,264 acres to 3,578 acres. Of 
these 3,578 acres, 2,392 acres were appropriated from 
private lands, for which 264,604 yen has been paid by 
the Japanese army. 

The lands transferred from the army to the Railway 
Bureau to be used as station sites at Yong-san, Ping- 
yang, and Shin-wiju aggregated 804 acres, of which 649 
acres belonged to private individuals, requiring the re- 
imbursement of 60,453 yen by the Japanese govern- 
ment. 

As for the lands appropriated for the above-named 



JAPANESE "OUTRAGES" IN KOREA 227 

three railways — the Masampo, the Seoul-Shinwiju, and 
the Seoul-Wonsan Hne — -their total area originally 
amounted to 14,876 acres, but as the result of readjust- 
ment it was reduced to 10,401 acres, of which 2,081 
acres were public lands. For the remaining 8,320 acres, 
belonging to private individuals, the Railway Bureau 
paid 590,605 yen. 

This, then, is the real substance of the story which, as 
told in Mr. Homer B. Hulbert's " The Passing of Korea," 
appears in this distorted form : 

" The Japanese military put their hands upon eight 
square miles [5,120 acres] of the most valuable land near 
Seoul simply for the building of barracks and parade 
grounds for twelve thousand men, when experts affirm 
that one-sixteenth of that space would have been ample. 
That land could not be bought in open market for six 
million dollars, but the Japanese knew the government 
could not pay a proper price, so they gave two hundred 
thousand dollars, to cover the cost of removal only. 
And this is all the Koreans could ever hope to get." 

The land referred to by Mr. Hulbert could be no 
other than that at Yong-san which I have already 
mentioned, for in no other place near Seoul did the 
Japanese military occupy any land. If this be so, Mr. 
Hulbert's accusation widely misses the mark. The area 
of the land in question, instead of being 5,120 acres, as 
Mr. Hulbert represents it to be, did not exceed 2,479 
acres. Of this total 905 acres were afterwards restored 
to their original owners, while 401 acres were transferred 
to the Railway Bureau to be used as station site, fair 
compensation having been made therefor. Thus the 
land permanently occupied by the army at Yong-san 
was reduced to 1,173 acres, of which 429 acres belonged 



228 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

to the Korean government and required no compensa- 
tion. It comes to this that the private lands permanently 
appropriated by the Japanese army aggregated 744 acres 
only, for which 101, gs^jyen has been paid, averaging 137 
j/en per acre. 

I cannot conclude this chapter without saying a few 
words about the regrettable conditions resulting from the 
fact that the Japanese officials, lacking the knowledge 
of the Korean language, are forced to employ inter- 
preters, mostly Koreans, in carrying out administrative 
measures. Now the interpreters are not alwa)'S honest, 
and the dishonest interpreters are dreaded by the people 
even as are the thieves. Let me illustrate their favorite 
method of extortion. A Japanese officer desires to 
obtain so many sacks of barley or rice, and negotiates 
for them through an interpreter. The cunning inter- 
preter transmits the order to the villagers, but demands 
much more than the amount asked for. The villagers 
would say they are unable to supply so much, where- 
upon the interpreter comes back with feigned disappoint- 
ment and indignation and tells the officer, in such a way 
as would arouse his anger, that the villagers refused to 
negotiate. The rascal then goes back to the people, 
saying that the Japanese officer is coming to chastise 
them. The Koreans, seized with fear, entreat the inter- 
preter to appease the officer's anger, promising a generous 
payment to the wretched man. As if by enchantment, 
they are informed that the Japanese has consented to 
take much less than he asked for at first. The officer 
goes off with the amount he actually wanted to obtain, 
and the bad interpreter laughs in his sleeve when the 
innocent villagers express their gratitude with the pay- 
ment of a substantial sum. 



JAPANESE *' OUTRAGES " IN KOREA 229 

Here is another example of trickery. The interpreter 
goes to a rich man and transmits a verbal order to pre- 
sent himself at a certain Japanese office. " Why ? " he 
demands. " I am not to tell you," responds the inter- 
preter, " but you must follow me." The rascal then 
intimates that the rich man is suspected of being in 
complicity with insurgents, and that the Japanese are 
resolved to punish him severely. " Is there any way of 
eluding the Japanese order ? " asks the terror-stricken 
man. The interpreter apparently sympathizes with the 
poor fellow, and assures him that he will do all he can to 
secure a pardon if a liberal sum of money is provided for 
his disposal, so that he may bribe the Japanese officers. 
The money is paid, and the interpreter disappears, while 
the Japanese are cursed by the defrauded man for what 
they have no knowledge of. 

The evils of employing interpreters in the administra- 
tion of government are too obvious to require any elucida- 
tion. Japan has inaugurated in Korea an admirable sys- 
tem of law courts, but the inability of Japanese judges to 
speak the Korean language has militated against making 
the institution as perfect as it should be. Japan's reputa- 
tion has suffered enough through the pernicious conduct 
of interpreters, and it is up to her to adopt measures for 
the speedy elimination of this undesirable element from 
Korean administration. 



XIV 

THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA 

A fire took place in our house ; 

The thatched cottage is gone. 

'Tis sad, exceedingly sad ; 

Yet there's one thing that rejoices us : 

Those cruel bedbugs, which sucked our blood, 

Were all destroyed in the fire. 

THIS is a literal translation of the song that was 
heard jauntily sung in the streets of Seoul for 
some time before the annexation. The great 
political convulsions which had shaken their country to 
the foundation could not help impressing even the people 
upon whose minds care sat most lightly. Some bard or 
songster scented the popular feeling and expressed it in this 
song. A foreign overlord had come to rule them, and 
the sovereign rights of their state had been snatched from 
it one after another. It was as if a house caught fire, re- 
ducing its beams and pillars into smoldering embers. It 
was a sad plight in which they found themselves. And 
yet the misfortune was not entirely without its consola- 
tion : the yangpan that had led a life of idleness, luxury, 
and caprice at the expense of the common people, had 
been deprived of much of its arbitrary privilege and 
power, and the termination of the vile practice of extor- 
tion and blackmail perpetrated by the privileged class 
seemed well-nigh at hand, thanks to the advent of Japa- 
nese rule. Bedbug — that was the unceremonious appella- 
tion which the song bestowed upon the parasitic yangpan, 

230 



THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA 23 1 

T\\^ yangpans position in Korea was not dissimilar to 
the position of the French nobiHty prior to the great rev- 
olution. It was exempt from taxation, and indeed from 
all duties to the state, but subsisted by virtually preying 
upon the common people. Official positions were ex- 
clusively reserved for it to be utilized for the exploitation 
of the populace. Men of the yangpan caste were thus 
enabled to maintain a seraglio and a large retinue, and 
indulge in vice and luxury without contributing aught 
towards the welfare of the state, while the masses of peo- 
ple were harnessed to toil without the least hope of re- 
compensation. 

But the time at last arrived when the plebeian sons of 
Korea were enabled to rise against the aristocracy and 
shake off the yoke of tyranny. The picturesque career 
of Song-ping-shun, the man who led this new movement, 
need not be recounted here : suffice it to say that what- 
ever success was attained by the movement was wholly 
due to Japanese influence which was behind Song. 
When the Russo-Japanese war broke out, the Japanese 
army enlisted a large number of Korean laborers to be 
employed in connection with the transport service. In 
this Song saw a golden opportunity to attain his cherished 
ambition. He lost no time in offering his service to the 
Japanese army by supplying men and provision. The 
motives which prompted him to take this course were 
perhaps not entirely unselfish. It is probable that his 
chief interest was in fortune-making rather than in polit- 
ical reform. A sagacious man, he did not fail to discern 
a lucrative job in the service which he volunteered to 
render the Japanese. By furnishing the Mikado's army 
men and provision, he could pocket a handsome com- 
mission, and, what was more important, could secure the 



232 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

favor of the Japanese authorities, which might be utihzed 
for his own benefit, should Japan acquire mastery of the 
peninsula. 

But the motive does not matter. What is important is 
that he became the actual leader of a large force of men 
whom he assembled for the Japanese miUtary authorities. 
The force consisted mostly of men of the plebeian order 
who had long been oppressed by \hQ yangpan. Some of 
them were ignorant coolies, some peaceable common peo- 
ple, not a few rowdies and malcontents who openly 
cursed the aristocracy. However dissimilar they may 
have been in temperament and character, they were like 
one man in that they all nurtured hatred of ih.Q yangpan 
and desired its downfall. Song himself, having sprung 
from the downtrodden class, was in sympathy v/ith the 
general sentiment among his men. So this band of 
Koreans, originally enlisted to serve the Japanese army 
as transport laborers, gradually and unconsciously as- 
sumed the nature of a political faction whose purpose was 
the curtailment of the influence of the yangp an. Some 
of the men were no doubt animated by a spirit of 
revenge, and gave vent to their enmity and discontent by 
means not always reputable. Their acts were perhaps 
pardonable, considering the oppression and persecution 
to which they had been subjected at the hands of the 
privileged class. Yet it was nevertheless deplorable as it 
only resulted in widening the gap of hostility that had 
opened between the aristocracy and the common people. 
Moreover, their invocation of Japan's name in perpetrat- 
ing harmful conduct did not fail to injure Japan's reputa- 
tion, at least in the eyes of the privileged class of 
Koreans. 

To all appearances Song was a staunch and consistent 



THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA 233 

advocate of Japanese protectorate, and he had the cour- 
age to preach his poHtical convictions in the face of the 
yet povverfulj/^/^^^^/^ and official chques, which acquiesced 
in the new order of things only reluctantly. His sagacity, 
his energy, his magnetic power, and the tactfulness of his 
movement were such that he succeeded in gathering 
nearly three hundred thousand men under his standard. 

Japan was not unappreciative of Song's unremitting 
toil for the cause of the new regime, and when Prince Ito 
assumed duties as resident-general in 1907, the lamented 
statesman persuaded the Korean emperor to appoint Song 
to the post of Minister of Home Affairs. Korean official- 
dom composed of men who sprang from the yangpan class 
regarded this *' upstart " statesman with mingled contempt, 
distrust, and disgust ; and yet they were forced to rec- 
ognize the great influence that was behind their new 
colleague. How could they ignore a man controlling 
three hundred thousand followers whose watchword was 
reform and progress ? The appointment of Mr. Song to 
the post of a minister marked a new epoch in the political 
history of Korea, for it was a tacit recognition by the 
privileged class that the masses of people could no longer 
be abused and oppressed as they had been. 

Song's mission was twofold : on the one hand, he stood 
for the emancipation of the common people, and on the 
other he toiled for the promotion of Japanese influence 
in the government. It is the second phase of his mission 
that we are chiefly concerned with here, for his consistent 
championship of the Japanese cause was no doubt one of 
the factors which facilitated the annexation of Korea by 
the Mikado's Empire. Although Mr. Song's indiscreet 
utterances with regard to the Christian missionaries in 
Korea resulted in his dismissal from the government at 



234 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

the behest of the very Japanese statesman who had rec- 
ommended him to the Korean emperor, his star as a 
political leader did not wane. His hold upon his follow- 
ers was too strong to be broken by the loss of his official 
honors. A politician capable of holding together a large 
following under adverse circumstances as well as when 
fortune smiled upon him — a man of so remarkable a 
personality had to be reckoned with, whether he was in 
or out of the government. 

Mr. Song's dismissal occurred in February, 1908. By 
that time he had clearly discerned that the ultimate and 
inevitable destiny of his country was its fusion with 
Japan. He had seen that the independence of Korea 
had become naught but the merest sham, with his coun- 
trymen having neither the desire nor the ability to regain 
it. He had been forced, however reluctantly, to admit 
that the corruption of the court and officialdom, and the 
impotency, indifference, and supineness of the people in 
general had become such as to make the regeneration of 
the country, without the direct and constant application 
of strong influence from outside, an impossibility. Once 
such influence was removed the nation would ever cease 
to advance, and fall back into the quagmire of factional 
feuds, court intrigues, the exploitation of the masses, and 
all that constituted a state of anarchy. If the Korean 
people were so utterly devoid of the qualities requisite for 
an independent nation, what was the use of investing it 
with a pretense of sovereign rights ? The maintenance 
of such sovereignty on the part of Korea had not been 
innocuous, but had proved a serious hindrance in the 
way of reform. The dual administration formed by the 
Korean court and the Japanese residency-general had 
accomplished much for the amelioration of conditions in 



THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA 235 

the peninsula, but in its actual working it had been found 
far from satisfactory. The Korean statesmen and offi- 
cials, ever longing for the old days of corruption, were 
always at cross purposes with the residency-general, so 
that good measures initiated by the latter fell far short 
of attaining the end for which they were conceived. The 
local functionaries, who were in direct touch with the 
people, were as corrupt as the high officials in the central 
government ; at their hands those laws, intended for the 
promotion of the welfare of the masses, were in most 
cases converted into a dead letter. If the native govern- 
ment ceased to exist, and handed over to the Japanese 
its last vestige of power, the cause of reform and progress 
would be served much better. Then the Japanese au- 
thorities would be free not only to initiate laws and regu- 
lations, but also to put them into execution without 
encountering obstructions and hindrances from corrupt 
native officials. Thus, only thus, the process of reform 
in Korea would be greatly simplified, and the long- 
abused common people would really begin to bask in 
the blessing of the new regime. 

Such was the thought which caused Mr. Song to ad- 
vocate the amalgamation of Korea with Japan. Towards 
the end of 1908, he confided this idea to a few Japanese 
statesmen, Prince Ito one of them. But Japan at that 
moment was not inclined to take any measure towards 
the final obliteration of Korean independence, and offered 
no encouragement to Song's suggestion. Then happened 
the assassination of Prince Ito. In this regrettable inci- 
dent Mr. Song saw the psychological moment to openly 
advocate annexation. He had both the tact and influence 
to convert his followers to his political convictions ; and 
in October, 1909, his political party, the // Chin Hoi^ 



236 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

passed a resolution declaring that annexation was the 
only satisfactory solution of the Korean question, and 
memoriahzed both the Korean emperor and the Japanese 
government accordingly. By that time Japan had been 
forced to admit that affairs in Korea had not been going 
right, and had already formulated her policy for the 
eventual annexation of the country. Prince Ito's trip to 
Harbin, where he was assassinated, was probably under- 
taken for the purpose of obtaining Russia's consent to 
the annexation. But the Japanese government was un- 
wiUing to carry out the new pohcy at the recommenda- 
tion of the // Chin Hoi^ fearing that such a course would 
make it appear that it was partial to a political faction in 
Korea. Then again, had Japan annexed Korea in the 
wake of the Harbin tragedy, the world may have sus- 
pected that she was acting in a spirit of revenge. What 
appeared to Song a psychological moment seemed to the 
Japanese government and people the most unopportune 
moment to assume any measure towards the annexation. 
So the matter received no serious consideration in Japan, 
and was entirely dropped for the time being. 

Meanwhile Mr. Song's action was subjected to the 
severest criticism at the hands of the privileged class in 
his country. He was accused of conspiring to sell his 
country to Japan for some unholy purpose. And yet 
Song was not daunted, and continued to advocate an- 
nexation, in the face of sarcasm, insinuations, and ma- 
lignment hurled at him by the men of the yangpan class. 
He was convinced that the stage would soon arrive 
wherein the Japanese statesmen would be forced to exe- 
cute the measures they had already outlined. And he 
was right. 

In August, 19 10, Viscount General Terauchi, Japa- 



THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA 237 

nese Minister of Army, was appointed to be the resident- 
general. He proceeded to his post, authorized to nego- 
tiate for the annexation. Viscount Terauchi's manner 
in handUng the dehcate matter was admirable. While 
not unappreciative of the valuable service rendered Japan 
by Mr. Song and his party, General Terauchi was too 
sagacious to show partiality towards the Korean politi- 
cian, knowing that such a course would inevitably sow 
seeds of enmity among various political factions in the 
peninsula, where harmony was needed most. It was no 
doubt the part of wisdom to deal in a spirit of fairness 
with all factions, whether pro-Japanese or anti-Japanese. 
None of the Korean political parties, if such they could 
be called, was animated by public spirit, not, indeed, even 
Mr. Song's. Their leaders all had some selfish purpose 
to serve, and cared little whether their country remained 
independent or not. The country had had more than 
enough of chaos and disturbance engendered by the 
strife among these petty factions, and it was high time 
that they should be terminated once and for all. By 
showing no favoritism towards Mr. Song's faction, but 
by treating all parties with impartiality, Viscount Tera- 
uchi could command the respect and confidence of all, 
creating with none a feeling of suspicion and distrust. 
The // Chin Hoi and its leaders were doubtless a little 
disappointed by the attitude of Viscount Terauchi, but 
even they must at heart have recognized that this atti- 
tude was unimpeachable. 

Viscount Terauchi's instructions given to his country- 
men in Korea were equally commendable. Upon the 
officials he urged economy and industry in conducting 
their official business. To the Japanese community in 
general he offered the advice that moral laxity, usually 



238 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

prevalenr in colonies and frontier territories, should be 
carefully avoided. Above all he endeavored to bring 
home to all classes of Japanese that it was their foremost 
duty to treat their Korean neighbors with sympathy and 
kindness. 

Simultaneously with the treaty of annexation, which 
was signed on August 22, 1910, Viscount Terauchi issued 
a proclamation defining the treatment to be accorded to 
the imperial household of Korea and indicating the na- 
ture of Japanese policy to be adopted in Korea after the 
annexation. In the first place, the Korean emperor, 
though no longer wielding political authority, was allowed 
to maintain and enjoy the same personal dignity and 
comfort as before. He was to be known by the title of 
His Imperial Highness Yi Wang (Prince Yi), and the 
crown prince to be called Prince Heir, while the ex- 
emperor was to be given the title of His Imperial High- 
ness Tai Wang (Prince Father). Their highnesses are 
accorded the treatment of Japanese princes of the blood, 
receiving annual grants as munificent as before. 

Nor did Korean ministers and other officials fail to 
receive due consideration. Some of them were created 
peers and had conferred upon them monetary grants 
appropriate to their rank and merits ; some were ap- 
pointed to be members of the newly created Central 
Council, an advisory body to the Japanese government- 
general of Korea ; while others were made officials either 
of the central or of the local offices. Even the yangpan 
class, which contributed little to the welfare of the 
country, was not entirely left in the cold, for those of its 
members whose records were not decidedly bad were 
accorded special awards. Local functionaries who mis- 
appropriated public money were freed from their respon- 



THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA 239 

sibility and exempted from paying in the balance of the 
sum due. 

Equally generous were measures taken with regard to 
the masses of people. It was officially announced that 
dutiful sons, virtuous wives, and other persons whose 
behavior was exemplary should be duly rewarded and 
publicly honored. In view of the fact that centuries of 
maladministration entailed universal impoverishment of 
the masses, the people were exempted from paying the 
land tax, which was due until 1908 but remained un- 
paid, while those who borrowed public grain before the 
end of 1909 were not required to return it. In addition, 
the land tax due in the autumn of 1910 was reduced by 
one-fifth of the rate. Further, a sum of about seven- 
teen million yen was advanced from the treasury to 
be donated to 238 districts of the thirteen provinces, 
so that the people would be enabled to settle down to 
the pursuit of industrial work and promote their well- 
being in other respects. In addition to the Central 
Hospital and three charity hospitals opened a few years 
before, a charity hospital was to be instituted in each 
province to confer upon needy patients the blessing of 
advanced medical science. Even those who contravened 
the laws were not forbidden to share the benevolence 
of the new administration, especially where the nature of 
offense was found deserving extenuation. Thus hun- 
dreds of prisoners have been set free, many of them 
being given money with which to return to their homes. 

The annexation has necessarily brought upon Japan a 
heavy burden of new responsibilities, especially in the 
matter of finance. To meet the extraordinary expendi- 
ture, entailed by the creation of a new peerage, the 
reduction of the land tax, the grant of a beneficial fund 



240 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

to the people, and other benevolent measures, the Japa- 
nese government has decided to raise a national loan to 
the maximum amount of 30,000,000 yen. From the 
view-point of Japan's own benefit it is open to question 
whether the annexation is desirable or not. Yet Japan 
was obliged to take the step she did, if she was to com- 
plete the task she had embarked upon. 

We have considered the effects of the annexation upon 
Korea herself; it remains for us to examine its effects 
upon the interest of foreign nations. 

One of the inevitable results of the annexation is the 
abolition of exterritoriality. This question has already- 
been minutely discussed in connection with }udicial re- 
form in Korea. 

Of more serious concern to Western nations is the 
question of foreign trade with Korea. As a principle, 
the abrogation of Korea's foreign treaties, which is the 
corollary of the annexation, should ipso facto imply the 
nullification of the tariff schedules agreed upon between 
Korea and foreign countries. But in view of the fact that 
the annexation was necessitated chiefly by considerations 
of a political nature, the Japanese government is anxious 
not to disturb the economic interest of foreigners in 
Korea, and is moreover conscious of the advisability of 
abstaining from measures which may bring about radical 
changes in the commercial relations between Japan and 
Korea. It has therefore decided to maintain the customs 
tariff hitherto enforced in Korea, for a term of ten years, 
in respect of trade, foreign as well as national. For the 
same period the existing tonnage dues are to be main- 
tained ; foreign vessels will be allowed to participate in 
the coasting trade of Korea ; while all the open ports, 
with the exception of Masampo, which is to become a 



THE ANNEXATION OF KOREA 24 1 

naval base, are to offer the facilities of access hitherto ob- 
taining. The exception of Masampo will in no way 
affect foreign commercial interests in the peninsula, as 
the port has never had any foreign trade. Shin-wiju, 
which has been opened as a substitute, is from a com- 
mercial point of view far more important than Masampo. 
Moreover, the extension to Korea of Japan's existing 
treaties, while abolishing the right of exterritoriality, will 
confer upon resident foreigners in Korea the privilege of 
residing and trading in all parts of the country, as well as 
other rights and privileges now enjoyed by foreigners in 
Japan proper. It will be observed that for the next ten 
years the barrier of tariff will still stand between Japan 
and Korea, which may retard the growth of Japanese 
trade in the newly annexed territory. Is this not an in- 
dication of Japan's consistent intention to give foreign 
economic interests a square deal ? The decade's respite 
ought to afford foreign enterprise an ample chance to 
consolidate the foothold which it has already obtained in 
Korea. 



XV 

AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 

OF all Western nations the United States has the 
greatest economic interest in Korea. True, she 
ranks next to Great Britain in the import trade 
of the peninsula, and also to Russia and Holland in its 
export trade. But the true extent of American interest 
in Korea cannot be gauged merely by the volume of her 
trade with that country : we must take into consideration 
the various enterprises which have been started by Ameri- 
can citizens in different parts of the empire. The princi- 
pal mining industries, the first railroad ever built in Korea, 
and the first electric trolley line, electric lighting plant, 
water-works and telephone system in the Korean capital 
— these are all fruits of American economic activities in 
the Hermit Kingdom. 

The great strides which American enterprise has made 
in Korea are perhaps largely due to the influence which 
Dr. Horace N. Allen, for many years American minister 
at Seoul, exercised in the Korean court. A personal 
friend, physician and adviser for the Korean emperor, he 
was in a position to assist his nationals in their efforts to 
obtain various concessions in Korea, and used his in- 
fluence to promote and encourage American undertak- 
ings where they were found legitimate. His efforts, how- 
ever, would have hardly been rewarded with so great a 
success, had it not been for the initiative of an American 
citizen whose bold spirit of speculation and whose un- 

242 



AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 243 

daunted courage made him unusually fit to open up a coun- 
try which was shrouded in an almost mythological at- 
mosphere. This American is Henry C. CoUbran, of 
Denver. Before going to the Far East, Collbran was 
prommently connected with the construction of the Mid- 
land Railway. Soon after his arrival in Korea early in 
the nineties, he was commissioned by an American syn- 
dicate to build a railroad connecting Seoul with the 
Chemulpo anchorage. A line of only twenty-six miles, 
its construction was nevertheless an exceedingly impor- 
tant undertaking, for the road, if road it could be called, 
between the capital and the port was so wretched that 
foreign travellers accustomed to modern conveniences 
found it practically impassable. An old-time traveller in 
Korea, describing his journey over this road, says : 

" I had to have a pony and eight men to bring myself 
and wife to the walls. I rode the pony and tlic madame 
came in a chair, borne on the shoulders of four coolies, 
with a relay of four others to help them. Towards the 
end of the journey we had to push on for fear that we 
might not get to Seoul before the gates closed. The city 
is surrounded by a massive wall nine miles in length and 
thirty feet high. At that time this wall was entered only 
by gates, and these were closed at night by heavy doors 
plated with iron which were not opened again until the 
next day. We got in just in time to see the gates close." 

This undertaking of Collbran's was naturally most 
heartily appreciated by all foreigners in Seoul. Although 
the American syndicate sold the road to the Japanese 
before it was completed, it remains a worthy monument 
to American enterprise, which undertook its construction 
when the prospect of its successful operation was far from 
bright. 



244 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Soon after the Seoul-Chemulpo Railway was off his 
hands Collbran organized a firm under the name of " CoU- 
bran and Bostvvick Development Company," and obtained 
the concession to build an electric trolley line in Seoul in 
connection with a lighting plant. When the trolley line 
was opened the natives entertained prejudice against it, 
and on several occasions cars were attacked by mobs. 
They beUeved that the innovation might result in fearful 
drought which would destroy the crops. Their theory 
was that as the cars looked like boats sailing to and fro 
through the streets, the gods of rain, peering down from 
the heavens, would say : '• These people hve in a city 
floating on water," and would pass on without giving them 
a drop of rain. The car line runs through two of the 
main gates, all of which now stand wide open day and 
night, and on out into the country. The picturesque 
theory of the natives seems to have crumbled before the 
rude argument of demonstrated facts, for they are to-day 
fairly good patrons of the line. 

Before the installation of an electric lighting plant by 
the firm of Collbran and Bostwick all Seoul was pitch 
dark at night. At that time no men of the plebeian order 
were allowed to go about after dark, but women, irrespec- 
tive of class, were at liberty to appear in the street. This 
seems rather strange in a country where women are shut 
up in the *' inner apartment," but the theory was that the 
members of the imperial family as well as officials, who 
were exempt from the rules governing the common peo- 
ple, might with impunity indulge in dubious conduct, de- 
scending sometimes even to obscenity, when women were 
out in the dark without any masculine escort. In these 
days it was not seldom that a young maiden or a married 
woman suddenly disappeared while taking her nocturnal 



AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 245 

stroll, and failed to return home for months or years. In 
such cases it was generally believed that the woman, on 
account of her rare beauty, had been marked by the em- 
peror or a prince or a high official. In a country like 
Korea, therefore, dark streets meant moral degradation, 
and the first lighting plant in Seoul had attached to it a 
far greater significance than was indicated by the ma- 
terial convenience which it introduced. But the lighting 
system inaugurated by Collbran and Bostwick was re- 
stricted to a small section of the town, and it remained 
for the Japanese to enlarge upon the old plan and con- 
vert benighted Seoul into a tolerably well-lighted town, 
for the firm disposed of the lighting plant as well as the 
street-car line in favor of the newly-organized Japanese 
firm known as the Japanese-Korean Gas and Electric 
Company. 

Collbran's next undertaking was the installation in 
Seoul of a system of water- works. Sanitation in Korea 
has been conspicuous only by its absence. Where Jap- 
anese influence is not yet felt the front gate of a native 
house is often adorned with a slimy pit into which the 
filth and rubbish are dumped, and the infiltration from 
the malodorous cesspools pollutes the well water until it is 
unfit to use. Indeed the impure well water has been the 
cause of terrible epidemic diseases which scourge the 
country almost every year. In the summer of 1886 
nearly a thousand people died every day of cholera 
caused almost wholly by impure water. Collbran's un- 
dertaking to put in water-works in the Korean capital 
was perhaps the greatest boon ever conferred upon the 
city, and especially its foreign community. In this great 
work Collbran and Bostwick acted as the agent of a 
British syndicate, the Korean Water- Works Limited, to 



246 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

which the American firm sold the concession in August, 
1905, but the fact remains that its successful execution 
was due to the initiative and business acumen of Ameri- 
can citizens. The work, which entailed a cost of mil- 
lions, was finished in August, 1908, and the water has 
been immediately turned on to be delivered at the door 
or in the house. The water is drawn from a point on the 
Han River, three miles from Seoul. It is first delivered 
into settling reservoirs, with a capacity of 2,496,000 
gallons, by centrifugal pumps, and then passed through 
sand filter-beds, gravitating into a clear water tank hav- 
ing a capacity of 256,000 gallons. From thence it is 
pumped through a twenty-one inch steel main, two miles 
in length, into a service reservoir which has a capacity of 
1,404,700 gallons, its top- water level being 287 feet above 
the sea. Clear water is then distributed to the city 
through a twenty-one inch main. 

Almost as important as the various undertakings we 
have described are the mining industries undertaken by 
Americans. The oldest and most profitable of such 
mines are the gold mines at Wun-san which have been 
worked for eleven or twelve years. The American syndi- 
cate operating this mine is called the Oriental Consolidated 
Mining Company which has a capital of 10,000,000 j^/2. 
Organized by James R. Morse of New York in the nine- 
ties, the company was incorporated under the laws of 
West Virginia. According to the report, the total out- 
put from the opening of the mine up to June 31, 1908, 
has amounted to ;^ 10,70 1,1 57, and the output during the 
seven months, ended February i, 1909, reached ^1,716,104 
in gross value, or ;^ 1,42 1,2 1 3 in net value. The company 
pays to the Korean government an annual royalty of 
25,000 yen. At the end of December, 1908, the company 



AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 247 

employed, in addition to seventy-five Americans and 
Europeans serving as superintendents or foremen, sixty 
Japanese, who were skilled laborers, 2,300 Koreans, and 
600 Chinese, all unskilled. 

Other mines operated by Americans are, in the order 
of importance, as follows : 

1. The Su-an gold mines, which originally belonged 
to British concessionaires, were leased to the Collbran 
and Bostwick Development Company in February, 1908. 
The American firm has installed stamp mills, and pros- 
perous business is promised. 

2. The Chiksan gold mines are owned by an Ameri- 
can-Japanese concern, but their operation is under Ameri- 
can management. Some twenty-four Americans are 
employed as superintendents and foremen. In addition 
to the ores already opened an extensive deposit has 
lately been found. 

3. The Kapsan copper mines had, before they were 
handed over to Collbran and Bostwick, been worked by 
Koreans in a most primitive fashion, and for nearly a 
thousand years suppHed almost all the copper consumed 
in Korea. 

4. A few years ago an American discovered a graph- 
ite ore not far from Seoul. It was the first graphite ore 
ever found in Korea. A brief experiment, however, dis- 
closed that this mine was not of much value. A more 
promising mine was later found on the east coast of 
Korea, containing graphite of superior quality. 

Of the above enumerated mines, the Kapsan copper 
mine has an interesting history which requires a brief 
consideration by reason of the fact that the disputes over 
the mine between the Japanese residency-general and the 
Collbran and Bostwick Development Company have 



248 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

furnished foreign critics with a pretext to asperse Japan's 
attitude towards foreign interests in Korea. The conces- 
sion to exploit this copper mine was granted to Collbran 
and Bostwick by the Korean emperor when the Russo- 
Japanese war had just begun. When Japan became the 
mistress of the peninsula, the residency-general on be- 
half of the Korean government refused to confirm this 
concession on the ground that it was granted neither 
through the proper channel nor in appropriate form to 
make it legally binding. The litigation that ensued 
lasted three years and ended only in the summer of 1908, 
in a manner, it is true, perfectly satisfactory to the 
American firm. It was deplorable, to be sure, that the 
decision was delayed so long, yet it is hardly fair to attrib- 
ute this delay to any sinister design on the part of Japan. 
Japan was no doubt desirous of promoting by all legiti- 
mate means the interest of her own nationals, but to say 
that she contrived virtually to close the " open door " by 
subterfuge and chicanery is a malignant slander which 
can emanate only from jealous or embittered minds. 
The prolongation of the contention was caused by the 
necessity of examining voluminous records and of in- 
vestigating other complicated matters in connection with 
the case. 

While the Kapsan case was in dispute, Collbran and 
Bostwick were not inchned to comphment the Japanese, 
and it is but natural that views on this matter based 
upon the information obtained from the firm in that 
period of suspense should be extremely gloomy and un- 
favorable to Japan. This statement should not be con- 
strued as a reflection upon the American concessionaires* 
sincerity. They would not have been human if they 
had acquiesced in the situation without complaint, and 



AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 249 

no one should hesitate to express unreserved sympathy 
for them in their ill-luck in having had to carry on so 
protracted a litigation. With this in view it is refreshing 
to note that when the Kapsan case was brought to a 
happy issue on June 15, 1908, Messrs. Collbran and 
Bostwick made a public statement whose dignity and 
graciousness were calculated to add much to their credit. 
In this statement which was cabled to the American 
press Messrs. Collbran and Bostwick said that " Prince 
Ito has made good his assurance of extending full support 
and generous treatment, once he was convinced of the 
merit of every claim presented for his consideration ; " 
that " the new conditions will comprise such permanent 
security of title as will satisfy the most exacting American 
or European lawyer ; " and that *' as Korea is known to be 
a well mineralized country, it is certain that the revised 
and favorable mining regulations, which will provide 
perfect protection and security, will attract experienced 
mining capital." 

Since this statement was made the Korean mining laws 
have been revised in a manner satisfactory to all conces- 
sionaires and prospectors. Nor was this all that was done 
by the residency-general for the exploitation of min- 
ing resources in Korea, The Japanese administra- 
tion induced the Korean government to extend to all 
mining concerns, irrespective of nationality, the privilege 
of importing free of duty all machinery and materials to 
be used for mining purposes — a privilege which until then 
had been enjoyed only under special concessions granted 
to a few foreign concerns. Still another measure taken 
by the residency-general for the encouragement of min- 
ing industries in Korea was the addition of copper to the 
list of minerals which are exempt from export duty — an 



250 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

immunity which had been appHed only to gold and 
silver. 

Apart from such legislation, foreign concerns, operat- 
ing various mines in Korea, have been materially bene- 
fited by the extension to their mining districts of postal 
and telegraph facilities, and the installation of police 
stations necessary to maintain order among mining 
laborers. Under the old Korean regime could any 
foreigner dream of enjoying such facilities and protec- 
tion ? 

The significance of these new measures, it must be 
emphasized, lies not so much in their own merits as in 
the indication they afford of Japan's true intentions and 
policies. As a Japanese subject I would be accused of 
immodesty were I to laud these intentions and policies^ 
yet if one looks at them without bias one is forced to ad* 
mit that they have not strayed far from the path of " fair 
play and a square deal," which is the watchword of those 
critics who would make it appear that Japan is the most 
self-seeking, the most unreasonable, and the most tricky 
nation that has ever existed. Indeed it is more amusing 
than provoking to see these critics lay their hands upon 
all sorts of missiles with which to assail the Japanese. 
They even have had the audacity to invent stories where 
material is lacking to belittle Japan. To cite an instance, 
a prominent American author on the Far Eastern ques- 
tion, championing the cause of Collbran and Bostwick 
(Collbran and Bostick he mistakenly calls the firm) in 
the above described Kapsan case, writes : 

*' Japan's secret service men in America and England 
were employed to scrutinize the past of Messrs. Collbran 
and Bostick to discover, if possible, something injurious 
to their character which might be used against them in 



AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 25 1 

the matter. Employees of the Japanese Legation at Wash- 
ington circulated reports, taking pains that they would 
reach the State Department, that Messrs. Collbran and 
Bostick are adventurers who managed by fraudulent 
means to get some valuable concessions in Korea, and 
which they are now trying to blackmail the Japanese into 
purchasing from them at an exorbitant price." 

One cannot be indignant at such delightful httle fairy 
tales. Yet they no doubt admirably serve the purpose 
for which they are invented, for an unsophisticated public 
believes them with all the avidity with which the httle 
children listen to stories about Cinderella or Jack the 
Giant Killer. True, Japan had to take great pains in in- 
vestigating into the validity of the Kapsan claim of Coll- 
bran and Bostwick for the reason that under the old 
regime many concessions and privileges were obtained by 
doubtful means. For who can deny that Korea, with its 
corrupt court and its venal officials, was the paradise of 
concession-hunters, adventurers, and speculators ? If the 
censors of Japan are reluctant to beheve this statement 
because it comes from a Japanese, note the following pas- 
sage from the Hon. George N. Curzon's " Problems of 
the Far East " : 

" A royal figurehead, enveloped in the mystery of the 
palace and the harem, surrounded by concentric rings of 
eunuchs, ministers of state, officials and retainers, and 
rendered almost intangible by the predominant atmos- 
phere of intrigue ; a hierarchy of office-hunters and office- 
seekers, who are leeches in the thinnest disguise ; a feeble 
and insignificant army ; an impecunious exchequer, a de- 
based currency, and an impoverished people — these are 
the invariable symptoms of the fast vanishing regime of 
the older and unredeemed Oriental type. Add to these 



252 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

the first swarming of the flock of foreign practitioners, 
who scent the enfeebled constitution from afar, and from 
the four winds of heaven come pressing their pharmaco- 
poeia of loans, concessions, banks, mints, factories, and 
all the recognized machinery for filling Western purses at 
the expense of Eastern pockets, and you have a fair pic- 
ture of Korea as she stands after ten years of emergence 
from her long seclusion and enjoyment of the intercourse 
of the nations." 

The reiteration and corroboration of such views can be 
found in not a few books and articles in various languages. 
To make the situation still worse the corrupt entourages 
of the emperor were always on the alert to utilize every 
opportunity to line their pockets by acting as intermedi- 
aries between their master and foreign promoters. Let 
me tell you a story for Mr. Collbran. When the Coil- 
bran and Bostwick Development Company was organized 
some years ago, Mr. Yi Wan-yong and three other 
Korean gentlemen advised the ex- emperor to buy some of 
the company's shares, as the electric enterprises in Seoul, 
they pleaded, would yield great profit in the near future. 
They succeeded in inducing His Majesty to pay over the 
sums of 500,000 yen and joo,ooo yen on two occasions. 
The greater portion of this money, however, appears to 
have been misappropriated by the four gentlemen above 
referred to, so that what had been received by the com- 
pany was only the remaining trifle. In the meantime 
the electric enterprise has proved a great success, and the 
ex-emperor naturally expected the dividend of the com- 
pany in due proportion to the money paid over. But the 
dividend was very small. On inquiry it was found that 
the four gentlemen were guilty of fraud. They had the 
audacity to forge an imperial receipt, in which the square 



a 



AMERICAN ENTERPRISE IN KOREA 253 

seal of the reigning sovereign, instead of the octagonal 
one of the retired emperor, was used. 

In such atmosphere of mendacity and peculation is it 
not natural that the Japanese administration, committed 
to the protection of Korean interest and welfare, should 
be on its guard when claims, secured in the old era of 
corruption, are presented for its confirmation ? And in 
fairness it must be recognized that the same precaution 
has been employed with regard to Japanese claims. The 
case of the so-called Nagamori land scheme affords 
ample vindication of this impartial attitude of the Japa- 
nese administration. 

This land scheme was broached by a bold Japanese 
speculator by the name of Nagamori, who, taking ad- 
vantage of the chaotic state on the peninsula incident to 
the war with Russia, persuaded the Korean ruler to 
grant him a gigantic concession, authorizing him to 
redeem all the waste lands in the country. The plan 
was matured so surreptitiously that even the Japanese 
authorities had little knowledge of it until its originator 
made it known to them with a view to securing their 
assistance in its execution. In its inception the project 
was not necessarily objectionable, inasmuch as there was 
an immense area of fallow land, which ought to be 
brought under the plough. But, however harmless and 
even good the intentions of its originator might have 
been, it was evident that the proposal was ill-timed, for 
Japan was obligated to devote all her energies to the 
internal reform of Korea before embarking upon any 
undertaking of its nature, and it was most fortunate that 
as soon as the Japanese press raised a hue and cry 
against the scheme the Tokio administration forced 
Nagamori to relinquish the claim. 



254 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

There are minor cases wherein the Japanese authori- 
ties exercised their influence to prevent the realization 
of schemes of questionable nature with which Japanese 
subjects were identified ; but the above-described case 
must serve. In the following chapter I shall elucidate 
my views on the question of the " open door " in Korea. 



XVI 

AMERICAN TRADE IN KOREA AND THE 
" OPEN DOOR » 

IN the previous chapter I have described the predom- 
inating position which American interest occupies 
in Korea. In no other Far-Eastern country has the 
United States gained so firm a foothold as in that country. 
Dr. Horace N. Allen, writing admiringly of this unique 
position attained by American interests, says : 

" To those who had made the trip by way of the Suez 
Canal and had visited that wonderful belt of commercial 
colonies under British rule, the sight of which makes the 
British blood in American veins tingle with pride, this 
condition of affairs in Korea was particularly impressive. 
While the American elements and American interests 
were something of a negligible quantity in the bustling 
marts that mark Britain's progress from Egypt through 
the Indian Ocean and the China seas ; in Korea every- 
thing seemed to be American and our influence to pre- 
dominate, quite reversing the situation as compared with 
the foreign settlements of the Far East." 

Yet in the same breath Dr. Allen voices the appre- 
hension that this agreeable sensation will not be ex- 
perienced by Americans who may chance to visit Korea 
hereafter. Under Japanese rule there will, he seems to 
believe, be a wholesale discrimination against foreign 
interests in the peninsula, and the much-heralded " open 
door " will become the merest sham. To him it appears 
that when the Washington administration definitely 

255 



256 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

recognized Japanese suzerainty in Korea, it practically 
abandoned all the advantageous position which had been 
acquired by the initiative and enterprise of American 
citizens. 

It is not difficult to understand why Dr. Allen criticizes 
the Japanese advance in Korea in so gloomy terms, when 
it is remembered that not only did his long residence 
among the Koreans make him extremely sympathetic 
towards them, but his influence was the principal factor 
in the acquisition of American influence in Korea. And 
yet we can hardly share his views on the effects of 
Japanese rule upon American economic interest unless 
we fly in the face of indisputable facts. While it is not 
given to Japan to sacrifice her own interest in order to 
promote that of other nations, her methods in competing 
with Western nations will always be legitimate, and it is 
up to America to enter the arena with the manly de- 
termination which has characterized her past career, and 
face the new combatant without complaints and lamen- 
tations. Japanese capital may seek to buy up American 
enterprises, as it has done in the case of the Seoul electric 
trolley line, but that would simply be a case of give and 
take, and if the terms offered are not acceptable the 
Americans are under no obligation to sell. Ask Messrs. 
Collbran and Bostwick whether they sold the trolley line 
in Seoul under agreeable circumstances and on satisfactory 
conditions, and they will not hesitate to answer in the 
affirmative. Inquire also whether there is any occasion 
for apprehension as to the future of the American mining 
concerns in Korea, and you will readily discover that not 
a fleeting shadow is cast over their bright prospect. The 
metals produced are purchased by the Japanese almost 
on the spot, thus doing away with the trouble of shipping 



AMERICAN TRADE IN KOREA 257 

them to distant countries, and the mine owners all bear 
testimony to the satisfactory state of their transactions 
with the Japanese buyers. To say, then, that Japan 
means to reserve Korea for her own development at the 
expense of other trading nations interested in that 
country, is not to represent the situation in the true 
hght. To drive this home to the reader it is necessary 
to review the foreign trade of Korea with special refer- 
ence to America's share in it. 

I have said that of the Western nations trading with 
Korea America ranks next only to England in the im- 
port trade of the country, but when Asiatic nations 
are taken into consideration she occupies the fourth 
place : Japan comes first, China second, England and 
the United States following in the order named. On the 
other hand when we compare the progress of American 
trade in Korea during the past several years with that of 
the other three countries, we find Japan, China, and 
Great Britain lagging far behind the United States. In 
1903 the total amount of import from America was only 
398,377 yen, and it is a most remarkable fact that after 
the lapse of five years the amount of American trade has 
increased almost eleven times, while British and Japanese 
trade has increased eight times and twice, respectively. 
Import trade from China has been declining rather than 
increasing. It certainly bespeaks the sagacity and 
energy of American traders that while Japan, enjoying 
all the advantages afforded by her favorable geographical 
position, the large number of her nationals residing in 
Korea, and many another circumstance, could only double 
her export to Korea, American export to the country 
has increased eleven-fold. The following table shows 
the growth of import trade from America, 1903 to 1908, 



258 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

as compared with that from Japan during the same 
period : 



Year 


Import from America 


Import from Japan 


Value in yen 


Value in yen 


1901 


398,377 


11,554.969 


1904 


1,813,115 


19,007,287 


1905 


1,978,812 


23,561,899 


1906 


2,557.511 


23'9i4>i54 


1907 


3»295.558 


27,363,872 


1908 


4.194,529 


24,038,458 



Again if we compare import trade from America to 
Korea for 1908 with that from other principal trading 
nations, we obtain the following table : 

Import from Value in yen 

Japan - 24,038,458 

England ------ 6,781,715 

China _----_ 4,880,246 

America ------ 194,529 

Germany ------ 395»33i 

Asiatic Russia - - - - - 51,598 

Other countries _ _ - - 670,550 



Total ----- 41,012,427 

It will be seen that fifty-eight per cent, of the import 
trade of Korea was contributed by Japan, while England 
participated in it to the extent of sixteen per cent. Im- 
port from China amounted to eleven per cent., and that 
from America ten per cent. 

While import from Japan was so large as fifty-eight 
per cent, of the entire import of Korea, it must be borne 
in mind that Korean goods were exported to the Mikado's 
Empire to the extent of 10,424,560 yen, which is equiva- 
lent to seventy-seven per cent, of the total export trade 
of the peninsula. As against this enormous purchase 



AMERICAN TRADE IN KOREA 259 

made by Japan, America participated in the export trade 
of Korea in 1908 to the extent of only 44,017 yen^ while 
in the preceding year she bought practically nothing. 
In the following table America's part in the export trade 
of Korea, during the five years from 1904 to 1908, is 
compared with that of Japan : 



Year 


Export to America 


Export to Japan 


Value in yen 


Value in yen 


1904 - 


- 


- 5^697,371 


1905 - 


- 


5'3S9'9i4 


1906 - 


225 - 


6,916,848 


1907 - 


- 


- 12,649,267 


1908 - 


44,017 - 


- 10,424,560 



Under ordinary circumstances a country becomes a 
good customer of the nation which is a liberal purchaser 
of her produce. This point I have already discussed in 
the chapter on Japan's commercial advance in Man- 
churia, and it is only natural that Japan, ranking first in 
the export trade of Korea, should also rank first in its 
import trade. And yet Japan's export to Korea has in- 
creased less than one-fifth as rapidly as that of America, 
whose purchase of Korean products is almost nil. 

In examining the statistics pertaining to American ex- 
port to Korea, one thing challenges our particular atten- 
tion, /. e.y that American trade began to forge ahead as 
soon as Japan occupied the peninsula. Prior to the es- 
tablishment of the Japanese protectorate American export 
to Korea was rather insignificant, that for 1903 having 
amounted to only 398,377 yen. But early in 1904 the 
island empire became the mistress of the peninsula, and 
American export to Korea suddenly swelled to 1,813,115 
yen. This phenomenon cannot be regarded as a mere 
coincidence, for the statistics clearly indicate that the 



26o AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

sudden augmentation of American trade was due to 
Japanese demand for American goods. Since 1904 the 
progress of American export to Korea has been both 
steady and rapid. In the face of these facts who can say 
that Japanese rule in Korea is inimical to the " open 
door," and consequently to American interests ? It is 
time that the advocates of America's commercial expan- 
sion in the Far East should pause and think whether 
their cause will be served by indulging in sentimentalities 
and platitudes at the expense of Japan's reputation. 

The chief imports from America are railway materials, 
kerosene-oil, and flour. In these three articles America 
is almost monopolizing the market. While American 
cigarettes, lumber, cement, nails, sheetings, and salt fish 
are imported to a considerable extent, these have formi- 
dable rivals in Japanese, British, and, in a few cases, 
Chinese goods. In 1908 American flour imported to 
Korea amounted in value to 372,816 yen as against li,- 
475 y^^"^ of Japanese flour. American kerosene-oil was 
imported to the extent of 1,369,991 yen, while Russian 
and Lankat oils imported amounted to only 20,409 yen 
and 50,000 yen, respectively. As the tables above pre- 
sented clearly indicate, America's most formidable com- 
petitors are Japan and England. China, too, has a 
greater share in the import trade of Korea than does 
America, but the Chinese goods, with the exception of 
lumber and salt fish, are of such nature as does not in- 
fringe upon America's field. True, statistics show that 
in 1908 Chinese cigarettes imported to Korea amounted 
in value to so much as 176,010 yen as against 48,501 yen 
from America, but the cigarettes from China are mostly 
manufactured at the Shanghai and Mukden factories of 
the American-British Tobacco Trust. This Anglo-Amer- 



AMERICAN TRADE IN KOREA 261 

ican concern is so important a factor in the tobacco trade 
of Korea that it requires more than a passing note, but 
before entering into its description let us study the fol- 
lowing table which shows where America feels the com- 
petition of Japan and England keenly : 

^ . From America From Japan From England 



Kjruuas 


(j-f//) 


(;/<?«) 


(^yen) 


Flour 


372,816 


11,475 





Kerosene - - i 


^369.991 


1,124 





Rails 


944,486 


22,535 


27,101 


Locomotives 


343*469 


39.911 


27,106 


Railway cars 


192,633 


6,996 


5.704 


Salt fish - 


27,387 


100,547 





Candles - 


20,464 


47,071 


44,353 


Sheetings - 


39,142 


2,138,620 


792,601 


Shirtings - 


7,390 


32,842 


2,898,439 


Iron bars - 


22,966 


17,551 


101,916 


Galvanized iron 


15.551 


22,214 


203,814 


Iron pipes 


6,365 





581,785 


Iron nails - 


30.085 


10,513 


49,902 


Cigarettes - 


48,501 


615,290 


99,832 


Telephone and tele 


- 






graph material 


",835 


228,315 


16,587 


Lumber - 


32,680 


168,351 





Cement 


31,666 


202,330 






It will be seen that in salt fish, sheetings, shirtings, can- 
dles, galvanized iron, cigarettes, telephonic and telegraphic 
materials America finds strong rivals in Japan and Eng- 
land. Again, American trade in iron pipes and iron nails 
falls far behind that of England, while more lumber and 
cement are imported from Japan than from America. 

It has been noted that the total amount of import from 
America in 1908 was 4,194,529 j^^;^. This, however, does 
not include import from Hawaii and the Philippines. 
The importation of refined sugar from Hawaii and the 
Philippines was commenced in 1908, the amount im- 



262 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

ported in that year being 270,000 pounds. Cigarettes 
were also imported in that year from the PhiUppines, 
with the result that the total amount of American tobacco 
imported in 1908 showed an increase of 60,000 yen as 
compared with that for the preceding year. Including 
other articles imported, Hawaii and the Philippines par- 
ticipated in the import trade of Korea to the extent of 
23,274 yen and 66,925 yen, respectively, making the 
grand total of American export to Korea in 1908 4,284,- 
728 yen. 

Now we must enter into details of the tobacco trade 
in Korea with special reference to the activities of the 
American-British Tobacco Trust, for the competition in 
this particular field between the trust and the Japanese 
tobacco monopoly has been, and will continue to be, 
keen. It is estimated that Korea consumes 840,000,000 
cigarettes annually, about 40,000,000 being contributed 
monthly by Japan. The remainder are composed largely 
of Virginia leaf tobacco and are manufactured mostly at 
Shanghai, and also in the United States and England. 
According to the report of Mr. Thomas Sammons, Amer- 
ican consul-general at Seoul, the American-British trust 
already has over forty per cent, of the total cigarette 
business of Korea. It has also been stated in a previous 
chapter that the trust has over fifty per cent, of the entire 
Manchurian import trade, and controls the great bulk of 
all the business of the Orient in this particular line out- 
side of Japan. What business success this Occidental 
company has gained in the Far East is largely due to its 
energetic business methods and its system of carrying 
stocks in the field of its commercial operations. The 
company has in the Oriental field a staff of active, able 
American and British salesmen, many of whom speak 



AMERICAN TRADE IN KOREA 263 

the native language, and under whom many native sales- 
men are employed. In introducing goods among the 
natives suitable advertisements such as posters or dodgers 
are freely utilized and sample packets of cigarettes are 
generously distributed. Where retailers are not anxious 
or willing to push sales, hawkers are employed to drum 
up trade. A printing plant is maintained in Shanghai, 
where up-to-date American color presses are used to 
prepare advertising matter with the text in native char- 
acters as well as pictures designed to suit local conditions. 

There are two kinds of cigarettes used in Korea, one 
with mouthpiece attachment, the other without. About 
forty-five per cent, of the Korean cigarette trade is in the 
mouthpiece, or Russian variety, of which the Japanese 
tobacco monopoly suppHes more than ninety per cent. 
Much hand labor is necessary in the production of these 
cigarettes, but the trust, after a careful investigation, 
promises to manufacture by machinery cigarettes with 
mouthpiece attachment. Should this new departure 
prove successful the trust is bound to become a strong 
competitor in the market heretofore monopolized by the 
Japanese. 

The remaining fifty-five per cent, of the trade is in the 
cigarettes without mouthpiece attachment, and it is in 
this field that the American-British tobacco interests 
occupy a dominant position. The Japanese monopoly 
supplies only fifteen per cent, of this variety, the remain- 
ing forty per cent, being almost entirely contributed by 
the American managers of the American-British com- 
pany. 

Turning to Japan's tactics in competing with the 
American-British company, we are informed that where 
competition is keenest the Monopoly Bureau sells goods 



264 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

at cost price to the Oriental Tobacco Company, which is 
the sole agency for Japanese cigarettes. The monopoly 
regulations, however, forbid the sale of tobacco at less 
than cost price under any circumstances. It is believed 
that tobacco factories on a large scale will be established 
both in Korea and in Manchuria. The fact that the im- 
portation of Japanese cigarettes into Korea has been so 
great is principally due to the large number of Japanese 
residing in the country, but it is not believed, as Consul- 
Generai Sammons says, that their attachment to Japanese- 
made cigarettes will prove unalterable, regardless of price 
or quality. 

While American trade in Korea has made phenomenal 
progress there is much room which can be exploited for 
its further advancement. American boots and shoes, 
watches, rubber and elastic goods, refrigerators, hard- 
ware, hats and caps would find in Korea a limited but 
increasing market. But the handicap in doing any direct 
business with America is that the American exporter 
usually demands spot cash against documents in America ; 
consequently the loss of interest resulting from this 
method, coupled with the uncertainty as to when the 
goods will actually arrive there, is so great that the 
merchants prefer to pay higher prices even for inferior 
goods and get them from Japan. It takes from three to 
nine months from the date of ordering to get the goods to 
Korea. Cash must accompany small orders, and as in- 
terest rates are as high as ten to twenty-four per cent, 
per annum, and even higher in some instances, transac- 
tions of this kind are not inviting. In addition to these 
unfavorable circumstances such American merchandise 
as boots and shoes have to contend with the disadvan- 
tages arising from the absence of retail stores that could 



AMERICAN TRADE IN KOREA 265 

handle American-made boots and shoes, although there 
is an increasing demand for these articles. Set this over 
against thousands, and even tens of thousands, of Japa- 
nese retail stores distributed throughout the country, and 
you have another reason why Japan has far and away 
the largest share in the import trade of Korea. It seems 
obvious that a practical suggestion for removing the 
above-described impediments in the way of America's 
commercial development in Korea would render Amer- 
ican interests infinitely greater service than a hundred 
volumes of books censuring, in many instances upon 
flimsy authorities, Japan's methods of pushing her com- 
mercial interest in the peninsula. 



XVII 
AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 

SINCE the inauguration of the Japanese protectorate 
in Korea the unfriendly attitude assumed by some 
of the foreign missionaries towards Japan has 
claimed the attention of both the Japanese authorities 
and press. Fortunately much of the misconception, 
which formerly existed in the minds of the missionaries 
with regard to the intentions of Japan, has been dis- 
pelled, thanks to the lenient policy of the latter. Yet a 
certain section of the Japanese press continues to voice 
misgivings and apprehensions. The assassination of 
Prince Ito by a Korean convert to Christianity was by 
some enterprising, though somewhat irresponsible, Japa- 
nese journals made an occasion to rekindle the smoulder- 
ing embers of distrust into a flame which, for a while at 
least, cast a lurid glare over the evangelical workers in 
the erstwhile Hermit Kingdom. The assassin was a 
Roman Catholic convert, but to the average Japanese 
there is little difference between Protestantism and Roman 
Catholicism. Some journals went so far as to intimate 
that two Americans, one of them a missionary, had wit- 
tingly been engaged in stirring up anti-Japanese senti- 
ment among the masses of the Korean population, an 
agitation which was indirectly responsible for the Harbin 
tragedy enacted by the Korean fanatic. Such insinua- 
tions can only recoil upon those who make them, and it 

266 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 267 

was only natural that they should have been silenced by 
the saner views of the majority of the Japanese press. 
At the same time it is to be regretted that, while many 
of the missionaries are unbiased and fair in their attitude 
towards the new regime, there are a few prone to form 
hasty conclusions and indulge irt unwarranted criticism. 
The acts of the latter class of missionaries have been 
partly responsible for the unkindly judgments which some 
Japanese papers have passed upon the heralds of the 
Gospel in Korea. Since 1908, the Christian missionaries 
in Korea have been unusually active, manifesting a deter- 
mination to make Korea a Christian nation before many 
years. During 1909 they sold over 400,000 Testaments, 
Gospels, and other portions of Scripture as against 200,- 
000 in the previous year, and in the current year they are 
resolved to increase the number of native converts to 
1,000,000, which is more than one-tenth of the entire 
Korean population. 

Nowhere else in the world has Christianity spread so 
rapidly as in Korea. It was only in 1884 that Korea re- 
ceived the first Protestant missionary in the person of Dr. 
Horace N. Allen, an American physician, who was, as he 
himself said, given the task of opening the peninsula to 
Christianity at the point of a physician's lancet. The 
pioneer's work was admirably done, and within a quarter 
of a century Korea is able to boast of 250,144 converts, 
1,900 native pastors, 800 churches, fifteen mission hospit- 
als, and 350 missionary schools with 15,000 pupils. It 
is true that Roman Catholicism entered Korea as early as 
the middle of the seventeenth century; but in 1866 
Prince Tai-wun, father and regent of the retired emperor, 
ordered the wholesale slaughter of all the converts to 
Christianity. The real beginning of Christianity in 



268 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Korea, therefore, dates from 1884, two years after 
America secured the first treaty which the Land of the 
Morning Calm had ever made with any Western nation, 
and which removed the ban put on the propagation of 
the Gospel. 

Almost simultaneously with the advent of American 
missionaries, English missionaries also appeared in the 
field, to be followed by those from France, Germany, 
Russia, Australia, and Canada. At present the principal 
missionary societies represented in Korea are the 
Methodist and Presbyterian Churches in the United 
States, the Australian and Canadian Presbyterian 
Churches, and the Society for the Propagation of the 
Gospel of the Anglican Church. Add to these the 
Catholic Churches in Germany and France, and the 
Greek Orthodox Churches in Russia, and the list is well- 
nigh complete. The various Protestant Churches are 
bound together with an admirable spirit of cooperation, 
while all the Presbyterian Churches have united in one 
presbytery. According to the latest statistics the foreign 
population of Korea, excluding Japanese and Chinese, 
numbers 757, of which 315 were missionaries. As the 
number of native population is estimated at 9,781,671 it 
appears that there is one missionary to every 31,053 
Koreans. Set this over against one missionary per 
63,000 persons in Japan, and you can readily understand 
how great an influence the missionaries exercise in Korea. 
The following table shows the nationalities of the mission- 
aries in Korea, and affords some idea of the respective 
strength of the Protestant, Catholic, and Greek Orthodox 
Churches : 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 269 

America No. missionaries No. native No. native 

pastors converts 

Presbyterian loi 1,022 148,780 

Methodist 78 563 28,017 

Adventist 5 6 unknown 

Y. M. C. A. 6 o unknown 

England 

Anglican 24 31 4,435 

Bible Society 3 7 unknown 

Salvation Army 8 O 300 

Canada 

Presbyterian 14 43 3*830 

Australia 

Presbyterian 13 23 75 

France 

Catholic 57 63 61,290 

Germany 

Catholic 2 o unknown 

Russia 

Greek Orthodox 4 8 unknown 



Total 315 1,766 246,727 

A glance at these figures reveals to us that America 
has by far the greatest share in the evangelical work in 
Korea. Of the 315 missionaries now resident in Korea 
190 are Americans, while of 248,493, constituting the 
entire body of native Christians, 178,387 were proselytized 
through the influence of American missionaries. With 
these figures before us it is not difficult to understand 
why America is seriously concerned with the missionary 
question in Korea. 

The reason for the remarkable success which the 
American missionaries have achieved in Korea is not far 
to seek. In the first place, the American missionary has 
consistently followed a lenient and catholic policy in 
dealing with the natives who flock to the Christian 
standard, allowing them autonomy to a certain extent in 
the management of churches and schools. He teaches 
fundamental principles and points out the path which he 
thinks the natives should follow, but he has the wisdom 



270 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

to refrain from interfering with them in such matters as 
are not essential to the propagation of the Gospel. He 
does not insist upon conducting everything in accord with 
his own conception of civilization, but pays due respect 
to the customs and usages which form the woof and 
warp of the native institutions. For instance, American 
missionaries have established boys' schools separately 
from girls', as the Koreans, hke the Chinese, have preju- 
dice against the mingling of the two sexes in public. So 
also they have avoided housing men's hospitals in the 
same buildings as those for women. In schools and 
churches pupils and congregations are not required to sit 
on chairs, but are allowed to sit on the floor after the 
Korean fashion. Perhaps the Rev. Ernest F. Hall, of 
the Presbyterian mission in Korea, expresses this tactful 
policy of the American missionaries most adequately 
when he says : 

" Every nation must eventually evangelize its own 
people. It is not the purpose of the foreign missionary 
enterprise to place Americans as pastors over the churches 
in foreign lands. The missionary is a superintendent of 
various forms of work, educational, evangelistic, medical, 
and literary. He is teaching them the principles of the 
Christian religion and training native leaders who shall in 
turn be preachers and leaders of others. . . . The 
Oriental and Occidental minds and modes of life are very 
different. The basic principles of Christianity are the 
same. The way in which the Church shall express those 
principles and work them out in practical Hfe will differ 
in different lands. Hence the desire to establish a church 
in Korea which, while it shall be Christian, shall be 
so adapted as to accomplish the work of Christianizing 
the whole land and of giving the people the opportunity 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 271 

to express themselves in work and in worship in a man- 
ner best suited to their own ideals and modes of 
thoughts." 

The second cause of the American missionary's success 
lies in the ample knowledge he possesses of the Korean 
language. Either in preaching or in teaching he uses the 
vernacular with remarkable fluency. In every-day inter- 
course with the natives he can freely communicate his 
thoughts, which goes a long way towards the winning of 
the confidence of the Koreans. When a missionary 
newly arrives in Korea from America, it is the rule not 
to assign to him any fixed position for at least three years, 
but to require him to devote his best energies to the study 
of the Korean language. Compare this with the case of 
Japanese judges, who administer justice through Japanese 
or Korean interpreters that are not always honest, or that 
of Japanese teachers attempting to impart complicated 
knowledge to Korean youths also with the assistance of 
interpreters, some of whom are deplorably incompetent ! 
Surely Japan must learn a lesson from the method of 
American missionaries if she is successfully to carry out 
the great task which she has undertaken in behalf of 
Korea. 

The presence in Korea of so large a number of foreign 
missionaries, assuming an unfriendly, if not hostile, 
attitude towards the advent of Japanese rule created a 
situation which demanded serious attention on the part 
of the Japanese authorities. True to the national policy 
of religious tolerance which she had consistently adhered 
to since the opening of her doors to foreign intercourse, 
Japan decided not only to allow the foreign missionaries 
in Korea unrestricted freedom of religious propaganda, 
but to make them her virtual co-workers in the grand 



272 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

undertaking of the regeneration of Korea. At the same 
time, however, the missionaries were given to understand 
that Japan would not connive at the acts of those, who, 
under guise of spiritual work, would not scruple to insti- 
gate the natives to oppose Japanese measures. That this 
precaution on the part of Japan was not altogether su- 
perfluous must be admitted, for some of the mission- 
aries did not stop to think that the time had come when 
Korea had to be subject to the influence of either Japan 
or Russia, and that under Japan at least there would be 
religious liberty with the fullest possible freedom to carry- 
on the work of evangelization. Let us be far from im- 
puting sinister motives to the acts of such missionaries : 
we admit that they were moved by a natural feeling of 
sympathy for those among whom they were laboring, and 
considered it their duty to take sides against Japan, It 
was an open secret that those natives, who were engaged 
in sedition and conspiracy against the Japanese protect- 
orate, were at one time or another under missionary in- 
fluence, and made Christian churches and schools their 
rallying points as well as their havens of retreat. It 
might have been that the missionaries themselves never 
indorsed such unscrupulous acts of the native converts ; 
yet the fact remains that the agitation of these ill-advised 
followers of Christianity proved no small obstacle to the 
execution of the reform measures mapped out by Japan. 
Perhaps the plainest explanation of Japan's fundamental 
religious policy in Korea is found in the following state- 
ment made by no less a personage than Prince Ito in 
September, 1907, at the request of the Tokio representa- 
tive of the Associated Press : " So long as the missionary 
moves along his own road, attends to his own business, 
and permits me to move along my own road and attend 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 273 

to my own business, there shall be no interference with 
the work of the missionary by me or by any of those 
whom I control ; but if the missionary shall step aside 
and cross the path I am on and obstruct that way, there 
can be but one result — I cannot be expected to give 
way." This principle is in harmony with the views of 
the majority of the Korean missionaries, who believe it 
their mission to establish the kingdom of God which 
shall rule within the hearts of the Koreans, and not to 
determine whether Korea shall rule herself or whether 
she shall be controlled by another nation. This funda- 
mental policy the veteran statesman expounded whenever 
occasion presented. It was his conviction that without 
judicious, efficient government, Korea could not reap the 
full benefit which the noble efforts of the missionaries 
ought to bestow upon her. On the other hand, he was 
also convinced that, alienated from sound religion, which 
is the corner-stone of true civilization, civil government, 
however efficient in itself, would find it difficult to breathe 
life and energy into a nation which had been decrepit for 
many centuries. In the harmonious cooperation of these 
two great institutions, sound religion and honest govern- 
ment, each working out its own great purposes without 
interfering with or infringing upon the rights and respon- 
sibilities of the other — in this alone Ito believed lay the 
hope of Korea's salvation. 

Acting upon this conviction Ito persuaded the Korean 
government to subscribe io,ooo_;^^;2 towards the building 
fund of the Y. M. C. A. in Seoul. It was also through 
his influence that the crown prince was induced to lay 
the corner-stone of the building — an event which en- 
couraged the native Christians as well as their foreign 
spiritual teachers. Over the main entrance to the build- 



274 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

ing one notices carved on a block of granite an inscrip- 
tion by the hand of the crown prince himself, which 
remains a public memorial of the interest taken by the 
Imperial House in the erection of the building. When 
delegates came from every quarter of the world to attend 
the opening exercises of the building, Prince Ito tendered 
a banquet in their honor, and addressed them as follows : 

** In the early years of Japan's reformation the senior 
statesmen were opposed to religious toleration, especially 
because of distrust of Christianity. But I fought vehe- 
mently for freedom of religious belief and propaganda, 
and finally triumphed. My reasoning was this : Civili- 
zation depends upon morality, and the highest morality 
upon religion. Therefore religion must be tolerated and 
encouraged. It is for the same reason that I welcome 
the Young Men's Christian Association, believing that it 
is a powerful ally in the great task I have undertaken in 
attempting to put the feet of Korea upon the pathway of 
true civilization." 

This is the key-note of Ito's religious policy in Korea. 
So zealously did he observe this principle that when Mr. 
Song, Korean Minister of Home Affairs, made indiscreet 
remarks about the foreign missionaries in Korea, he did 
not hesitate to dismiss him. The Korean statesman's 
remarks were to the following effect : " The most 
serious question now before us relates to the native 
Christians, whose affiliations are of a questionable nature. 
They are united in the common object of opposing the 
present administration, and are conspiring to undermine 
it. The fact that they are backed by a group of Ameri- 
can missionaries makes the question extremely delicate ; 
but once they take up arms in insurrection, I shall not 
hesitate a moment to adopt drastic measures." In order 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 275 

to allay the uneasiness which was naturally caused by 
such imprudent utterances, Prince Ito made public a 
letter which he addressed to the American ambassador 
at Tokio on the question. From this letter the following 
passage is quoted as it serves to explain Japan's attitude 
towards the native Christians and foreign missionaries : 

" During the Korean emperor's recent trip to the 
northern and southern parts of Korea, I met a number of 
missionaries at Ping-yang, and had an opportunity to 
ascertain that they not only take no steps whatever in 
opposition to the administration of the Korean govern- 
ment, but are in sympathy with the new regime and are 
endeavoring to interpret to the Korean people the true 
purpose of that regime. I am personally acquainted 
with many American missionaries in Seoul, with whose 
conduct and views I am fully familiar. The fact that 
they are in sympathy with the new regime in Korea 
which is under the guidance of the residency-general, 
and that they, in cooperation with the residency-general, 
are endeavoring to enlighten the Korean people, does 
not, I trust, require any special confirmation. ... I 
may also state that the Christians in Korea will continue 
to receive equal treatment with other subjects, and will be 
dealt with only in case of distinct violation of the laws 
of the country. . . . It may also be stated that among 
the many Korean Christians not a few are attempting to 
make use of that religion for inspiring the idea of inde- 
pendence. This fact cannot be regarded as due to the 
instigation of the American missionaries, . . . and 
I wish to make this explanation of the matter on behalf 
of the American missionaries in Korea." 

The repeated avowal of Japan's catholic policy towards 
Christianity and its frequent vindication cannot fail to 



276 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

convince even the most skeptical of the sincerity of her 
intentions, and it is but natural that the American mis- 
sionaries in Korea are now u^iiling to cooperate v^ith 
the Japanese authorities. For this signal change of the 
American missionaries' attitude the judicious policy of 
the Roosevelt administration was as much instrumental 
as the tolerance of Japan. In the early stage of the 
Japanese occupation of Korea some missionaries ear- 
nestly believed that the United States was going to inter- 
fere with Japan, and a great number of Koreans, lured 
by the same chimerical idea, rallied to the Christian 
mission churches. But Washington knew its business 
better than did the missionaries. Not only did it not 
encourage those missionaries who would see the new 
order of things subverted, but it repeatedly told them to 
*' refrain from any expression of opinion, or from giving 
advice, concerning the internal management of the 
country, or from intermeddling in political questions." 
To carry out this policy of the Washington government 
no one perhaps was better adapted than Mr. Sammons, 
then American consul-general at Seoul. A man of 
genial temperament and sympathetic nature, the consul- 
general was extremely popular throughout Korea, and 
his sane counsel was of great influence in converting 
those of his compatriots who had been inclined to assume 
hostile attitude towards the Japanese administration. 
During some two years of his incumbency his position 
was one of extreme delicacy and difficulty, requiring 
assiduous toil and unwavering patience. Those clamor- 
ous missionaries who always had complaints of one nature 
or another actually overwhelmed him with appeals and 
requests, many of which were found not justifiable. 
Amid these protests and complaints Mr. Sammons stood 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 277 

firm, assuring the missionaries of the futility of the 
attempt to obstruct the Japanese advance, with the 
result that the unwise took second thought, and grad- 
ually learned that the Japanese were not quite so bad as 
they were thought to be. 

There was one condition which the missionaries were 
especially reluctant to accept, and that was the Japanese 
proposal to put all the missionary schools directly under 
the regulations of the Korean government. The resi- 
dency-general was prompted to adopt this measure by 
reason of the undoubted fact that in some quarters the 
Koreans were educated to oppose the Japanese pro- 
tectorate. With this proposed step the climax of irrita- 
tion was reached, some missionaries bitterly resenting 
the movement, and the Japanese intimating that the 
opposition on the part of the missionaries was evidence 
of the necessity of their control because it was evidence 
of enmity. But thanks to the unremitting toil of Mr. 
Sammons and to the sane counsel of Bishop Harris, of 
Dr. Heber Jones of Seoul, of Dr. Wells of Ping-yang, 
and some other broad-minded Christian workers, the 
difficulty was solved in a most satisfactory manner. In 
the agreement that ensued the missionaries agreed to 
register the mission schools as prescribed in the educa- 
tional regulations of the government. In recognition of 
this concession the residency-general not only reasserted 
its fixed policy of not interfering with Christian religious 
teaching, but promised to cooperate with the missionaries 
in promoting the interests of Christian schools, extend- 
ing to the graduates of such schools the same benefits 
and privileges as those enjoyed by the graduates of the 
government schools. That the missionaries are well 
pleased with this arrangement is indicated by the fact 



278 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

that as soon as the agreement was made they began to 
register their schools with the government, so that 
within a comparatively short time all the missionary 
schools will, it is expected, be under the " Regulation 
concerning Private Schools." 

While the prospect of harmonious relations between 
the Japanese authorities and the missionaries in Korea 
is becoming brighter every day, still circumstances are 
not lacking which are liable to prove fresh causes of 
misunderstanding. The chief of such circumstances is 
the conduct of native Christians who, abusing the confi- 
dence placed in them by foreign missionaries, do not 
scruple to take such steps as would besmirch the names 
of their spiritual teachers. To cite an instance, a recent 
number of the journal published by the Presbyterian 
Church in Seoul contained an article in Korean under 
the caption of " Are the People of Great Korea not De- 
sirous of Obtaining the Right of Independence ? " which 
apparently was intended to arouse anti-Japanese senti- 
ment among the natives. The article was written by 
a Korean and was published over his own signature, 
and Dr. Underwood, who was in the position to super- 
intend the publication, was, it has been explained, wholly 
unaware of its contents. Yet the insertion of an article 
of such seditious nature in the organ of a religious body, 
which intends to cooperate with the Japanese authorities, 
is liable to cause fresh misgivings to an uninformed 
public, while credulous natives may derive from it hope 
which cannot be gratified. 

Another cause of difficulty lies in the acts of those 
natives who profess to embrace Christianity only to 
abuse it in their scheme of evading the law. In a cer- 
tain village in North Korea the inhabitants insisted that 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 279 

as Christians they were not bound by duty to pay taxes 
unless they were so instructed by their mission head- 
quarters. They hoisted banners bearing the inscription 
of a cross, and attempted to mob the tax collectors out 
of the village. When the attention of the missionaries, 
who the rioters said were their religious teachers, was 
called to this performance, it transpired that the rioters 
were not Christians and had no relation whatever with 
any religious organization. Naturally the missionaries 
were greatly annoyed by this trickery, and approved 
due punishment of the culprits. It is, therefore, ex- 
tremely dangerous to pass severe judgment on foreign 
missionaries upon the flimsy authority of dishonest 
natives. 

On the other hand it must be admitted that some of 
the Japanese journals are responsible for the mischief 
done to the consolidation of friendly relationship between 
the missionaries and the Japanese people, for fortunately 
or unfortunately a section of the Japanese press has 
lately emulated the methods of American newspapers 
of extremely enterprising nature. Only recently the 
Hochiy a Tokio daily claiming to enjoy a very wide 
circulation, published an article declaring that if all the 
missionaries left Korea the happiness of the natives 
would be greatly enhanced. What an indiscreet, un- 
warranted statement when the Japanese government 
and the thoughtful class of its subjects are testifying to 
the good work done by the missionaries, and striving 
to remove all causes of irritation with regard to the re- 
ligious question in Korea ! 

Last but not least, the indiscreet acts of some mission- 
aries are as reprehensible as the sensational utterances 
of thoughtless newspapers. I would be the last man to 



28o AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

deny that, as a rule, American missionaries are possessed 
of sound common sense as well as superior mental quali- 
ties. Yet now and then we come across missionaries 
whose lack of wisdom causes much trouble to their 
fellows. Several years ago there was one missionary 
from America whose quick temper bordered upon in- 
sanity. This man, while a guest at a Buddhist temple, 
lost his patience and began smashing the little plaster 
idols with his cane. For some time after this awkward 
incident the priest declined to admit any missionary to 
the sacred precincts. The case created a sensation at the 
time as the British representative at Seoul urged drastic 
measures in punishment on the ground that his govern- 
ment would never allow any interference with the native 
worship in India. This intemperate missionary, rebuked 
by the American minister, gave a promise of decent be- 
havior, but it was not long before he forgot the promise 
and wrote a letter to the Korean emperor calling upon 
him to repent of his sins and asking to be allowed to 
preach repentance to him. This letter, written by an 
ignorant native scribe, was full of derogatory terms, 
and the matter was naturally referred to the American 
minister, who was again obliged to admonish the mis- 
sionary. 

To be sure, such a flagrant case of indecency is an 
isolated one ; yet it cannot fail to prejudice the natives 
against the entire body of missionaries. It is needless to 
enumerate less notorious cases, but the following passage 
from Dr. Horace N. Allen's " Things Korean " bears 
testimony to the presence of not a few missionaries who 
make themselves unnecessarily obtrusive : 

" There were some missionaries for whom it was always 
a pleasure to work. They only came for assistance when 



AMERICAN MISSIONARIES IN KOREA 281 

they had meritorious cases well supported by the neces- 
sary evidence. Others were inclined to rush to the lega- 
tion or consulate on the slightest pretext and their calls 
were dreaded, since one never wishes to appear unsympa- 
thetic or disobliging. Yet it was most distressing to be 
continually obliged to intrude some petty missionary 
case of emergency into delicate negotiations of a more 
or less serious nature." 

It must not be presumed that Japan is unwilling to 
hear the missionaries criticize her methods in Korea. 
Sensitive as we are, we are not so narrow-minded as to 
close our ears to sound criticisms, much less so arrogant 
as to hurl defiance at them. There must, however, be a 
clear line of demarcation between malicious criticism and 
criticism that springs from genuine sympathy and good 
wishes for the success of the Japanese administration. It 
is the former class of criticism which Japan is ill-disposed 
to heed ; but sympathetic criticism, even when expressed 
in vigorous terms, will always be welcomed by her. It 
is not because the missionaries are critical that the Jap- 
anese administration has at one time been apprehensive 
of their activities, but because their criticisms seemed in 
many cases far from well-meaning. 



BOOK III 
The Immigration Question 



XVIII 

JAPANESE IMMIGRATION BEFORE THE EXCLUSION 

AGREEMENT 

IN the summer of 1907, the governments of Japan 
and the United States entered into an understand- 
ing with a view to prohibiting the immigration of 
Japanese laborers into the United States. How this 
measure was forced upon the Roosevelt administration, 
which entertained no idea of excluding Japanese immi- 
gration, I shall explain in the following two chapters ; in 
this chapter I shall dwell upon Japanese immigration 
before the exclusion understanding — its extent, its nature, 
its comparison with European immigration. A discus- 
sion of this nature, it may be said, is of historical interest 
rather than of practical value, as Japanese immigration 
has become a thing of the past. Yet an intelligent un- 
derstanding of the Japanese immigration of anti-exclusion 
days is essential to an appreciation of the situation which 
necessitated an agitation of a most boisterous nature to 
compel the government at Washington to negotiate an 
exclusion agreement with Japan. When the real status 
of Japanese immigration is made clear, the American 
public will at least understand why the people, if not the 
government, of Japan cannot help feeling that the ex- 
clusion agreement is not in accord with the principle of 
fairness and justice. 

Japanese immigration into America may be said to 
have begun in 1886, when there were 194 immigrants 
from Japan. True, as early as 1866 Japanese began to 
enter this country in small numbers, but up to 1885 the 

285 



286 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

figures remained almost stationary, as is shown in the 
following table : 

y. Number European Nwnber Japanese 

year Immigrants Immigrants 

1866 278,916 7 

1867 283,751 67 

1868 130,090 o 

1869 315^963 63 

1870 328,626 48 

1871 265,145 78 

1872 352,155 17 

1873 397»54i 9 

1874 262,783 21 

1875 182,961 3 

1876 120,920 4 

1877 106,195 7 

1878 101,612 2 

1879 134,259 4 

1880 348,691 4 

1881 528,545 II 

1882 648,186 5 

1883 522,587 27 

1884 453,686 20 

1885 353^083 49 

The enactment of the Chinese exclusion law in 1884 
created a situation which facilitated the introduction of 
Japanese labor into California. The large landowners 
of that state, having been deprived of Chinese farm hands, 
found in the Japanese an excellent laborer to be utilized 
on their farms and orchards, and tried to encourage Jap- 
anese immigration by offering alluring terms. The result 
began to be perceptible two years after the enactment of 
the Chinese exclusion law, when there were 194 immi- 
grants from Japan. Since that time the increase of Jap- 
anese immigration was so steady that in 189 1 it exceeded 
a thousand. 

Towards the latter part of the nineties a new factor was 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 287 

injected into the situation, opening a wider field of em- 
ployment for Japanese labor. The western railroads had 
found out that the Japanese made excellent section hands, 
and tried every means to obtain as many Japanese as 
possible. Thus in 1899 Japanese immigration rose to 
2,844. In the year following the figures suddenly leaped 
to 12,635, but this extraordinary phenomenon was due 
to the fact that in that year Japanese immigration to 
Hawaii was for the first time included in the immigration 
statistics of the United States. In fact more than half 
the total Japanese immigrants came to Hawaii. Mean- 
while, the railroads continued to employ Japanese labor- 
ers in increasing numbers, while the general prosperity 
which prevailed in this country up to 1907 stimulated 
Japanese immigration as much as it encouraged European 
immigration. The high water-mark in Japanese immi- 
gration was reached in 1907 when it numbered no less 
than 30,226. In the following table Japanese immigra- 
tion from 1886 to 1907 is compared with European 
immigration for the same period : 



V/'ar 


Number European 


Number Japanese 


•£. Cl^T 


Immigrants 


Immigrants 


1886 


329.529 


194 


1887 


482,829 


229 


1888 


538,131 


404 


1889 


434,790 


640 


1890 


445,680 


691 


1891 


546,085 


1,136 


1892 


608,472 


1,498 


1893 


429,139 


1,380 


1894 


279,052 


1. 931 


1895 


250,342 


1,150 


1896 


329,067 


1,110 


1897 


216,397 


1,526 


1898 


217,786 


2,230 



288 



AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 



Year 


Number European 


Number Japanese 


Immigrants 


Immigrants 


1899 


297.349 


2,844 


1900 


424,700 


12,635 


1901 


469.237 


5.269 


1902 


619,068 


14,270 


1903 


814,507 


19,968 


1904 


767,933 


14,264 


1905 


974.273 


10,331 


1906 


1,018,365 


13.835 


1907 


1,199,566 


30,226 



We have traced Japanese immigration up to 1907, the 
year in which the agitation of the trades unions in Cah- 
fornia culminated in the Japanese exclusion agreement. 
Reserving for later chapters the history of this agitation 
and the status of Japanese immigration after the said 
agreement, let us here examine more critically statistics 
pertaining to Japanese immigration for several years 
previous to the exclusion agreement, when Japanese came 
to these shores in larger numbers than in any other period. 

We can comprehend the extent of Japanese immigra- 
tion more clearly when we compare it with that from 
those European countries which furnish this country 
with most immigrants. This comparison is shown in the 
following table : 



i8gi-igoo 



igoi-igo$ 



igob 



No. im- Per cent, 
migrants of total 

Japan 24,806 

Austro-Hungary. 592,707 



Germany 

Italy . 

Russia , 

Ireland 

Sweden 

Norway 

Greece 



505.152 
651,893 
505,290 
388,416 
226,266 
95.014 
15.979 



.67 
16. 
14. 
18. 

14. 
10. 

6. 

2.6 
•43 



No. im- 
migrants 

64,102 

944,239 

176,995 
959,768 

658,735 
184,095 
154,607 
103,065 
49,962 



Per cent, 
of total 

1-7 
25- 
4.6 

25- 
17- 
4.8 

4. 
2.7 

1-3 



No. im- Per cent, 
m igra nts of total 

13,835 
265,138 

37,564 
273,120 
215,665 

34,995 
23,310 
21,730 
19,489 



1-3 

24. 

3-4 

25- 
20. 

3-2 

2. 
2. 
I.S 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 289 

We learn that in the decade from 1891 to 1900 Japa- 
nese immigration was so insignificant that it admits of 
no comparison with that from European countries. In 
the five years following, Japanese immigrants numbered, 
roughly speaking, only one in twenty- five compared with 
Austro-Hungarian and ItaHan immigrants, and one in 
seventeen compared with Russian immigrants. Again, 
in the year 1906 Japanese immigrants were only one- 
twenty-fourth as numerous as Austro-Hungarian immi- 
grants, one-twenty-fifth as compared with Italian im- 
migrants, one-eighteenth with Russian immigrants, and 
one-third with Irish and German immigrants. 

The figures in the above table include Japanese immi- 
grants both to Hawaii and the mainland of America. To 
ascertain, therefore, the true significance of Japanese 
immigration to the Pacific Coast, it is essential to inquire 
into the destinations of Japanese immigrants. The Japa- 
nese government endeavored, even before the exclusion 
agreement, to restrict as much as possible the number of 
passports to continental United States. Hence, more 
than one-half of Japanese immigrants were destined to 
Hawaii, where there was no ill-feeling towards the Japa- 
nese, the mainland of America having received a com- 
paratively small number of Japanese. The apportion- 
ment of Japanese immigrants among Hawaii and the 
Pacific Coast states is shown in this table : 

Year Hawaii California Oregon Washington 



1902 


9»i25 


2,518 


130 


2,419 


1903 


13^045 


4,511 


329 


1,820 


1904 


6,590 


4.003 


318 


2,446 


1905 


6,692 


2,022 


279 


1,200 


1906 


9.051 


2,068 


398 


1,619 


1907 


20,865 


3»69i 


447 


3,226 



290 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

It will be seen that while Japanese immigrants in 1907 
were so many as 30,226, more than two-thirds of the 
total came to Hawaii. But the bearing of Japanese im- 
migration upon the Pacific Coast will be understood 
more fully when the proportion of the Japanese and the 
European immigrants coming to that section is ascer- 
tained. Thus we observe that the tendency on the 
Pacific Coast was, comparatively speaking, towards in- 
creasing the European population and decreasing the 
Japanese. In 1903 the proportion of Japanese to Euro- 
pean immigrants to the three Pacific Coast states was 
3 to 1 1.3; in 1904, 3 to 12.5; in 1905, 3 to 20.3; in 
1906, 3 to 19. 1. 

The destinations of immigrants given in the immigra- 
tion statistics of the United States are merely those 
professed by individual immigrants upon their arrival in 
this country. Hence the actual destinations of Japanese 
are frequently different from those recorded by the immi- 
gration officials. As a matter of fact, Japanese immi- 
grants are more widely scattered over different parts of 
the country than the report of the Commissioner-General 
of Immigration shows them to be. 

The most powerful argument against Chinese immigra- 
tion previous to the enactment of the Chinese exclusion 
law was that they flocked to the state of California, and 
so were likely to jeopardize the growth and occupancy 
of that state by Americans. The Chinese immigrants 
from 1854 to 1882 totalled 139,455, the overwhelming 
majority of whom came to and remained in California. 
In view of the fact that in the seventies of the past 
century, when agitation for Chinese exclusion was begun, 
the state of California had a population of only 560,000, 
including negroes, Indians and Chinese, the apprehension 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 291 

that the Chinese might hinder the wholesome growth of 
the white community in that state was not without 
ground. But the conditions on the Pacific Coast have 
since radically changed, while cuxumstances attendant 
upon Japanese immigration are widely different from 
those accompanying Chinese immigration. Up to 1900 
the white population of California (excluding negroes, 
Indians, Chinese and Japanese) increased to 1,402,727. 
In 1870 the population of Oregon was only 90,923, and 
that of Washington only 23,955, both including negroes, 
Indians and Chinese; but the census of 1900 reports the 
population of Oregon at 394,582, and that of Washington 
at 496,304, both excluding negroes, Indians, Chinese and 
Japanese. It is needless to say that during the seven 
years that followed the year 1900 the white population 
on the Pacific Coast increased even more rapidly than 
in the years preceding. And the increase of the white 
population is merely one of many factors which go to 
solidify the American community on the Pacific Coast. 
It may, therefore, well be asked whether the argument 
advanced against Chinese immigration in the eighties 
can reasonably be applied to the Japanese immigration 
of to-day. 

We have studied Japanese immigration up to the con- 
clusion of the exclusion agreement with special reference 
to its extent and its destinations. The next question 
which requires our attention is that of the nature of 
Japanese immigration — its classification by occupation, 
its financial conditions, its state of education. 

A study of the reports of the Commissioner-General 
of Immigration reveals that the Japanese immigrants 
were not necessarily recruited from among the lowest 
classes of laborers. To call them " coolies " without dis- 



203 


601 


53 


1.977 


797 


223 


830 


652 


181 


i.55« 


1,205 


173 


572 


1,442 


132 


i»474 


1,184 


317 


743 


777 


207 


«35 


632 


195 



292 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

crimination is not to render them justice. The oc- 
cupations of Japanese immigrants for the eight 
years from 1899 to 1906 are shown in the following 
table : 



Year Profes- Skilled Farmers Farm Laborers Merchants Servants 

sional laborers 

1899 . . 92 121 828 854 

1900 . . 563 1,793 2,521 3,855 

1901 . . 167 603 897 1,153 

1902 . . 222 1,047 5>2I2 451 

1903 . . 274 923 5,010 5,816 

1904 . . 373 641 121 6,775 

1905 . . 280 358 380 5,883 
1906. .256 329 522 8,435 



Year i Miscellaneous * No occupation 

1899 84 559 

1900 192 707 

1901 181 585 

1902 199 4,388 

1903 591 5,282 

^904 253 3,244 

1905 181 2,219 

'906 593 2,446 



The meaning of the above table will be understood 
more fully when the figures for each occupation are re- 
duced into percentage of the total Japanese immigrants 
and compared with figures representing each occupation 
of European immigrants, likewise rendered into percent- 
age. For this purpose the following table is prepared, 
comparing the Japanese immigrants for 1906 with those 
from several European countries : 

* This consists of agents, bankers, hotel keepers, manufacturers and 
fishermen. 

* This includes women and children under fourteen years. 



I 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 293 

People or race Professional Skilled Farmers Fann Laborers 

laborers 

Japanese 1. 79 2.16 3.66 59.22 5.86 

Italian (South) 32 12.63 -37 S^-S^ 29.41 

Italian (North) .... 1. 13 11.15 3.25 11.08 37-94 

Irish 1,47 11.56 2.44 5.36 24.8 

Hebrew 71 33-26 .1 i.il 5.44 

German 2,7 18.86 2.17 14.17 7.58 

Polish 19 6.19 .79 33.64 23.35 

Slovak 07 3.79 1.41 46.17 12.31 

Scandinavian 1.45 19. 11 2.42 6.45 25.82 

People or race Merchants Servants 

Japanese 4.43 1.36 

Italian (South) 89 4.50 

Italian (North) 1. 24 6.82 

Irish 79 36.6 

Hebrew 2.27 6.39 

German 3.34 13.58 

Polish 09 16.3 

Slovak 04 14.4 

Scandinavian 52 24.02 

From this table it will be seen that the majority of 
Japanese immigrants were farmers and farm laborers. 
Common laborers, who are apt to crowd in the city, 
formed a very small portion of Japanese immigrants, 
viz., only five per cent, as against twenty-nine per cent', 
from South Italy, thirty-seven per cent, from North Italy, 
twenty-four per cent, from Ireland, twenty-three per cent, 
from Poland and twenty-five per cent, from Scandinavia. 
With the exception of Germany, Japan furnished the 
largest percentage of professional men. In examining 
these figures it is necessary to remember that they in- 
clude those for Hawaii, which received the majority of 
Japanese laborers given in the table. 

It is worthy of note that the per capita sum of money 
shown by Japanese immigrants at the time of landing is 
smaller only than that possessed by English and German 
immigrants. In the fiscal year 1905, the average sum of 
money brought by English and German immigrants was 



294 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

$S7'^S ^iid ;^43.72 per capita, respectively, while Japa^ 
nese immigrants brought $S2.yS each. In 1906 English 
immigrants brought ^57.90 per capita, Germans ;^40,87, 
and Japanese ^31.09. In the following table the per 
capita sum of money shown by Japanese immigrants in 
1905 and 1906 is compared with that brought by immi- 
grants from various European countries other than Eng- 
land and Germany. 

I. Statistics for 1905 

/^ace or people Number Total amount Per capita 

immigrants money shown 

Japanese 11,021 416,395 37*78 

Italian (South) .... 186,390 3,127,207 16.77 

Italian (North) .... 39,930 1,169,980 26.79 

Irish 54,266 1,421,682 26.19 

Hebrew 129,910 1,824,617 14.04 

Polish 102,437 1,352,230 13.20 

Scandinavian 62,284 1,604,205 25.75 

Slovak 52,368 818,207 15-43 

Magyar 46,030 695,108 15- 10 

Croatian-Slovenian . . . 35,104 539.337 15-36 

Russian 3,746 I33»576 35-65 

II. Statistics for 1906 

Race or people Number Total amount Per capita 

immigrants money shown 

Japanese 14,243 442,909 3i-09 

Italian (South) .... 240,528 3*637,787 10.96 

Italian (North) .... 46,286 1,237,404 26.73 

Irish 40,959 i>o82,332 26.42 

Hebrew 153,748 2,362,125 I5'36 

Polish 95,835 1,103,955 "-51 

Scandinavian 58,141 1,542,129 26.52 

Slovak 38,221 526,028 I3'76 

Magyar 44,261 621,077 14.03 

Croatian-Slovenian . . . 44,272 582,503 13- ^5 

Russian 5,814 I59>25i 25.67 

The above figures account for the fact that only an in- 
finitesimal portion of Japanese immigrants were afforded 
aid in hospitals in this country, while European countries 
furnished hundreds, even thousands of immigrants re- 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 295 

lieved in hospitals. It is also natural that only a very- 
small number of Japanese immigrants were denied ad- 
mission on the ground of being paupers or likely to be- 
come public charges. In the following table the number 
of Japanese afforded aid in hospitals in 1906 is compared 
with that of European immigrants so reheved : 

Race or people Number Relieved Per cent, 

ifumigrants in hospital 

Japanese I4>243 i .007 

Italian (South) 240,528 i>776 .73 

Italian (North) 46,286 346 ,74 

Irish 40^959 214 .52 

Hebrew 153,748 2,495 ^'62 

Greek 23,127 189 .8l 

German 86,813 867 .99 

Polish 96,835 1,000 1.04 

Scandinavian 5^)141 '79 .3 

We see that out of the entire Japanese immigrants only 
one was relieved in hospital. This is almost naught by 
the side of the enormous number of European immigrants 
who became public charges in the same year. The fact 
that so few Japanese became public charges is due not 
only to their happy financial condition, but also to the 
presence among them of a very small number of the aged 
and infant. Almost ninety-eight per cent, of Japanese 
immigrants for 1906 were in the ages from fourteen to 
forty-four, leaving only two per cent, for the aged and 
infant ; whereas ten to thirty-three per cent, of immigrants 
from various European countries were under fourteen or 
over forty- four years. 

Now we are in a position to consider the educational 
condition of Japanese immigrants. Owing to the fact 
that the Japanese language is radically different from 
English, it requires considerable time and labor for a 
Japanese to acquire a knowledge of English. A com- 



296 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

pulsory educational system is adopted in Japan as far as 
primary education is concerned, but in the primary school 
no foreign language is taught. It is only in the high 
school that the English language finds place in the 
studies. Naturally many a Japanese, when arriving in 
this country, has no knowledge of English. And yet 
the rate of illiteracy among the Japanese immigrants, 
though larger than those among English, Irish, German 
and Scandinavian immigrants, is considerably smaller 
than the rates of illiteracy among South Italians, Ruthe- 
nians, Lithuanians, Poles, Croatians and Slovenians, etc. 
The Commissioner-General of Immigration's report for 
1904 contains a very instructive chart, showing the rates 
of illiteracy among immigrants from different countries. 
From this chart the following table is prepared, compar- 
ing the percentage of illiteracy among the Japanese im- 
migrants with that among the immigrants from those 
European countries which furnish this country with more 
than twenty per cent, of illiterates : 

Race or People Per cent, of 

illiterates 

Japanese 22 

Italian (South) 54 

Greek 24 

Portuguese 68 

German Empire. {^°j{f^^^^- \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\ \\% 

Hebrew 23 

Polish 36 

Slovak 28 

Ruthenian 59 

Roumanian 3^ 

Bulgarian, Servian, Montenegrin .... 45 

Dalmatian, Bosnian, Herzegovinian ... 36 

^ Croatian, and Slovenian . . . . ... .36 

' Hebrew 23 

Russian 26 

Lithuanian 54 

. Polish 36 



Austro-H angary. 



Russian Empire. 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 297 

According to this table twenty-two out of every hun- 
dred Japanese were illiterate, forming the smallest rate of 
illiteracy in the list. The largest rate of illiteracy was 
among the Portuguese, viz., sixty-nine per cent., the 
Ruthenians came next, the South Italians and Lithuanians 
third, the Bulgarians, Servians and Montenegrins fourth, 
the Poles fifth, and so on. 

No discussion of Japanese immigration would be com- 
plete which does not consider its bearing upon the 
economic conditions of the Pacific Coast. Such a con- 
sideration seems especially necessary as the Japanese 
immigrant has been accused of lowering the wages of 
American laborers. My inquiry into the matter leads 
me to the conclusion that this charge is not founded upon 
any fact that can be substantiated. This question, so far 
as California is concerned, will be minutely discussed in 
a separate chapter ; here I am concerned with conditions 
that prevailed in Washington and Oregon at the time 
when the exclusion agreement was entered into. 

The Japanese immigrants were engaged in the kinds of 
work in which American laborers did not care to be em- 
ployed. They did not, as a rule, compete with Ameri- 
can laborers. True, in certain kinds of works the Japa- 
nese were paid less than were American laborers, but this 
does not mean that they sold their labor at a cheap price. 
On the contrary, they were getting the highest wages 
they could reasonably ask. Where they accepted 
smaller wages than were paid white working men, they 
did so merely because their physical strength was not 
equal to that of their white fellow working men, or be- 
cause they were unable to speak English or unfamiliar 
with the tools they had to use. And yet in any kind of 
work the Japanese were not getting much smaller wages 



298 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

than were the American laborers. Let us illustrate this 
with the case of the Japanese in Washington. 

In 1906 there were in Washington some 12,894 Japa- 
nese, of whom 697 and 288 were independent business 
men and farmers, respectively. Of the remaining Japa- 
nese population the following classification was ob- 
tained : 



Sawmill laborers and wood-cutters 2,685 

Railroad laborers 2,332 

Farm laborers I>234 

Fishery and cannery laborers 904 

Housework 1,204 

Hotel, store and restaurant laborers 3»0^4 

Miscellaneous laborers 536 



The wages of these Japanese laborers were approxi- 
mately as follows : 



Sawmill and wood-cutting $ i-75-^ 2.75 (day) 

Railroad 1.50- 2.50 (day) 

Farm labor 1.50- 1.90 (day) » 

Fishery and cannery 1. 30- 1.65 (day)* 

Housework i5-00- 50.00 (month) * 

Hotel, store and restaurant labor . . . 30,00- 70.00 (month) ^ 

Hotel and restaurant cook 40.00- 70.00 (month) ^ 



That these wages were not, with a few exceptions, 
smaller than the wages of American laborers will be 
understood when the above table is compared with the 
following table based upon the report of the Bureau of 
Labor of Washington, showing the average wages of 
various kinds of labor in which most Japanese laborers 
were engaged : 

1 With room and board. 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 299 

Occupation Average wages 
Section foreman (Great Northern Railroad) . . .$ 1.80-^ 2.00 (day) 

Section hand (Great Northern Railroad) .... 1. 35- 1. 50 (day) 

Section foreman (Northern Pacific Railroad) . . 2.07 (day) 

Section hand (Northern Pacifiic Railroad) .... 1. 47 (day) 

Section foreman (Oregon Railroad) 1. 91 (day) 

Section hand (Oregon Railroad) 1. 75 (day) 

Section foreman (Columbia and Puget Sound 

Railway) 2.16- 2.33 (day) 

Section hand (Columbia and Puget Sound Rail- 
way) 1.30- 1.75 (day) 

Section foreman (Washington and Columbia 

Railroad) .... 1. 93 (day) 

Section hand (Washington and Columbia Rail- 
road) 1.50 (day) 

Common labor at mercantile establishment 

(Seattle) 1.50- 2.00 (day) 

Common labor at mercantile establishment (Ta- 

coma) .... 1.50 (day) 

Common labor at mercantile establishment 

(Spokane) 3.40 (day) 

Restaurant cooks 45.00- 90.00 (month) 

Restaurant waiters 30,00- 60.00 (month) 



The conditions, prevailing in Washington in 1906, also 
prevailed, with but little modification, in Oregon and 
other states in the Pacific Northwest. 

When the state of California began to agitate for the 
exclusion of the Chinese, even the merchants and dealers 
in that state countenanced the movement, for the reason 
that the Chinese immigrant did not consume American 
goods, importing almost all of his living requirements 
from his native country. On the other hand, merchants 
and dealers of the Pacific Coast do not, generally speak- 
ing, favor the agitation against the Japanese, whose 
daily requirements, with the exception of a few things, 
are bought in this country. Indeed, it may be safe to say 
that the mercantile class on the Pacific Coast is willing 
to welcome Japanese immigrants. 

On this point, the following passage from the 
" Second Biennial Report of the Bureau of Labor 



300 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Statistics of the State of Oregon" may be read with 
interest : 

" It is shown that of the food and materials consumed 
by the Chinaman, sixty per cent, is foreign and forty per 
cent, domestic. On the other hand, the Japanese im- 
ports only eleven per cent, of his living requirements 
from his native land, the balance, or eighty-nine per cent., 
being domestic. The Japanese purchases all of his cloth- 
ing in the United States, amounting to fifteen per cent, 
of his articles of subsistence, while of his food, which 
represents eighty-five per cent, of his living expenses, 
eighty-seven per cent, is domestic and thirteen per cent, 
foreign. Eighty-one per cent, of the Chinaman's sub- 
sistence is food, of which proportion seventy-five per 
cent, is foreign and twenty-five per cent, domestic, and 
the balance, or nineteen per cent., is clothing, all domestic." 

Such, in brief, was the status of Japanese immigration 
immediately before the conclusion of the exclusion 
agreement of 1907. Considering the facts and figures 
we have set forth, it may well be questioned whether 
such a drastic measure of exclusion as was adopted by 
the mutual consent of the United States and Japan was 
justified. That the administration at Washington did not 
wish to put a ban upon Japanese immigration maybe in- 
ferred from the fact that Mr. Roosevelt in his message to 
Congress in 1906 eulogized the Japanese in the most 
glowing terms, and went so far as to urge that the Japanese 
should be naturalized. About that time, however, an un- 
toward situation was developing in California, furnishing 
the anti-Japanese agitators with a golden opportunity to 
push their movement. But for that peculiar situation the 
anti-Japanese propaganda in California might never have 
assumed the formidable proportions that it did. 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 301 

This situation was created by the immigration en 
masse of Japanese in Hawaii to the mainland of America. 
The higher wages paid on the Pacific Coast were an ir- 
resistible temptation to the Hawaiian Japanese. Indeed, 
many a Japanese, unable to obtain passports to con- 
tinental America, came to Hawaii only to make that point 
a stepping stone to the Pacific Coast. The Japanese 
government, while exercising its utmost influence to re- 
strict the emigration of its subjects to continental United 
States, did not feel constrained to limit passports to 
Hawaii, knowing that Japanese labor was needed and 
welcomed there. But the good intentions of the Japanese 
government were misused by many a Japanese, who 
secured a passport to Hawaii with no intention to re- 
main there. Nor was this surprising, considering that 
the wages paid the sugar plantation laborer in Hawaii 
were scarcely as much as half the wages paid the farm 
laborer on the Pacific Coast. So the Japanese exodus 
from Hawaii grew to such dimensions as alarmed the 
sugar planters, while in California it created suspicion 
among the trades unions. The great sugar interests in 
Hawaii tried every means to check the migration of 
Japanese from the island, without, of course, increasing 
their wages. Indeed, it was even alleged that they 
entered into alliance with the trades unions and some of 
the newspapers in California. At any rate their united 
propaganda proved so successful that the government at 
Washington was obliged to meet their demands. The 
result was the exclusion understanding of 1907, which not 
only stopped the migration into the mainland of Japa- 
nese laborers in Hawaii but denied admission to those 
who came direct from Japan. 



XIX 
DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE— I 

ONCE upon a time there was a man who told an 
elephant that he would take the animal into 
paradise, if he would only let him ride on his 
back to make the trip. The elephant nodded a consent, 
and the man and the animal started in quest of the 
beautiful world, the man guiding the reins with his cun- 
ning intellect, the elephant trotting forward with ponder- 
ous feet. The goal was at last reached, but when the 
doors of paradise were ajar, the man slipped in, leaving 
the elephant behind to his grief and disappointment. 

How often is the old story exemplified in our midst in 
these blessed days of the twentieth century ! Dema- 
gogues, like the cunning man of old, now and again hold 
out alluring promises before the public, declaring that 
the promises will all be fulfilled if the public will follow 
their lead, or what is better, put itself under their reins, 
as did the elephant in the fable. The pubUc is readily 
coaxed to gratify the desire of the agitators ; so they be- 
come good friends for the nonce, and start on a journey 
to the promised land. Would that the good-natured 
people might awaken to the knowledge that they are 
dupes of the agitators ! But the knowledge seldom 
dawns upon them until the journey is ended, only to 
make themselves sorry figures. 

Thus it was that the anti-Japanese agitation on the 
Pacific Coast of a few years ago began and subsided. It 

302 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — I 303 

was the old story — some one wanted to go to the Senate 
or the House, or some one had the gubernatorial bee 
buzzing in his bonnet, or some one wanted to sell his 
paper, or some one wanted to make a living by levying 
upon the innocent laborers, or some " interests " wanted 
to control Japanese labor for their exclusive benefit. 
Seeing that Japanese immigration was beginning to be a 
cause of apprehension to the laboring class of California, 
these men joined hands, setting their minds to make the 
most of it. A drunkard broke into a Japanese restau- 
rant, or a rowdy tried to extort money from a Japanese 
shopkeeper, and such trifling incidents were readily con- 
verted by evil-schemers into an occasion to arouse 
animosity and hatred against the Japanese in general. 
Their demonstration was so loud and noisy that the voice 
of sane counsel was drowned and silenced, and the pubHc, 
like the poor elephant in the old story, was once again 
straddled by crafty riders. 

It was the twenty-third day of December, 1906. A 
mass-meeting was held in Walton Hall, San Francisco, 
to demonstrate the animosity of the laboring class against 
the Japanese. It was presided over by one O. A. Tveit- 
moe. That man, I was told, was the instigator of the 
anti-Japanese agitation, the Denis Kearny of the time. 
He rose to speak, and in the climax of his peroration he 
shouted : •* If Americans and Japanese married the re- 
sult would be a nation of gas-pipe thugs and human 
hyenas ! " Ah, that was a monumental speech ! Then 
appeared upon the platform P. H. McCarthy, the man 
who was later elected mayor of San Francisco. His 
harangue frothed with bellicose utterances, and his au- 
dience, unkempt and sullen, approved him with tremen- 
dous applause, when he screamed at the height of his 



304 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

voice : " California and the states west of the Rockies 
alone could whip Japan into a jelly." 

About a year later I chanced to attend another mass- 
meeting, this time in Portland, Oregon. Senator Gearin 
was the star speaker of the evening. In florid terms our 
distinguished senator told his audience how beautiful 
and cultured and moral the city of Portland was, and de- 
clared that a city like that should not be polluted by 
hordes of barbaric Japanese. And there were but a few 
Japanese in Portland at the time ! The Honorable 
Gearin was followed by one Reverend Mr. Wilson. This 
disciple of Christ's was pious enough to invoke God's 
name in emphasizing his condemnation of the Japanese, 
and declared, with voice trembling, that the Japanese 
must be excluded because " they are a race that live on 
rice and rats " ! Then came another orator — but why 
waste words on the fatuous vociferations of these apostles 
of exclusion ? What has been said is enough to indicate 
the nature of the agitation and agitators. It is more vital 
to review the history of the anti-Japanese movement. 

O. A. Tveitmoe, the organizer of the Japanese and 
Korean Exclusion League, was born in Norway in 1865. 
In the latter eighties he emigrated to the United States 
and located in Minnesota, a state which had long been 
the Mecca of Norwegian immigrants. A crafty man, he 
did not think it worth his while to till the soil, as did his 
fellow immigrants, and preferred the dignified calling of 
a political agitator. In 1892 he was engaged in agita- 
tions favorable to the Farmers' Alliance in a small town 
in Minnesota. About this time he committed a blunder, 
which stamped an ineffaceable taint upon his life. In 
spite of the noble calling to which he dedicated himself, 
his eyes were not insensible to the tempting glitter of 



\ 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — I 305 

gold, and while writing as a reporter on a small Nor- 
wegian weekly paper, he forged the name of a local 
merchant to a note for ;^200 and negotiated it. He was 
convicted and sentenced to eighteen months in the state 
prison at Stillwater, Minn., where, after serving a part of 
his sentence, he was pardoned by the governor. Then 
he moved to San Francisco, where he gradually distin- 
guished himself in the camp of labor unions, until he was 
appointed secretary of the Building Trades Council of 
that city. What mischievous souls they must have been 
who, on the morrow of Tveitmoe's glorious ascent to the 
long-coveted post, mercilessly dragged to the garish light 
of day the unhappy past of the ambitious Norwegian ! 
The San Francisco Bulletin^ in attacking the corrupt ad- 
ministration of Mayor Schmitz, incidentally published, in 
November, 1907, the infamous story of the note-forgery 
episode, which made Tveitmoe an inmate of a Minne- 
sota penitentiary. The story was even illustrated with 
the official prison photographs of the erstwhile criminal. 
The Bulletin s attack upon Tveitmoe was made upon the 
assumption that his appointment by Mayor Schmitz to 
be a member of the board of supervisors was a reflection 
upon the integrity of the mayor himself and his adminis- 
tration. Yet Tveitmoe was not daunted, nor was the 
laboring class, which exalted him to the post he then oc- 
cupied, ashamed of him. And why should they? 
Tveitmoe had washed his hands of the stain of the forgery 
incident, and was now, to all appearances, a gentleman. 

Such, in brief, is the personality of the hero of the anti- 
Japanese agitation which was begun on the Pacific slope 
in 1905. It was on May 7th of that year that an anti- 
Japanese convention was for the first time held in San 
Francisco. For months previous, the San Francisco 



306 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Chronicle and Mr. Tveitmoe's paper, the Organized 
Labor, had been engaged in stirring up ill-feeHng against 
the Japanese in California. For a month or so beginning 
with February 23, 1905, the Chronicle published day after 
day the most sensational articles inveighing against the 
Japanese ; even after that, articles of much the same na- 
ture continued to appear at frequent intervals in the col- 
umns of that paper. The Organized Labor was even 
more sensational and vehement in arraigning the Japa- 
nese. And yet their agitation apparently failed to kindle 
enthusiasm among the San Franciscans, for the conven- 
tion of May 7th proved to be a tame affair, attended by a 
comparatively small number of delegates, most of them 
politicians. The delegates were but half-hearted in ad- 
vocating the exclusion of Japanese ; they came to the 
convention apparently for political effect. However, a 
resolution was adopted, protesting against " the national 
policy, laws, and treaties which allow Japanese to enter our 
ports, to the great detriment of our citizenship, our stand- 
ard of living, and the progress of American civilization." 
In spite of the apparent indifference of the Californians 
towards the campaign of the Chrofticle and Mr. Tveitmoe, 
it cannot be said that the movement was ill-timed. The 
municipal government of San Francisco had been in the 
hands of trade-union bosses, with the now ill-famed 
Schmitz at its head. Hatred of Japanese immigrants 
seemed to have pervaded the city hall, and on May 6, 
1905. — the day before Tveitmoe called together the first 
anti-Japanese convention — the Board of Education of the 
city had passed a resolution declaring it to be necessary 
to segregate Japanese from white pupils. It seemed as 
if Tveitmoe's agitation had been officially endorsed, even 
invited, by the municipal authorities. So our Norwegian 




DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — I 307 

labor leader did not feel disconcerted by the lack of en- 
thusiasm at the first anti-Japanese convention, and pro- 
ceeded to organize what was to be known as the Japanese 
and Korean Exclusion League. 

About five months after its organization, or to be more 
accurate, on October 22, 1905, the Japanese and Korean 
Exclusion League convened a mass-meetmg, which 
adopted a resolution instructing its executive committee 
to appear before the Board of Education, and petition 
for the establishment of separate schools for Japanese 
children. It will be noted that the resolution of the 
education board of May 6, 1905, which we have just 
mentioned, had never been carried into effect. The 
petition of the Exclusion League was duly laid before the 
board, and yet nothing was done about the matter. 
Then came the earthquake of April 18, 1906, which re- 
duced to debris thirty-six of the seventy-six schools in 
San Francisco. This furnished a golden opportunity 
for the anti-Japanese municipal government to carry out 
the segregation of Japanese pupils, which for want of 
plausible excuse had been deterred. Pleading that the 
schools surviving the calamity were inadequate even to 
accommodate white children, the education board, on 
October 11, 1906, ordered all Japanese pupils, together 
with Chinese children, to a separate school. At that 
time there were only ninety-three Japanese pupils dis- 
tributed among twenty-three schools. With the ex- 
ception of two, the number of Japanese in attendance 
at any one school did not exceed six. The greatest 
number of Japanese was at the Redding Primary School, 
where there were twenty-three. At this school there 
was room for many more pupils than were attending. 
That, however, made no difference. Insufficient accom- 



308 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

modation was an excuse too transparent to deceive any- 
body ; the real reason was malice and prejudice. 

It cannot be gainsaid that the ordering of all Japanese 
pupils to one school was tantamount to the summaiy 
prohibition of their attending schools. The condition 
in San Francisco, incident to the earthquake and con- 
flagration, was such that it was practically impossible 
even for adults living at remote distances to attend a 
school located in the burned section. Small wonder 
that there was only one Japanese student who attended 
the '♦ Oriental School." The Japanese community in 
San Franciso, reasonably indignant at the discrimination, 
resolved to ignore the Oriental School and assume the 
education of Japanese children in its own hands. 

Meanwhile, President Roosevelt was watching with 
the most serious concern the development of the anti- 
Japanese propaganda in California. In his message to 
Congress dated December 6, 1905, he devoted several 
thousand words to the repudiation of the exclusion 
movement. The memorable document raised on all 
sides a storm of mingled wonder, wrath, and admiration. 
To follow it up, Mr. Roosevelt sent Mr. Metcalf to 
California to investigate the situation, and upon re- 
ceiving Mr. Metcalf 's report, addressed, on December 
18, a special message to Congress. His discussion of 
the Japanese question contained in his first general mes- 
sage may have seemed too efifusive, too rhetorical, and 
indeed too vociferous to be convincing, but there can 
be no doubt that this second message touched the vital 
point without any of the faults of the message that pre- 
ceded it. On the question of the segregation of Japanese 
children, the President said : 

" I call your especial attention to the small number 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — I 309 

of Japanese children who attend school, to the testimony 
as to the brightness, cleanliness and good behavior of 
these Japanese children in the schools, and to the fact 
that, owing to their being scattered through the city, the 
requirement for them all to go to one special school is 
impossible of fulfillment and means that they cannot have 
school facilities. 

" Let me point out further that there would be no 
objection whatever to excluding from the schools any 
Japanese on the score of age. It is obviously not de- 
sirable that young men should go to school with chil- 
dren. The only point is the exclusion of the children 
themselves. The number of Japanese children attending 
the public schools in San Francisco was small. The 
government has already directed that suit be brought 
to test the constitutionality of the act in question, but my 
earnest hope is that such suit will not be necessary, and 
that as a matter of comity the citizens of San Francisco 
will refuse to deprive these young Japanese children of 
education and will permit them to go to the schools." 

As the President pointed out, the Japanese never ob- 
jected to the exclusion of young men ; but they could 
not bear to see all Japanese pupils, irrespective of age, 
driven out of the public school, simply because they 
were Japanese. Of the ninety-three Japanese pupils 
attending public schools when segregation was ordered, 
none was over twenty years of age, and only two were as 
old. Six were aged nineteen ; six were eighteen years 
old ; twelve seventeen ; nine sixteen ; and ten fifteen. 
The remaining forty-eight were between six and fourteen 
years old. As for the charge that Japanese pupils were 
morally inferior, and exercised baneful influence among 
white children, it was a calumny pure and simple, and 



3IO AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

could only reflect upon the character of those who 
uttered it. When the exclusion agitation was at its 
height Colonel Irish, naval officer at San Francisco, at 
a banquet of the Unitarian Club, read the following 
letter, written to him by an experienced public-school 
principal of San Francisco : 

" I have had ample opportunities, in over twenty years 
of experience with Japanese students, to know whereof 
I speak, in all its bearings. 

" No considerable part of these students are adults. 
Had the adult pupils ever reached as large a proportion 
as twenty per cent., there would, years ago, have been 
protests from teachers and principals, and Japanese 
adults could and would have been excluded from ele- 
mentary day-school, just as other adults, without friction 
or objection. 

" Japanese children do not crowd white children out 
of the schools. The San Francisco schools are not over- 
crowded. They never have been overcrowded during 
the past twenty years, except in a few spots, and that 
for. causes entirely outside this matter. 

" The statement that the influence of the Japanese, in 
our schools, have had a tendency towards immorality is 
false and absolutely without foundation. From all I 
have heard in conference with other school men, as well 
as from my own continuous and careful observation, 
there has never been the slightest cause for a shadow 
of suspicion affecting the conduct of one of these Jap- 
anese pupils. On the contrary, I have found that they 
have furnished examples of industry, patience, unob- 
trusiveness, obedience and honesty in their work, which 
have greatly helped many efficient teachers to create the 
proper moral atmosphere for their class rooms. 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — I 31I 

" Japanese and American children have always been 
on good terms in my class rooms, and in others concern- 
ing which I am informed. They work side by side, 
without interference or friction, and often some Japanese 
student would be a great favorite among his American 
classmates. 

" In all my years of experience, there has never come, 
orally or in writing, from the parents whose children have 
attended my school, one hint of complaint or dissatisfac- 
tion concerning the instruction of their children in the 
same school or the same rooms with Japanese. Nor has 
there ever been any complaint or protest from teachers 
in regard to this coeducation." 

Views of the San Francisco school-teachers, almost 
without exception, bear testimony to the accuracy of 
this statement. I, of course, hazard no guaranty that 
no Japanese pupil has ever committed or will ever com- 
mit blunders. There may have been solitary cases of 
undesirable conduct on the part of Japanese pupils, but 
there can be no doubt that on the whole they are more 
docile, intelligent, industrious, orderly, and clean in habit 
than the average children of most immigrants from other 
countries. Let those, who scandalize Japanese pupils 
with invented tales of immorality, read the recent report 
of the Chicago Law and Order League, wherein it is 
stated that in the twenty-three months covered by the 
investigation, 600 Chicago school children occupied the 
wards in the county hospital devoted to disease resulting 
from immorality. 

It is no pleasant task to narrate the school incident : 
let us bring our review of the question to a speedy con- 
clusion. To state it briefly, then, the trouble ended in a 
compromise, as the result of the President's conference 



312 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

with Mayor Schmitz, which took place in Washington 
in February, 1906. That compromise was in the follow- 
ing form : 

" First. Children of alien races who speak the English 
language, in order to determine the proper grade in 
which they may be enrolled, must first be examined as 
to their educational qualifications. 

" Second. That no child of alien birth over the ages 
of ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, or sixteen years 
shall be enrolled in any of the first, second, third, fourth, 
fifth, sixth, seventh or eighth grades, respectively. 

" Third. If said alien children shall be found deficient 
in their abihty to speak, or deficient in the elements of 
the English language, or unable to attend the grades 
mentioned in Section 2 by reason of the restrictions 
mentioned therein, such children shall be enrolled in 
special schools or in special classes established exclu- 
sively for such children and in the manner the Board of 
Education shall deem proper and most expedient." 

There is nothing extraordinarily favorable for Japanese 
children in this compromise, and it ought to have been at- 
tained simply on the ground of fairness and justice, without 
demanding of Japan any sacrifice therefor. As a matter of 
fact, it was made possible only by imposing upon Japan 
the condition that she should prohibit the emigration of 
her subjects to the United States. In other words Japan 
was forced to accept the alternative of exclusion in order to 
restore in the San Francisco public schools a handful of 
Japanese pupils. In the effort to avoid a Scylla the Jap- 
anese foundered upon a Charybdis, and the Exclusion 
League congratulated itself upon the success of its 
scheme to force the Japanese into the snare. 

Just as the school question was a means to the end of 



I 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — I 313 

excluding Japanese immigrants, so the violence and out- 
rages, resorted to by the riffraff of the San Francisco 
population against the Japanese residents there, were 
calculated to facilitate the attainment of the same end, as 
the frequent occurrence of such violence and outrages 
would inevitably create with the American people an im- 
pression that there was an unbridgeable chasm dividing 
the Japanese from other races residing in this country. 
Let us see what such outrages were. 

In backward countries where the administration of law 
is hopelessly lax, bands of robbers are subsidized by peace- 
able people to secure immunity from sudden attack. How- 
ever incredible it may seem in a country of liberty and 
enlightenment, this is virtually what some Japanese busi- 
ness men in San Francisco had to do with trade-union 
men who tried to crush their business by violence. This 
phase of the question is clearly set forth in Secretary 
Metcalf's report to the President. For two or three 
weeks in October, 1905, several Japanese restaurants in 
San Francisco were subjected to frequent attacks by men 
professing to belong to labor unions. Windows and 
furniture were broken, stones were thrown, blows were 
struck, and customers attempting to enter any of the 
Japanese restaurants were restrained by force. Some 
days the rioters visited the Japanese establishments morn- 
ing, noon, and evening, and their visits were accompanied 
by threats and intimidation if not by violence. So ob- 
noxious and even dangerous had their activities become 
that the Japanese restaurant-keepers decided, towards the 
end of October, to pay money to the rioters to buy safety. 
A sum of ;^350 was immediately raised, and an agree- 
ment was entered into with one W. S. Stevenson, the 
ringleader of the rioters, for the payment of that sum 



314 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

upon the condition that outrages be stopped. Of the 
^350 the first payment was made to the amount of j^ioo, 
and as if by enchantment, the hoodlums ceased to loiter 
about the Japanese restaurants. Tennyson once sang 
that " The jingling of the guinea helps the hurt that 
honor feels," but in this case, the jingling of the dollar 
seemed to intensify the hurt that honor felt, for neither 
Stevenson nor his representative ever appeared to receive 
the remainder of the money promised by the Japanese. 

Aside from the assaults upon the Japanese restaurants 
a score of Japanese were stoned and beaten by hoodlums 
and laborers. Among the Japanese thus attacked were 
Dr. F. Omori, of the Imperial University of Tokio, who, 
as stated by Prof. George Davidson, of the State Univer- 
sity of California, is one of the greatest living authorities 
on seismography. Dr. Omori had been sent to San 
Francisco by the Imperial University to study the causes 
and effects of the earthquake. While engaged in ob- 
servation in the field, he and his assistants were stoned 
by hoodlums. Dr. Nakamura, professor of architecture 
in the Imperial University of Tokio, who had also been 
sent there by the Japanese government to study the 
effects of the earthquake upon the buildings in San Fran- 
cisco, was likewise subjected to a similar humiliating 
treatment. Yet these gentlemen, knowing that the out- 
rages were committed by the merest riffraff of San Fran- 
cisco, requested that no ofificial recognition be taken of 
them. The Japanese at home fully appreciated that the 
majority of the San Franciscans did not approve of in- 
discreet agitation against their compatriots in California, 
and continued to entertain for the city stricken with 
earthquake and fire the most heartfelt sympathy, which 
manifested itself in the contribution towards the relief 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — I 315 

fund of ^^246,000, a sum larger than that contributed by 
any other single country. 

For the preservation of Japan's good-will through the 
dark days of the anti -Japanese campaign in San Fran- 
cisco, much credit must be given to the actions taken by 
various other cities on the Pacific Coast, vindicating their 
sincere desire to be friends with the Japanese, in spite of 
San Francisco. While the abuse of the Japanese in San 
Francisco was going on, the cities of Los Angeles, Port- 
land, Tacoma, and Seattle, through their respective 
chambers of commerce, declared at various times in 
February and March, 1907, that they were against any 
measure aimed at the segregation of Japanese pupils or 
the exclusion of Japanese immigrants. As the declara- 
tions were all framed virtually in the same spirit, if not in 
the same language, they may well be represented by the 
declaration issued by the Chamber of Commerce of 
Seattle. It was as follows : 

" It is the opinion of the Seattle Chamber of Com- 
merce that a majority of the people of the Pacific Coast 
are not in favor of any immigration law that will treat 
the people of Japan differently from the way in which we 
treat the people of any European country. We recog- 
nize that the United States and the empire of Japan are 
bound together by the ties of trade, commerce and old 
friendship, which in the past have proved of great advan- 
tage to both countries, and if preserved, contain a sure 
pledge of still greater benefits for the future. We believe 
that any immigration treaty, which would discriminate 
against Japan by denying to the people of that country 
ordinary rights or privileges granted to the people of 
other civilized nations, would be uncalled for and would 
be detrimental to the trade and commerce of the Pacific 



3l6 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Coast, and, by checking the growth, development and 
prosperity of this section, would tend directly to narrow 
the field of employment for our own people and decrease 
the demand for our own labor. It would injure the 
Pacific Coast farmers by barring the way to a large and 
profitable market for flour and other foodstuffs. It 
would strike directly at those manufacturing industries 
throughout the country which are now supplying steel 
rails, machinery, food and appliances for the development 
of Japan, Korea and Manchuria. It would practically 
close Japan, Korea and Manchuria to American capital 
and to the use of American skilled labor that would 
otherwise be largely employed in the development of the 
resources of those countries. 

" Moreover, as the enforcement of the terms of any 
new immigration treaty putting Japan on a different foot- 
ing from that of other nations or any law or regulation 
made pursuant to such a treaty would necessarily be in 
the hands of bureau officials, its administration would, in 
our opinion, be almost certain to sow the seeds of dis- 
agreements, dissension and strife between the two coun- 
tries. 

" Therefore, be it resolved that in the opinion of this 
chamber it would be against the best interests of the 
Pacific Coast and of the whole country to conclude any 
treaty or enact any law, the effect of which would be to 
treat the people of Japan in a manner different from the 
treatment accorded to the people of other civilized 
powers." 

This resolution, as well as those of the other cities, 
was submitted to the President and the Secretary of 
State, but was unheeded. 



XX 

DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE— II 

THE resolutions of the chambers of commerce of 
four great cities on the Pacific Coast, which we 
have noted in the preceding chapter, were 
received in Japan with great satisfaction and a profound 
sense of relief. But the joy brought by the pleasant 
tidings was soon to be dispelled by the anxiety caused by 
the disquieting news from San Francisco. The Japanese 
had hoped that such outrages as had been perpetrated in 
San Francisco during the previous fall would never be 
repeated. They had cherished the belief that the good 
sense of the citizens of that city and the efficiency of its 
police authorities would make such disorderly conduct 
impossible. But in this they were sorely disappointed. 
Almost upon the heels of the reassuring declarations 
made by other cities on the Pacific Coast, a number of 
Japanese restaurants in San Francisco were once again 
subjected to violent attacks and intimidation at the hands 
of hoodlums and laborers. 

The fresh outrages were started in the usual manner. 
One evening in May, 1907, four white men, belonging to 
labor unions, were taking supper in a Japanese eating- 
house. Presently another party of union men, acting 
apparently on a preconcerted plan, appeared in front of 
the restaurant, and, after talking loudly and in vile lan- 
guage at the entrance, ordered the four men, who were 
eating supper, to come out. Two of the men did go out, 

317 



3l8 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

and as soon as they reached the sidewalk they were 
assaulted, knocked down, and beaten. The object of 
the attacking party was, evidently, to punish their fellows 
for patronizing a Japanese restaurant, but the uproar soon 
attracted a crowd, made up mostly of hoodlums and 
roughs. Instantly the mob spirit was let loose, and the 
crowd, not satisfied with the punishment of the cus- 
tomers, proceeded to wreck the restaurant. By the time 
the destruction of the windows and furniture and dishes 
was completed, the passions of the rioters had been 
spurred to such a pitch that they forthwith started to 
destroy a Japanese bath-house opposite the restaurant on 
the other side of the street. Several calls for the police 
had been sounded, but no officer appeared in the scene 
of violence. For several consecutive nights after this 
incident, laborers and hoodlums visited various Japanese 
restaurants, breathing threats and often resorting to 
violence. 

To be sure, these occurrences were deplorable enough, 
but it was unfortunate that they should have been 
brought by the Japanese ambassador to the notice of 
the President or the Secretary of State. It ought to 
have been remembered that at the time San Francisco, 
whose energies had been overtaxed in the struggle to 
rise from the ruins spread by the earthquake and confla- 
gration, was also hampered by the street-car strike, 
which occasioned much disorder throughout the city. 
Hoodlum sympathizers with the striking carmen stoned 
cars, assaulted peaceable citizens, and even insulted 
women, among whom was the wife of the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court. The throwing of stones and 
bricks, and the exploding of dynamite and infernal ma- 
chines were almost the order of the day. The apostles 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — II 319 

of Japanese exclusion did not, of course, scruple to take 
advantage of this general reign of lawlessness, and em- 
ployed all the means at their command to aggravate the 
outrages perpetrated by the hoodlums against the Japa- 
nese. That such a dismal state of affairs should be 
permitted to prevail certainly did not reflect favorably 
upon the efficiency and integrity of the municipal gov- 
ernment of San Francisco, and yet one could be lenient 
towards it if one remembered the terrific calamity that 
had overtaken the city. Apparently the Japanese am- 
bassador of that time did not feel obliged to view the 
situation so sympathetically, and saw it fit to call the 
President's attention, in a friendly, informal way, to the 
abuses to which the Japanese in San Francisco had been 
subjected. Mr. Roosevelt received the ambassador's re- 
minder with what courtesy the conventional etiquette of 
diplomacy might require, but in the bottom of his heart 
he no doubt felt somewhat annoyed to see such petty 
incidents thrust into delicate diplomacy. The President, 
moreover, probably regarded it as an affront to the 
national pride of his country that an ambassador from a 
foreign nation should remind him so frequently of the 
disorders prevailing in a section of his country. At any 
rate it was a regrettable move that was taken by Ambas- 
sador Aoki, and it was small wonder that about that time 
the President's displeasure with the Japanese ambassador 
began to be rumored abroad. 

More diplomatic was the move taken by the leading 
chambers of commerce in Japan. Brief messages cabled 
to the Japanese press with regard to the renewed attack 
of laborers upon Japanese business establishments in 
San Francisco created intense anxiety, as the extent of 
damage suffered and the nature of outrages could not 



320 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

be ascertained at the time. The Japanese chambers of 
commerce discerned, in the frequent occurrence of anti- 
Japanese demonstrations in Cahfornia, a grave danger to 
the traditional friendship which had bound together 
America and Japan for half a century, and felt con- 
strained to do something to alleviate the situation. At 
the same time they were anxious that the matter would 
not be turned into diplomatic channels, as such a course 
would only result in aggravating the situation by putting 
both the Tokio and the Washington government in an 
embarrassing position. Consequently they decided to 
appeal to their sister organizations in America in the 
name of commerce and trade. The result was the joint 
note of the five most influential chambers of commerce 
in Japan addressed to the leading chambers of commerce 
in America, requesting the latter to exercise their whole- 
some influence for the betterment of conditions in San 
Francisco. 

The action of the Japanese chambers of commerce 
was no doubt suggested by the previous resolution of 
the chambers of commerce on the Pacific Coast, which 
we have already noted. The Japanese appeal was, on 
the whole, well received on this side of the water. The 
Chamber of Commerce of Seattle responded to it with a 
most cordial letter, a passage from which is here repro- 
duced : 

" In the future, as in the past, Seattle will always be 
found standing for justice and fair play for the Japanese, 
as well as for all other nationalities within her borders. 
For more than ten years Seattle has been the American 
home port of the Nippon Yusen Kaisha, the great Japa- 
nese steamship company. This company has been a 
pioneer in opening up a profitable and friendly trade 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — II 32 1 

between the two countries. Commerce in our day is the 
most powerful and persuasive ambassador of peace and 
good-will among nations. It brings the people of the 
world closer together, removes prejudices and promotes 
national friendships. Not the least important mission of 
chambers of commerce- — the spokesmen, so to speak, of 
the commerce of their respective countries — is to cooper- 
ate with one another in smoothing away and compro- 
mising the differences that inevitably arise from time to 
time between the peoples of different countries, as be- 
tween communities in the same country. In this spirit, 
and with this end in view, the Seattle Chamber of Com- 
merce extends to the chambers of commerce of the cities 
of Tokio, Osaka, Kyoto, Yokohama and Kobe its most 
friendly consideration, and trusts that the good relations 
which have existed so long between our cities, as between 
our countries, and with such manifest advantage to both, 
may continue unbroken into the far future." 

A most auspicious sequel to this exchange of views 
between Japanese and American chambers of commerce 
was the mutual visits of the leading financiers and busi- 
ness men of each country to the other, to which reference 
will be made in the proper place. That the exchange of 
cordialities between the commercial organizations of the 
two countries materially contributed to the brightening 
of Japanese-American relations in general cannot be 
doubted, even if it may not have produced any direct 
effect upon the Japanese situation in San Francisco. 

Meanwhile, the American government proceeded to 
take measures for the exclusion of Japanese laborers, 
whether skilled or unskilled. By this time it became evi- 
dent that Mr. Roosevelt's attitude towards the Japanese 
question had changed perceptibly. When he penned that 



322 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

memorable message of December, 1906, wherein he ex- 
tolled the Japanese in a manner which almost embarrassed 
them, he had, I am inclined to believe, no idea of indors- 
ing the programme of the Japanese and Korean Exclusion 
League. Indeed he was so enthusiastic in praising the 
Japanese that he recommended that Congress provide for 
their naturalization. Did he now regret that he had ever 
made so strong a case for the Mikado's subjects ? At 
any rate, he accepted, wilUngly or unwillingly, the main 
contention of the Exclusion League after he conferred 
with the California delegates headed by the now dis- 
graced Mayor Schmitz. Mr. Roosevelt immediately 
took steps towards the fulfillment of the promise he had 
given the delegates, and entered into negotiation with the 
Japanese government, which showed a willingness to ad- 
just the matter along the line marked out by the Presi- 
dent. And yet the exclusionists did not stop their agita- 
tion; so far from it, they caused a group of politicians to 
introduce in the California legislature several bills directed 
against the Japanese residents in that state. Fortunately 
the enactment of such discriminative laws was prevented 
by the vigorous protest from Mr. Roosevelt. In March, 
1907, he telegraphed to Governor Gillette, of California, 
a message, contending that the action of the state legisla- 
ture was most unfortunate in the effect upon his efforts to 
secure the exclusion of Japanese laborers by friendly 
agreement. Then followed a number of letters from him, 
resulting in the withdrawal of the anti-Japanese bills. 

Up to that time, the activities of the Japanese and 
Korean Exclusion League were confined to California. 
The state of Washington was friendlily disposed towards 
the Japanese immigrants who had been arriving there 
in considerable numbers. As for Oregon, she had no 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — II 323 

reason for taking any interest in the propaganda, for her 
Japanese population was a negligible quantity. So the 
agitators of California determined to arouse an anti- 
Japanese prejudice among the people of other Pacific 
Coast states. The Exclusion League set up branches in 
Portland and Seattle and called mass-meetings of laborers 
to demonstrate against the Japanese. Not only this, but 
the league stretched its hands into British Columbia, and 
tried to mvest the organization with an international 
nature. This latter move was extremely opportune, as 
Japanese laborers in Hawaii, after the doors of continental 
United States had been closed against them, began to enter 
British Columbia in numbers larger than ever before. 
This was arousing apprehension among the working men 
in the province, and the Exclusion League of California 
saw in the situation a God-sent opportunity. 

At this time the Seattle branch of the league was 
directed by a picturesque character. A hotel cook by 
trade, he cherished an ambition out of all proportion to 
his ability, his training, and his education. Being a 
working man he aspired to authority in the field of or- 
ganized labor. If Samuel Gompers and John Mitchell 
could rise from the rank of laborers to the dizzy heights 
of fame, why not he ? To his chagrin, the established 
trade unions of Seattle were not anxious to confer upon 
him a crown of leadership. In the moment of despond- 
ency an inspiration rekindled his ambition. He saw 
that the anti-Japanese campaign in San Francisco lifted 
O. A. Tveitmoe from obscurity, and made him one of 
the most talked-about men on the Pacific Coast. If 
Tveitmoe could do that down in San Francisco, why 
could he not do the same up in Seattle ? So Arthur E. 
Fowler — for such was the name of this aspiring hotel 



324 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

cook — set out to preach the gospel of Japanese exclusion, 
talking about the ♦* Yellow Peril " and all that. Nobody 
listened. Perhaps he had better get somebody who 
could talk louder to help him, so he got into communi- 
cation with Tveitmoe. The arch-exclusionist of San 
Francisco fancied he found in Fowler an able lieutenant, 
and the Seattle branch of the Exclusion League was im- 
mediately established. 

Fowler's chance had at last arrived. He scented a 
growing feeling of antipathy towards the Japanese immi- 
grants in Vancouver. To Vancouver he rushed, and 
there he revealed to his fellow agitators in British 
Columbia the favorite tactics of the Exclusion League. 
The result was the disturbance of September 7, 1907. 
Imagine Fowler's delight. He saw his name printed in 
all the papers on the Pacific Coast ; he surely felt like a 
man who woke up one fine morning to find himself 
famous. But alas ! his fame was not to last. Only a few 
days after the Vancouver incident, he appeared in Bell- 
ingham, Washington, on the holy mission of exclusion. 
But even before he opened his crusade there, the police 
of Bellingham put him under arrest, the judge declared 
him insane, and committed him to the asylum at Stella- 
coom. Thus began and ended the career of the secre- 
tary of the Japanese and Korean Exclusion League in 
Seattle. His disappearance from the stage of agitation 
was mourned by the Seattle Post Intelligencer in these 
terms eminently fit for the occasion : 

*' No man of gentle impulses will be inclined to pass 
harsh judgment upon Arthur E. Fowler, secretary of the 
Japanese-Korean Exclusion League, who has been ad- 
judged insane by Judge John A. Kellogg, of Bellingham, 
and committed to the Stellacoom asylum. Fowler's mis- 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE— II 3^5 

sion was not holy. There is no need in this free coun- 
try for work of the kind prosecuted by this unhappy man 
and his associates. 

" Fowler's fate is supremely pathetic. There may be 
a warning in it for other men who seek to subvert Ameri- 
can principles and blot out all that is good and enduring 
in the tradition and sentiment of this nation. . . . 

" Of such strength is the faith of the average Ameri- 
can in his own country and its institutions that he is not 
afraid to share his fortunes with the friendly stranger, 
without regard to race, lineage or color ; indeed, if he has 
any fear at all, it is of princely meddlers, fair of skin and 
smooth of speech, who come hither to talk rather than to 
toil, rather than of honest plodders who come asking 
only the privilege of respecting the nation, its laws, cus- 
toms and institutions, while they dig their living out of 
the ground." 

Fowler's fall and the general unpopularity of the Ex- 
clusion League in Seattle, and indeed in Washington, 
worried Tveitmoe and his associates. They had dreamed 
of effecting one strong organization that would embrace 
all Western states and British Columbia, and thus convert 
the entire Pacific slope from Los Angeles to Vancouver 
into a solid bulwark to keep the Japanese out. Now 
their pleasant dream was broken by the rude shock of 
Fowler's downfall. Yet they were not daunted, and de- 
cided to carry war into the camp of the enemy. In ac- 
cordance with this resolution they held, early in February, 
1908, an interstate conference in Seattle, the city which 
had hissed Fowler off the stage. Again their efforts 
proved utterly futile. The exclusionists came thither 
with the avowed object of creating a stronghold of anti- 
exclusion sentiment, but when the campaign was over 



326 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

they found they had scored a failure. The Seattle Post 
Intelligencer awaited the coming of the exclusionist 
delegates, with its broadside ready to open fire upon 
them. The day before the arrival of the delegates this 
paper sounded a warning to what it called " unwelcome 
guests," saying : 

" Delegates who may come to Seattle to attend the 
meeting of the Japanese-Korean Exclusion League to- 
morrow will be unwelcome. They are not wanted in 
this community, and the pity is that the law does not 
afford a means of keeping them away. . . . When 
these meddlers meet in the city of Seattle, if they must 
meet here, it will behoove them to speak and act with 
caution. In utterance or act, there must be no violence 
in this community, due to the presence here of foreign 
agitators who wear the livery of Americanism merely to 
defile it ; else they may find that the real Americans of 
this city can do a little excluding on their own account, 
with a primitive rawness that might have the smell of tar 
and feathers." 

It did not take long for the exclusionists to find out 
that they were utterly out of place in that metropolis of 
the Pacific Northwest. But that was not the worst they 
experienced. They quarrelled among themselves upon 
the question of distribution of offices, and it was in sullen 
mood and with blighted hopes that the delegates left 
Seattle. 

Meanwhile Japan earnestly set to the task of stopping 
the emigration of her laborers to the United States, and 
approached the American government with what she 
considered to be a workable plan. The plan was accepted 
by the Washington administration, and thus the two na- 
tions found the way to act in unison. It happened just 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — II 327 

at this time tliat the Atlantic squadron of America left 
home waters on a cruise around the world. The event 
occasioned many wild rumors both in America and in 
Europe. Not a few American newspapers intimated that 
the cruise was intended to be a demonstration directed at 
Japan, in order to bring the immigration question into a 
speedy settlement. The Japanese, like all Orientals, they 
said, were insincere and evasive, and that nothing could 
appeal to them more forcibly than display of force. They 
failed to see that their unwarranted comments were cal- 
culated to estrange Japan and America, and to impair 
the traditional friendship between the two nations, which 
they themselves certainly desired to maintain. Appar- 
ently they could not realize that the Japanese were no 
less proud and patriotic than the Americans, and that 
any allusion to the cruise of the Atlantic fleet as the 
manifestation of the " big stick " policy must rasp the 
tenderest nerve of the Japanese people. The Japanese 
are, in a sense, a people of strong sentiments and have in 
many instances shown themselves capable of acting in 
utter disregard of the idea of gain or loss, when once 
their pride was deeply affected. Such a nation would be 
the last to bow to military prowess paraded before its 
eyes. If Japan and America are to be good friends, as 
they indeed must, neither should affront the other by the 
exhibition of force, but each must take the other into 
confidence and act with sympathy and consideration. 

But to come back to the Atlantic squadron. European 
newspapers, and especially those of Paris, were even more 
sensational in reporting the departure of the fleet for the 
Far East. Some of these papers had the audacity to re- 
port that the Japanese navy was secretly preparing to 
challenge the American fleet, coloring the report with 



328 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

the invented story of mysterious movements of the 
Mikado's men-of-war. Worse still, an anonymous writer, 
presumably a German, circulated a pamphlet in London, 
describing the " coming conflict " between Japan and 
America. Obviously there were some agents of mischief 
at work with the sinister intention to alienate American 
sympathy from Japan. Shortly afterwards a German 
novel, elaborating the plot set forth in the pamphlet, was 
published in Berhn, and its English version appeared in 
New York. But the Japanese government and people 
had too much sense and too strong a confidence in the 
American government to be disturbed by such tricks, 
and it was but natural that they should have extended to 
the American battle-ships the most enthusiastic vv^elcome 
and the most cordial treatment. In view of these circum- 
stances it was regrettable that, almost a year after Japan 
welcomed the American squadron, Mr. Roosevelt, dis- 
cussing in the Outlook the question of Japanese immigra- 
tion, should refer to a powerful navy as a necessary 
means of enforcing the restriction of immigration. 
The reference may have implied no reflection upon the 
integrity of Japan, but it sounded very much like an 
intimation that the visit of the American battle-ship squad- 
ron to Japanese waters was really intended to intimidate 
the Japanese, and that the Japanese government would 
not adhere to the exclusion understanding, unless the 
United States had a navy powerful enough to prevent its 
violation. Were American newspapers right after all, 
when they believed that the cruise of the Atlantic fleet 
was not purely a practice cruise ? And were the Japa- 
nese after all simpletons to take the call of the American 
fleet at their ports for a mark of friendship ? However, 
it is not given to humanity never to err, and even Mr, 



DENIS KEARNYISM ONCE MORE — II 329 

Roosevelt cannot be absolutely free from indiscretions. 
In our admiration of his patriotism, his probity, and his 
straightforwardness, we can gladly forget small blunders 
that he may occasionally commit. 

The smoldering embers of anti-Japanese agitation in 
California once again threatened to rekmdle a conflagra- 
tion in January, 1909. ihe legislature of California had 
submitted for its consideration several discriminatory 
bills all directed at the Japanese residents in that state. 
The first of these bills denied the Japanese the ownership 
of land ; the second provided that no Japanese should be 
appointed director of any corporation in California ; the 
third conferred upon the municipal governments in that 
state the option to segregate Japanese from the residential 
quarters of American citizens. While the term •* aliens " 
instead of " Japanese " was used in these bills, it was all 
but evident that they aimed at the Japanese. For while 
European immigrants could be easily naturalized, the 
Japanese were barred from becoming American citizens. 
The fourth anti-Japanese bill, like the measure taken by 
the San Francisco school board three years previously, 
provided for the segregation of Japanese children in all 
the schools throughout the state. In this last-named 
bill the exclusionist legislators meant to hit Japan 
straight in the face, for here they used the specific term 
" Japanese " in place of the general term " aliens." 
Needless to say that these bills were introduced through 
the influence and agitation of the Exclusion League, 
When President Roosevelt learned of the introduction 
of these bills, he lost no time in launching a vigorous 
protest on the ground that their enactment would be in 
violation of the rights conferred upon the Japanese by 
treaty, which was the supreme law of the land. He also 



330 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

contended that the bills, if passed, would result only in 
defeating the main purpose, which was the exclusion of 
Japanese laborers. Governor Gillette and Speaker Stan- 
ton, of the Cahfornia Assembly, took sides with the 
President, and exercised their influence to prevent the 
passage of the bills. Once more the league failed to 
attain its coveted end. 



XXI 

JAPANESE IMMIGRATION AFTER THE EXCLUSION 

AGREEMENT 

WE have examined the real status of Japanese 
immigration prior to the exclusion agreement 
of 1907, as well as the circumstances which 
forced that agreement upon the Roosevelt administra- 
tion. It remains for us to inquire what the exclusion 
agreement is and what it has actually achieved. 

In fulfillment of the promise Mr. Roosevelt made to 
Mayor Schmitz and the school board of San Francisco 
early in 1907, the President caused the Congress to in- 
corporate, in the Immigration Act approved on February 
25th of that year, the following provision : 

" Whenever the President shall be satisfied that pass- 
ports issued by any foreign government to its citizens to 
go to any other country than the United States or to 
any insular possession of the United States or to the 
Canal Zone are being used for the purpose of enabling 
the holders to come to the continental territory of the 
United States to the detriment of labor conditions 
therein, the President may refuse to permit such citizens 
of the country issuing such passports to enter the conti- 
nental territory of the United States from such other 
country or from such insular possessions or from the 
Canal Zone." 

On the basis of this provision the President, on March 
14, 1907, issued a proclamation excluding from conti- 
nental United States *' Japanese or Korean laborers, 

33^ 



332 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

skilled or unskilled, who have received passports to go 
to Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii, and come therefrom." 
To put this executive order into operation, the Depart- 
ment of Commerce and Labor, on March 26, 1907, issued 
a circular which reads as follows : 

" Aliens from Japan or Korea are subject to the general 
immigration laws. 

" Every Japanese or Korean laborer, skilled or unskilled, 
applying for admission at a seaport or at a land border 
port of the United States, and having in his possession a 
passport issued by the government of Japan, entitling 
him to proceed only to Mexico, Canada, or Hawaii, shall 
be refused admission. 

" If a Japanese or Korean alien applies for admission 
and presents a passport entitling him to enter the United 
States, or one which is not limited to Mexico, Canada, or 
Hawaii, he shall be admitted, if it appears that he does 
not belong to any of the classes of ahens excluded by the 
general immigration laws. 

" If a Japanese or Korean alien applies for admission 
and presents a passport limited to Mexico, Canada, or 
Hawaii, and claims that he is not a laborer, either skilled 
or unskilled, reasonable proof of this claim shall be re- 
quired in order to permit him to enter the United States. 

" If a Japanese or Korean skilled or unskilled laborer 
is found in the continental territory of the United States 
without having been duly admitted upon inspection, the 
procedure employed under the general immigration laws 
for the arrest and hearing of aliens who have entered 
the United States surreptitiously shall be observed." 

Meanwhile the American government entered into 
negotiation with the Japanese government with a view 
to securing its cooperation in the enforcement of the 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 333 

immigration regulations. Japan willingly acceded to 
the American request, and suggested plans for the 
control of immigrants. Thus an understanding was 
reached, contemplating that the Japanese government 
should issue passports to continental United States only 
to such of its subjects as were *♦ non-laborers " or were 
laborers who, in coming to the continent, sought to re- 
sume a formerly acquired domicile, to join a parent, wife 
or children residing there, or to assume active control 
of an already possessed interest in a farming enterprise 
in this country ; so that the three classes of laborers 
entitled to receive passports to continental United States 
have come to be known by the following designations : 

I. Former residents. 

II. Parents, wives, or children of residents. 
in. Settled agriculturists. 

The American government, in negotiating the exclu- 
sion of Japanese laborers, was chiefly concerned with the 
conditions on the Pacific Coast, and had httle, or no idea 
of extending to Hawaii the application of the exclusion 
agreement. But the Japanese government of its own 
initiative and vohtion decided to issue passports to Hawaii 
only to those laborers who were former residents, or par- 
ents, wives, or children of residents. This unexpected 
move on the part of Japan was by no means an agreeable 
surprise to the sugar interests in Hawaii and their allies 
on the Pacific Coast. They had urged the exclusion of 
Japanese laborers from the continental territory with the 
object of checking the exodus of Japanese laborers from 
Hawaii, so that the sugar planters might have an abun- 
dant supply of cheap labor. They had dreamed that the 
happy days were coming when the Japanese laborers 
would be completely at their mercy, accepting what 



334 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

wages employers would deign to give. Whether the 
Japanese government espied their designs or not, it is a 
fact that its act in restricting the immigration of its sub- 
jects to Hawaii proved a great disappointment to the sugar 
interests of the island. 

We have explained the scope and nature of the ex- 
clusion understanding, and are in a position to describe 
its practical working. The regulations concerning the 
exclusion of Japanese laborers came into effect in March, 
1907 ; yet Japanese immigrants for the fiscal year 1907 
totalled 30,226, the figures being the largest in the his- 
tory of Japanese immigration to America. From this 
the uninformed may infer that the exclusion regulations 
failed, in the first year at all events, to attain the end for 
which they were adopted. The inference is wrong. 
Although the exclusion regulations were issued in 
March, 1907, it required a considerable time to complete 
the preparations necessary for their enforcement and to 
obtain Japanese cooperation without which they could 
not accomplish satisfactory results. Consequently the 
new arrangement did not begin to work smoothly in all 
its details until July or August of that year. It will, 
therefore, be seen that Japanese immigration for the fiscal 
year 1907, extending from July, 1906, to June, 1 907, 
was affected but little by the new system. On the con- 
trary the high state of prosperity, which prevailed in this 
country during that year, brought an unusually large 
number of immigrants from Japan, as also from European 
countries. European immigrants for that year totalled 
1,199,566, breaking all records in the immigration history 
of America. The same circumstances which swelled the 
tide of European immigration produced similar effects 
upon Japanese immigration. 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 335 

By the middle of the summer of 1907, however, the 
effects of the new system began to be perceptible. Japan, 
on her part, had been striving to put the official machin- 
ery for the control of her emigrants to America in efficient 
working order. The united efforts of the two governments 
could not fail to produce a marked effect. Thus in the 
fiscal year ended June 30, 1908, Japanese immigrants 
totalled 15,803, showing a decrease of 14,423 as compared 
with the total for the preceding year. This result, re- 
markable as it was, was not quite up to the expectations 
of the two governments. By the summer of 1908, how- 
ever, the official machineries of both Japan and America 
for the control of immigration had attamed a greater de- 
gree of efficiency, in consequence of which Japanese 
immigrants for the year ended June 30, 1909, declined to 
3,430, as against which no less than 7,382 left this coun- 
try for their home land, resulting in a decrease of 3,952 
in the Japanese population in Hawaii and the mainland. 
Again, in the fiscal year 1910 there were 4,125 immi- 
grants from Japan, whereas 7,379 Japanese returned 
home, resulting in a decrease of 3,254 in the Japanese 
population in continental United States and Hawaii. In 
the following two tables the effects of the exclusion agree- 
ment since its inauguration are clearly shown : 

I. Continental United States 
Year Arrivals Departures Increase or decrease 

1908 9.544 4*796 Increase . . 4,748 

1909 2,432 5,004 Decrease . . 2,572 

1910 2,598 5,024 Decrease . . 2,426 

II. Hawaii 

Year Arrivals Departures Increase or decrease 

1908 8,694 4,392 Increase . , 4,302 

1909 1,493 2,378 Decrease . . 885 

1910 1,527 2,355 Decrease . . 828 

In examining the above statistics it is important to re- 



336 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

member that the majority of the Japanese immigrants 
were " non-laborers." Indeed, it often is a strain to the 
susceptibihty of Japan to see such of her nationals as 
high officials, noted scholars or influential financiers 
treated as immigrants, once they seek admission to this 
country. It makes not a jot of difference whether they 
come to buy a million dollars' worth of railway material, 
or they are en route to Washington or London to assume 
their duties at the Japanese Legation, or they are sent by 
the government to carry out some scientific investigation. 
All the same, they are immigrants, and are reported 
accordingly by the immigration officials. What an 
anomaly ! Yet the Japanese is willing enough to toler- 
ate the absurdity, if America deems it essential to the 
maintenance of peace between the two countries to 
bestow even upon Japanese of high social and official 
standing the unceremonious appellation of " immigrant." 
Perhaps, too, it is a bit of American humor or American 
hospitality to treat all foreign guests, irrespective of rank 
and title, without superfluous formalities. Let us, then, 
make ourselves at home here in this land of liberty, how- 
ever brusque the immigration officials may be. 

But I must come back to statistics. I have stated that 
the majority of the so-called Japanese immigrants are 
non-laborers who do not come within the scope of the 
immigration agreement. To verify this statement I pre- 
sent the following table, showing the classification of 
Japanese immigrants to continental United States into 
laborers and non-laborers : 

Year Total immigrants Laborers Non-laborers 

1908 8,694 4,041 5,503 

1909 1,493 713 1^719 

1910 1,527 705 1,893 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 337 

A cursory examination of this table may create an im- 
pression that inasmuch as hundreds of Japanese laborers 
are yet coming to these shores every year, the govern- 
ment at Tokio cannot be strict in adhering to the spirit of 
the " gentlemen's agreement." To dissipate such erro- 
neous impressions a more critical analysis of statistics is 
necessary. Let us take, for convenience's sake, the fig- 
ures for 1910. The 2,598 Japanese who entered the 
mainland in that year are classified as follows : 



Former residents - • - - - 714 

Parents, wives, or children of residents - i>i48 

Settled agriculturists ----- i 

Non-laborers ----- 649 

Laborers --.---- 86 



Total 2,598 

Now " former residents " and " parents, wives, or chil- 
dren of residents " include both laborers and non-labor- 
ers, but laborers of these two classes are not, as we have 
already seen, subject to the exclusion agreement. As 
the table shows, there were only eighty-four laborers who 
were neither former residents nor parents, wives or chil- 
dren of residents. Of these eighty-four laborers, forty- 
seven had proper passports, but the remaining thirty-nine 
had not proper passports, that is, they had passports to 
Canada, Mexico, or Hawaii, but not to continental 
United States. How these thirty-nine laborers with no 
proper passports were admitted by the immigration 
authorities is not explained in the report of the Commis- 
sioner-General of Immigration. Whatever the reason 
for their admission, the Japanese government cannot be 
held responsible for it. As for the forty-seven laborers 



338 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

who had passports to continental United States, it is 
probable that the Japanese government, upon the 
strength of their statements, regarded them as non-labor- 
ers and issued passports accordingly, whereas the immi- 
gration authorities of this country, after cross examina- 
tion, concluded that they were, strictly speaking, not 
entitled to passports. In handling an enormous number 
of applications for passports, no government can be 
absolutely free from errors. It rather bespeaks the effect- 
iveness and sincerity of the efforts of the Japanese gov- 
ernment that only so few as forty-seven managed to 
evade its vigilance and obtain passports without proper 
qualifications. 

We have examined immigration statistics pertaining to 
continental United States. As for Hawaii, we observe 
that the number of Japanese laborers coming there was 
larger than the number of non-laborers, as is shown in 
the following table : 

Year Total immigrants Laborers Non-laborers 

1908 8,694 5,700 2,994 

1909 1,493 i>2i3 280 

1910 1,527 1,298 235 

Further Inquiry, however, reveals the fact that almost 
all the laborers admitted belonged to either one of two 
classes, i. e.^ " former residents " and " parents, wives, or 
children of residents," classes which do not come within 
the scope of the exclusion agreement. Thus, of 1,527 
Japanese admitted to Hawaii in 1910, 257 were former 
residents, 1,166 were parents, wives or children of resi- 
dents and fifty-eight were non-laborers. Of the remain- 
ing forty-six who were all laborers, eleven came without 
proper passports, while thirty-five, though found not to 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 339 

belong to either one of the above-named two classes, had 
proper passports. 

The Japanese government has kept a record of the 
departure of its subjects for the United States as well as 
their return home from that country. It is, as the Com- 
missioner-General of Immigration observes, both gratify- 
ing and interesting that this record almost agrees with 
similar records kept by the Immigration Bureau of the 
United States. The government at Washington, in spite 
of spasmodic alarms raised by Pacific Coast politicians, is 
well satisfied with the results accomplished during the 
past few years, and is fully appreciative of Japan's sincere 
intention to cooperate with the United States in the 
matter of immigration. This sense of satisfaction and 
appreciation is expressed in the Commissioner-General 
of Immigration's report for the past fiscal year, which 
contains the following passage : 

" The experiment certainly, with the cooperation of 
the Japanese government, much more completely accom- 
plished the exclusion of Japanese laborers, as defined in 
the regulations putting the arrangement into effect, than 
have the Chinese exclusion laws ever operated to prevent 
the immigration of Chinese laborers, as defined in such 
laws, and is working at this moment with a greater 
degree of relative success." 

Agitators against Japanese immigration, forced to rec- 
ognize that the Japanese government is effectively 
checking the emigration of its subjects to the United 
States, have invented a new excuse to continue their 
spurious propaganda. They assert, as does ex-Mayor 
James D. Phelan, of San Francisco, that " whereas the 
* gentlemen's agreement ' has apparently kept the Japa- 
nese from shipping to American ports, they go to British 



340 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Columbia and Mexico in large numbers and immediately 
come over the borders to the fat lands and the attractive 
climate so agreeable to them on the Pacific Coast of the 
United States." The contention is flimsy, but it shall re- 
ceive a few words of criticism, lest the public may be mis- 
guided. The opponents of Japanese immigration who 
advance such views ignore the fact that the present 
understanding between Japan and the United States 
was inaugurated for the very purpose of stopping the 
entry of Japanese laborers from Canada and Mexico, as 
well as Hawaii. They also ignore that the Japanese 
government is striving to check the emigration of its 
subjects not only to the United States proper but to the 
territories contiguous to this country. As a matter of 
fact, the new arrangement is accomplishing such satis- 
factory results that the immigration officers in charge of 
the Mexican and Canadian borders have nothing to com- 
plain about the Japanese. On the contrary, their state- 
ments bear testimony to the effectiveness of the existing 
system. As an instance, let me cite the following pas- 
sage from the latest report of the immigration inspector 
at El Paso, who deals with the immigration of Japanese 
by way of the Mexican border : 

" The small proportion to which this character of im- 
migration has declined will be readily marked, as the 
total for the year reached only fifty-six cases, thirty-six 
of whom were admitted, two debarred, and eighteen were 
departmental warrant cases. With the lapse of additional 
time the effectiveness attending the regulation of Japa- 
nese immigration by agreement between the two coun- 
tries interested becomes more forcibly demonstrated. 
Japanese applicants for admission at Mexican border 
ports are confined almost wholly to transits, bona fide 



JAPANESE IMMIGRATION 34I 

residents of Mexico, or domiciled residents of the United 
States returning, and the few surreptitious entries represent 
merely the straggUng rear guard of the Japanese immi- 
grants who entered Mexico in such large numbers three 
or four years ago. The easy effectiveness with which 
the Japanese coolie-labor problem has been met throws 
into still sharper contrast the cumbersome, ineffective 
Chinese-exclusion law with which our officers are daily 
struggling in an effort to secure a satisfactory enforce- 
ment." 

The new American- Japanese treaty, which went into 
effect in July last, contains no reference to the exclusion 
of Japanese laborers. In the old treaty we find the fol- 
lowing article : 

" It is, however, understood that this and the succeed- 
ing article do not in any way affect the laws, ordinances 
and regulations with regard to trade, the immigration of 
laborers, police and public security which are in force or 
may hereafter be enacted in either of the two countries," 

In the new treaty there is no similar article. This fact 
seems to have created on the Pacific Coast the apprehen- 
sion that the government at Washington, yielding to 
Japanese demand, means ultimately to remove the ban 
placed upon Japanese immigration. Such an apprehen- 
sion is not warranted. So long as the existing agree- 
ment with regard to the exclusion of Japanese laborers 
cannot be abrogated by the mutual consent of the two 
governments concerned, the Japanese government will 
never deviate from the spirit of that agreement, but will 
exercise all its influence in checking the emigration of its 
subjects of the laboring class to the United States. Im- 
migration clause or no immigration clause, this policy of 
Japan will not undergo an iota of alteration under the 



342 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

new treaty. Why, then, was Japan anxious to have that 
clause removed from the new treaty ? Simply because 
the maintenance of such a clause would leave upon Japan 
the stigma of inferiority. No provision similar to the one 
cited above is found in any of the treaties which the 
United States has concluded with those foreign nations 
whose standing is on a par with that of herself. When 
the expired American-Japanese treaty was concluded in 
1894 Japan was not yet in a position to enter into the 
comity of nations on a footing of equality, and in con- 
sequence she was obliged to acquiesce in the insertion of 
an immigration clause in that instrument. Since that 
time, however, the Mikado's Empire has proved its ability 
to take its position as one of the great powers of the 
world. And as the Japanese advanced in the path of re- 
form and progress they not unnaturally felt galled by the 
presence of the immigration clause in the treaty with the 
United States. The elimination of that clause from the 
new treaty will confer upon Japan no material benefit, 
but she will at least have the satisfaction of seeing an 
obnoxious tarnish'removed from her national escutcheon. 
Meanwhile, the Pacific Coast may rest assured that the 
new treaty will entail no situation that will impair its 
welfare and interests. 



XXII 

THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA 

EARLY last year Mr. Mackenzie, Labor Commis- 
sioner of California, submitted to Governor 
Gillette a voluminous report on the Japanese in 
that state. The report was a shock to the exclusionists. 
The anti-Japanese agitation had succeeded in forcing the 
Federal government to erect a barrier against Japanese 
immigration. The Mikado's government, reahzing the 
embarrassing situation in which the Washington adminis- 
tration had been placed, had willingly agreed to stop the 
emigration of its subjects to the United States. The 
Japanese population in California had already begun to 
decline perceptibly. Everything had seemed to go splen- 
didly with the exclusionists. 

Now comes Mr. Mackenzie with the strange recom- 
mendation that the Japanese should be admitted to 
California. Worse still, he contends that the little brown 
laborer is in some respects even more desirable than the 
white working man. What an outrage ! How could he 
dare fly in the face of the all-powerful trades unions, and 
thrust before them such a scandalous proposition ? The 
worst of it is that Mackenzie advances this proposition 
deliberately, advisedly, and logically, propounding it with 
figures and statistics, and supporting every statement he 
makes with substantial evidence. And he does this in a 
report of more than 200,000 words. 

Mr. Mackenzie's report has aroused a storm of protest, 

343 



344 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

indignation, bewilderment, ridicule and sarcasm on the 
part of the laboring elements in CaHfornia, and the poli- 
ticians and newspapers, representing and echoing the 
sentiment of the trades unions. It is as if a nest of 
hornets were stirred, and the labor commissioner has 
been made the target of the most stinging criticism. Not 
a few newspapers have accused him of betraying the 
trust which was placed upon him by the legislature, in 
order to serve the interest of the owners of large farms. 
How much or how little truth there is in such accusations 
I am not able to judge ; but if we were to gauge the 
value of Mr. Mackenzie's report from the methods he 
followed in obtaining his data, we are forced to bestow 
upon the document more than a cursory examination. 
Let us, then, first see what his methods were. 

Early in 1909 the legislature of California approved an 
appropriation of ;^ 10,000 to be utilized for investigating 
the conditions of Japanese in that state. The duty of 
directing the investigation naturally devolved upon the 
State Commissioner of Labor Statistics, Mr. John D. 
Mackenzie. The work was begun on April 15, 1909, 
with the appointment of nine special agents, of whom 
eight were men and one woman — all white and Amer- 
icans. There were no Japanese or other aliens em- 
ployed in any capacity. To this force of special agents 
were added for the office work two expert statisticians 
and two stenographers. 

In appointing these field and office workers much stress 
was laid upon their special fitness for the particular 
branch of the work to which each was assigned. At 
the same time it was made plain to them that in view 
of the small appropriation the investigation could not be 
properly undertaken and successfully completed without 



THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA 345 

the practice of rigid economy, sacrifice of personal com- 
fort, and disregard of the number of hours that constitute 
a day's work. Preparatory to the undertaking of the 
field work a general scheme was formulated, so far as 
practicable, from information then in hand ; the general 
scope of the inquiry, the various lines of industry, and 
fields of activity were determined upon, and a plan was 
drafted that could be economically and expeditiously fol- 
lowed. Positive instructions were issued to all special 
agents, whenever the element of comparison entered, to 
have all data recorded on schedules or submitted in 
special reports, free from bias and without prejudice. 

One of the most important phases of the inquiry was 
in connection with the employment of Japanese in 
agriculture, horticulture, viticulture, and various other 
divisions of the products of the soil. For the purpose 
of facilitating and expediting the field work in the 
interior of the state, the special agents used the cities 
and towns as a working basis, and carried forward the 
inquiry, covering the districts by use of horse and buggy, 
going into the orchards, berry fields, vineyards, beet 
fields, seed farms, and, in fact, into all fields of agri- 
cultural or horticultural industry where Japanese might 
be employed, whether as a dominant factor or incidental 
to the requirements of the harvest. The investigation 
was made by personal visits into all the basins, valleys 
and foot-hill regions of the state where the cultivation of 
the soil required labor that was or might be performed 
by Japanese. Work in the various fields of agriculture 
commenced with the harvesting of deciduous fruit crops 
and grapes throughout the state, and the picking of the 
berry crops, continuing through the seasons of harvest- 
ing the later products of orchard and vineyard, and of 



346 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

the sugar beet field and the gathering of citrus fruits in 
the fall and winter. 

In this work upward of 4,000 schedules were obtained, 
covering thirty-six of the fifty-eight counties in the 
state and including an aggregate of 697,105 acres of 
cultivated land. The itinerary extended from counties 
in the extreme north to the southern boundary line, a 
distance of about 1,000 miles. The schedules were ob- 
tained from employers of white people, and of Japanese 
or other Oriental labor exclusively, as well as from those 
employing both white people and Orientals. 

But the investigation was not confined to the condition 
of Japanese laborers. Special effort was also made to 
obtain from all Japanese holding leaseholds, tenures or 
ownerships in lands, or operating farms, vineyards and 
orchards under various tenures of interest in crops. Visits 
were also made to packing, drying and shipping plants 
and wineries. Nor was the inquiry hmited to the field 
of agricultural industries. More than 2,500 schedules 
were obtained from Japanese engaged in business ac- 
tivities of various characters in isolated communities, as 
well as in the larger centres of Japanese population 
throughout the state. This number represents approxi- 
mately ninetj^-eight per cent, of the Japanese business 
houses and other similar establishments in the state. 

The investigation included records of articles of in- 
corporation granted to resident Japanese or to foreign 
Japanese companies licensed by the state ; ownership of 
lands and terms relating thereto ; leases of lands and 
improvements recorded ; the character or class of taxes 
paid ; attendance at public schools ; inmates of public 
institutions ; information regarding the fishing industries 
of the state ; and the Alaskan fisheries which employ 



THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA 347 

San Francisco as a basis of labor supply. In addition to 
the schedules or blank forms which the agents were re- 
quired to fill, census cards were prepared, printed both 
in English and Japanese, and the work of securing the 
data was carried on coincident with the various other 
hnes of the investigation. 

Without entering into unessential details, these were 
the methods employed by Mr. Mackenzie. Apparently 
they were comprehensive and well conceived. Granted 
that they were faithfully followed, there is little doubt 
that the investigation was likewise exhaustive and 
thoroughgoing. It behooves us to see what the inquiry 
disclosed. 

Let us first set forth the conclusions reached as the 
result of the investigation. In Mr. Mackenzie's own 
words the conclusions are as follows ; 

" I. That the relationship existing between the farm 
labor utilized at the present time in the great industries 
of the orchard, vineyard and field, and the industries 
themselves have been developed along lines of an evolu- 
tionary character, and which are practically impossible 
of modification in any material degree. 

" 2. That the problem of solving the situation by 
drawing from the present available white farm supply 
by any known or suggested methods of modification of 
the conditions now obtaining in this state will afford no 
practical or material relief. 

" 3. That the creation of the ideal intelligent class of 
white farm labor to be drawn from all sources within the 
confines of the United States is practically an impossi- 
bility, for the reason that such an effort would entail an 
entire and radical readjustment of economic conditions 
and the relationship that now exists between the grower 



348 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

and the system of transportation, distribution and market- 
ing. 

" 4. That the perpetuity or continued development of 
these great and highly specialized forms of agricultural 
activity must largely depend upon a supply of labor com- 
ing from without the United States, and of such a nature 
and character as to conform to the conditions resulting 
from the application of that labor to the agricultural 
demands. 

" 5. That the transition from the cereal-growing period 
to the development of specialized agriculture increased 
the ratio of temporary help required by the farming dis- 
tricts beyond the normal available supply within the state 
during periods of largely increasing population. 

" 6. The necessity for providing the large number of 
temporary employees engaged in the harvest with employ- 
ment during the various periods other than the harvest 
season is a vital element in the solution of the farm labor 
problem." 

The peculiar condition of agriculture in California re- 
quires the kind of labor which is capable of independent 
subsistence, quick mobilization, submissive of instant dis- 
missal and entaihng no responsibility upon the employer 
for continuous employment. The Japanese met these 
conditions more satisfactorily than any white laborer. 

The introduction of Japanese labor into California 
followed the enactment of the Chinese exclusion act of 
1884. Its first appearance was in the great Vaca Valley 
fruit district, where during the last ten years it has been 
dominant. But it was not until 1888 that the injection 
of this new factor made itself noticeably felt. Then some 
of the growers began to oppose the coming of Japanese 
as vigorously as they had urged the exclusion of the 



THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA 349 

Chinese. Before long, however, they tacitly admitted 
that Japanese labor was an indispensable element in 
the development of the industry with which they were 
identified. They could not be blind to the fact that the 
successful establishment of fruit growing industry on a 
profitable basis depended upon a minimum and prompt 
labor — labor which is not only available on short notice 
but can be dismissed the moment when the harvest is 
finished. What they tacitly admitted ten years ago they 
have since openly declared. 

The most important industries in which Japanese are 
employed are the cultivation of sugar beets, and the 
picking of grapes. It is shown in Mr. Mackenzie's report 
that sixty-six per cent, of the entire working force of the 
sugar beet industry is Japanese. As the work in this 
industry has been voluntarily surrendered to the Jap- 
anese by the white laborers, it has become a matter of 
serious import whether the Japanese labor shall be con- 
tinued, and if not, by what means the necessary labor may 
be obtained to continue the cultivation of beets. The 
same holds true as to the grape industry, both in raisin 
and wine grapes. While the cultivation and pruning of 
the vines are done mostly by white men, more than 
eighty per cent, of the labor required in picking the 
grapes is supplied by Japanese. 

The success of the Japanese laborer in the field of his 
largest employment is largely due to his economical 
method of independent subsistence, the prevalence of the 
contract labor and boss system, his perfected scheme of 
mobilization, his peculiar adaptability to any form of agri- 
cultural labor and his willingness to work for short periods. 
Wherever he may be employed, he has reduced subsist- 
ence into a science. Not the cost of food alone enters 



350 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

into his scientific solution of the problem, but his entire 
existence is regulated on a basis of rigid economy, so 
that he reduces the expenditure for essential subsistence 
to approximately twenty per cent, of his average wages. 
He practices economy on the basis of his earning power, 
and does not permit his expenditure to increase in the 
same ratio as his earnings may increase. The Japanese, 
earning from $1.2^ to ;^i.50 a day, will spend from twenty 
to thirty cents a day for subsistence, while the average 
maximum cost of subsistence for those earning from 
$i.yS to ^2.50 is thirty-five cents. Though spending so 
small a portion of his earnings for subsistence, he is en- 
abled to subsist comfortably by eliminating unnecessary 
waste. 

Not less important than the economical method of liv- 
ing is the operation of the boss system. This includes 
two classes of operators, the field boss and the contractor. 
The latter was evolved from the former, a necessary re- 
sultant of a condition created by the successful employ- 
ment of field boss in handling labor on a large scale for 
short periods. The Japanese boss makes a systematic 
survey of every important field where Japanese labor 
might successfully compete with other races and especially 
in those fields where monopoly and ultimate domination 
might be hoped for. So thorough is this survey that the 
contractors, lessees, share-workers and field bosses are 
fully informed of the acreage, the character of crops and 
the prospective production in their respective districts. 
They are also familiar with the personality and sentiments 
of the farm owners, and are well advised as to the utility 
or futility of any effect towards controlling the labor sup- 
ply or the securing of leases. While this system is now 
firmly established, its maintenance in the future is prob- 



THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA 35 1 

lematical, and this for a twofold reason. First, the en- 
forcement of Japanese exclusion has entailed so marked 
a shortage of Japanese labor that the bosses are beginning 
to find it difficult to assemble enough men to meet the 
demand. In the second place, the boss system, while 
enabling a laborer to earn more money in a given time 
for a short period, does not accord him much oppor- 
tunity to share in the profits of his continued labor. 
Naturally men, preferring steady employment, do not 
like to work under this system. 

Now we are in a position to inquire into the moral 
character of the Japanese. The reliability of the Jap- 
anese contractor of means and responsibility, says Mr. 
Mackenzie, is as high as that displayed by white men of 
like responsibility in similar operations. The element of 
reliability of the Japanese sub-boss, small contractor or 
laborer is of no lower type than is observed in the 
available white man in the same class or character of em- 
ployment. The comparison of the individual Japanese 
laborer with the individual white laborer of the typical 
class, which is now in the field, and from which is re- 
cruited all the white help now obtainable, discloses a 
higher standard on the part of the Japanese. 

One of the important factors which make the Japanese 
preferable to the white man as a farm laborer is his pe- 
culiar adaptability. No matter how untractable or unde- 
pendable he may seem in the absence of competition, he 
reforms quickly in the face of competition, while the 
white man remains the same under all circumstances, and 
will not adapt himself to disagreeable conditions. Of 
course there have been many complaints heard against 
Japanese regarding their methods in seeking to increase 
their wages ; yet no one questions the efficiency of the 



352 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Japanese laborer in his special field. It isTreely admitted 
that no other labor is available for the work performed 
by the Japanese. The complaints of the employers of 
Japanese labor come from the fact that the Japanese are 
not free from that common weakness — or may we not as 
well say virtue ? — of aspiring for independence. In their 
zeal to secure higher wages so that they may save in 
time enough to become owners of farms, they have some- 
times emulated the tactics of the white working men, and 
have gone on strike at the most critical moments. Says 
the report : 

" Japanese ambition to progress beyond mere servility 
to the plane of the better class of American working 
men, to own a home, to operate industries, to be master 
and not slave, is of the same quality as that of the Italian, 
the Swiss, the Portuguese, and the Russian with whom he 
competes, and in line with the ambition of that type of 
American who will not compete with him. The moment 
that this ambition is exercised, that moment the Japanese 
ceases to be an ideal laborer." 

The character of Japanese tenants and owners of farms 
is naturally higher than that of mere farm laborers. The 
Japanese landowners are steady and industrious, and 
from their earnings purchase land of low value and poor 
quality. The care lavished upon this land is something 
remarkable, and frequently its acreage value has increased 
several hundred per cent, in a year's time. These men, 
as a rule, show a courtesy that is inbred, and gladly ex- 
tend hospitality to American visitors. Most of them in- 
dicate an intention to make the section in which they 
have located a permanent home, adopting American cus- 
toms and manners. Evidence of the desire of the Japa- 
nese, whether independent farmers or laborers,^to learn 



THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA 353 

English was found in all the quarters visited by the agents. 
English dictionaries and books were observed among 
every man's belongings. The Japanese lessees of farms 
have often been accused by unsympathetic critics of abus- 
ing the soil, trying to get all the good out of the ground 
at a minimum cost and in the shortest possible time. 
Once a farm is operated by a Japanese tenant, such critics 
declare, it is certain to become a waste land, which can 
no longer be cultivated profitably. Such insinuations 
certainly are not supported by Mr. Mackenzie's report, 
which states that farms leased to Japanese are, at the ex- 
piration of the lease, always sought by white farmers. 

One of the arguments advanced by the exclusionists 
against the Japanese laborers is that they deprive white 
men of employment by underselling their labor. Yet the 
facts gathered by Mr. Mackenzie run directly counter to 
such arguments. The average wage paid by white 
farmers to white help is ^1.38 per day with board, and 
^1.80 without board, while the Japanese is paid ^^ 1.49 per 
day with board and ^1.54 without board. This, however, 
does not furnish the sound basis of comparison, for 
49.2 per cent, of the Japanese farm laborers are working 
by contract or piece work, under which condition their 
earnings are much larger than those of the whites. The 
average wages paid Japanese labor by Japanese farmers 
were even higher than those paid by white farmers, 
averaging $\.'J^ per day with board. 

The erroneous idea that the Japanese immigrants do 
not consume American goods, but use articles imported 
from their native land, is clearly pointed out in the report 
under review. The Japanese in America invariably sub- 
stitute American food articles for rice and fish which, 
while at home, constituted their staple food. While rice 



354 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

is still the basis of their food, the records of the dealers 
show that the demand for this staple by the Japanese has 
decreased approximately fifty per cent, in the past seven 
or eight years. The Japanese themselves believe that 
the adoption of American diet increases their capacity for 
labor. As for the clothes used by Japanese, it is a mat- 
ter of common knowledge that they are all of American 
origin. 

That section of the Japanese population in California, 
which is engaged in mercantile business, and activities 
other than agriculture, is also considered minutely in the 
report. The special agents visited 2,548 mercantile 
establishments operated by Japanese. Of this total 
1,938 were owned by individuals, 550 by partnerships, 
and 64 by corporations. The aggregate capital of these 
establishments is estimated at about ;^4,ooo,ooo, and their 
total annual transactions at ;^ 16,1 14,000, of which 36.8 
per cent, was with the white people. The total annual 
rent paid by these Japanese is over ;^900,000. The fol- 
lowing seven cities have 61.5 per cent, of the total 
number of Japanese establishments : 



Cities No. Japanese 

establishments 

Los Angeles 505 

San Francisco - ... - 497 

Oakland 178 

Sacramento - - - - - 154 

Fresno ...... loi 

San Jose ...... 79 

Stockton 54 



San Francisco does not contain the largest number 
of establishments, but thirty-four per cent, of the entire 



THE JAPANESE IN CALIFORNIA 355 

investment and 40.2 per cent, of the entire business 
transacted are represented in that city. " 

Let us conckide the review of this report by presenting 
a set of statistical tables, showing at a glance the status 
of the Japanese population in Cahfornia as it was found 
on January i, 19 10. 

Number of Japanese Population 

Total Japanese in state - - - 41,628 

Total male Japanese - - - - 37,000 

Engaged in argiculture ... 27,800 

Working for whites - . . . 6,244 

Working for Japanese - - - . 6, 244 

Total school children - - - - 1,017 

Miscellaneous ..... 1,440 

Farms Owned by Japanese 

Number of farms .... igp 

Total acreage of farms - - . 10,791 

Assessed value ..... ^397,298 

Mortgages on farms .... ;^ 174,684 

Town Property Owned by Japanese 
Separate holdings - - . . 185 

Assessed value ..... ;^ 174,694 
Mortgages ;^50;359 

Farms Leased by Japanese 

Farms operated by crop lessees - - 1,170 

Total acreage of same . - - . 46,480 

Farms operated by share lessees - - 431 

Total acreage of same . - - - 33,028 



XXIII 
THE NATURALIZATION OF JAPANESE 

IN December, 1906, President Roosevelt, in his mes- 
sage to Congress, recommended that an act be passed 
specifically providing for the naturalization of Japa- 
nese who come to this country intending to become 
American citizens. This recommendation aroused at the 
time but little interest among the Americans : the news- 
papers and magazines gave it but cursory comment ; the 
Western politicians dismissed it as absurd and impracti- 
cable, while their Eastern colleagues seemed unwilling to 
make it a topic of serious discussion. Perhaps this sug- 
gestion of the President's failed to draw the attention it 
deserved, because it came at a moment when the nation's 
interest was focussed upon an unfortunate question which 
had been brought into undeserved prominence — the San 
Francisco school '• incident." It is unfortunate that Mr. 
Roosevelt himself has since receded from the stand he 
took when he penned that message. To meet the 
clamors of the trades unions and agitators of California, 
he was forced to renounce his former views with regard 
to the Japanese question. Indeed he has virtually joined 
the camp of exclusionists, as his recent writings in the 
Outlook testify. 

To the Japanese the question of naturalization is more 
vital and of greater significance than most other ques- 
tions that affect them. Indeed it is the sine qua nan of 
the Japanese question of to-day. If this one question 
shall be solved in a manner satisfactory to them, such 

356 



THE NATURALIZATION OF JAPANESE 357 

anti-Japanese bills as have been introduced time and again 
in the legislature of California will never again be put 
forward. 

I fail to appreciate the justice or wisdom of a law 
which summarily denies the Japanese the right to 
become American citizens, irrespective of their individual 
character, achievements, or social standing. The Japa- 
nese in America object to such a law not only because it 
affects their honor as a race, but because it is prejudicial 
to their material interests. Many a Japanese has estab- 
lished considerable business in this country ; not a few 
have become prosperous farmers, cultivating large tracts 
of land. And yet, except in a state or two, no Japanese 
can lawfully own landed property, because in most 
states the alien enjoys but limited property rights. 
Among the Japanese in America, furthermore, are men 
who, at home, played important parts in the political 
movement, and who are keenly alive to all vital political 
issues in this country ; among them, such scientists as 
Dr. Takamine, whose medical discoveries are highly 
appreciated by all specialists ; among them, writers and 
authors whose names are not only widely known in their 
native land, but are frequently seen printed in American 
publications. It is such Japanese as these who are most 
anxious to see the naturalization law of this country so 
amended as to qualify them to enjoy the unlimited rights 
and share the full duties of American citizenship. 

Arguments advanced against the naturalization of 
Japanese are mostly superficial, being founded neither 
upon the careful study of the naturalization law now in 
force, nor upon the close investigation into the real 
status of the Japanese population in America. In the 
examination of such arguments, we may overlook the 



358 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

somewhat sensational utterances of such stark antagonists 
of the Japanese as Mr. Tveitmoe, president of the Japa- 
nese and Korean Exclusion League ; what we are con- 
cerned with here is the opinion prevaiHng among those 
Americans who are able to look at this question more 
broadly and judiciously. 

It is contended that should the United States open to 
the Japanese the door to citizenship its western coast 
will be overrun by a horde of ignorant citizens of the 
laboring class. The absurdity of such apprehension is 
evident when we consider the safeguard provided in the 
naturalization law and the satisfactory working of the ex- 
clusion agreement. The existing naturalization law is, 
in my opinion, potent enough to bar out all aliens who 
are morally or intellectually backward. It reserves to 
the authorities an ample power of discrimination in 
naturalizing immigrants. On the other hand, the immi- 
gration of Japanese laborers has been so effectively 
checked that the Pacific Coast need no longer lend ear to 
the alarmist utterances of professional agitators. Fur- 
thermore, Japanese of the laboring class do not, as a rule, 
care to be naturalized, but they, with few exceptions, 
return to their native land as soon as they have saved a 
modest sum of several hundred or a thousand dollars. 
From whichever side we may view the question, the con- 
clusion seems inevitable that in the event of the right of 
naturalization being extended to the subjects of Japan, a 
comparatively small number of Japanese of the best class 
will avail themselves of the newly granted privilege. 

The question, " What class, and how large a portion, 
of the Japanese in the United States will become Amer- 
ican citizens, in case the right of naturalization is extended 
to them ? " is a question which cannot be answered with- 



THE NATURALIZATION OF JAPANESE 359 

out venturing upon a statistical study as to the number 
and occupations of the Japanese in America. Unfortu- 
nately, our efforts to reach an accurate conclusion on 
this point are beset with difficulties, inasmuch as statis- 
tical data available for our inquiry are deplorably inade- 
quate. 

The annual report of the Commissioner-General of 
Immigration throws little hght upon this question. Per- 
haps the best available data in this connection are the 
reports of the Japanese consuls in America for the year 
1906. The Foreign Department of Japan divides the 
United States into four consular districts — (i) the Seattle 
district, comprising Alaska, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, 
Wyoming and Montana ; (2) the San Francisco district, 
comprising California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, 
Arizona and Utah ; (3) the Chicago district, comprising 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Nebraska, the Dakotas, Missouri, Arkansas, Texas, Lou- 
isiana, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Ohio ; (4) the New 
York City district, comprising the rest of the United 
States. Now, at the beginning of 1906, there were 
14,190 Japanese (13,377 males, 813 females) in the 
Seattle district; 31,092 (29,386 males, 1,706 females) in 
the San Francisco district; 1,860 (i,755 males, 105 
females) in the Chicago district ; and 2,456(2,358 males, 
98 females) in the New York district, aggregating 49,598, 
of which 2,722 were women. 

Since this census was taken five years have elapsed, 
but as the exclusion agreement was entered into in 1907, 
we may presume that the Japanese population has 
remained almost stationary during the interval of five 
years. With the consular census of 1906 as the basis of 
our investigation, we shall proceed to inquire how many 



360 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

of this total may be expected to sever allegiance to the 
Mikado's Empire and swear fidelity to the republic. 

In carrying on this inquiry, it behooves us to analyze 
the Japanese population in the United States by occupa- 
tion, inasmuch as the question whether or not a Japanese 
immigrant will stay permanently in this country largely 
depends upon the nature of vocation he pursues. A 
railroad laborer or a farm-hand, for instance, almost in- 
variably returns home after several years of toil, but a 
successful storekeeper or a prosperous farmer would 
rather stay in this country and be naturalized. The con- 
sular census above mentioned gives some information as 
to the kinds of occupations in which the Japanese in this 
country are engaged; yet it is impossible to draw an 
accurate conclusion from this information alone, because 
not only do the four consulates, which prepared the 
census, follow different systems in the classification of 
occupations, apparently with no cooperation among them, 
but the classifications thus made are so crude that they 
are of little assistance in our inquiry. The writer, hovi^- 
ever, has long been interested in an investigation along 
this line, and through his personal observations and in- 
vestigations during several years of his sojourn on the 
Pacific Coast and its adjacent states, in the South and 
Middle West, and in New York and other states on the 
Atlantic Coast, he is enabled to modify, elaborate and 
alter the statements in the consular census, and form a 
rough idea as to the numbers of his compatriots pursuing 
different occupations in this country. 

We have seen that according to the consular census 
the aggregate number of the Japanese in America is 
49,598. We shall classify this population roughly into 
the following eight groups: (i) students and officials, 



THE NATURALIZATION OF JAPANESE 361 

(2) professionals, (3) merchants and their employees, 
(4) farmers, (5) farm laborers, (6) railroad laborers, (7) 
domestic laborers, and (8) miscellaneous laborers. Ap- 
plying this classification to the Japanese population in 
each consular district, we obtain the figures in the 
following table : 

San Francisco Seattle Chicago New York Total 

District District District District 

Officials and students . , . 617 no 131 120 978 

Professionals 19 1 84 35 100 410 

Merchants and employees . 1,909 1,404 238 500 4,051 

Farmers 1,400 230 60 10 1,700 

Farm laborers 20,000 I>5I7 190 21,707 

Railroad laborers .... 2,000 5,029 442 7.471 

Domestic laborers .... 3,500 3,151 124 708 7i483 

Miscellaneous laborers . . 1,475 2,665 640 1,018 5»798 

Total 31,092 14,190 1,860 2,456 49,598 

Of these eight classes, students and officials might well 
be left out of consideration, since they all expect to re- 
turn to their native country. It is also safe to say that 
farm, railroad, domestic and miscellaneous laborers will 
contribute very little, if at all, to the total of American 
citizens. Unlike many European immigrants, the Jap- 
anese immigrant has not burned his bridge behind him, 
disposing of his all before leaving his native place. On 
the contrary, he still retains his modest old home, with 
its few acres of rice-field and its patch of fastidiously 
cultivated garden ; there the spirits of his ancestors still 
rest in the ancient family sanctuary, and his wife and 
children are awaiting his return. In his travels in this 
country, the writer has come in close contact with many 
laborers of this class, and he feels warranted in stating 
that they all intend to return home as soon as they have 
saved a modest sum with which to improve materially 
their lot in life. 



362 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

Now, we must consider the remaining three classes, 
viz., professionals, merchants and their employees, and 
independent farmers — classes which are more likely to 
become naturalized than those already noted. We have 
seen that there are 410 professionals, 4,051 merchants, 
including employees, and 1,700 farmers. The class of 
professionals includes scientists, lecturers and instructors 
connected with American colleges, artists and designers, 
the staffs of Japanese newspapers published in various 
parts of this country, and physicians, clergy and teachers 
working almost exclusively among their fellow country- 
men. As to the class of merchants and their employees, 
it is difficult to know just how many of 4,051 are mer- 
chants ; but we are not perhaps straying far from the 
truth in estimating their number at 1,000, making the 
remaining 3,051 represent the total of their employees. 
This distinction is important, because it is the merchants 
rather than their employees who are likely to become 
American citizens. It is, however, among the farmers 
that we find most of those who are anxious to see the 
Federal laws so altered as to accord them the full rights 
of American citizenship. 

Thus, excluding all Japanese least likely to be natural- 
ized, we have 3,110 Japanese (410 professionals, 1,000 
merchants, 1,700 farmers) who will, when the right of 
naturaHzation is extended to them, probably convert 
themselves into members of the republic. The writer, of 
course, does not predict that all of these 3,110 Japanese 
will renounce allegiance to their fatherland, any more 
than he claims that there will be no candidate for Amer- 
ican citizenship in classes other than those of profession- 
als, merchants and farmers. Presuming, however, that 
3,110 out of the aggregate of 49,598 may apply for nat- 



THE NATURALIZATION OF JAPANESE 363 

uralization certificates, we reach the conclusion that only 
six per cent, of the total Japanese population now in this 
country constitutes a body of possible candidates for 
American citizenship. What loss will this country suffer 
in naturalizing such a comparatively small number of 
industrious, intelhgent, even intellectual Japanese ? What 
danger, indeed, will there be in giving them the privilege 
of voting ? Have they not come from a country where 
a local self-government and a constitutional government 
have been successfully practiced for a score of years ? 
Does not America allow even Russian peasants to cast 
the ballot after a few years of residence — peasants who, 
long oppressed under an absolute government, have no 
knowledge of the working of a free government until 
they come to this country ? 

I have stated that only a small number of Japanese 
will swear allegiance to the republic ; that such Japanese 
will be recruited from among the best classes of the 
Mikado's subjects ; that ignorant and undesirable laborers 
care to remain in this country no longer than is necessary 
to save a modest sum of money. But, supposing that 
there are some laborers of the lower class who are de- 
sirous of becoming American citizens, is the present 
naturalization law powerless to discriminate against such 
applicants ? I am inclined to think that the law, if 
executed strictly, is adequate enough to cope with such 
a case. 

The new naturalization law, which went into effect 
September, 1907, is doubtless a great improvement upon 
the old law, its provisions being couched in such elastic 
terms as would enable the naturalization authorities to 
prevent the admission into citizenship of those aliens 
who are morally or intellectually unfit to become members 



364 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

of the republic. The law provides that no alien unable 
to speak English shall be naturalized; that an alien 
applying for a naturalization certificate must prove that 
he has resided continuously within the United States for 
five years at least, and within the state or territory where 
his certificate is to be obtained one year at least ; that 
he must also make it appear to the satisfaction of the 
authorities that during his residence in this country he 
has behaved as a man of good moral character, attached 
to the principles of the Constitution of the common- 
wealth, and well disposed to the good order and happi- 
ness of the republic, which statement must be verified 
by the affidavits of at least two creditable witnesses who 
are American citizens. It will, therefore, be seen that 
there is much room for the naturalization authorities to 
employ their own discretion and judgment in their 
efforts to maintain the moral and intellectual standards 
of the American nation by preventing the naturalization 
of undesirable aliens. The educational test, for instance, 
may be so employed as to bar out almost all Japanese 
laborers, for it rests entirely with the authorities to 
decide how well an alien must be able to speak English 
to be admitted as an American citizen. As a matter 
of fact, the majority of Japanese laborers do not speak 
English, while some possess but a smattering knowledge 
of the language. 

Again, the moral test provided in the law is as flexible 
as the educational test. The court reserves the power 
to withhold the naturalization certificate until it is con- 
vinced that the statement made by the candidate for 
citizenship as to his moral character is genuine and 
sincere ; in fine, it entirely depends upon the discretion 
of the court whether or not an alien can be regarded as 



THE NATURALIZATION OF JAPANESE 365 

morally wholesome. In the face of these provisions, 
the conclusion seems natural that, in the event of the 
right of naturaUzation being extended to the Japanese, 
there will be no danger of the United Slates becoming 
infested by the undesirable classes of Japanese immi- 
grants — a conclusion which has also been reached in 
considering this question from a statistical point of 
view. 

To those Japanese who are desirous of being admitted 
to American citizenship, the alteration of the unequitable 
practice of the courts is a matter of urgent concern. 
Small in number, they are the flower of the Japanese 
population in America. To enumerate all the represent- 
ative Japanese in America is alike impracticable and 
superfluous ; suffice it to say that these are men who are 
most anxious to see the present naturalization law so 
changed as to render them justice. Unlike the other 
classes of Japanese immigrants, most of these Japanese — 
merchants, farmers and professional men — have brought 
their wives with them, while some are married to Amer- 
ican women. Far from being clannish, the Japanese in 
America endeavor to adjust themselves to their new en- 
vironment. In no city have they established their " China- 
town " or their " Ghetto." 

It has been asserted that the Mikado's subject is so ir- 
revocably wedded to his native country that he will never 
become attached to his adopted country. To such a 
generalization as this, the Japanese in America have but 
one reply to offer : " Only give us the rights of American 
citizenship, and you will see what sort of citizens we shall 
make." What more, indeed, can they say, when they 
have never been given an opportunity to prove their 
fidelity to the republic ? No immigrant, unless he be 



366 AMERICAN-JAPANESE RELATIONS 

from a degenerate state, enters the threshold of a foreign 
land without at first cherishing some sense of pride in his 
own country — without, indeed, the determination that he 
shall never permit anything to obliterate his love for his 
fatherland. With all his intense patriotism and his deep 
love for the Land of the Rising Sun, the Mikado's sub- 
ject is, after all, not unlike the subject of the Kaiser, who, 
emigrating to the United States, becomes in a few years 
an enthusiastic admirer of his new country, ready to de- 
fend everything American. It is unfair and unmanly to 
close to him the door to Americanization, and declare 
that the^son of Nippon is inherently incapable of becom- 
ing a faithful member of the republic. 

In the disposition of the immigration question, Japan 
has met every request of the United States with perfect 
willingness and graciousness. Is it not time that the 
United States should return Japan's courtesy by ad- 
mitting Japanese subjects into citizenship ? Such a 
course will certainly prove a potent auxiliary to the 
traditional friendship between the two nations, without at 
the same time entailing any undesirable effects upon the 
welfare and interests of the United States, and especially 
its Pacific Coast. The Mikado's government will not fail 
to appreciate it as a vindication of the good-will which 
this country entertains towards Japan, in spite of the 
agitations on the Pacific Coast and the spasmodic out- 
bursts of " Hobsonic " jingoism ; while those Japanese 
who will become American citizens will no doubt exercise 
their influence in furthering friendship between their 
native and their adopted countries. 



Index 



Allen, Dr. Horace N, : 
Adviser to Korea, 163, 165 
Assistance to American interests, 

242 
Minister to Korea, 166 
On American enterprise in 

Korea, 255 
On American missionaries in 

Korea, 280 
On Korean characteristics, 153 
Pioneer in Korea, 267 
America : 

American enterprise in Korea, 

242-254 
American flour in Manchuria, 

133 ; in Korea, 260 
American kerosene in Man- 
churia, 134 ; in Korea, 260 

American tobacco in Manchuria, 

134 ; in Korea, 262 
American cottons in Manchuria, 

135-137 
Exclusion agreement with Japan, 

332, 338, 339 

Exclusion of Japanese immigra- 
tion to, 331, 358 

Expedition to Korea, 158, 160 

Imperialism of, 62 

Japanese consular districts in, 

359 
Japanese immigration to, 285- 

301 
Japanese population in, 359 ; its 

classification by occupation, 

361 
Korean appeal to, 168 
Korean minister to, 164 
Manchurian policy of, 58 
Naturalization law of, 358, 364 
Naturalization of Japanese in, 

357. 362 
New treaty with Japan, 341 
Proposed Manchurian railway of, 

72»73 



Treaty with Korea, 157, 161, 

162, 202 
American- British Tobacco Trust, 

134, 260 
Antung Mukden railway, 45, 46, 

90 

Bethel, E. T., editor Korea Daily 
News, 221—223 

Californikl : 

Anti Japanese bills in legislature 
of, 329 

Increase of white population in, 
291 

Investigations concerning Japa- 
nese in, 344 

Japanese contractors in, 350 

Japanese immigration to, 289, 
348 

Japanese labor in, 349 

Japanese mercantile establish- 
ments in, 354 

Japanese population in, 355 

Labor commissioner's report on 
Japanese in, 347-355 

Moral character of Japanese in, 

35^352 
Trades unions in, 313, 316 
Wages of Japanese in, 353 
China : 

Characteristic diplomacy of, 79 
Her designs upon America, 78, 

88 
Manchurian policy of, 78-97 
Relations with Korea, 147-149, 

162, 164 
War with Japan, 149 
Chinese immigration to America, 

291, 300 
Chinchou-Aigurf railway question, 

72-75, 89 
Chientao, Chi no- Japanese contro- 
versy over, 94-96 



367 



368 



INDEX 



Collbran, Henry C. : 

His railway enterprise in Korea, 

243 

His electric trolley and lighting 

system in Seoul, 244 
His water-works in Seoul, 245 
His mining enterprise, 247 
Collbran Bostwick Development 
Co.: 
Organization of, 244 
Kapsan copper mine of, 247 
Litigation with Japanese resi- 
dency-general, 248 
Dealings with Korean emperor, 
252 
Crane, Charles R., 69 

Eastern Chinese Railway: 
Cooperation with South Man- 
churia Railway, 107, 108 
Financial difficulties of, 50, 51 
Railway land of, 52, 53 

Harbin, flour mills in, 36 

Russian railway land at, 53 
Hawaii, Japanese immigration to, 
289, 290, 301, 338 
Restriction of Japanese immi- 
gration to, 333, 335 
Hay, Secretary of State, "open- 
door " principle of, 58-60 
Hulbert, Homer B. : 

On Japanese in Korea, 168, 225, 

227 
On Korean maladministration, 
203 

Ito, Prince : 

Assassination of, 235, 266 

Attitude towards foreign inter- 
ests in Korea, 249 

Attitude towards missionaries in 
Korea, 272, 273 

Control of Japanese in Korea, 
217 

His letter to American ambas- 
sador, 275 
Japan, American squadron's visit 
to, 327 

Annexation of Korea by, 237 ; 
its effects upon Korea, 238, 



239 ; upon foreign interests 

240 
Attitude towards missionaries 

271-274 
Control of emigration to Amer 

ica by, 333, 335, 338, 358 
Commercial success in Man 

churia, 114 
Commercial expansion policy of, 

122-126 
Efforts to maintain Korean inde 

pendence, 149-153. I73 
Enterprises in Korea, 174-185 
Manchurian policy of, 113 
New treaty with America, 341 
Protectorate over Korea, 152 
Reforms in Korea by, 187-201, 

204-2 I 3 
Treaty with Korea, 145 
War with China, 149 
Japanese and Korean Exclusion 

League, 307, 312, 322, 326 
Japanese immigration to America : 
Action of Japanese chamber of 

commerce on, 319 
Agitation against, 306, 329 
Beginning of, 285 
Causes of exclusion of, 301 
Comparison with European im- 
migration, 287, 288, 293, 294, 

295, 296 
Classification by occupation, 292, 

336 
Decline of, 335 
Economic effects upon Pacific 

Coast of, 297-300, 353, 354 
Educational condition of, 296 
Extent of, 287, 288 
Measures for the exclusion of, 

331. 332 
Significance to Pacific Coast of, 

289 
Wholesome nature of, 294, 295, 

351 

Knox, Secretary of State, 68, 

69, 72, 89, 106 
Korea : 

Agriculture in, 179, 195 
American enterprise in, 242- 
254. 255 



INDEX 



369 



American imports to, 260 
American trade in, 257, 258 
American missionaries in, 268 
Annexation of, 237 
British trade in, 257, 261 
Cigarette trade in, 262, 263 
Chinese encroachment upon, 

145, 148, 162 
Codification of laws in, 208 
Corruption of imperial court of, 

187, 188, 251 
Educational reform in, 200 
Exterritoriality in, 202, 240 
Fishery in, 180 

Foreign journalism in, 221, 222 
Insurgency in, 218-220 
Japanese appropriation of lands 

in, 225-227 
Japanese courts in, 210-213 
Japanese banks in, 177 
Japanese expenditure in, 187 
Japanese import to, 257, 258 
Japanese officials in, 191 
Japanese railways in, 174, 175 
Japanese population in, 182, 215, 

216 
Japanese postal, telegraph and 

telephone service in, 176 
Japanese protectorate over, 152, 

168 
Judicial reform in, 202-213 
Korean envoy to America, 163 
Korean traits, 153 
Mining laws in, 249 
Native banks in, 194 
Official corruption in, 189, 1 90, 

252 
Public works in, 192 
Recognition of independence of, 

145 
Russian aggression in, 150 
Sanitation in, 198 
Treaty with America, 157, 162 
Korea Water Works, Limited, 245 

LiAo-TUNG Peninsula, leased ter- 
ritory of, 25, 26 

Manchuria : 

American trade in, 127 
Coal mines in, 27, 40 



Chinese railways in, 48 

German trade in, 131 

Japanese commercial museums 

in, 122 
Japanese commercial advance in, 

67, 114 
Japanese population in, 39 
Japanese railways in, 26, 27, 32, 

33> 44-48, 70 

Japanese steamship service to, 
124 

Lumbering industry in, 28, 42 

Open ports of, 29 

Products of, 116, 117, 121 

Railway guards in, 31, 55 

Russian railways in, 49, 70 

Russian trade in, 132 
Manchurian bean : 

Export to Japan of, 1 17, I20 

Importance of, 1 16 

Introduction to Europe of, Il8 
Mackenzie, J. D. : 

Labor commissioner of Cali- 
fornia, 343 

Investigations concerning Jap- 
anese in California, 344-346 

Report on Japanese in Cali- 
fornia, 347-355 
Millard, Thomas F., 38, 172 

*< Open door " in Manchuria, 29, 

55, 58, 64, 108 
" Open door " in Korea, 255, 260 
Oregon, Japanese in, 299, 300 
Increase of white population in, 

291 
Japanese immigration to, 289 
Oriental Consolidated Mining Co., 

246 
Oriental Development Co., 179, 

180, 194 

Port Arthur, 56 
Preston, W. T. R., on Japanese 
rule in Korea, 224 

Rea, George Bronson, i 14-116 
Roosevelt, Theodore, 63, 155, 169, 
170, 308, 309, 319, 321, 328, 

329, 356 
Root, Secretary of State, 68, 7 1 



370 



INDEX 



Russia, Korean policy of, 150, 151 
Manchurian railways of, 49, 70 
Mancliurian trade of, 132 
Rapprochement with Japan, loi 
Treaty of peace with Japan, 24 

Sammons, Thomas, American 
Consul-General at Seoul, 264, 
276 
San Francisco : 

Exclusion of Japanese school 
children in, 307, 308, 309, 3i;2 
Japan's sympathy with, 314 
Lawlessness in, 313, 317, 318 
Moral integrity of Japanese 
school children in, 310, 311 
Seattle, Branch of Exclusion League 
in, 323 
Friendly attitude towards Japan, 

3^5' 320 
Resolution of Chamber of Com- 
merce of, 315 
Unpopularity of anti-Japanese 
agitation in, 324, 325, 326 

Schil?, Jacob H., on Russo-Jap- 
anese relations, 98 

Shinmintung-Fakumen railway 
question, 80-86, 92 

Song-ping-shun, advocacy of Jap- 
anese annexation of Korea, 

235 



Opposition to Korean aristocracy, 
231 

Rise to power of, 233 

Utterances on missionaries, 274 
South Manchuria Railway Co., 44, 
45 » 80 

Cooperation with Russian rail- 
ways, 107, 108 

Railway land of, 52 
Stevens, D. W., American adviser 
to Korea, 152, 222 

Taft, President W. H., Chinese 
policy of, 23 

Tairen, Japanese metropolis in 
Manchuria, 39, 56 

Terauchi, Viscount, Governor-Gen- 
eral of Korea, 237 

Tveitmoe, O. A., President Jap- 
anese Korean Exclusion 
League, 303 
Career of, 304, 305 
Anti- Japanese agitation of, 306, 
324 

Washington : 
Japanese in, 298 
Japanese immigration to, 289 
Wages of Japanese in, 298 
White population in, 291 



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